

THE DISPATCHES
OF
FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON
DURING HIS VARIOUS CAMPAIGNS
FROM
1799 to 1818.

“ Monumentum are perennius.”

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THE DISPATCHES
OF
FIELD MARSHAL
THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

DURING HIS VARIOUS CAMPAIGNS
IN
INDIA, DENMARK, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, ~~THE LOW~~,
COUNTRIES, AND FRANCE,

FROM
1799 ~~TO~~ 1818.

COMPILED FROM OFFICIAL AND AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTS,

BY
LIEUT. COLONEL GURWOOD,

ESQUIRE TO HIS GRACE AS KNIGHT OF THE BATH.

VOLUME THE FOURTH.

A NEW EDITION.

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25

THE DISPATCHES,
&c.
OF
FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,
IN
THE PENINSULA.

AN Expedition had been fitted out in the autumn of 1805, to proceed to Hanover, under the command of Lord Cathcart; and Major General Sir Arthur Wellesley, soon after his return to England* from India, was appointed to the command of a brigade in it. But the consequences of the battle of Austerlitz rendered it prudent to recall this force; and the troops composing it were placed on the coast for future operations, or for the defence of the country against threatened invasion.

In the mean time, Marquis Cornwallis died at Ghazypoor, near Benares, on the 5th of October, 1805, shortly after his arrival in India as the new Governor General; and, on the 30th of January, 1806, Major General Sir Arthur Wellesley succeeded his Lordship as Colonel of the 33d regiment, of which he had been Lieutenant Colonel above twelve years.

On the return of the expedition from Hanover, Major General Sir Arthur Wellesley was appointed to the command of a brigade of infantry, stationed at Hastings, in the Sussex district; to the discipline, manœuvre, and minute details of which he paid the most scrupulous attention †.

* Major General Sir A. Wellesley arrived in England in September, 1805.

† There is no situation, and there are no circumstances, in which an officer of the army may be placed that will not, in some manner or other, be stamped

He had been elected to serve in the new Parliament for the borough of Rye; and in his place in the House of Commons, by a simple statement of facts, repelled the unworthy attacks made upon Lord Wellesley's brilliant administration of the extensive empire of India*.

In the month of April, 1807, a new administration was formed. The Duke of Richmond was appointed Lord Lieutenant of Ireland; and Major General Sir Arthur Wellesley the Chief Secretary, and, consequently, sworn of the King's privy council.

In the month of August, in the same year, war was declared against Denmark; and, on the 8th of September, a combined expedition, under Admiral Gambier and Lord Cathcart, took possession of the city and citadel of Copenhagen. Major General Sir Arthur Wellesley commanded the division of reserve; and at Kiøge, on the 29th of August, had an affair with the army of the enemy, described in the following dispatch to Lord Cathcart, the Commander of the land forces.

To Lieut. General Lord Cathcart, K.T.

‘MY LORD,

‘Kiøge, 19th August, 1807.

‘According to the intention which I announced to your Lordship on the evening of the 27th, I moved to Roeskild

with the superior principles of the thorough soldier. An intimate friend having remarked in familiar terms to Sir Arthur Wellesley, when at Hastings, how he, having commanded armies of 40,000 men in the field; having received the thanks of Parliament for his victories; and having been made Knight of the Bath, could submit to be reduced to the command of a brigade of infantry? ‘For this plain reason,’ was the answer, ‘I am *nimmukwallah*, as we say in the East; that is, I have ate of the King's salt, and, therefore, I conceive it to be my duty to serve with unhesitating zeal and cheerfulness, when and wherever the King or his government may think proper to employ me.’ This maxim has the more force from there being officers in the army, who, unfortunately for them, having declined subordinate employ, from flattering themselves with superior pretensions, have repented their decision during their professional lives; and it is for this reason that the compiler has presumed to draw the attention of those who may hereafter be placed in similar circumstances to the great military principle, as well as to the example of the Duke of Wellington.

* See ‘Hansard's Debates,’ Mr. Paul's motions for the impeachment of Marquis Wellesley, 1805 and 1806.

Kroe, and placed Colonel Reden at Vallengrebek; and General Linsengen marched yesterday morning to Roeskild: by these different movements his force became the right instead of the left.

‘ Having had reason to believe that the enemy still remained at Kioge, I determined to attack him this day. I settled with General Linsengen, that he should cross the Kioge rivulet at Little Salbye, and turn the enemy’s left flank, while I should move along the sea road towards Kioge, and attack him in front.

‘ Both divisions broke up this morning, and marched according to the plan concerted. Upon my approach to Kioge, I found the enemy in force on the north side of the town and rivulet, and they commenced a cannonade upon the patrols of hussars in my front; they had three or four regular battalions formed in one line, with cavalry on both flanks, and apparently a large body beyond the town and rivulet. At the time agreed upon with General Linsengen, I formed my infantry in one line, with the left to the sea, having the two squadrons of hussars upon the right. There had been some appearance of a movement by the enemy to their left; and I had not had any communication with General Linsengen, and was not certain that he had passed the rivulet: I therefore thought it proper to make the attack in an *echelon* of battalions from the left; the whole covered by the 1st batt., 95th regiment, and by the fire of our artillery.

‘ It fell to the lot of the 92d regiment to lead this attack, and they performed their part in the most exemplary manner, and were equally well supported by the 52d and 3d.

‘ The enemy soon retired to an intrenchment which they had formed in front of a camp on the north side of Kioge, and they made a disposition of their cavalry upon the sands to charge the 92d in flank, while they should attack this intrenchment. This disposition obliged me to move Colonel Reden’s hussars from the right to the left flank, and to throw the 43d into a second line; and then the 92d carried the intrenchment, and forced the enemy to retreat into the town in disorder. They were followed immediately in the most

gallant style by Colonel Reden and his hussars, and by the 1st batt., 95th regiment*, and afterwards by the whole of the infantry of my corps. Upon crossing the rivulet, we found General Linsengen's corps upon our right flank, and the whole joined in the pursuit of the enemy.

‘Major General Ozhoken, the second in command, who had joined the army with four battalions last night from the southern island, attempted to stand in the village of Hersolge, but he was attacked briskly by the hussars, with detachments of which were Captain Blaquiere and Captain Cotton of the Staff, and by a small detachment of the 1st of the 95th; and he was compelled to surrender, with Count Wedel Jarlsburg, several other officers, and 400 men.

‘The loss of the enemy has been very great, many have fallen, and there are nearly sixty officers and 1100 men prisoners. In their flight they have thrown away their arms and clothing, and many stands of the former have fallen into our hands. I believe that we have taken ten pieces of cannon; but I have not yet received all the reports from the detachments employed in the pursuit of the enemy. I have not seen General Linsengen, as he is still out with his hussars, but I understand that the enemy had destroyed the bridges at Little Salbye, which was the cause of the delay of his operations upon their flank.

‘I cannot close this letter without expressing to your Lordship my sense of the good conduct of the troops; all conducted themselves with the utmost steadiness; but I cannot avoid mentioning particularly the 92d regiment, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Napier; the 1st batt., 95th regiment, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Beckwith; the British artillery, under the command of Captain Newhouse; the Hanoverian hussars, under Colonel Reden, and the Hanoverian light artillery, under Captain Sympher, as a corps that had particular opportunities of distinguishing themselves: I am also much obliged to General Linsengen and to Brig. General R. Stewart, for the assistance I received from them in the formation and execution of the plan by which the enemy have been defeated. The officers of the Staff have also ren-

* Now the Rifle Brigade.

dered me much assistance ; and I must particularly mention Captain Blaquiere and Captain Colin Campbell.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ *Lord Cathcart, K.T.*

‘ P. S. We have taken a large store of powder and other military stores in this town, which I propose to destroy, if I should not be able to prevail upon the Captain of one of His Majesty’s ships to take charge of them.’

On the 7th of September, in conjunction with Captain Sir Home Popham, Captain of the fleet, and Lieut. Colonel Murray*, Deputy Quarter Master General of the British forces under Lord Cathcart, Major General Sir Arthur Wellesley drew up and signed the articles of capitulation of the town and citadel of Copenhagen, with the Danish Officers deputed by General Peymaun, the Commander in Chief of his Danish Majesty’s forces in Zealand†.

* Lieut. General Sir George Murray, G.C.B., &c.

† *Lieut. General Lord Cathcart, K.T., to Viscount Castlereagh,
Secretary of State.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Citadel of Copenhagen, 8th Sept., 1807.

‘ On the evening of the 5th September a letter was sent by the Danish General, to propose an armistice of twenty four hours, for preparing an agreement on which articles of capitulation might be founded. The armistice was declined, as tending to unnecessary delay, and the works were continued ; but the firing was countermanded, and Lieut. Colonel Murray was sent to explain that no proposal of capitulation could be listened to, unless accompanied by the surrender of the fleet.

‘ This basis having been admitted by a subsequent letter, on the 6th, Major General Sir A. Wellesley, whom I had sent for, for this purpose, from his command in the country, where he had distinguished himself in a manner so honorable to himself, and so advantageous to the public, was appointed, with Sir Home Popham and Lieut. Colonel Murray, to prepare and sign articles of capitulation ; and those officers having insisted on proceeding immediately to business, the capitulation was drawn up in the night between the 6th and 7th.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh,*

‘ CATHCART.

Articles of Capitulation for the Town and Citadel of Copenhagen, agreed upon between Major General the Right Hon. Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B., Sir Home Popham, Knight of Malta, and Captain of the Fleet, and Lieut. Colonel George Murray, Deputy Quarter Master General of the British forces, being thereto duly authorized by James Gambier, Esq., Admiral of the Blue, and Commander in Chief of His Britannic Majesty's ships and vessels in the Baltic Sea, and by Lieut. General the Right Hon. Lord Cathcart, Knight of the Thistle, Commander in Chief of His Britannic Majesty's forces in Zealand and the North of the Continent of Europe, on the one part; and by Major General Waltersdorff, Knight of the Order of Dannebrog, Chamberlain to the King, and Colonel of the North Zealand Regiment of Infantry, Rear Admiral Lutken, and I. H. Kerchhoff, Aide de Camp to His Danish Majesty, being duly authorized by his Excellency Major General Peymaun, Knight of the Order of Dannebrog, and Commander in Chief of His Danish Majesty's forces in the Island of Zealand, on the other part.

‘Art. 1. When the capitulation shall have been signed and ratified, the troops of His Britannic Majesty are to be put in possession of the citadel.

‘2. A guard of His Britannic Majesty's troops shall likewise be placed in the dock yards.

‘3. The ships and vessels of war of every description, with all the naval stores belonging to his Danish Majesty, shall be delivered into the charge of such persons as shall be appointed by the Commanders in Chief of His Britannic Majesty's forces; and they are to be put in immediate possession of the dock yards, and all the buildings and store houses belonging thereto.

‘4. The store ships and transports in the service of His Britannic Majesty are to be allowed, if necessary, to come into the harbour for the purpose of embarking such stores and troops as they have brought into this island.

‘5. As soon as the ships shall have been removed from the dock yard, or within six weeks from the date of this capitulation, or sooner if possible, the troops of His Britannic Majesty shall deliver up the citadel to the troops of his Danish Majesty, in the state in which it shall be found when they occupy it. His Britannic Majesty's troops shall likewise,

within the before mentioned time, or sooner if possible, be embarked from the island of Zealand.

‘ 6. From the date of this capitulation hostilities shall cease throughout the island of Zealand.

‘ 7. No person whatsoever shall be molested, and all property, public or private, with the exception of the ships and vessels of war, and the naval stores before mentioned, belonging to his Danish Majesty, shall be respected; and all civil and military officers in the service of his Danish Majesty shall continue in the full exercise of their authority throughout the island of Zealand; and everything shall be done which can tend to produce union and harmony between the two nations.

‘ 8. All prisoners taken on both sides shall be unconditionally restored, and those officers who are prisoners on parole shall be released from its effect.

‘ 9. Any English property that may have been sequestered, in consequence of the existing hostilities, shall be restored to the owners.

‘ This capitulation shall be ratified by the respective Commanders in Chief, and the ratifications shall be exchanged before 12 o’clock at noon this day.

‘ Done at Copenhagen, this 7th day of September, 1807.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY,

‘ HOME POPHAM,

‘ GEORGE MURRAY.

‘ Ratifié par moi,

‘ PEYMAUN.’

In February, 1808, Major General Sir Arthur Wellesley being in his place in the House of Commons, the Speaker, having returned the thanks to other General Officers, Members of the House, for their conduct at Copenhagen, thus particularized Major General Sir Arthur Wellesley on that occasion:—

‘ But I should indeed be wanting to the full expression of those sentiments which animate this House, and the whole country, if I forbore to notice that we are on this

day crowning with our thanks one gallant Officer, long since known to the gratitude of this House, who has long trodden the paths of glory, whose genius and valour has already extended our fame and empire, whose sword has been the terror of our distant enemies, and will not now be drawn in vain to defend the seat of empire itself, and the throne of his King.—I am, Sir Arthur Wellesley, charged to deliver the thanks of this House to you, and I do accordingly thank you, in the name of the Commons of the United Kingdom, for your zeal, intrepidity, and exertion displayed in the various operations which were necessary for conducting the siege, and effecting the surrender of the navy and arsenal of Copenhagen.’

Major General the Hon. Sir Arthur Wellesley replied as follows :—

‘ Mr. Speaker,—I consider myself fortunate that I was employed by His Majesty on a service which this House has considered of such importance as to have marked with its approbation the conduct of those Officers and troops who have performed it. The honor which this House has conferred upon my honorable friends and myself is justly considered by the Officers of the navy and army as the highest which this country can confer : it is the object of the ambition of all who are employed in His Majesty’s service, and to obtain it has doubtless been the motive of many of those acts of valor and good conduct which have tended so eminently to the glory, and have advanced the prosperity and advantage of this country. I can assure the House that I am most sensible of the great honor which they have done me, and I beg leave to take this opportunity of returning you, Sir, my thanks for the handsome terms, respecting myself, in which your kindness to me has induced you to convey the resolution of the House.’

On the return of the expedition from Zealand, Sir Arthur Wellesley resumed his duties as Secretary for Ireland*.

* See ‘Hansard’s Debates.’ The official and other dispatches, although full of local interest with regard to Ireland, are not inserted in this work.

CAMPAIGN IN THE PENINSULA.

In the spring of 1808 a force was assembled at Cork, with a view, as it was supposed, to some of the Spanish colonies of South America; but from the extraordinary changes which had taken place towards the latter end of 1807, and the beginning of 1808, in the affairs of Spain and Portugal, by the French intervention, or rather invasion, of those countries, and the consequent national appeals to Great Britain for aid to rescue them from this flagrant usurpation of Bonaparte, new fields presented themselves, in which the palm of victory was to be disputed with the conquerors of Europe.

The British army was now successfully to emulate the splendid fame of the navy; and, during the seven following years, by its discipline and courage, under the great general who commanded it in the Peninsula, its own former proud days of Crecy *, Poictiers †, Agincourt ‡, Blenheim §, Ramilies ||, and Malplaquet ¶, were to be eclipsed by the still prouder successes which now annually** followed, to be finally crowned by the most triumphant and decisive victory gained in modern times, at the great battle of Waterloo!

| | | |
|-----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|
| * Crecy.....1346 | ‡ Agincourt.....1415 | Ramilies...1706 |
| † Poictiers1356 | § Blenheim.....1704 | ¶ Malplaquet, 1709 |

| | | |
|--------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| ** 1. Vimeiro.....1808 | 6. Ciudad Rodrigo 1812 | 11. Nivelle. ...1813 |
| 2. Oporto.....1809 | 7. Badajoz1812 | 12. Nive1813 |
| 3. Talavera1809 | 8. Salamanca ...1812 | 13. Orthez ...1814 |
| 4. Busaco1810 | 9. Vitoria.....1813 | 14. Toulouse...1814 |
| 5. Fuentes de Oñoro 1811 | 10. Sorauren.....1813 | 15. WATERLOO 1815 |

*His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief to Lieut. General**
the Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.

‘SIR,

‘Horse Guards, 14th June, 1808.

‘His Majesty having been graciously pleased to appoint you to the command of a detachment of his army, to be employed upon a particular service, I have to desire that you will be pleased to take the earliest opportunity to assume the command of this force, and carry into effect such instructions as you may receive from His Majesty’s Ministers.

‘The force which His Majesty has been pleased to place under your command consists of the following corps:—

| | | | |
|-------------------------------|-----------|---|-----------------------------|
| Royal Artillery | | } | With Major General Spencer. |
| Royal Staff Corps, Detachment | | | |
| 29th Foot | | | |
| *32d do. | 1st Batt. | | |
| *50th do. | do. | } | To proceed from Cork. |
| *82d do. | do. | | |
| *5th do. | do. | | |
| *9th do. | do. | | |
| *38th do. | do. | } | To proceed from Cork. |
| *40th do. | do. | | |
| 60th do. | 5th do. | | |
| *71st do. | 1st do. | | |
| *91st do. | do. | } | |
| 95th, four Companies† | | | |
| 4th Royal Vet. Batt. | | | |

And the Staff‡ appointed to this force is composed as follows:—

Major General Spencer.
 Major General Hill.
 Major General Ferguson.
 Brig. General Nightingall.
 Brig. General Fane.
 Brig. General Catlin Craufurd.

‘On all subjects relating to your command you will be pleased to correspond with me, and you will regularly communicate to me all military transactions in which you may

* Sir A. Wellesley had been promoted to the rank of Lieut. General on the 25th April, 1808.

† Whenever the 95th occurs, it is meant the regiment of three battalions which then bore that number, but now called the Rifle Brigade.

‡ The names of the other military and civil Staff Officers are too numerous for insertion.

be engaged, reporting to me all vacancies that may occur in the troops under your command; and as the power of appointing to commissions is not vested in you, you will be pleased to recommend to me such Officers as may appear to you most deserving of promotion, stating the special reasons, where such recommendations are not in the usual channel of seniority.

‘As the regiments marked thus (*), under your command, have second battalions attached to them, and which remain in this country, it is necessary that I should acquaint you that the first battalions under your orders being composed exclusively of the senior Officers of their respective ranks, such vacancies as may occur therein, by promotion or casualty, must unavoidably be supplied by Officers from the second battalions, who will be ordered immediately to join, on such vacancies being made known to me.

‘Should you have occasion to recommend any gentleman for an ensigncy, you will be pleased to make known his address, in order that, if His Majesty should be pleased to confirm the recommendation, he may be directed to join the corps immediately on his appointment.

‘You will transmit, monthly, returns of the troops under your command to the Secretary at War, and to the Adjutant General, for my information; and you will strictly adhere to His Majesty’s Regulations, in regard to the pay, clothing, and appointments of the troops; and your special attention must necessarily be directed to their discipline, and to the interior economy of the different corps, which is so essential, not only to the comfort of the soldier, but to the preservation of his health under every change of climate to which he may be exposed.

‘Under the head of pay, I have to direct your attention to the instructions of the Paymasters General to their deputy, respecting the usual stoppages being deducted from the pay of the several Staff Officers, and to which you are requested to give the most punctual attention.

‘You will be vested with the usual powers of convening General Courts Martial, upon which subject I have to observe that, as great inconvenience has arisen to the service from Officers commanding on foreign stations having permitted prisoners to return to England prior to the proceedings and

opinion of the Court Martial having been submitted to the King, I have to request that, in all cases where any person whatever may be tried by a General Court Martial, and where your powers are not sufficient to enable you to decide finally upon the proceedings, opinion, and sentence of the Court, you do not permit the prisoner to return to England until His Majesty's commands shall have been duly communicated to you through the proper channel for that purpose.

'I have likewise to acquaint you, that as many General Officers, from the best motives, have taken upon themselves to commute sentences of capital punishment to transportation for a term of years, or for life, when it is found that no such power is delegated by His Majesty, and, consequently, that the whole of the proceedings may be thereby rendered nugatory, it will be necessary that your particular attention should be given to the powers granted to you by His Majesty's warrant on this subject, in order to prevent you from inadvertently falling into a similar irregularity.

'It is particularly desirable that the Officer, and the head of the Quarter Master General's staff, should be directed to keep a journal, or other memorandum, descriptive of the movements of the troops, and occurrences in which they are engaged; as also, that he should take and collect plans of the harbours, positions, or fortified places, in which the troops may be, for the purpose of being transmitted to me and lodged in the military dépôt.

'In all points where any question or doubt may arise, and in which you may be desirous of receiving further and more specific instructions, you will always find me ready to pay the earliest attention to your representations.

'I am, &c.

'FREDERICK,

'Lieut. General

'Commander in Chief.

'Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.'

*Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State, to Lieut. General
the Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.*

'DEAR SIR,

'Downing Street, 21st June, 1808.

'Our accounts from Cadiz are bad; no disposition there or in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar to move; General Spencer returning to Gibraltar: the proceedings, however,

in the northern provinces were not then known. It is material to know the effect produced by that effort which may be hourly expected.

‘The cabinet are desirous of postponing, till they hear again, their final decision on your instructions, being unwilling you should get too far to the southward, whilst the spirit of exertion appears to reside more to the northward.

‘Hitherto no time, in fact, has been lost, as your equipment cannot be assembled at Cork for some days. The arms and cavalry transports are not yet got to Portsmouth, and it is better to bring the whole together than to trust to junctions on the coast of Spain.

‘You will have the goodness to order the transports to be kept fully victualled whilst in port, that you may carry with you a full supply.

‘I am, &c.

‘*Lieut. General*

‘CASTLEREAGH.

‘*Sir A. Wellesley, K.B., Cork.*’

To Major General Hill.*

‘MY DEAR HILL,

‘Dublin Castle, 23d June, 1808.

‘I rejoice extremely at the prospect I have before me of serving again with you, and I hope that we shall have more to do than we had on the last occasion on which we were together.

‘I propose to leave town for Cork as soon as I shall receive my instructions from London. I understand that everything has sailed from England which is to go with us; and the horses belonging to the Irish Commissariat will be at Cork, I hope, before the transports shall have arrived in which they are to be embarked. Let me hear from you if you learn anything respecting them. The dragoons are to come direct from England to the rendezvous, and will not detain us at Cork.

‘I enclose a list of the names of the Officers appointed to be Deputy Assistant Adjutants and Quarter Masters General. Major Arbuthnot† will probably be in Dublin this day, and I shall send him to Cork immediately, and you will

* General Lord Hill, G.C.B.

† Major General Sir T. Arbuthnot, K.C.B.

put him in charge of the Adjutant General's department. You will put the senior of the list of Assistant Deputy Quarter Masters General in charge of that department, and give him the enclosed return of camp equipage and stores embarked in the *Grinfield* transport. I had understood that I was to have had stores of this description for 8000 men ; and I shall be obliged to you if you will desire the head of the Quarter Master General's department to inquire whether there are in the transport any more camp equipage stores besides those contained in the enclosed return.

‘I beg you to arrange for the embarkation of the Deputy Assistant Adjutants General, and the Deputy Assistant Quarter Masters General : probably they and the Commissaries had best go in the horse ships.

‘I understand there is a vessel at Cork to carry thirty six horses for the Officers, besides those intended for the Commissariat horses ; and I shall be obliged to you if you will desire that spare room may be kept for my horses, and those of my Aides de Camp, which will arrive at Cork in a day or two.

‘There remains nothing now but to brigade the troops, which may be a convenience for the present, and give us the assistance of the General Officers in the different arrangements which may be necessary on board the transports. But what we shall do now can only be temporary, as the whole corps must necessarily be new modelled when we join General Spencer. The Veteran battalion must be put out of the question, as that corps must go into the garrison of Gibraltar.

‘The corps might be brigaded as follows :—the 95th and the 5th batt. of the 60th ; the 5th, 9th, and 38th ; the 40th, 71st, and 91st. You will alter this arrangement, if the corps belonging to your brigade are not put together, and you will put such (if all the corps of your brigade are not embarked for this service) corps as you please with the 9th. Let General Fane then command the Light brigade ; General Craufurd the Highlanders ; and General Ferguson, who belongs to Spencer's corps, that brigade which has been, and will hereafter be yours. The Veteran battalion to report to General Fane, until it shall be otherwise disposed of.

‘Pray let me hear from you, and acquaint me with all your wants, and whether I can do anything for you here. You will readily believe that I have plenty to do, in closing a

government in such a manner as that I may give it up, and taking the command of a corps for service; but I shall not fail to attend to whatever you may write to me.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major General Hill.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General Hill.

‘MY DEAR HILL,

‘Dublin Castle, 25th June, 1808.

‘I desired Torrens to write to you yesterday, to tell you it was probable that we should be detained till the cavalry should come round from Portsmouth; and I have now to request that you will make arrangements with the agent of transports, that the soldiers embarked may have fresh provisions and vegetables every day; and that the stock of provisions in the transports may be kept up to the original quantity which each is capable of containing.

‘I also think it very desirable that the soldiers should have permission to go ashore as they may wish, under such regulations as you may think proper; and that the regiments should be sent ashore and exercised in their turns.

‘I request you to arrange these matters with the agents of the transports, which can easily be done by a good management of the ships’ boats.

‘I shall let you know as soon as I hear anything certain of the cavalry.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major General Hill.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Brigadier General the Hon. C. Stewart.*

‘MY DEAR CHARLES,

‘Dublin Castle, 25th June, 1808.

‘I enclose some papers which I have received respecting the state of the transports at Cork. The troops are certainly too much crowded; and I recommend that those which can be quartered within one day’s march of Cork may be landed, unless it be certain that we shall go immediately. The troops would be on board before I should get to Cork, if they should be landed and marched only one day’s march

* The present Marquis of Londonderry, G.C.B., and brother to the late Marquis of Londonderry, K.G., then Lord Castlereagh.

into the country; and they would certainly benefit by this arrangement.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brigadier General*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ *The Hon. C. Stewart.*’

To Major General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Dublin Castle, 29th June, 1808.

‘ I received your letter of the 27th this morning, and I am glad to find that you can make arrangements for landing the corps so frequently. It will tend much to the health of the men, and will make them feel less unpleasantly the heat and confinement of the transports.

‘ There is camp equipage complete, including havresacks and canteens for 4000 men, on board the *Grinfield*, which sailed from Portsmouth on the 21st of June; and for the same number on board the *Tuscan*, which sailed from Portsmouth on the 23d.

‘ As soon as these vessels shall arrive, you will direct the regiments to make returns for the number of canteens and havresacks that they may require, which are to be issued upon these returns from the Quarter Master General’s stores. But they are to be kept in their packages in the regimental store of each regiment, and are not to be issued to the soldiers until further orders shall be given.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Hill.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State, to Lieut. General
the Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Downing Street, 30th June, 1808.

‘ The occupation of Spain and Portugal by the troops of France, and the entire usurpation of their respective governments by that power, has determined His Majesty to direct a corps of his troops, as stated in the margin, to be prepared for service, to be employed, under your orders, in counteracting the designs of the enemy, and in affording to the Spanish and Portuguese nations every possible aid in throwing off the yoke of France.

‘ You will receive, enclosed, the communications which have been made by the deputies of the principality of Asturias, and

the kingdom of Galicia, to His Majesty's government, together with the reply which His Majesty has directed to be made to their demand of assistance.

‘ I also enclose a statement of the supplies which have been already dispatched to the port of Gijon, for the use of the people of Asturias.

‘ As the deputies from the above provinces do not desire the employment of any corps of His Majesty's troops in the quarter of Spain from whence they are immediately delegated ; but have rather pressed, as calculated to operate a powerful diversion in their power, the importance of directing the efforts of the British troops to the expulsion of the enemy from Portugal, that the insurrection against the French may thereby become general throughout that kingdom as well as Spain, it is therefore deemed expedient that your attention should be immediately directed to that object.

‘ The difficulty of returning to the northward with a fleet of transports, at this season of the year, renders it expedient that you should, in the first instance, proceed with the armament under your orders off Cape Finisterre. You will, yourself, precede them in a fast sailing frigate to Coruña, where you will have the best means of learning the actual state of things, both in Spain and Portugal ; and of judging how far the corps, under your immediate orders, either separately or reinforced by Major General Spencer's corps, can be considered as of sufficient strength to undertake an operation against the Tagus.

‘ If you should be of opinion, from the information you may receive, that the enterprise in question cannot be undertaken without waiting for reinforcements from home, you will communicate, confidentially, to the provisional government of Galicia, that it is material to the interests of the common cause that your armament should be enabled to take an anchorage to the northward of the Tagus, till it can be supported by a further force from home ; and you will make arrangements with them, for having permission to proceed with it to Vigo, where it is conceived it can remain with not less security than in the harbour of Ferrol, and from which it can proceed to the southward with more facility than from the latter port.

‘ In case you should go into Vigo, you will send orders to

Major General Spencer to join you at that place, should he have arrived off the Tagus, in consequence of the enclosed orders; and you will also transmit home such information as may enable His Majesty's Ministers to take measures for supporting your corps from hence.

'With a view to the contingency of your force being deemed unequal to the operation, an additional corps of 10,000 men has been ordered to be prepared for service, and which, it is hoped, may be ready to proceed in about three weeks from the present time. I enclose such information as we are in possession of with respect to the enemy's force in Portugal; a considerable proportion of which is said to have been lately moved to Almeida, on the North-eastern frontier. You will, no doubt, be enabled to obtain more recent information at Coruña, in aid of which Lieut. Colonel Brown has been ordered to proceed to Oporto, and to meet you, with such intelligence as he can procure, off Cape Finisterre.

'An officer of engineers, acquainted with the defences of the Tagus, has also been sent off the Tagus to make observations, and to prepare information for your consideration with respect to the execution of the proposed attack on the Tagus. The result of his inquiries he will be directed to transmit also to the rendezvous off Cape Finisterre, remaining himself off the Tagus till your arrival.

'You are authorised to give the most distinct assurances to the Spanish and Portuguese people, that His Majesty, in sending a force to their assistance, has no other object in view than to afford them the most unqualified and disinterested support; and in any arrangements that you may be called upon to make with either nation, in the prosecution of the common cause, you will act with the utmost liberality and confidence, and upon the principle that His Majesty's endeavors are to be directed to aid the people of Spain and Portugal in restoring and maintaining against France the independence and integrity of their respective monarchies.

'In the rapid succession in which events must be expected to follow each other, situated as Spain and Portugal now are, much must be left to your judgment and decision on the spot.

'His Majesty is graciously pleased to confide to you the

fullest discretion to act according to circumstances for the benefit of his service ; and you may rely on your measures being favorably interpreted, and receiving the most cordial support.

‘ You will facilitate, as much as possible, communications between the respective provinces and colonies of Spain, and reconcile, by your good offices, any differences that may arise between them in the execution of the common purpose.

‘ Should any serious division of sentiment occur, with respect to the nature of the provisional government which is to act during the present *interregnum*, or with respect to the Prince in whose name the legal authority is considered as vested by the captivity or abdication of certain branches of the royal family, you will avoid, as far as possible, taking any part in such discussions, without the express authority of your government.

‘ You will, however, impress upon the minds of persons in authority, that, consistently with the effectual assertion of their independence, they cannot possibly acknowledge the King or Prince of Asturias as, at present, possessing any authority whatever, or consider any act done by them as valid until they return within the country, and become absolutely free agents. That they never can be considered free so long as they shall be prevailed on to acquiesce in the continuance of French troops either in Spain or Portugal.

‘ The entire and absolute evacuation of the Peninsula, by the troops of France, being, after what has lately passed, the only security for Spanish independence, and the only basis upon which the Spanish nation should be prevailed upon to treat or to lay down their arms.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ CASTLEREAGH.

‘ *Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.*’

*Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State, to Lieut. General
the Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ Sir,

‘ Downing Street, 30th June, 1808.

‘ Since my instructions to you, No. 1, were closed, advices have been received from Sir Charles Cotton, off the Tagus. The intelligence therein conveyed does not require that I

should vary any part of those instructions, except in so far as to direct that, instead of going yourself to Coruña, you should send a confidential officer to that port, to execute that part of your instructions, and to meet you off Cape Finisterre, or to follow you to the Tagus. You will, of course, feel it of the most pressing importance that your armament should proceed off the Tagus, not separating yourself from it, with the least possible delay. The artillery preparation, which was ordered to be in readiness for 1st July, with a view to another service, has been embarked with six additional 10 inch mortars, and will sail from the river to-morrow. It will be directed to proceed immediately off the Tagus. Two additional battalions, at present cantoned in the neighbourhood of Cork, the 36th and 45th, consisting of about 1200 men, have been ordered to embark, and join your force; for the reception of which, and to prevent the troops already embarked from being too much crowded, 3000 tons of transports sailed this day from the Downs, with a fair wind; as did also the 20th light dragoons from Portsmouth.

‘ I consider, therefore, that every part of your equipment has been forwarded from hence; and, I trust, you will find the whole ready to proceed upon your arrival at Cork. But if the two last regiments should not have been actually embarked, you will not delay your departure, but will order them to follow you off the Tagus. 30,000 stand of arms, and an equal number of pikes, have been sent, which you will make such use of as the public service may appear to you to require. A supply of money has also been sent, for the use of your troops. Any demands for military stores, which you may receive from the provinces which have declared against France, you will send home, and it will be the earnest wish of His Majesty’s Government to comply with them as far as circumstances will permit. With respect to the money, £200,000 has been ordered to be sent to Ferrol, for the immediate use of the Spanish patriots, till further arrangements can be made. It would much facilitate their financial operations, if they could give circulation in Spain to a paper currency, secured upon their South American finances;—this, together with a moderate duty upon imposts, would furnish them with immediate resources, and, in proportion as a cur-

rency of the nature alluded to could be thrown into circulation, it would have the effect of attaching the soldiers to the national cause.

‘I mention this subject that, in any communication you may have with the persons in authority, you may press it on their attention.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General*

‘CASTLEREAGH.

‘*Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.*’

To Major General Hill.

‘MY DEAR HILL,

‘Dublin Castle, 3d July, 1808.

‘I have received my instructions, and I understand that the cavalry, and some ships to receive the 36th and 45th regiments, sailed from the Downs and Portsmouth on the 30th. I shall be at Cork on Wednesday; and I hope that we shall sail immediately afterwards.

‘The horses of the Commissariat will be at Cork on Tuesday and Wednesday; and I shall be obliged to you if you will arrange with General Floyd respecting their early embarkation.

‘I should have taken horses of the artillery if I could have got them; but, alas! I could not, and have, therefore, taken those which will probably only do our work till we shall get others.

‘I have written to Malcolm a long letter, respecting the arrangements of the transports into divisions, a code of signals for the army, and return of transports and flat bottomed boats; so that we may make all our arrangements for landing whilst we shall be on the passage. He will probably speak to you on these subjects, and I shall be obliged to you if you will give him all the assistance and information in your power.

‘Tell Arbuthnot that I shall be obliged to him to have my horses embarked in the transport allotted for the staff horses. He had better send up to Cork to one of the officers of General Floyd’s staff to desire that the horses may be forwarded to Cove.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Major General Hill.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Brigadier General Lee.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Cork, 7th July, 1808.

‘According to the desire which you expressed in the conversation which I had with you at Lord Harrington’s on Wednesday, I proceed to give you my opinion on the nature and circumstances of the command which you are about to exercise in the county of Limerick. In the first place, I must point to you that the situation of a General Officer commanding in a district in Ireland is very much of the nature of a Deputy Governor of a county or a province: he becomes necessarily charged with the preservation of the peace of the district placed under his command; and the Government must confide in his reports and opinions for the adoption of many measures relating solely to the civil administration of the country. From these circumstances it is obvious that it is the duty of every General Officer to make himself acquainted with the local circumstances of his district, and with the characters of the different individuals residing within it, in order that he may decide for himself according to the best of his judgment and information, and that he may not be misled by others.

‘This duty will be still more obvious by a consideration of certain circumstances which exist in nearly all parts of Ireland. It frequently happens that disturbances exist only in a very small degree, and probably only partially, and that the civil power is fully adequate to get the better of them; at the same time, the desire to let a building to government for a barrack—the desire to have troops in the county, either on account of the increased consumption which they occasion of the necessaries of life, or because the increased security which they would give to that particular part of the country would occasion a general rise in the value and the rent of land, which probably at that moment might be out of lease—or, in some instances, the desire to have the Yeomanry called out on permanent duty—occasions a representation that the disturbances are much more serious than the facts would warrant. Upon these occasions, letter after letter is written to the Commanding Officer and to government; the same fact is repeated through many different channels; and the result

of an inquiry generally is, that the outrage complained of is by no means of the serious nature or of the extent which has been stated.

‘The obvious remedy for this evil, and that which is generally resorted to, is to call for informations on oath of the transactions which are complained of: but this remedy is not certain; for it frequently happens that the informations on oath are equally false with the original representations. The General Officer, then, has no remedy excepting, by his acquaintance and communication with the magistrates and gentlemen of the county, to acquire a knowledge of characters, and to become acquainted with all the circumstances which occur.

‘It frequently happens that the people who do commit outrages and disturbances have some reason to complain; but, in my opinion, that is not a subject for the consideration of the General Officer. He must aid in the preservation of the peace of the county, and in the support of the law; and he who breaks the law must be considered in the wrong, whatever may have been the nature of the provocation which he has received.

‘It is possible that grievances may exist in the county of Limerick; provisions may be too dear, or too high a rent may be demanded for land; and there may be no poor laws; and the magistrates may not do their duty as they ought by the poor: but these circumstances afford no reason why the General Officer should not give the military aid which he may have at his command to preserve the peace, to repress disturbance, and to bring those to justice who may have been guilty of a violation of the law.

‘In respect to the gentlemen of the county in which you are posted, I recommend to you to attend particularly to the Lord Chief Baron O’Grady. You will find him well informed of the transactions in the county of Limerick, and well acquainted with characters, and disposed to assist your judgment. I also recommend to your attention Mr. Dixon, the late high sheriff of the county; and Colonel Vercker, the member for the city of Limerick. There may be, and certainly are, other gentlemen in the county of Limerick on whose information you can depend; but I have requested

Mr. Trail, to whom I send this letter, to apprise you confidentially of the names of those whom you ought to consult.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brigadier General Lee.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Cork, 7th July, 1808.

‘ I arrived here last night, and I find that the 20th light dragoons and the 3000 tons of shipping for the infantry are not arrived. The Irish Commissariat horses, for the draught of the artillery, are not yet all arrived, and will not be on board until Saturday. I propose to wait till that day for the dragoons and the additional tonnage, and, if they should not have arrived, I shall sail with what is ready, and let the rest follow.

‘ By some accident, which, from not having seen the agent of transports, I cannot yet account for, we have four transports, as stated underneath, which have not been returned to me in any statement from the Transport Board or from your brother. These vessels have enabled General Floyd to embark the 95th, and to make some provision for the embarkation of the 36th. But it appears to me that the whole are too much crowded, and if the additional tonnage does not arrive to-morrow, I shall settle to leave behind the Veteran battalion, or the 36th, to follow with the additional tonnage and the 20th dragoons, to give more space to all the troops in the transports. If the additional tonnage should arrive, and I should find that I do not want these four ships, I shall leave them behind.

‘ Upon a review of your instructions, and a consideration of the state of affairs in Spain, according to the last accounts, I rather think that, as soon as I have got everything away from Cork, I shall best serve the cause by going myself to Coruña, and joining the fleet off Cape Finisterre or the Tagus. I propose accordingly to go on board one of the craft, and I expect to be at the rendezvous before the troops.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Cork, 8th July, 1808.

‘ Since I wrote to you yesterday, the ships having on board the 20th light dragoons, excepting the *Rebecca*, *Albion*, and *Jackall*, the *Minerva* laden with hay, the *Britannia* and *Harford* with arms, and the *Britannia* with intrenching tools, have arrived. The empty transports have not, however, yet appeared; and I propose in the morning to land part of the Veteran battalion, to make room for the whole of the 36th, and I shall then sail with the first fair wind.

‘ All the horses of the Commissariat will be on board early to-morrow.

‘ Upon consulting with Malcolm, I find that no inconvenience can result from my going to Coruña, and that he should make Cape Finisterre in his passage to the Tagus at all events. As I must derive the greatest advantage from going there, I shall therefore embark in one of the smaller vessels, and join the fleet again when it comes off the Cape.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. General Floyd, commanding at Cork.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cork, 8th July, 1808.’

‘ I have the honor to acquaint you that camp equipage for 8000 men only has been provided for the army about to sail under my command, and I have it not in my power to make the necessary issue to the 36th and 45th regiments. I therefore request that you will be pleased to give the necessary orders that camp equipage for 1500 men may be issued from the stores of this place, and delivered over to the Deputy Assistant at the head of the Quarter Master General’s department at Cove.

‘ I likewise beg leave to acquaint you that the camp kettles provided for the use of my force are of the Flanders pattern, the size of which would cause considerable inconvenience in the service in which it is probable I shall be engaged: and having been given to understand that small tin kettles are in store here, I request you will be pleased to cause an issue to be made of them for the use of the troops under my command.

The Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General at Cove will give to the Assistant Commissary General at Cork the necessary receipt for the same, as well as for the camp equipage for the 36th and 45th regiments.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Floyd.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. Cheeseman, R.N., Resident Agent of Transports, Cork.

‘SIR,

‘Cork, 10th July, 1808.

‘In consequence of no hospital ship having yet arrived for the use of the army under my command, I have to request that you will forthwith appropriate an empty transport, for the reception of such medical staff and sick as the Deputy Inspector of Hospitals may send on board the same.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. Cheeseman, R.N.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Cove, 10th July, 1808.

‘The wind is still contrary, but we hope it will change so as to sail this evening. We are unmoored, and shall not wait one moment after the wind may be fair.

‘I see that people in England complain of the delay which has taken place in the sailing of the expedition; but, in fact, none has taken place; and even if all had been on board we could not have sailed before this day. With all the expedition which we could use, we could not get the horses of the artillery to Cork till yesterday, and they were immediately embarked; and it was only yesterday that the 20th dragoons arrived, and the ships to contain the 36th regiment and a detachment of the 45th, which arrived yesterday evening and embarked.

‘Your instructions to me left London on the Friday evening, and I was at Cork on the following Wednesday, which is as much expedition as if the instructions had come by the post.

‘I leave here, at the disposal of government, 1668 tons of shipping. The resident agent will report the names of the ships to the Transport Board.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Return of the effective force embarked, and under the command of the
Right Hon. Lieut. General Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.*

‘Cork, 13th July, 1808.

| REGIMENTS. | Field Officers. | Captains. | Subalterns. | Staff. | Staff Sergeants. | Sergeants. | Drummers. | Rank and File. | Horses. |
|-------------------------|-----------------|-----------|-------------|--------|------------------|------------|-----------|----------------|---------|
| Royal Engineers . . | .. | 2 | 4 | .. | .. | 1 | .. | 11 | .. |
| Royal Artillery . . . | 2 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 8 | 5 | 345 | .. |
| Royal Artillery Drivers | .. | .. | 1 | .. | 1 | 1 | 1 | 46 | .. |
| 20th Light Dragoons . | 2 | 2 | 6 | 3 | .. | 19 | 3 | 346 | 215 |
| 5th Foot | 3 | 10 | 27 | 6 | .. | 53 | 21 | 987 | .. |
| 9th „ | 3 | 9 | 22 | 5 | .. | 51 | 21 | 950 | .. |
| 36th „ | 2 | 9 | 28 | 4 | .. | 49 | 23 | 589 | .. |
| 38th „ | 3 | 10 | 28 | 6 | .. | 54 | 22 | 956 | .. |
| 40th „ | 3 | 9 | 29 | 6 | .. | 54 | 19 | 920 | .. |
| 45th „ | 3 | 8 | 17 | 6 | .. | 38 | 22 | 500 | .. |
| 60th „ 5th batt. . . | 2 | 7 | 18 | 6 | .. | 54 | 22 | 930 | .. |
| 71st „ | 2 | 8 | 23 | 5 | .. | 50 | 21 | 875 | .. |
| 91st „ | 3 | 8 | 24 | 5 | .. | 51 | 20 | 907 | .. |
| 95th „ 2d batt. . . | 1 | 4 | 13 | 1 | .. | 20 | 8 | 399 | .. |
| 4th R. Vet. batt. . . | 1 | 6 | 14 | 4 | .. | 47 | 20 | 744 | .. |
| Total | 30 | 96 | 259 | 59 | 2 | 550 | 227 | 9,505 | 215 |

‘ROWLAND HILL,

‘Major General.’

*Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State, to Lieut. General
the Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.*

‘SIR,

‘Downing Street, 15th July, 1808.

‘Since my dispatches to you of the 30th ultimo, marked “Secret,” Nos. 1 and 2, the enclosed intelligence has been received from Major General Spencer with respect to the state of the enemy’s force in Portugal.

The number of French troops immediately in the vicinity of Lisbon (so far as this information can be relied on) appearing much more considerable than it was before reported to be by Sir Charles Cotton, His Majesty has been pleased to direct a corps of 5000 men, consisting of the regiments men-

tioned in the margin*, to be embarked, and to proceed, without loss of time, to join you off the Tagus.

‘His Majesty has been further pleased to direct, that the troops under Lieut. General Sir John Moore, which are arrived from the Baltic, as soon as they shall be refreshed, and their transports can be re-victualled, should also proceed, without delay, off the Tagus.

‘The motives which have induced the sending so large a force to that quarter are,—

‘First, to provide effectually for an attack upon the Tagus ; and, secondly, to have such an additional force disposable, beyond what may be indispensably requisite for that operation, as may admit of a detachment being made to the southward, either with a view to secure Cadiz, if it should be threatened by the French force under General Dupont, or to co-operate with the Spanish troops in reducing that corps, if circumstances should favor such an operation, or any other that may be concerted.

‘His Majesty is pleased to direct that the attack upon the Tagus should be considered as the first object to be attended to. As the whole force (of which a statement is enclosed), when assembled, will amount to not less than 30,000 men, it is conceived that both services may be amply provided for ; the precise distribution as between Portugal and Andalusia, both as to time and proportion of force, must depend on circumstances, to be judged of on the spot ; and should it be

* RAMSGATE.

Under Brig. General Anstruther :—

| | | | | | | |
|--------------------|---|---|---|---|---|-----|
| 9th Foot, 2d Batt. | . | . | . | . | . | 675 |
| 43d do. | . | . | . | . | . | 861 |
| 52d do. | . | . | . | . | . | 858 |
| 97th | . | . | . | . | . | 769 |

HARWICH.

Under Brig. General Acland :—

| | | | | | | |
|---------------------|---|---|---|---|---|-----|
| 2d or Queen's Foot | . | . | . | . | . | 813 |
| 20th | . | . | . | . | . | 689 |
| 95th, two Companies | . | . | . | . | . | 180 |

4845

Two Companies of Artillery. 200

5045

deemed advisable to fulfil the assurance which Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple appears to have given to the Supreme Junta of Seville, under the authority of my dispatch of the 6th instant, that it was His Majesty's intention to employ a corps of his troops, to the amount of 10,000 men, to co-operate with the Spaniards in that quarter, a corps of this magnitude may, I should hope, be detached without prejudice to the main operation against the Tagus, and may be reinforced, according to circumstances, after the Tagus has been secured : but if, previous to the arrival of the whole force under orders from England, Cadiz should be seriously threatened, it must rest with the senior officer off the Tagus, at his discretion, to detach, upon receiving a requisition to that effect, such an amount of force as may place this important place out of the reach of immediate danger, even though it should, for the time, suspend operations against the Tagus.

‘ As the force which may be called for on the side of Cadiz can only require a field equipment, the ordnance preparation which has been sent with a view to the reduction of the Tagus will remain at that station.

‘ With the exception of the ordnance preparation sent for the attack of the forts on that river, it has not been deemed necessary to encumber the army with any larger detail of artillery than what belongs to a field equipment, with a proportion of horses.

‘ Exclusive of the period for which the transports are provided, a due proportion of victuallers will accompany the armament, which, with the supplies which may be expected to be derived from the disposition and resources of the country, it is conceived, will remove all difficulty on this head, so long as the army shall continue to act near the coast.

‘ The great delay and expense that would attend embarking and sending from hence all those means which would be requisite to render the army completely moveable immediately on its landing, has determined His Majesty's government to trust in a great measure to the resources of the country for their supplies.

‘ There is every reason to believe, from the ardour of the inhabitants, both of Spain and Portugal, that so soon as a British army can establish itself on any part of the coast, not only numbers will be anxious to be armed and arrayed in

support of the common cause, but that every species of supply which the country produces for subsisting and equipping an army will be procurable; it therefore becomes the first object of consideration (if a direct and immediate attack upon the defences of the Tagus cannot in prudence be attempted), on what part of the coast between Peniche, on the north, and St. Ubes, on the south of that river, a position can be taken by the British army, in which its intercourse with the interior may be securely opened, and from whence it may afterwards move against the enemy, endeavoring, if possible, not only to expel him from Lisbon, but to cut off his retreat towards Spain.

‘A proportion of cavalry, as far as the means of transport exist, will accompany the troops, which can be hereafter increased, according as circumstances shall point out.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General*

‘CASTLEREAGH.

‘*Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.*’

*Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State, to Lieut. General
the Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.*

‘SIR,

‘Downing Street, 15th July, 1808.

‘I am to acquaint you that His Majesty has been pleased to intrust the command of his troops serving on the coasts of Spain and Portugal to Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple, with Lieut. General Sir Harry Burrard, second in command*.

‘The Lieutenant General has been furnished with copies of your instructions up to the present date exclusive. These instructions you will be pleased to carry into execution with

* *Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State, to Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple.*

‘SIR,

‘Downing Street, 15th July, 1808.

‘Permit me to offer you my congratulations on the flattering commands I have been charged to convey to you from His Majesty, and to request you will, at the same time, accept my personal thanks for the zeal and ability with which you have discharged your public duties during the late important period.

‘I trust the force which has been provided will enable you to give a new and decisive turn to affairs both in Portugal and Spain.

‘Permit me to recommend to your particular confidence Lieut. General Sir Arthur Wellesley. His high reputation in the service as an officer would in itself dispose you, I am persuaded, to select him for any service that required great prudence and temper, combined with much military experience.

‘The degree, however, to which he has been for a length of time past in the closest habits of communication with His Majesty’s Ministers, with respect to the

every expedition that circumstances will permit, without awaiting the arrival of the Lieutenant General, reporting to him your proceedings. And, should you be previously joined by a senior officer, you will in that case communicate to him your orders, and afford him every assistance in carrying them into execution.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ CASTLEREAGH.

‘ *Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.*’

affairs of Spain, having been destined to command any operation that circumstances might render necessary for counteracting the views of France against the Spanish dominions in South America, will, I am sure, point him out to you as an officer of whom it is desirable for you, on all accounts, to make the most prominent use which the rules of the service will permit.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ CASTLEREAGH.

‘ *Sir Hew Dalrymple.*’

H. R. H. the Commander in Chief to Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple.

‘ *Sir,*

‘ *Horse Guards, 21st July, 1808.*

‘ His Majesty having been graciously pleased to appoint you to the command of a large division of his army, to be employed on a particular service, I have to notify to you the several corps, General and Staff Officers, which compose this army, and to desire that you will use your best endeavors to carry into effect such instructions as you may receive from His Majesty’s Ministers.

‘ In transmitting to you a list of your force I have felt it my duty, with the view of giving you every information and assistance in my power, to annex to it an outline of the manner in which it appears to me that it would be most advisable to brigade the army: but, although I have given this plan every possible consideration, yet I mean you should fully understand it is intended solely for your guidance, in the event of the circumstances of your situation rendering it practicable and easy; and by no means to curb you in any other arrangements you may think it advisable to adopt, under the pressure of local or other difficulty.

‘ The 4th Royal Veteran Battalion is not included in this dislocation, as that corps is at present intended for the garrison of Gibraltar; but it may possibly be in your power to take a more serviceable corps from thence in lieu of it, bearing in mind that this battalion is not to be permanently stationed at Gibraltar, but to be sent eventually to Madeira.

[*The remainder of this letter is the same as that addressed to Lieut. General Sir A. Wellesley at pp. 10, 11, and 12, beginning with the words ‘ On all subjects,’ and is therefore not repeated.*]

‘ I am, &c.

‘ *FREDERICK,*

‘ *Commander in Chief.*

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ *Sir Hew Dalrymple, at Gibraltar.*’

‘ Horse Guards, 20th July, 1808.

‘ *List of the several Corps, General and Staff Officers, composing a large division of His Majesty's Army, to be employed upon a particular Service.*

‘ His Majesty has been pleased to direct that the under-mentioned corps should be formed into one army, viz.—

SIR JOHN MOORE'S CORPS.

| | |
|---|--------|
| 3d Light Dragoons, King's German Legion . | 562 |
| British Artillery | 374 |
| German ditto | 320 |
| * 4th Foot, 1st Batt. | 971 |
| * 28th do. | 1020 |
| 52d do. | 951 |
| * 79th do. | 995 |
| * 92d do. | 934 |
| 95th, three Companies | 300 |
| Royal Staff Corps | 50 |
| 1st Light Batt., King's German Legion . | 907 |
| 2d do. do. | 903 |
| 1st Line Batt. | 725 |
| 2d do. | 761 |
| 5th do. | 753 |
| 7th do. | 679 |
| Garrison Company | 48 |
| | <hr/> |
| | 11,253 |

MAJOR GENERAL SPENCER'S CORPS.

| | |
|-------------------------------|-------|
| Royal Artillery | 245 |
| Royal Staff Corps | 45 |
| * 6th Foot, 1st Batt. | 946 |
| 29th do. | 806 |
| * 32d, 1st Batt. | 874 |
| * 50th do. | 948 |
| * 82d do. | 929 |
| | <hr/> |
| | 4,793 |

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY'S CORPS.

| | |
|---------------------------------|-------|
| 20th Light Dragoons | 394 |
| Royal Artillery | 226 |
| * 5th Foot, 1st Batt. | 990 |
| 9th do. | 833 |
| * 36th do. | 591 |
| * 38th do. | 957 |
| * 40th do. | 926 |
| * 45th do. | 670 |
| 60th, 5th Batt. | 936 |
| * 71st, 1st do. | 903 |
| * 91st, do. | 917 |
| 95th, four Companies | 400 |
| 4th Royal Veteran Batt. | 73 |
| | <hr/> |
| | 9,280 |

FORCE NOW EMBARKING.

| | | |
|--------------------------------|---|-------------------|
| British Artillery, one Company | } | Number not known. |
| German do. do. | | |
| 2d Foot, or Queen's | | 731 |
| 9th, 2d Batt. | | 633 |
| 20th | | 530 |
| 43d, 2d Batt. | | 721 |
| 52d do. | | 654 |
| 95th, two Companies | | 200 |
| 97th | | 695 |
| 18th Light Dragoons | | 649 |
| | | <hr/> |
| | | 4,803 |

‘ His Majesty has further been pleased to direct, that Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple shall have the chief command thereof, and that Lieut. General Sir Harry Burrard be second in command, when the Staff of this army will consist as follows, viz.—

Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple, Commander of the Forces.

Lieut. General Sir Harry Burrard, second in command.

Lieut. Generals Sir John Moore, the Hon. John Hope, Mackenzie Fraser, Lord Paget, Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Major Generals J. Murray, Lord W. Bentinck, Hon. Edward Paget, Spencer, Hill, Ferguson.

Brig. Generals Acland, Nightingall, R. Stewart, the Hon. C. Stewart, H. Fane, R. Anstruther, Catlin Craufurd.

Brig. General H. Clinton, 1st Foot Guards, *Acting* Adjutant General.

Lieut. Colonel Murray, 3d Foot Guards, *Acting* Quarter Master General.

Bt. Lieut. Colonel Torrens, 89th Foot, Military Secretary.

‘ His Majesty has further been pleased to command that the following should be the outline of the dislocation of the troops, subject to the discretion of the General commanding.

‘ The reserve, under the command of Lieut. General Sir John Moore and Major General the Hon. Edward Paget.

| | | |
|--------------------------------|---|------------------------------------|
| 18th Light Dragoons. | } | Brig. General the Hon. C. Stewart. |
| 20th do. | | |
| 3d Lt. Drs., K.G.L. | | |
| 52d Foot, 1st Batt. | } | Brig. General R. Anstruther. |
| 52d do. 2d do. | | |
| 95th, nine Companies | | |
| 43d Foot, 2d Batt. | } | Brig. General R. Stewart. |
| 60th do. 5th do. | | |
| 1st Lt. Batt., K.G.L. | | |
| 2d do. do. | | |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|-----------------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|---|-------------------------------------|
| 2d, or Queen's Foot | } | Brig. General Acland. | } | Lieut. General the Hon. John Hope. | | |
| 4th, 1st Batt. | | | | | | |
| 28th | | | | | | |
| 79th | } | Major General Ferguson. | | | | |
| 91st | | | | | | |
| 92d | | | | | | |
| 6th. | } | Major General Spencer. | | | } | Lieut. General Lord Paget. |
| 29th | | | | | | |
| 32d. | | | | | | |
| 5th. | } | Brig General Nightingall. | | | | |
| 50th | | | | | | |
| 82d | | | | | | |
| 9th. | } | Major General Hill. | } | Lieut. General Mackenzie Fraser. | | |
| 9th, 2d Batt. | | | | | | |
| 40th, 1st do. | | | | | | |
| 36th | } | Brig. General Fane. | | | | |
| 45th | | | | | | |
| 97th | | | | | | |
| 20th | } | Brig. General Catlin Craufurd. | | | } | Lieut. General Sir A. Wellesley. |
| 38th | | | | | | |
| 71st | | | | | | |
| 4 Batts. of Infantry of the King's Ger- man Legion. | } | Major General J. Murray. | | | | |

*Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State, to Lieut. General
the Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Downing Street, 21st July, 1808.

‘ In the event of your deeming it may be advantageous that the troops now proceeding from England should be disembarked at any point on the coast of Portugal north of the Tagus, I am to suggest to you the propriety of your requesting Sir Charles Cotton to station one of his cruizers to the northward of the Berlings*, with such information as you may deem material to communicate to the senior Officer in command of the troops: and I shall intimate to the Officers in charge of the troops proceeding from hence, that they should be prepared, at that point, to receive an intimation from you of the actual state of things in the Tagus.

‘ I am, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.

‘ CASTLEREAGH.

* Rocks on the coast of Portugal, opposite Peniche.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ H.M.S. *Crocodile* *, Coruña,
21st July, 1808.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ I have the honor to inform you, that having adverted to the tenor of your Lordship’s instructions of the 30th ultimo (Nos. 1 and 2), I deemed it expedient to quit the fleet containing the troops under my command, as soon as it was clear of the coast of Ireland, on the 13th instant; and I arrived here in this ship yesterday.

‘ I have had several conferences with the Junta of Galicia since my arrival, the general result of which has been, that the whole of Spain, with the exception of the kingdoms of Navarre and Biscay, are in arms against the French; and that in many places detachments of the French troops had been defeated by the Spanish people. The information, however, which has been received by the Junta of Galicia is not of an official nature; and I am not enabled to state positively where these occurrences have taken place, or to what extent, although I imagine that there is no doubt that these French corps have been defeated in the manner reported in the private letters received by individuals.

‘ The Galician army, joined by that of Castille, (the whole consisting of 50,000 men, of which 20,000 are stated to have been regular troops,) was posted at Rio Seco, in the province of Valladolid, and was attacked on the 14th instant by a French corps, under the command of Marshal Bessières, consisting of 20,000 men (of which 4000 were cavalry), which had been at Burgos: in the commencement of the action the Spanish troops had the advantage; but towards the close of the day the French cavalry charged the left of the Spanish line, which consisted of the Castillian peasantry, and which was broken and defeated, with the loss of 7000 men, some Officers of distinction, and two pieces of cannon. The loss of the French troops in the action is stated to have been 7000 men and six pieces of cannon. On the following day the Spanish army retired to Benavente, on the Esla; from which measure the French have acquired the command of the course of the Rio Douro, and are in a situation to impede the communication between this province and those to

* The *Crocodile* was commanded by the Hon. G. Cadogan, now Earl Cadogan.

the southward, and to the eastward, likewise in arms against the French.

‘The Junta of Galicia have given their consent to my using the port of Vigo, if I should find it necessary, to afford shelter to the fleet, or even to land the troops there.

‘It appears, from the intelligence which I have received here, that the total number of the French troops still in Portugal is about 15,000 men, of which number 12,000 are at Lisbon and in the neighbourhood; and Almeida is occupied by a small corps. The three provinces north of the Rio Douro are in arms against the French; and there is a corps of Portuguese troops in Oporto, the number of which is stated to be 10,000 men; besides these, a Spanish corps, consisting of 2000 men, commenced their march on the 15th instant, from a port in the southern part of Galicia, towards Oporto, where I expect they will arrive about the 24th or 25th instant.

‘I have not received any account of General Spencer, from which I can form a judgment whether that Officer will have it in his power to proceed to Lisbon, according to the tenor of your Lordship’s instructions of the 30th of June and 2d of July.

‘I propose to sail from hence this night, and to go to Oporto in this ship; and I shall be directed in the future operations of the army, for the execution of your Lordship’s instructions, by the intelligence which I shall receive there. I shall request Captain Malcolm to follow me with the convoy to Oporto.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Coruña, 21st July, 1808.

‘I arrived here yesterday, and I propose to go to sea again this day, to meet the fleet, which however has not yet appeared off the coast.

‘Since my arrival I have had frequent conversations with the Junta; and Mr. Stuart*, who arrived also yesterday, will send by this conveyance to Mr. Canning an account of all the intelligence which we have received from them respecting the

* Lord Stuart de Rothesay, G.C.B.

present situation of affairs in Spain. The general result, however, appears to me to be, that the whole of the Spanish nation, with the exception of the provinces of Biscay and Navarre, and those in the neighbourhood of Madrid, are in a state of insurrection against the French; that several French detachments in different parts of the country had been destroyed, viz., a corps under Lefebvre, which had been attacked four times, near Zaragoza, in Aragon, particularly on the 16th and 24th of June, a corps which I believe to have been under the command of Dupont; and it is said that Dupont was taken prisoner in an action fought between Andujar and La Carolina, before the 23d of June; and two corps defeated in Catalonia before the 19th of June, one on its march to Montserrat, and the other to Zaragoza. The Catalonians have also got possession of the fort of Figueras, in the neighbourhood of Rosas, and have blockaded the French troops in Barcelona.

‘As, however, the communication, which was never very perfect between one province and the others, has been impeded by the march and position of the French armies, and particularly by their late success at Rio Seco, to which I shall presently refer, the Junta have no official accounts of any of these actions; but they give credit to those they have received, copies of which will be transmitted to Mr. Canning by Mr. Stuart. He will also send the account which the Junta have received of the action at Rio Seco.

‘The army of Castille and Galicia united was posted at that place, which is in the province of Valladolid; and their intention, as is stated, was either to have attacked the French corps under Marshal Bessières at Burgos, or to have marched upon Madrid. But I suspect that they would have confined their operations to the arrangement of the insurrection towards Madrid, and to cutting off the communication between the French troops stationed there and in Biscay and Navarre.

‘It is said that they intended to attack Marshal Bessières on the 16th, but he attacked them on the 14th: his infantry was at first defeated by the Spaniards, with the loss of 7000 men; but afterwards his cavalry fell upon the left wing of the Spanish army, which consisted of the peasants of Castille, and defeated it.

‘I understand that the Spanish army, which consisted of 50,000 men, lost about 7000 men and two pieces of cannon ; and that they had taken and still retain six pieces belonging to the French.

‘The Spaniards retired either on that night or on the next day to Benavente on the Esla. The worst of this action is, that it has given the French possession of the whole course of the Douro, and by obliging the Galician troops to retire from Rio Seco, it has interrupted the communication between this province and those to the southward and eastward.

‘I understood that the Junta were much alarmed when they received the account of this defeat ; but the arrival of the money yesterday has entirely renewed their spirits ; and I did not see either in them or in the inhabitants of this town any symptom either of alarm or doubt of their final success. The capture of Santander by the French is not considered an event of any importance ; and it is said here that a corps was actually on its march from the Asturias to retake that place.

‘It is impossible to convey to you an idea of the sentiment which prevails here in favor of the Spanish cause. The difference between any two men is whether the one is a better or a worse Spaniard, and the better Spaniard is the one who detests the French most heartily. I understand that there is actually no French party in the country ; and at all events I am convinced that no man now dares to show that he is a friend to the French.

‘The final success must depend upon the means of attack and defence of the different parties, of the amount of which it is impossible for me at present to form an opinion. If it be true that the several French corps which I have above enumerated have been cut off, it is obvious that Bonaparte cannot carry on his operations in Spain, excepting by the means of large armies ; and I doubt much whether the country will afford subsistence for a large army, or whether he will be able to supply his magazines from France, the roads being so bad and the communications so difficult.

‘If this be true, his object must be to gain possession of the northern provinces, and this can be done only by the invasion and possession of the Asturias. I think, therefore, that our government ought to direct its attention particularly

to that important point, and to endeavor to prevail upon the Asturians to receive a body of our troops.

‘I consider this point so important, that I should not be surprised if Bonaparte, finding that he cannot penetrate by land, should make an effort to reach the Asturias by sea ; and I should therefore recommend to you to reinforce the squadron which is here, and let it cruise between Cape Ortegal and Santander. It might come here in case of a gale from the northward.

‘I suggested to the Junta to fit out the ships at Ferrol for this service ; but they said it would divert their attention and their means from other more important objects ; and that although they were aware of its importance, they would prefer relying, for the naval defence which they might require, on the assistance to be received from Great Britain.

‘It will be necessary that you should assist all the Spanish provinces with money, arms, and ammunition. Notwithstanding the recent defeat of the Galician army, the Junta have not expressed any anxiety to receive the assistance of British troops ; and they again repeated this morning that they could put any number of men into the field, if they were provided with money and arms ; and I think that this disinclination to receive the assistance of British troops is founded in a great degree on the objection to give the command of their troops to British Officers.

‘The Junta here have expressed a great wish to unite in a general Cortes with the other provinces ; but in addition to the difficulties which must attend the adoption of this measure, from the position of the French armies, I understand that there are others referable to the desire which each of the kingdoms of which Spain is composed has, that the Cortes should be established within itself.

‘If the French should be obliged to quit Madrid, it is probable that this difficulty would be overcome ; and till that period, or until the strength of the French army shall have been driven from the centre of Spain, I am not quite certain that it is not as well that each of the kingdoms should be governed by its own Junta. I am convinced that the general zeal and exertion of each are greater, at present, than would be manifested if the whole kingdom were under the direction of one body.

‘In respect to my own operations, I find that Junot has collected, it is supposed, 12,000 men at Lisbon; and the French still hold Almeida, and other points in Portugal, with 3000 more. The three northern provinces of Portugal are in a state of insurrection, and there is a Portuguese army at Oporto, to join which 2000 Spanish troops have marched from Galicia, and they will arrive there about the 24th or 25th.

‘From the intelligence which I have received here, I can form no opinion whether I shall be joined by General Spencer or not. Mr. Stuart heard from the *Brilliant*, on his passage, that General Spencer had left Cadiz, after the Spaniards had got possession of the French fleet, and had gone to Ayamonte, at the mouth of the Guadiana, to stop the progress of a French corps which was coming by that route from Portugal into Andalusia. They had heard nothing here of this movement; but they had heard a report that 5000 British troops had been in General Castaños’ army, and had behaved remarkably well, but on what occasion, and what troops, they did not know.

‘I understand that there is a Spanish corps of 20,000 men in Estremadura, at Almaraz, on the Tagus, which corps will impede the communication between Junot and the army at Madrid; and it may be reasonably expected that the number of French now in Portugal will be the number which we shall have to contend with. The Junta express great anxiety respecting my operations in Portugal, and have strongly recommended me not to attempt to land at Lisbon, or in the neighbourhood of the French army. They urge as an objection to this measure, that I shall thereby entirely lose the advantage of the co-operation of the Spanish and Portuguese forces at Oporto, who will not be able to approach Lisbon till they have heard that I have disembarked; and they recommend that I should disembark at Vigo or Oporto, and bring the allies with me to Lisbon.

‘It is impossible for me to decide upon this or any other measure till I shall know more of the situation of affairs. I should have no doubt of success, even without General Spencer’s assistance, or that of the allies, if I were once ashore; but to effect a landing in front of an enemy is always difficult, and I shall be inclined to land at a distance from Lisbon.

‘I now intend to look for the fleet this night, and if we should not find it, I shall leave one of Captain Hotham’s

squadron upon the rendezvous, with directions for Malcolm to follow me, and go in the *Crocodile* to Oporto, where I shall be able to decide upon the measures which I shall adopt.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Charles Stewart, Esq.

‘ H.M.S. *Crocodile*, off Cape Finisterre,
23d July, 1808.

‘ My DEAR SIR,

‘ I find that the two ships which I imagined contained the stores for the *Asturias* are not in the fleet, notwithstanding that they were reported to me at Cork by the Commanding Officer of my artillery. I conclude, therefore, that they have really arrived at Gijon, and that the Officer is not so correct as the editor of the *Oviedo Gazette*.

‘ I hear that the actions at Zaragoza were an attack upon the place by the French, who have been frequently repulsed. I hear also that the French have concentrated their force at Lisbon, and that the insurrection has extended itself to that city. The French troops cannot show themselves outside of it.

‘ We hear from San Sebastian, that King Joseph has entered Spain, and had passed that fortress. He was received by the constituted authorities, but not by the people.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Stewart, Esq.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To General Sir James Pulteney, Bart., Secretary at War.

‘ SIR,

‘ H.M.S. *Donegal*, at Sea, 25th July, 1808.

‘ I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 5th instant, communicating to me His Majesty’s appointment to serve as a Lieut. General on the Staff, with two Aides de Camp, upon a particular service, from the 23d instant; and I beg leave to acquaint you that His Majesty’s Commission, to serve as Commander of the Forces upon the service in which I am at present engaged, is dated the 14th of June, 1808, from which period the Staff of the army have been appointed and doing duty. I therefore request that you will transmit to me, at your earliest convenience, an authority

'to issue pay to the Staff of the army from that date; or to inform me in what manner those are to be paid who were not before upon the Staff in Ireland.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *The Right Hon.*

the Secretary at War.

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

' H.M.S. Crocodile, off Oporto,

25th July, 1808.

' MY DEAR LORD,

' I avail myself of the opportunity of the return of the *Peacock* to England, to inform you that I sailed from Coruña, as I told you I should, on the night of the 21st, and joined the fleet the next day, and arrived here yesterday, in the *Crocodile*: the fleet are now coming on.

' All the provinces to the north of the Tagus, with the exception of the country immediately about Lisbon, are in a state of insurrection against the French, and the people are ready and desirous to take arms, but, unfortunately, there are none in the country; indeed, I may say, none to arm the troops which the Bishop of Oporto and the Junta of this place have assembled. They have at present a corps of about 5000 men, regular troops and militia, including 300 cavalry at Coimbra, armed with 1000 muskets got from the fleet, fowling pieces, &c., and 12,000 peasantry, mostly unarmed, I believe.

' The regular troops are composed of detachments of different corps, and cannot in any respect be deemed an efficient force. Besides these, there are 300 Spanish infantry, about 1500 regular Portuguese infantry, and some militia volunteers and peasantry, here.

' The corps of Spanish infantry, which had commenced its march from Galicia, as I informed you in my last letter, is not yet arrived. It was stopped on the frontier, because there were no orders at Braganza to allow it to enter the country; and although the Bishop expects it, the Portuguese Officers appear to think that the success of the French against the Spanish army on the 14th has diverted this corps from the cause in this country. Under all the circumstances, I have determined to take forward the Portuguese corps now at Coimbra, and to collect everything else upon this place.

‘The Bishop is much alarmed respecting the success of the French in the province of Valladolid. It is reported here that there has been a second action; and I saw a letter last night from the Bishop of Santiago, stating that General Cuesta, the Castillian Commander in Chief, had informed him that he had gained a victory in this action, and had actually in his camp 1500 horses taken from the French cavalry; and it is, at the same time, reported that the French are actually in Benavente. It is impossible to learn the truth.

‘I have received a letter from Sir Charles Cotton, of the 9th instant, in which he advises me to leave the fleet to windward, and to go down to the Tagus to confer with him. He has occupied a post with 400 marines at Figueira on the Mondego, in front of Coimbra, at which place, or at Peniche, he thinks it will be most advisable for me to land. I therefore propose to send the fleet to the Mondego to make all the arrangements for landing; to go down to communicate with the Admiral; and by the time I shall have returned, all will be ready to go on shore, either at the Mondego or Peniche, or farther to the southward if the Admiral thinks it advisable.

‘I have heard nothing positive of General Spencer, excepting that he was with Sir Charles Cotton in the beginning of this month, his corps having been landed, merely to preserve the health of the men, near Cape St. Mary’s. I conclude, therefore, that I shall find him with the fleet off the Tagus.

‘The French corps is concentrated at or about Lisbon, and is said to consist of from 13,000 to 14,000 men. Sir Charles Cotton says they are adding to the fortifications of the town, of a citadel within the town, and of Fort St. Julian.

‘The measures to be adopted for this country are to supply it with arms and money. I saw a statement last night, from which it appears that they could get together 38,000 men with ease, if they had arms or money to pay them. If I should find the troops at Coimbra to be worth it, I propose to arm them.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General Spencer.

‘ H.M.S. Crocodile, off the Tagus,
26th July, 1808.

‘ SIR,

‘ I have the honor of receiving your letters of the 15th and 16th instant.

‘ As the instructions which I have received from his Majesty’s Ministers positively direct me to make an attack upon the French troops in the Tagus, if I should find the force under my command sufficient to enable me to make it; as these instructions were framed at the instance of the Juntas of Galicia and Asturias; and as the Junta of Galicia, with which I have communicated lately at Coruña, have again pressed me to carry into execution the object of those instructions; and, above all, as I am convinced that the most effectual mode in which Great Britain can serve the Spanish cause is by driving the French out of Portugal, and thus to make that kingdom the point of communication between the northern and southern parts of Spain itself, I cannot avoid urging you to embark the troops under your command, as soon as you shall receive this letter, and to proceed to the Tagus, when you shall receive further orders from me.

‘ If, when you receive this letter, you should be engaged in any active operations, the relinquishment of which would, in your judgment, be detrimental to the Spanish cause, you will not obey this order, but still continue such operations; but if you should not be so actually engaged, and should embark as ordered, you will take care to apprise the Junta of Seville of the motives which have induced His Majesty’s Ministers to make an effort to wrest the kingdom of Portugal from the power of the French; and of the reasons for which I think that I shall most effectually forward the interests and objects of the Spanish nation, by persevering in carrying into execution the orders I have received, as detailed in the first part of this letter.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Spencer.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General Spencer.

‘ H.M.S. Crocodile, off the Tagus,
26th July, 1808.

‘ SIR,

‘ In case you should quit Cadiz according to the instructions contained in my dispatch of this date, it occurs to me, from

the representation you have made of the wants of the Junta of Seville, that the Spanish nation would be most effectually served, and the minds of the principal persons among them would be reconciled to your departure, if their pecuniary distresses could be relieved by an immediate advance of money.

‘I therefore beg you to inform them, if they can procure money for a bill on the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury of England, that you are authorised to draw upon them for £100,000; and I authorise and beg you to give bills on the Lords of the Treasury for that sum of money, which you will pay to the persons who may be appointed to receive it by the Junta of Seville, and you will take their receipt for the same.

‘I think it probable that His Majesty may have directed a sum of money to be sent to the Junta of Seville, as he has to that of Galicia, which has been received; and if you should be able to procure the money for the bills which I have above requested you to give, I beg of you to leave a letter for the gentleman who may come up with the money which may be sent by His Majesty’s directions, in which you will inform him that you have made this advance; and you will request him to send to the Tagus, for the use of the army, an equal sum out of the money which it is supposed he will have brought out from England.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major General Spencer.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General Spencer.

‘H.M.S. Crocodile, off the Tagus,
26th July, 1808.

‘SIR,

‘As Lieut. Colonel Bathurst is appointed Deputy Quarter Master General to the troops under my command, and Mr. Hunter, Deputy Paymaster General, I feel great inconvenience from the want of the assistance of those Officers; and as I believe Major Rainey is present with your corps, who can take charge of the Quarter Master General’s department, I request you to send Lieut. Colonel Bathurst and Mr. Hunter to join me immediately, in the schooner which will take you this dispatch.

‘As I understand that some of the transports you have with you are heavy sailers, and as it is most desirable to the

King's service that your corps should arrive here at an early period, I recommend you to apply to Lord Collingwood, to allow some of the troops to come here in men of war, as being the most expeditious mode of sending them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Spencer.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ H.M.S. Crocodile, 26th July, 1808.

‘ I have the honor to inform you that I joined the fleet off Cape Finisterre on the 22d instant, and continued my voyage in this ship to Oporto (leaving them to follow me), where I arrived on the 24th, and the fleet on the following morning.

‘ I saw the Bishop of Oporto, who is at the head of the Junta, and the General Officers commanding the Portuguese troops, on that night ; and I learned from them, and from Lieut. Colonel Brown, that the Portuguese troops, militia, and regulars which had been collected, amounted to about 5000 men, and were posted at Coimbra, in the province of Beira, about eighty miles from Oporto, towards Lisbon. That, besides these troops, there were in advance about 1200 peasants armed in different modes, and a corps of about 1500 Portuguese infantry, and 300 Spanish infantry, at Oporto, besides volunteers and peasants. The whole of these troops, however, are badly armed and equipped. The peasantry have, I believe, no arms but pikes, and those called regular infantry are composed of individuals belonging to different corps of the Portuguese army. The corps of Spanish infantry, consisting of 2000 men, which I informed your Lordship in my letter of the 21st instant was ordered to march from Galicia into Portugal, had not left the former kingdom by the last accounts, and was not expected at Oporto.

‘ A post at Figueira upon the river Mondego, which falls into the sea at Mondego Bay, is occupied by 300 marines belonging to the fleet under the command of Captain Bligh, of H. M. S. *Alfred*, which was likewise detained there.

‘ On my arrival at Oporto, I received from Sir Charles Cotton a letter of the 9th instant, a copy of which I enclose, in which the Admiral recommends that I should leave the fleet at anchor to the northward, and go to the mouth of

the Tagus to communicate with him, as he thought it probable that it would be deemed advisable that the troops should land at Mondego Bay, or at Peniche. I have accordingly requested Captain Malcolm to anchor at Mondego, and I am now on my passage to the mouth of the Tagus.

‘ While I was at Oporto I requested the Bishop to supply me with 150 horses for the remount of the 20th light dragoons, of which corps there are nearly that number of men dismounted. I also requested him to supply the troops with 500 mules, of a description which could be applied either to draft or carriage, which I propose to apply to the carriage of the musket ammunition and intrenching tools, (there being with the army no ammunition, tumbril, or intrenching tool carts,) of a certain quantity of provisions, and if I should find it necessary, of the camp equipage of the army. The Bishop promised that I should have the horses and mules at Coimbra by the time that the army would be disembarked, if I should determine to disembark at Mondego Bay. I also made arrangements with him for the supply of fresh meat for the troops, and of forage and grain for the horses of the cavalry and artillery, and for the mules with the army.

‘ Having made all these arrangements, in the course of the night of the 24th instant I embarked from Oporto, on the morning of the 25th joined the fleet, and am now on my passage to the Tagus.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General Spencer.

‘ H.M.S. Crocodile, off the Tagus,

26th July, 1808.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ The public letters, which Captain Cooke* will deliver to you with this, will apprise you of my wishes that you should come here as soon as possible, and of the reasons for which I wish that you should do so.

‘ In addition to those stated in my public letter, I have to mention to you, that, from all that I have heard, I think there is reason to believe that Bonaparte is not now very strong in Spain; and that he has not at his command the

* The late Major General Sir H. F. Cooke, K.C.H.

means of reinforcing his troops sufficiently to strike any blow which can have a permanent effect. It is obvious that Dupont to the southward does not think himself sufficiently strong for Castaños, otherwise he would not halt and take up a defensive position. Even supposing that we should deem it expedient eventually to return and carry on operations in the south of Spain, it is not probable, from the general state of the French, that any great misfortune can happen before we return.

‘ In the mean time the Spaniards will acquire strength and experience; and I must observe that nothing we can do can be so useful to them as to get possession of and organize a good army in Portugal.

‘ On the other hand, if the efforts of the Spanish nation should fail, and if the French are now able to obtain possession of Cadiz, I do not think the presence of your corps would be of much avail to prevent the occurrence of this misfortune; while its presence here is of the utmost importance, to enable me to perform the operations intrusted to me, the success of which would be a great benefit to Great Britain,—even if all should unfortunately fail.

‘ Therefore, in either and all the views of the case, whether Spain is to continue or to fail, Portugal is an object, and your presence here is most necessary.

‘ You will find, on your arrival with Admiral Cotton, instructions for your operations.

‘ Do not delay on account of the bill which you are to draw for £100,000, but leave Tucker or somebody to settle it with the Junta with the bills in his hands.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Spencer.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM FOR DISEMBARKATION.

‘ 29th July, 1808.

‘ In the event of a landing being determined upon in Mondego Bay, a signal will be made to Captain Malcolm, when it will be settled at what period it may be proper to move the horse ships, and the ships having the ordnance on board, into the river.

‘ The infantry will be directed to be landed from the transports in the roads, and to be rowed in the boats up the river,

and landed on the south bank of it : General Fane's brigade first, excepting the Veteran battalion, which is to remain on board ; then General Ferguson's ; then General Craufurd's.

‘ In the mean time the following arrangements are to be made :—

‘ 1st. The havresacks and canteens now in the regimental stores are to be given out to the men.

‘ 2d. Tin camp kettles are to be issued from the Quarter Master General's stores to the regiments.

‘ 3d. The Commissary must issue to each of the Paymasters of regiments, on account of the Paymaster General, the sum of £1000 for each of the regiments, and in that proportion for the artillery, dragoons, and 95th companies, which he will receive from the *Donegal*. A month's pay may also be issued on the same account to the Officers of the Staff.

‘ 4th. General Hill will inform the Officer commanding the 20th light dragoons that he is to receive a sufficient number of horses to mount all his men ; that he will therefore be prepared to land the horse appointments of the men who have at present no horses.

‘ 5th. The following arrangement to be made respecting baggage. The men to land, each with one shirt and one pair of shoes, besides those on them, combs, razor, and a brush, which are to be packed up in their great coats. The knapsacks to be left in the transports, and the baggage of the Officers, excepting such light articles as are necessary for them. A careful serjeant to be left in the head quarter ship of each regiment, and a careful private man in each of the other ships, in charge of the baggage ; and each Officer who shall leave any baggage in a transport must take care to have his name marked on each package, and each numbered, and give a list of what he leaves to the soldier in charge of the baggage, in order that he may get what he may require.

‘ 6th. The men will land with three days' bread and two days' meat, cooked.

‘ 7th. The Commanding Officer of artillery is to land the three brigades of artillery, each with half the usual proportion of ammunition, the forge cart, &c. He will also land 500,000 rounds of musket ammunition for the use of the troops, for which carriage will be provided.

‘ 8th. Each soldier will have with him three good flints.

‘9th. Besides the bread above directed to be landed with the soldiers, three days’ bread to be packed up in bags, containing 100 lbs. each, on board each of the transports, for the number of soldiers who shall be disembarked from it.

‘10th. Mr. Commissary Pipon to be directed to attach a Commissary, and the necessary number of clerks, &c., to each brigade, to the cavalry and to the artillery. He will hereafter receive directions to take charge of the bread above directed to be prepared, and to make his arrangements for victualling the troops.

‘11th. Three days’ oats to be landed with each of the horses.

‘12th. The horses of the Irish Commissariat to be handed over, when landed, to the Commanding Officer of the artillery, who will allot the drivers to take charge of them; and then the Officers and drivers belonging to the Irish Commissariat to place themselves under the orders of Mr. Pipon.

‘13th. The Officers commanding companies will make an arrangement for purchasing mules for the carriage of camp equipage, for which they have received an allowance in the embarkation money.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, Bart.

H.M.S. Donegal, off Figuiera,
30th July, 1808.

‘SIR,

‘I arrived here this day, and have received dispatches from England, dated the 15th instant, from which I learn that a reinforcement to the amount of 5000 men is likely to arrive here immediately.

‘I propose to disembark here the day after to-morrow, but I shall not move forward till I shall hear of my reinforcement from England, or of the arrival of General Spencer. I think it probable that he will now come here, for I understand that General Castaños defeated Dupont in an action fought on the 20th instant, and that Dupont surrendered on condition that he should be sent to France by sea. If this should be true, there can be nothing to detain General Spencer in that quarter.

‘I propose to look at Peniche as I shall march towards Lisbon, and if there should be any prospect of early success, I shall attack the place. But in order to be able to effect

this object I must have 24 pounders; and the necessity there may be to have this ordnance at Peniche, and the desire which I have to profit as long as possible by the assistance of Captain Bligh, induce me to ask you to allow the *Alfred* to remain with us as long as may be possible. I shall not ask to detain either that ship or the *Donegal*, as soon as the moment shall arrive at which you may have it in your power to attack the fleet.

‘ If either the fleet having on board the ordnance stores, or General Spencer’s corps, or the reinforcements from England, should go to the mouth of the Tagus, I shall be obliged to you if you will order them here, directing that they may keep in shore, in case we should have occasion to communicate with them.

‘ Captain Malcolm will write to you about the marines, who shall be sent in the *Blossom* and *Lively*.

I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Admiral*

Sir C. Cotton, Bart.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh.

‘ H.M.S. *Donegal*, off the Mondego River,
1st August, 1808.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ I have the honor to inform you, that when on my passage from the fleet to the mouth of the Tagus, I fell in with H. M. S. *Plantagenet*, on the 26th July, in which was embarked Captain Cooke, of the Coldstream Guards, who delivered to me the dispatches from General Spencer, of which I enclose copies, by which I was informed that that Officer had landed at Puerto de Sta Maria, and had determined to remain in the province of Andalusia. After consulting with Sir Charles Cotton upon the situation of affairs in Portugal and Spain, I thought it proper to send General Spencer orders to re-embark his whole corps and to join me, unless he should be engaged in any active operation, the relinquishment of which he should deem detrimental to the cause of the Spaniards.

‘ As General Spencer, in his letter, and more particularly in a verbal message by Captain Cooke, represented the great distress for money which was felt by the Junta of Seville, I desired him to draw upon England for £100,000, and to pay that sum to the person they should appoint to receive it.

‘ I have the honor to enclose copies of the letters which I have written to General Spencer upon this occasion, in which the reasons which induced me to give these orders are sufficiently detailed ; and they will, I hope, justify me for having given them, without being under the necessity of troubling your Lordship with my reasons for thinking that it was probable that Dupont was not sufficiently strong for General Castaños ; that General Spencer’s corps was useless at Cadiz, while the operations of mine in Portugal were cramped for want of its assistance ; that a junction of the two corps was necessary to enable either to perform any effectual service ; and that, in the general situation of affairs in Spain, as well as in Portugal, it was most important to drive the French out of Portugal.

‘ The orders which I gave appeared to me to be entirely in conformity with the intentions and object of His Majesty’s government, and to be consistent with those which your Lordship gave to the General in your letter of the 30th June ; and although it appears by your Lordship’s dispatch of the 15th July, which I received here from Lord Burghersh on the 30th, that it was His Majesty’s intention to assist the Spanish nation with a body of his troops in Andalusia, I did not think it proper to recal those which I had sent to General Spencer on the 26th. The second orders would not have reached him till the 3d or 4th of August, when he would have carried the first into execution, and would probably be far advanced on his passage ; and I received accounts on my arrival here, on the same day, to which I gave credit, that General Castaños had defeated General Dupont on the 20th instant, and there was no longer any immediate necessity for the assistance of the British corps in that quarter of Spain. These accounts have been still further confirmed by others arrived this day, from which it appears that General Dupont, and all the French troops to the southward of the Sierra Morena, had surrendered, on condition that they should be sent to France by sea.

‘ The information of the state of the enemy’s force in Portugal, communicated to me by General Spencer, (which, however exaggerated the accounts he had received may be, deserve attention,) and the expectation held out by your Lordship, that a reinforcement would arrive here at an early

period, have necessarily induced me to delay the commencement of the operations of the troops under my command till the arrival of the corps from England, or of General Spencer. The General will have received my letter of the 26th, I hope, on the 28th, and I expect that he will be ready to sail by the 31st. The length of his passage to the Tagus, and to this place, must then depend upon the winds, which have blown from the southward since the 28th.

‘The enemy’s position in the neighbourhood of the Tagus appears so strong, that it is considered impracticable to make a landing in that quarter, without diverting the attention by an attack to the northward. The plans of attack on Cascaes Bay would fail, because it is stated to be impossible to approach the coast sufficiently with the large ships to silence the Fort of Cascaes, and the other works erected for the defence of the bay; and although the ships of war might be able to pass Fort St. Julian, the Fort Bugio, and the other works by which the entrance of the Tagus is defended, it is not imagined that these forts could be silenced by their fire, so as to enable the troops to land at Paço d’Arcos, as was proposed. Between Cascaes and the Cape Roca, and to the northward of Cape Roca, there are small bays, in which small bodies of men could be disembarked in moderate weather. But the surf on the whole of the coast of Portugal is great, and the disembarkation in these bays of the last divisions of the troops, and of their necessary stores and provisions, would be precarious, even if a favourable moment should have been found for the disembarkation of the first. The vicinity of the enemy, and the want of resources in the country in the neighbourhood of the Rock of Lisbon, for the movement of the necessary stores and provisions for the army, would increase the embarrassment of a disembarkation in that quarter.

‘All these considerations, combined with a due sense of the advantages which I shall derive from the co-operation of the Portuguese troops, have induced me to decide in favor of a landing to the northward.

‘There is no place to the northward of Lisbon which would at all answer for a place of disembarkation nearer than Mondego, excepting possibly Peniche. But the fort upon that peninsula is strong, and is occupied by the enemy with a sufficient garrison, and could not be taken without heavy ord-

nance; and the ordnance and ammunition, which your Lordship informed me in your dispatch of the 30th June was to sail from the river on that day, has not yet arrived.

‘ I shall consider the possession of the harbour and city of Lisbon as the immediate object of our operations, which must be attained by that of the forts by which the entrance of the Tagus is guarded. It is probable that it will be necessary to attack two of these forts, Cascaes and St. Julian, with heavy ordnance; and it is obvious that the enemy will not allow us to undertake those operations till he shall have been driven from the field.

‘ The positions which he would take for the defence of these posts must be all turned from the heights to the northward of Lisbon, and, indeed, unless prevented by our possession of these heights, the enemy would have it in his power to renew the contest in different positions, until he should be driven into Lisbon or retire. The last will be rendered difficult, if not impossible, excepting in boats across the Tagus, by the adoption of the line of attack by the heights to the northward, which I also prefer, as being more likely to bring the contest to the issue of a battle in the field.

‘ I have this day commenced my disembarkation in the river of Mondego, because I was apprehensive that any further delay might tend to discourage the country, and because I shall experience greater facilities in making the arrangements for the movement and supply of the army when it shall be on shore than while it shall continue afloat. The landing is attended with some difficulties even here, and would be quite impossible if we had not the cordial assistance of the country, notwithstanding the zeal and abilities of the Officers of the navy; and in all probability General Spencer and the reinforcements from England will arrive before the troops at present here shall be on shore: if either should arrive I propose to commence my march.

‘ I have the honor to inform your Lordship that I have issued 5000 stands of arms for the purpose of arming the Portuguese regular troops, who, it is intended, should co-operate with the British army in the attack on the French in this country.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY. ’

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘MY DEAR LORD, ‘ H.M.S. Donegal, 1st August, 1808.

‘I have nothing to add to my public letter of this date, excepting to tell you I have reason to believe General Spencer’s account of the French force in Portugal is exaggerated. I intended to make the attack with my own corps, aided by the Portuguese, if it should have turned out that he could not join me, according to my orders of the 26th of July, until I received your letter of the 15th, in which you announce the reinforcements; and I shall now march on, of course, as soon as one of the corps shall arrive.

‘Pole and Burghersh have apprised me of the arrangements for the future command of this army; and the former has informed me of your kindness towards me, of which I have experienced so many instances, that I can never doubt it in any case. All that I can say upon that subject is, that whether I am to command the army or not, or am to quit it, I shall do my best to insure its success; and you may depend upon it that I shall not hurry the operations, or commence them one moment sooner than they ought to be commenced, in order that I may acquire the credit of the success.

‘The government will determine for me in what way they will employ me hereafter, whether here or elsewhere. My opinion is, that Great Britain ought to raise, organize, and pay an army in Portugal, consisting of 30,000 Portuguese troops, which might be easily raised at an early period; and 20,000 British, including 4000 or 5000 cavalry. This army might operate on the frontiers of Portugal in Spanish Estremadura, and it would serve as the link between the kingdoms of Galicia and Andalusia: it would give Great Britain the preponderance in the conduct of the war in the Peninsula; and whatever might be the result of the Spanish exertions, Portugal would be saved from the French grasp. You know best whether you could bear the expense, or what part of it the Portuguese government would or could defray. But if you should adopt this plan, you must send everything from England—arms, ammunition, clothing, and accoutrements, ordnance, flour, oats, &c. These articles must find their way to the frontier,

partly by the navigation of the Douro and Tagus, and partly by other means.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. The ground I have for believing that Castaños has beaten Dupont is, that I have read a copy of his dispatch to the Junta of Seville, published in the Coimbra Gazette. Its purport is nearly what I have stated in my dispatch, excepting only that Dupont may have surrendered with his army, and that the French force in the Sierra Morena, not engaged in the action of the 20th, may have capitulated, on condition of being sent to France by sea. I do not understand Portuguese well enough to say whether this is not the case, and somebody has taken away the Gazette. ‘ A. W.

‘ 2d P.S. You will observe that I have exceeded my authority in ordering Spencer to draw for £100,000 upon England, and to advance that sum to the Junta at Seville; of which act I hope you will see the propriety, and that you will send me an approbation of it. I must mention, however, that since I did it, I have heard that Sir Hew Dalrymple had refused to advance them any money, although he had an authority.

‘ A. W.’

To Colonel Trant.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ On board the Donegal, 1st August, 1808.

‘ I have just received your letter of this day; and I shall write to the Bishop in order to have it ascertained whether or not the Portuguese troops under General Freire are to co-operate with me. If they should do so, I shall send you a project for the march combined with that of the British troops.

‘ You are mistaken in supposing that I shall march on Wednesday, or that any day is fixed for my march; but I shall take care to give you due notice of it, and will beg you to communicate it to General Freire, and to press him not to move forward until I shall be ready.

‘ The arms were sent on shore this day, and you shall have the 10,000 flints.

‘ I prefer the mares to the stallions for our cavalry.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Trant.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Juiz de Fora at Figueira.*

‘ SIR,

‘ H.M.S. Donegal, 1st August, 1808.

‘ As a part of the troops under my command have landed, and their horses, and the mules and cattle belonging to the people of the country, which are with the camp, situated near the village of Lavaos, are in want of grain and forage, I shall be much obliged to you if you will give directions that forage and grain may be collected at Lavaos for the use of the cattle, and mules, and horses, for which the Commissary will pay.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Juiz de Fora*
‘ *at Figueira.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMISSARY GENERAL.

‘ H.M.S. Donegal, 1st August, 1808.

‘ 1st. The troops will land with four days’ bread and two days’ meat; and it will be necessary to keep up that supply at the village of Lavaos, so that, when the army shall march, the troops may carry, each man, four days’ bread.

‘ 2d. Besides this quantity of bread to be carried by the men themselves, a quantity, equal to three days’ consumption for 10,000 men, must be carried, if possible, on the backs of mules; viz., two bags, or 224 lbs., on each mule; this will require 130 mules.

‘ 3d. Besides these seven days’ bread to move with the troops, the Lieutenant General desires that ten days’ bread, five days’ meat, and ten days’ spirits, for 10,000 men, should move from Lavaos about the same time, by the carts of the country, to be formed into a depôt about seventy miles in advance. This will require—

| | | | | | Carts. |
|---------|---|---|---|---|--------|
| Bread | . | . | . | . | 170 |
| Meat | . | . | . | . | 100 |
| Spirits | . | . | . | . | 37 |
| Total | . | . | . | . | 307 |

These carts must be levied, and will be relieved at Leyria.

‘ 4th. The Medical department will require two carts to

* The Magistrate in a Portuguese town.

march with the army, carrying twenty four bearers for wounded men, a case of utensils, and a medicine chest.

‘ 5th. The artillery will require, to move with the army, 250 mules, each to carry 2000 rounds of musket ammunition.

‘ 6th. The Quarter Master General’s department will require thirty mules to carry intrenching tools.

‘ 7th. The Commissary General will make arrangements for supplying the troops at Lavaos with bread, meat, spirits, and wood.

‘ 8th. The Commissary General will see in the General Orders to what day the troops, as they disembark, will have bread and meat, and he will provide accordingly for their subsistence.

‘ 9th. The horses will land, each with three days’ forage and oats: provision must be made for them after the 3d instant; but as the demand must be small, it is concluded that the country will experience no difficulty in supplying their wants, and therefore no provision is made for carrying forward forage or oats.

‘ 10th. The muleteers and carmen are to be provisioned from this date, and their cattle foraged.

‘ 11th. Bread, &c. to be landed from the ships accordingly.
‘ A. W.’

PROCLAMATION

By the Commanders in Chief of His Britannic Majesty’s Land and Sea Forces, employed to assist the loyal Inhabitants of the Kingdom of Portugal.

‘ PEOPLE OF PORTUGAL.

‘ The time is arrived to rescue your country, and restore the government of your lawful Prince.

‘ His Britannic Majesty, our most gracious King and master, has, in compliance with the wishes and ardent supplications for succour from all parts of Portugal, sent to your aid a British army, directed to co-operate with his fleet, already on your coast.

‘ The English soldiers, who land upon your shore, do so with every sentiment of friendship, faith, and honor.

‘ The glorious struggle in which you are engaged is for

all that is dear to man—the protection of your wives and children; the restoration of your lawful Prince; the independence, nay, the very existence of your kingdom; and for the preservation of your holy religion. Objects like these can only be obtained by distinguished examples of fortitude and constancy.

‘The noble struggle against the tyranny and usurpation of France will be jointly maintained by Portugal, Spain, and England; and in contributing to the success of a cause so just and glorious, the views of His Britannic Majesty are the same as those by which you are yourselves animated.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘Lavas, 2d August, 1808.’

‘CHARLES COTTON.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMISSARY GENERAL.

‘Lavas, 3d August, 1808.

‘1st. The 130 mules allotted to carry three days’ bread for the army should be divided into three divisions, each consisting of thirty five mules, and to be handed over to the Assistant Commissary attached to each of the brigades, the remaining twenty five being handed over to the Commissary attached to head quarters.

‘2d. The Assistant Commissaries are to be directed to give the muleteers each a ration of bread and meat daily, and to forage the mules.

‘3d. The 250 mules for the artillery must be mustered and set apart, and an Assistant Commissary must be appointed to take charge of them and forage them, and give rations to the drivers.

‘4th. Twelve of the best mules, now with the army, to be selected for draft, and these will answer for the intrenching tools, instead of the thirty before ordered. These must be handed over to the chief Engineer, and the Commissary General must provide rations for the mules and muleteers.

‘5th. A head muleteer, or *capitane*, to be appointed to superintend each division attached to the Assistant Commissaries of brigades, and to every fifty of the mules attached to the artillery, for the carriage of musket ammunition, and to the 100 mules ordered to be retained in the next article.

These head muleteers, if not otherwise paid in the service, to receive one shilling per diem, besides rations.

‘ 6th. One hundred mules, with drivers, to be retained in case of the arrival of reinforcements, and 150 carts, in addition to those ordered to be retained for particular service on the 1st instant.

‘ 7th. The mules and carts for the service being ascertained, the Commissary General should select them from the numbers now attending camp: he must put all the carts ordered on the 1st instant, and those and the mules ordered this day, in charge of an Assistant Commissary General, who will muster them, forage the mules and cattle, and give rations of bread and meat to the drivers.

‘ 8th. All the carts and mules above this number to be discharged.

‘ 9th. A head driver must be appointed for every fifty carts, ordered by the Memorandum of the 1st instant, and by the 5th article of that of this day; and if not already in the service, this man to be paid one shilling a day besides his ration.

‘ 10th. The carts and mules must do all the duty of the army till they shall be required to perform the particular services allotted to them in the Memorandum of the 1st and of this day.

‘ A. W.’

To Colonel Trant.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Lavaos, 3d August, 1808.

‘ I received your letter of the 2d this morning. I shall be perfectly satisfied if I can get 5000 regular troops and 2000 irregulars; upon which subject I have begged Colonel Brown to communicate with the Bishop; and I am decidedly of opinion that it is necessary to watch the enemy’s movements from the northward, and upon the Douro, with the remainder of the Portuguese troops that can be collected; for I acknowledge that I give no credit to the truth of the reported second or third Spanish victories at Benavente.

‘ It is very evident from your account that the Portuguese are not accurately informed even of the first action which was fought, not on the 12th, but the 14th of July; and not at Benavente, to which town the Spanish troops retreated, but at Rio Seco.

‘ I think that it would be attended with good consequences if I could see General Freire; and if you will settle a meeting with him I will go over to Monte Mor ó Velho on any day, at any hour, he will fix.

‘ I understood that you did not want any ammunition for the Portuguese troops.

‘ Are the 75,000 rounds to be fixed at Leyria for them ?

‘Believe me, &c.’

'Colonel Trant.'

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, Bart.

' SIR. ' Head Quarters at Lavaos, 4th August, 1808.

‘ I have just had the honor of receiving your dispatches of the 29th and 31st, by the *Scout*.

‘ In the letter which I had the honor of addressing to you on the 31st of July, I requested that in case the fleet, having on board the equipment for the heavy ordnance, or that having General Spencer, or that having a reinforcement from England, should arrive at the Tagus, you would order them to Figueira; and I conclude that you will have ordered the fleet of transports, having on board General Spencer's corps, to come here immediately.

‘ Upon a full consideration of all that passed between you and me upon the subject of disembarkations to be made in the bay of Lisbon, or to the northward, and in the neighbourhood of the Rock, I was convinced that it was a very hazardous undertaking for those who should attempt it, as well as for those who should depend upon the assistance and co-operation of the troops intended to be disembarked in that quarter.

‘ In respect to a disembarkation in the country south of the Tagus, it appeared to me to be a division of our force, likely to be attended with bad consequences to one, if not to both of our divisions; and therefore, upon the whole, I thought it better to concentrate our force at the earliest possible period, and to land the whole here, as being in every respect the most convenient landing place, and the most eligible spot from which to proceed to the attack of the enemy’s force in Portugal. On this ground, I re-

requested you to send General Spencer here, and in expectation of his arrival, I have disembarked my own corps, and wait only for his junction to commence my operations.

‘ I am fully aware of the advantage to be derived by diverting the enemy’s attention to the bay of Lisbon, during my advance towards that city; and, accordingly, I propose to send a battalion to the fleet, which is not very capable of making an active march, but may enable you, with the assistance of the marines of the fleet, to make a very seasonable diversion in my favor.

‘ I had heard a report that a detachment of the French army had crossed the Tagus, and I entertained some apprehensions for the fate of the Spanish detachment in Alentejo; and I am now happy to find, from such good authority, that it has returned northward.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Admiral*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Sir Charles Cotton, Bart.’

To Lieut. Colonel Brown.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Lavaos, 4th August, 1808.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 3d, and am much obliged to you for the exertions you have made to procure the mules for us: if you can get us 100, that number will, I imagine, be sufficient.

‘ I should be very glad to see you and Mr. Walsh here as soon as you can come over. I expect General Spencer with his corps every moment, and I propose to march as soon as he shall arrive.

‘ We shall be much distressed for the want of about 150 draft mules, to complete the draft of General Spencer’s artillery, which I was in hopes I should have had from the 500 which I expected Mr. Walsh would have purchased for me. Can he, or you, or the Portuguese Commander in Chief do anything to assist us in this way? Are there no draft mules left in the country?

‘ I am obliged to you for my chaise and cart, which I request you to send over as soon as you can. The Bishop *must*, however, receive payment for them.

‘ Tell Colonel Trant that I do not write to him, as I have nothing particular to say.

‘ I have received from Sir Charles Cotton, and from Seville, the official accounts of Castaños’ victory.

‘ The French, who had crossed the Tagus on the 26th, had retired again to this side of the river before the 31st. You may tell the gentlemen at Coimbra, and the Bishop, that this is certain.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Brown.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. Colonel Trant.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Lavaos, 6th August, 1808.

‘ I received your letter of the 5th at 3 this morning. I shall meet General Freire at Monte Mor, at 12 to-morrow.

‘ I was apprehensive that the Spaniards in Alentejo would suffer, when I heard that the French detachment had crossed the Tagus; but I was in hopes that they had not time to effect anything of importance, when I heard they had returned before the 31st. I hope now that the Spaniards retreated in good time, and that they have lost only their rear guard.

‘ There is nothing so foolish as to push these half disciplined troops forward; for the certain consequence must be, either their early and precipitate retreat, if the enemy should advance, or their certain destruction. I am determined not to move a man of my army till I am fully prepared to support any detachment I may send forward; and for this reason I object to send any troops to Leyria, in answer to various applications which have been made to me by a Portuguese Commissary, who has applied for protection, being, as he says, employed to collect supplies for the British troops, and which will probably fall into the hands of the enemy, if he should not be supported.

‘ I have uniformly objected to sending any detachment or any person forward till I should be enabled effectually to protect them; and I should have sent on in ample time to secure everything for the army that it could require, or that Leyria could afford. It is unfortunate, therefore, that this gentleman has been sent forward, particularly if the conse-

quence should be the loss of the supplies which Leyria might otherwise have afforded.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Trant.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Lavaos, 6th August, 1808.

‘ I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 2d, by the *Nautilus*, which brought General Spencer, and arrived here the day before yesterday. His troops are now coming in. They will land to-morrow, I hope, and I shall begin my march immediately.

‘ I am very much obliged to you for leaving the *Alfred* with us. I shall give Captain Bligh the plan of our marches, and shall arrange with him for our communication, from which I hope not only to derive some advantage in the way of subsistence, but to communicate to you intelligence of our movements. I propose besides to have daily communication by messengers, with Captain Malcolm, at Figueira, until he shall move from hence.

‘ I sent my letters to England by the *Blossom*, which will have reached you. The *Crocodile* is still here; and I thought it best to refrain from asking Captain Malcolm to send her till I should find it absolutely necessary, which has not been the case yet, as vessels have been going down every day.

‘ I am much obliged to you for ordering the ordnance vessels to join us. Your friends from ——— are still here. The arms which I propose giving them are those which the Portuguese troops will give up when they shall have received their new arms, and they are not yet arrived from Coimbra. They are perfectly satisfied with their arms, which, I understand, are serviceable. But if, when they shall arrive, I should find they are not so, I propose giving them 500 stands of new arms. They were a little alarmed when they heard that the French had crossed the Tagus, and I have not seen them since I heard from you that they had returned again.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Admiral*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‡ *Sir Charles Cotton, Bart.*

‘ I have written to you officially respecting the proclamation, in which I have made only a verbal alteration, and I have had a better translation made of it.’

To Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, Bart.

' SIR,

' Lavas, 6th August, 1808.

' I have had the honor of receiving your letter, in which you have enclosed the draft of a proclamation which, in your opinion, ought to be published to the Portuguese nation upon the commencement of the military operations. As I concur entirely in opinion with you, I have affixed your name and my own to a copy of this proclamation, and have directed that it may be published at Coimbra. I shall circulate it in the country, and send a certain number of copies to you.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Admiral*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Sir Charles Cotton, Bart.'

To Brigadier General Acland, &c.

' SIR,

' Lavas, 7th August, 1808.

' Having been informed by a dispatch from the Secretary of State, dated 15th July, that you was ordered to proceed from England to join the army under my command, I beg that, upon the receipt of this letter, you will proceed along the coast of Portugal till you shall join the *Alfred*, Captain Bligh, with a convoy, which ship will attend the movements of the army; and you will receive from Captain Bligh instructions to guide your future operations.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

' *Brigadier General Acland, or Officer commanding a corps composed of the following regiments; viz.—2d Batt., 9th Foot—2d Batt., 43d—2d Batt., 52d and 97th—the Queen's, or 2d Reg.—20th Foot—and two Companies, 95th.'*

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

' MY LORD,

' Lavas, 8th August, 1808.

' I have the honor to inform you that Major General Spencer arrived in Mondego Bay on the night of the 5th instant, and was followed by a part of the corps under his command on the 6th, and the remainder on the 7th, and the whole have been disembarked in the course of yesterday

and this day. The General had determined to embark, in obedience to your Lordship's instructions of the 30th June, on the 21st July, when he received intelligence of the defeat of Dupont, and he consequently had not seen my instructions to him of the 26th July, copies of which I transmitted to your Lordship in my last letter.

'I have received your Lordship's letter of the 21st July; and I had already requested the Captains commanding His Majesty's ships off Cape Finisterre to communicate to all vessels and convoys coming from England that the army under my command was landing in Mondego Bay.

'I propose to commence my march on the day after tomorrow, and I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter, which I have left here to be delivered to Sir Harry Burrard, in which I have communicated to him the state of affairs in Spain and Portugal, as far as I have been able to obtain a knowledge of them. I have sent a copy of this letter to Sir Hew Dalrymple.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*Viscount Castlereagh.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. General Sir Harry Burrard, Bart.

'SIR,

'Lavaos, 8th August, 1808.'

'Having received instructions from the Secretary of State, that you were likely to arrive on the coast of Portugal with a corps of 10,000 men, lately employed in the north of Europe under the orders of Sir John Moore, I now submit to you such information as I have received regarding the general state of the war in Portugal and Spain, and the plan of operations which I am about to carry into execution, in obedience to the orders of the Secretary of State.

'The enemy's force at present in Portugal consists, as far as I am able to form an opinion, of from 16,000 to 18,000 men, of which number there are about 500 in the Fort of Almeida, about the same number in Elvas, about 600 or 800 at Peniche, and 1600 or 1800 in the province of Alentejo, at Setuval, &c., and the remainder are disposable for the defence of Lisbon, and are in the forts of St. Julian and Cascaes, in the batteries along the coast as far as the Rock of Lisbon, and in the old citadel of Lisbon, to which the enemy have lately added some works.

‘ Of the force disposable for the defence of Lisbon, the enemy have lately detached a corps of about 2000 men under General Thomière, principally, I believe, to watch my movements, which corps is now at Alcobaça; and another corps, of 4000 men, under General Loison was sent across the Tagus into Alentejo, on the 26th of last month: the object of which detachment was to disperse the Portuguese insurgents in that quarter; to force the Spanish corps, consisting of about 2000 men, which had advanced into Portugal as far as Evora from Estremadura, to retire; and thus to be enabled to add, to the force destined for the defence of Lisbon, the corps of French troops which had been stationed at Setuval and in the province of Alentejo. At all events, Loison’s corps will return to Lisbon, and the French corps disposable for the defence of that place will probably be about 14,000 men, of which at least 3000 must be left in the garrison and forts on the coast and in the river.

‘ The French army under Dupont in Andalusia surrendered, on the 20th of last month, to the Spanish army under the command of General Castaños; so that there are now no French troops in the south of Spain.

‘ The Spanish army of Galicia and Castille, to the northward, received a check at Rio Seco, in the province of Valladolid, on the 14th July, from a French corps supposed to be under the command of General Bessières, which had advanced from Burgos.

‘ The Spanish troops retired on the 15th to Benavente, and I understand there has since been an affair between the advanced posts in that neighbourhood; but I am not certain of it, nor am I acquainted with the position of the Spanish army, or of that of the French, since the 14th of July. When you shall have been a short time in this country, and shall have observed the degree to which the deficiency of real information is supplied by the circulation of unfounded reports, you will not be surprised at my want of accurate knowledge upon these subjects.

‘ It is, however, certain that nothing of importance has occurred in that quarter since the 14th of July, and from this circumstance I conclude that the corps of Marshal Bessières attacked the Spanish army at Rio Seco, solely with

a view to cover the march of King Joseph Buonaparte to Madrid, where he arrived on the 21st of July.

‘ Besides the defeat in Andalusia, the enemy, as you may probably have heard, have been beaten off in an attack upon Zaragoza, in Aragon; in another upon the city of Valencia (in both of which actions it is said that they have lost many men); and it is reported, that in Catalonia two of their detachments have been cut off, and that they have lost the Fort of Figueiras in the Pyrenees, and that Barcelona is blockaded: of these last mentioned actions and operations I have seen no official accounts, but the report of them is generally circulated and believed. At all events, whether these reports are founded or otherwise, it is obvious that the insurrection against the French is general throughout Spain; that large bodies of Spaniards are in arms (among others, in particular, an army of 20,000 men, including 4000 cavalry, at Almaraz, on the Tagus, in Estremadura); that the French cannot carry on their operations by means of small corps. I should imagine from their inactivity, and from the misfortunes they have suffered, that they have not the means of collecting a force sufficiently large to oppose the progress of the insurrection and the efforts of the insurgents, and to afford support to their different detached corps; or that they find they cannot carry on their operations, with armies so numerous as they must find it necessary to employ, without magazines.

‘ In respect to Portugal, the whole kingdom, with the exception of the neighbourhood of Lisbon, is in a state of insurrection against the French; their means of resistance are, however, less powerful than those of the Spaniards. Their troops have been completely dispersed, their Officers had gone off to the Brazils, and their arsenals pillaged, or in the power of the enemy. Their revolt, under the circumstances in which it has taken place, is still more extraordinary than that of the Spanish nation.

‘ The Portuguese may have, in the northern parts of the kingdom, about 10,000 men in arms, of which number 5000 are to march with me towards Lisbon; the remainder, with a Spanish detachment of about 1500 men, which came from Galicia, are employed in a distant blockade of Almeida, and

in the protection of Oporto, which is at present the seat of government.

‘ The insurrection is general throughout Alentejo and Algarve to the southward, and Entre Minho e Douro, and Tras os Montes, and Beira, to the northward ; but for want of arms the people can do nothing against the enemy.

‘ Having consulted Sir C. Cotton, it appeared to him and to me, that the attack proposed upon Cascaes Bay was impracticable, because the bay is well defended by the Fort of Cascaes, and the other works constructed for its defence, and the ships of war could not approach sufficiently near to silence them. The landing in the Paço d’Arcos in the Tagus could not be effected without silencing Fort St. Julian, which appeared to be impracticable to those who were to carry that operation into execution.

‘ There are small bays within, and others to the northward of the Rock of Lisbon, which might admit of landing troops ; but they are all defended by works which must first have been silenced : they are of small extent, and but few men could have landed at the same time : there is always a surf on them, which affects the facility of landing at different times so materially, as to render it very doubtful whether the troops first landed could be supported in sufficient time by the others ; and whether the horses for the artillery and cavalry, and the necessary stores and provisions, could be landed at all.

‘ These inconveniencies attending a landing in any of the bays near the Rock of Lisbon would have been aggravated by the neighbourhood of the enemy to the landing place, and by the exhausted state of the country in which the troops would have been landed.

‘ It was obviously the best plan, therefore, to land in the northern parts of Portugal, and I fixed upon Mondego Bay, as the nearest place which afforded any facility for landing excepting Peniche ; the landing place of which peninsula is defended by a fort occupied by the enemy, which it would be necessary to attack regularly, in order to place the ships in safety.

‘ A landing to the northward was further recommended, as it would insure the co-operation of the Portuguese troops on the expedition to Lisbon. The whole of the

corps placed under my command, including those under the command of General Spencer, having landed, I propose to march on Wednesday. I shall take the road by Alcobaça and Obidos, with a view to keep up my communication by the sea coast, and to examine the situation of Peniche; and I shall proceed towards Lisbon by the route of Mafra, and by the hills to the northward of that city.

‘As I understood from the Secretary of State that a body of troops under the command of Brig. General Acland may be expected on the coast of Portugal before you will arrive, I have written to desire that he will proceed from hence along the coast of Portugal to the southward; and I propose to communicate with him by the means of Captain Bligh, of the *Alfred*, who will attend the movements of the army, with a few transports, having on board provisions and military stores. I intend to order Brig. General Acland to attack Peniche, if I should find it necessary to obtain possession of that place; and if not, I propose to order him to join the fleet stationed off the Tagus, with a view to disembark in one of the bays near the Rock of Lisbon, as soon as I shall approach sufficiently near to enable him to perform that operation.

‘If I imagined that General Acland’s corps was equipped in such a manner as to be enabled to move from the coast, I should have directed him to land at Mondego, and to march upon Santarem, from which situation he would have been at hand either to assist my operations or to cut off the retreat of the enemy, if he should endeavour to make it either by the north of the Tagus and Almcida, or by the south of the Tagus and Elvas. But as I am convinced that General Acland’s corps is intended to form part of some other corps, which is provided with a commissariat; that he will have none with him; and, consequently, that his corps must depend upon the country; and as no reliance can be placed upon the resources of this country, I have considered it best to direct the General’s attention to the sea coast.

‘If, however, the command of the army remained in my hands, I should certainly land the corps which has been lately under the command of Sir John Moore at Mondego, and should move it upon Santarem.

‘I have the honor to enclose a return of the troops under my command, and the copy of a letter which I have written

to Captain Malcolm, of the *Donegal*, in which the mode of disposing the transports is stated.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

Sir Harry Burrard, Bart., &c.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. Colonel Robe, commanding the Royal Artillery.

‘ SIR,

‘ Lavaos, 8th August, 1808.

‘ I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date, representing the inadequacy of the assistance in the Civil department of the Ordnance with which you have been provided for this service; the same being only one clerk of stores, who is also Paymaster, and five conductors of stores, two of whom have never yet joined.

‘ I have to acquaint you, in reply thereto, that although I fully concur with you in considering the establishment insufficient for the performance of all the duties required of it, yet I do not consider myself warranted in giving my authority for the increase of the same, or of granting any allowance to persons holding the temporary appointments in the Ordnance department, until the sanction of the Board be obtained. It is, therefore, not in my power to make the appointment *pro tempore*, specified in the scale annexed to your letter.

‘ I have likewise to acquaint you, in reply to your letter of this date, respecting the appointment of a Brigade Major, in consequence of the junction of the two detachments, by the arrival of Major General Spencer’s corps, that however the extension of your duties may render the assistance of such a Staff Officer necessary, I have it not in my power to make the appointment, nor to issue allowance to any Officer acting in that capacity, without the concurrence of the Board of Ordnance.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Robe, R.A.’*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY,

To Captain Malcolm, H.M.S. Donegal.

‘ SIR,

‘ Lavaos, 8th August, 1808.

‘ The following appears to be the result of the conference which I had with you this morning, respecting the future dis-

position of the fleet of transports for the convenience and benefit of the service.

‘ That the ships stated in the margin shall sail under convoy of H. M. S. *Alfred*, on the day that the army shall march from this place. I shall communicate to Captain Bligh the project of the march of the army, and shall request of him to bring to an anchor off the places in the neighbourhood of which we may be on the different days, in order that (if we should require it) we may communicate with him.

‘ That such of the transports as may be, in your opinion, capable of keeping the sea should remain with you at anchor, or otherwise, off the Mondego; and that all the remainder should be ordered into Oporto or the Mondego. I beg of you to let me know the names and numbers of each, and their contents. It would be desirable that an Officer should be left with each division, to facilitate getting the ships out of these harbours in case an enemy should approach.

‘ That measures should be adopted for giving the Veteran Battalion more space; and that in addition to the ships in which that corps is now embarked, three of the ships allotted to the 6th regiment should be given to them, and I beg that you will let me know their names. This regiment is then to be sent to the fleet off the Tagus, and it is desirable that the Officer who shall take them under his convoy should keep as near to the coast as may be possible.

‘ I shall establish a daily communication with you, and shall let you know regularly my progress; from which you will be enabled to judge, according to circumstances, when it may be necessary for you to move from Mondego Bay.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Captain Malcolm, R.N.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Lvaos, 8th August, 1808.

‘ My dispatch contains the fullest information upon every subject, and I have nothing to add to it. I have had the greatest difficulty in organizing my commissariat for the march, and that department is very incompetent, notwithstanding the arrangements which I made with Huskisson upon the subject. This department deserves your serious attention. The existence of the army depends upon it, and

yet the people who manage it are incapable of managing anything out of a counting house.

‘ I shall be obliged to leave Spencer’s guns behind for want of means of moving them ; and I should have been obliged to leave my own, if it were not for the horses of the Irish Commissariat. Let nobody ever prevail upon you to send a corps to any part of Europe without horses to draw their guns. It is not true that horses lose their condition at sea.

‘ I have just heard that Joseph Buonaparte left Madrid for France, accompanied by all the French, on the 29th of last month.

‘ I have received your private letter of the 21st of July, for which I am much obliged to you. I shall be the junior of the Lieutenant Generals ; however, I am ready to serve the government wherever and as they please.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple.

‘ SIR,

‘ Lavaos, 8th August, 1808.

‘ I have been apprised by the Secretary of State that His Majesty has been pleased to appoint you to command his troops employed in this part of Europe, and it becomes my duty to make you acquainted with the situation of affairs in Portugal.

‘ In order to perform this duty in the best manner in my power, I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter and of its enclosures, which I have written to Lieut. General Sir Harry Burrard, who is expected to arrive on the coast of Portugal to command a corps of troops.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General
Sir Hew Dalrymple.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple.

‘ SIR,

‘ Lavaos, 8th August, 1808.

‘ I have the honor to inform you that when I commanded His Majesty’s troops employed in this part of the world, I deemed it proper to authorize and direct Major General

Spencer, who was at that time, as I imagined, at or near Cadiz, to draw upon the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury for the sum of £100,000, and to advance that sum to such persons as the Junta of Seville shall appoint to receive it.

' I gave these directions in consequence of the impression I received from Major General Spencer by letter, and verbally by Captain Cooke, the Assistant Adjutant General, of the great distress to which the Junta of Seville were reduced; and from a knowledge which I had, that His Majesty would be disposed to relieve that distress by an advance of money, from what he had been graciously pleased to do in respect of the Junta of Galicia.

' I desired General Spencer to apprise, by letter, the person who I thought it likely would be sent from England with money for the use of the Junta of Seville, that he had made this advance, and to request him to send £100,000 of the money with which he might be charged to Portugal for the use of the army.

' Major General Spencer left the coast of Spain before he received these instructions, and, consequently, the Junta of Seville did not receive the aid which I had intended to afford them; and I now apprise you of these circumstances, in order that you may adopt such measures in respect to them as you may think proper.

' I apprised the Secretary of State, in a letter which I addressed to him on the 1st of August, that I had given General Spencer the directions to which I have above referred.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Lieut. General*
Sir Hew Dalrymple.

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple.

' SIR,

' Lavaos, 8th August, 1808.

' I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 16th and 24th of July, for which I am much obliged to you.

' Major General Spencer arrived in Mondego Bay on Friday the 5th, and a part of his corps followed him on the 6th. They were disembarked yesterday and this day; but I am sorry

to say, that we have not been joined by the detachment of artillery and ordnance which you stated, in your letter of the 24th, that you had directed to join us.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*
Sir Hew Dalrymple.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MARCH OF THE BRIGADE COMMANDED
BY BRIGADIER GENERAL FANE.

‘ Lavaos, 8th August, 1808.

‘ Major General Fane will be pleased to march to-morrow morning at 3 o'clock with the brigade under his command (60th regiment, 95th regiment, 50th dragoons, and detachment of Royal Artillery), and take his post in front of St. Gião. Captain Douglas, Assistant Quarter Master General, will point out the ground. Captain Gower will attend the column from the camp to show the road.

‘ In the evening he will be pleased to push forward some dragoons, with a detachment of 200 infantry, as far as may be judged expedient; and should intelligence be received that the enemy are not at Leyria or in the neighbourhood, General Fane will cause the town of Leyria to be occupied by this detachment either to-morrow evening or on Wednesday morning.

‘ Should he find that the enemy are in any force at or in the neighbourhood of Leyria, he will withdraw the detachment and remain in front of St. Gião until he receives orders from Sir Arthur Wellesley, to whom he will transmit the earliest intelligence he may obtain.

‘ Brig. General Fane will be pleased to cause a detachment to remain in camp to deliver over the camp equipage of the 60th and 95th regiments to the storekeeper, who will be on the ground at 3 o'clock, A.M. to receive it.

‘ The tents are to be packed up in bales ready for embarkation, with the number on each bale marked on the outside, and they are to be packed on the waggons by the detachments of the regiments.

‘ An assistant Commissary will attend the brigade to supply provisions. He will also make every inquiry respecting the resources which the army may be likely to find at

and near Leyria; and Brig. General Fane will be pleased to give him any assistance he may require to execute this duty.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL TRANT.

‘5000 stands of English arms will be landed to-morrow morning at Figueira, to be at the disposal of Colonel Trant. The intention in landing these arms is, that they should be given to the regular Portuguese troops under the command of General Freire. Of the 5000 stands which they will give up, 500 must be delivered to Colonel Trant, in order that they may be given to the deputies of Sines, for whom the Admiral has requested to have 500 stands of arms. These deputies will have a note for Colonel Trant, to request him to deliver those arms to them.

‘Colonel Trant will inform me if musket ammunition should be wanted for the 5000 arms.

‘Colonel Trant will inquire from General Freire, if a small advance of money would be likely to stimulate the exertions of his troops; and will let me know what amount would be required.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major General Hill.

‘MY DEAR HILL,

‘Lavaos, 9th August, 1808.

‘I enclose the copy of the orders which I gave General Fane, since which, having received intelligence that rendered it possible that the enemy might be in strength at Leyria, have directed him to halt, till further orders, at a wood about a mile in front of the advanced post on the high road to Leyria.

‘You will march with your own brigade, and General Ferguson’s will join General Fane where he is directed to halt; and you will proceed with the whole to St. Gião, where you will halt and put up for this day. There is a position with water in front of St. Gião, towards Leyria, which may answer for you.

‘If you should hear that the enemy are already in possession of Leyria, it is not worth while to drive them out this afternoon; but if you should have reason to believe that they

are not in possession of Leyria, I recommend that you should allow 200 of the riflemen and a few dragoons to feel their way into Leyria, as it is very important, if the enemy be not already there that they should not be allowed to get in there this night.

If you should obtain possession with your 200 men, support them with your whole corps, at as early an hour as possible in the morning, and take up your position in front of Leyria, and halt there to-morrow; but if you should find the enemy in possession of Leyria when you arrive at St. Gião, and you should not send on the detachment of the rifle corps, you will halt at St. Gião in the morning, till I shall join you, which will probably be at 5 or 6 o'clock, and you will be prepared to march at that hour.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Hill.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. I have desired Ferguson to move with his brigade as soon as he shall have got his bread, and join General Fane, and then proceed on the high road to St. Gião. You will do well to order your brigade to proceed on its march when it shall be ready with bread, &c., and join General Fane yourself immediately, and proceed on to St. Gião with the first brigade that will join you.’

‘ A. W.’

To Captain Bligh, H.M.S. Alfred.

‘ Sir,

‘ Lavaos, 9th August, 1808.

‘ You will probably receive instructions from Captain Malcolm to take under your charge certain victualling and ordnance store ships, the names of which are in the margin, with a view to take them down the coast of Portugal, and to endeavor to keep up a communication with the army under my command on its advance towards Lisbon.

‘ With this view it is necessary that I should apprise you of the project of my marches, and I have accordingly the honor to inform you that the army will be at Leyria on Thursday the 11th, and at Alcobaça on Friday the 12th, or Saturday the 13th. I mention the last day, as it is possible that I may have to halt one day at Leyria for the Portuguese troops.

‘ I think it desirable that you should not appear off the coast of Nazareth till Friday evening, as otherwise you would

acquaint the enemy with my intended route. If I should wish you to be there earlier I shall write to you from Leyria.

‘ At Nazareth you shall hear from me respecting my future plans.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Captain Bligh, R.N.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. General Sir H. Burrard, Bart.

‘ Camp at Lugar, 8 miles N. of Leyria,

10th August, 1808.

‘ SIR,

‘ Since I wrote to you on the 8th instant, I have received letters from Mr. Stuart and Colonel Doyle from Coruña, of which I enclose copies: from these you will learn the state of the war in that part of Spain; and you will observe that Mr. Stuart and Colonel Doyle are of opinion that Marshal Bessières will take advantage of the inefficiency of the Galician army, under General Blake, to detach a corps to Portugal to the assistance of General Junot.

‘ We have not yet heard of this detachment, and I am convinced it will not be made until King Joseph Buonaparte shall either be reinforced to such a degree as to be in safety at Madrid, or till he shall have effected his escape to France; with which view, it is reported, he left Madrid on the 29th of last month; I have therefore, I conceive, time for the operations which I propose to carry on, before a reinforcement can arrive from Leon, even supposing that no obstacles could be opposed to its march in Spain or in Portugal; but it is not probable that it can arrive before the different reinforcements will arrive from England; and as Marshal Bessières had not more than 20,000 in the action at Rio Seco on 16th July, I conceive that the British troops that will be in Portugal will be equal to contend with any part of that corps which he may detach.

‘ The possibility that in the present state of affairs the French corps at present in Portugal may be reinforced, affords an additional reason for taking the position at Santarem, which I apprised you in my letter of the 8th I should occupy, if the command of the army were to remain in my hands after the reinforcements should arrive: if you should occupy it, you will not only be in the best situation to sup-

port my operations, and to cut off the retreat of the enemy ; but if any reinforcements of French troops should enter Portugal, you will be in the best situation to collect your whole force to oppose it.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

Sir Harry Burrard, Bart., &c.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Charles Stewart, Esq.

‘ Camp at Lugar, 8 miles N. of Leyria,
10th August, 1808.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ I had the pleasure of receiving, this morning, your letter of the 2d, for which I am very much obliged to you.

‘ I do not think that Bessières will venture to make a detachment towards this country till King Joseph Buonaparte shall be in safety in Madrid, or shall have made good his retreat into France, upon which it is said that he had already set out on the 29th of last month.

‘ In either of these cases, I think it probable that an effort will be made to reinforce Junot, which however will be opposed by many natural obstacles in this country, as well as by the forces in Spanish Estremadura, through which province I conclude the reinforcement will pass rather than through the Portuguese provinces of Tras os Montes and Entre Minho e Douro. At all events, I hope to bring to a conclusion the operations, with the conduct of which I am entrusted, before this reinforcement can enter Portugal ; and if I should not, I have reason to expect that 15,000 men will soon arrive here under the command of Sir Harry Burrard, who will be more than a match for Junot and Bessières together.

‘ I was joined by General Spencer on the 6th and 7th. This corps landed in Mondego Bay on the 7th and 8th. The advanced guard marched yesterday, and I have marched this day. I shall have with me about 5000 Portuguese troops, of which there are about 10,000 in all. The other 5000 are employed partly in taking care of Oporto, and partly in a distant blockade of Almeida ; but these last have marched to Castello Branco, I believe, to join the Spanish detachment which is watching Loison’s motions.

‘ This General left Lisbon on the 26th of July, with 4000

or 5000 men (I believe before he knew that we were arrived on the coast), crossed the Tagus, and attacked at Evora a Spanish detachment of about 1000 men from the province of Estremadura, which had entered Alentejo, and some Portuguese peasants and troops, whom he entirely defeated. The object of this march appears to have been to relieve the garrison of Elvas, which has been effected, and to give a check to the insurrection in that part of Portugal.

‘Loison was at Elvas on the 3d of August, and he is now expected, and his arrival apprehended in all parts of Portugal. But I imagine that he will hasten back to oppose me.

‘Be so good as to communicate this letter to Colonel Doyle.

‘I am concerned that our friends of the Junta do not get on well. If we are lucky in this country, and can beat Junot well, and take Elvas and Almeida, we might soon have a general Cortes.

‘I have heard nothing from the south of Spain since the capitulation of Dupont.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Charles Stewart, Esq.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Deputy Commissary General.

‘SIR,

‘Leyria, 11th August, 1808.

‘I beg that you will make a requisition upon the Portuguese Commissary or magistrates here for eighty waggons with bullocks, to be in this town to-morrow, in order to release a similar number arrived from Lavaos with the army, which are to be discharged.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘The Dep. Commis. General.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. Colonel Gordon, Military Secretary to H.R.H.
the Commander in Chief.*

‘SIR,

‘Leyria, 11th August, 1808.

‘I have the honor to inform you that the corps of His Majesty’s troops placed under my command, which sailed from Cork on the 10th of July, arrived off the coast of Portugal on the 23d of that month, and on the 26th the fleet of transports anchored in Mondego Bay, at the recommendation of Admiral Sir C. Cotton, and I went to the fleet at the mouth of the

* Lieut. General Sir Willoughby Gordon, G.C.B., Quarter Master General.

Tagus, to communicate personally with the Admiral on the service, the performance of which had been entrusted to us.

‘ After a full consideration of the subject, it appeared to us both that a landing in the bay, or in the neighbourhood of the Rock of Lisbon, was a very difficult and precarious operation, whether viewed in relation to the strength of the works erected for their defence, to the impossibility of approaching them with the ships of war, or to the state of the surf and its increase with different winds.

‘ To these circumstances were to be added the neighbourhood of the enemy to the probable place of landing, with the whole of his forces, and the impossibility of procuring in the country so near Lisbon, and exhausted as it was, all the means which were requisite to move the provisions and stores which were necessary for the troops.

‘ We considered also, that by making a landing further to the northward we should have the advantage of the co-operation of the Portuguese troops, and of the means of the countries in insurrection against the French government for the supply of His Majesty’s troops.

‘ We therefore determined to land in Mondego Bay, on the northern bank of which, at the entrance of the river, the Admiral had already occupied a small Portuguese redoubt, with 300 marines.

‘ I returned to the fleet on the 30th of July, and on the 1st of August I commenced the disembarkation of the troops, which, on account of the surf which prevails along the coast of Portugal, was not completed till the 5th. On the 6th, General Spencer’s corps, which had remained on shore in Andalusia till the 21st, when the General heard of the surrender of the French army under General Dupont to the Spanish troops under General Castaños, arrived in Mondego Bay, and was landed on the 7th and 8th.

‘ In the mean time all the arrangements had been made for the march of the army, and for the supply of the troops on their way to Lisbon; and the advanced guard moved on the 9th, and the main body yesterday, when the former arrived here, and the latter this day. The Portuguese troops have also broken up from the positions they had for some time occupied in the neighbourhood of Coimbra, and they will arrive here to-morrow.

‘ The French army in Portugal is said to consist of about 16,000 men in the whole, of which number about 5000 or 6000 occupy Lisbon, Forts St. Julian and Cascaes, and the other works erected for the defence of the Tagus and of the Bay of Lisbon; 800 in Peniche, 600 in Almeida, 600 in Elvas, and, it is said, 1600 in Setuval: of the disposable force about 4000 are at Alcobaça, about sixteen miles from hence, under Generals Laborde and Thomière; and the remainder, under Generals Junot and Loison, are in the neighbourhood of Santarem, on the high road to Lisbon.

‘ There are many strong positions on both roads, which I imagine the enemy intend to contest. I shall march by the first, as, although circuitous, I shall be enabled to communicate with a small fleet of victualling and store ships, under charge of Captain Bligh, of H. M. S. *Alfred*, who will attend the march of the army.

‘ I have the satisfaction to inform you that the people of the country have done everything in their power to assist His Majesty’s troops, and have received them in every respect as friends. I have the pleasure to add, that the troops, on the other hand, have conducted themselves remarkably well, and I have not heard one complaint of them since the army landed.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Gordon.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Gordon, Military Secretary to H.R.H.
the Commander in Chief.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Leyria, 11th August, 1808.

‘ I have the honor to acquaint you, for the information of His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, that I found, before the landing of the army under my command in this country, that the exigencies of the service required that I should make an issue of bāt and forage money to the Officers of the different regiments, and forage money to the Officers of the Staff. In my orders for the payment of the same, I have been entirely guided by the schedule of rates enclosed in His Royal Highness’s letter of the 14th of June, with the exception of the Deputy Commissary General, to whom I was induced to authorize an issue of twenty rations, in con-

sequence of that allowance being specified in his instructions from the Lords of the Treasury.

‘ As many Officers of the army have, however, made strong representations to me upon the subject of their allowances, I feel it my duty to refer them to the consideration of His Royal Highness, who will, of course, be better able to judge how far it may be proper to make them known to the Lords of the Treasury.

‘ I have been informed that the Assistant Adjutants General have been in the habit of receiving, for many years back, ten rations of forage money; but at present they only receive six rations, which is four less than what is allowed to Aides de Camp and Brigade Majors, although the latter are Staff situations of an inferior rank.

‘ The Surgeons of regiments have likewise represented to me that the present regulation deprives them of the means of carrying their medicine chest, which has of late years been provided for by their being on a footing with Captains *with* companies. By the present issue, and in conformity with the schedule above referred to, they are paid as Captains *without* companies, and have no allowance for the carriage of the medicine chest but the £10 allowed as preparation money on embarkation in England.

‘ These are the principal and best founded objections to the schedule of rates of bāt and forage money transmitted to me by His Royal Highness, which, it appears, had been approved of by the Lords of the Treasury, notwithstanding that their Lordships have departed from it in the instructions which they have given to the Deputy Commissary General. I shall not, however, deviate from the orders of His Royal Highness.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Gordon.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Gordon, Military Secretary to H.R.H.
the Commander in Chief.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Leyria, 11th August, 1808.

‘ I have but little to add to my public letter of this day, which, of course, you will lay before His Royal Highness.

‘ Some letters which I have received from Colonel Doyle and Mr. Stuart, dated the 2d, at Coruña, mention the inefficiency of the Galician army, and the probability that it will

be employed only to cover the frontiers of Galicia. They therefore suspect that Bessières, whose corps is at or in the neighbourhood of Leon, will detach to the aid of Junot.

‘I do not imagine that Bessières will venture to make any detachment until King Joseph Buonaparte shall have made his retreat into France, with which view he left Madrid on the 29th of July. If I am right in this conjecture, Bessières’s detachment will not be in Portugal, even if its march should not be delayed by the difficulties of the country and by the efforts of the inhabitants of Spain and Portugal, until after I shall be in Lisbon, or, at all events, until our reinforcements shall have arrived.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Gordon.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. General Sir H. Burrard, Bart.

‘MY DEAR SIR HARRY,

‘Leyria, 11th August, 1808.

‘In my official letters of the 8th and 10th I have apprised you of the state of the war in this country and in Spain, and I shall adopt this mode of communicating to you what I know of the resources of this country, and those matters of which it will be convenient to you to be apprised in the operations which you will have to conduct.

‘In the first place, in the present season of the year, you cannot depend upon the country for bread. Portugal never fed itself during more than seven months out of twelve. The common consumption of the country is Indian corn; and the little which there is in the country cannot be ground at this season of the year, as the mills are generally turned by water, and there is now no water in the mill streams; you must therefore depend upon your transports for bread. Wine and beef you will get in the country; and in a short time, straw and Indian corn, or barley, for your horses; but the supply of these articles will not last long: this, however, is a consideration for a future period.

‘I conclude that you will have come equipped with horses to draw your artillery; you will want, therefore, mules to draw the carriages of your reserve musket ammunition, and some to carry a few days’ provisions to march with the troops. I have ordered 150 draught mules at Oporto, with which, if they had come in time, I should have drawn General Spencer’s

brigade of artillery, and you will of course take them. If you will write to the Bishop of Oporto about them, he will send them to you. As for mules for carriage, I am afraid you will get none; for I believe my corps has swept the country, very handsomely, of this animal. You must therefore depend for the carriage of your bread upon the carts of the country, drawn by bullocks; each of these will carry about 600 lbs., and will travel in a day about twelve miles; but I do not believe that any power that you could exert over them, particularly when they shall have already made an exertion against the enemy, by the assistance which they have given to me, would induce the owners of the carts to go from their homes a greater distance than to the nearest place where you could get carts to relieve them.

‘I think, therefore, that, if you should determine to march upon Santarem, you should, in the first instance, form a magazine of bread upon Leyria. Santarem is about thirty miles distant from hence; and this place is about twenty seven miles from the landing place in the Mondego. A magazine here would be safe, until the enemy should quit the Tagus to join a corps, which should enter Portugal by the Douro for his relief. You might be here as soon as he, and, at all events, your magazine would not be in danger unless he should quit the Tagus, which would give you possession of that river, and all the facilities of forming your magazine wherever you might please, as high up as Abrantes.

‘With a view, therefore, to your first operation in Portugal, which I will suppose to be to march to Santarem, I would recommend to you to form a magazine of ten days’ bread and five days’ meat, in case of accidents, at Leyria; and then to keep that quantity up or to increase it as you may find it convenient for your purposes at Santarem. You will probably find it convenient to increase it, in which you will experience no difficulty.

‘You will find the people of this country well disposed to assist you with everything in their power, but they have very little in their power, and they have been terribly plundered by the French. I shall desire the Commissary to let your Commissary know the price of the hire of carts and mules, and of other articles purchased by him.

‘The Quarter Master General shall be directed to make

your Quarter Master General acquainted with everything relative to the roads, &c.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Sir Harry Burrard, Bart.’

To General Freire, commanding the Portuguese Army.

‘ SIR,

‘ Calvario, 13th August, 1808.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Trant informed me this morning of the distress which your troops were likely to suffer from want of bread, and he earnestly urged me, on the part of your Excellency, to issue bread to the Portuguese troops from the British Commissariat.

‘ I must beg leave to call to your Excellency’s recollection what I have repeatedly told you, that it was not in my power to supply the Portuguese troops with bread; and, in fact, when your Excellency shall reflect upon my situation in this country, the distant prospect that Portugal will, in any reasonable time, be able to supply the wants of bread by the British troops; the distance at which we are placed from Great Britain, from whence we must draw our supplies of bread, under these circumstances; and, above all, that I have not made any previous arrangements to answer so extraordinary a demand on the part of your Excellency, you will, I am convinced, do me the justice to believe, that in declining to comply with your wishes, upon this occasion, I have been actuated solely by an attention to those circumstances attending our situation at the present moment, which are most likely to have a fatal influence on the success of the service in which we are both employed.

‘ I beg leave to recal to your Excellency’s recollection what I told you at Oporto, that I could only supply bread to the British troops; that I repeated this to you at Monte Mor ó Velho; and I apprised you in both these conferences that I should require wine and meat for my soldiers, and straw and corn for the horses and cattle attached to the army.

‘ I moved forward in great haste, and at great inconvenience to the army, in order to save the depôt formed at Leyria, as I understand, for the use of the British troops. But when I arrived there, having learned from the Portuguese Com-

missary, that if he delivered the bread to my troops, there would be none for those under the command of your Excellency, I declined to ask for it, and actually received nothing at Leyria excepting wine for one day.

‘I am really much concerned that your Excellency’s troops should suffer any distress; but you must be aware that the arrangements for providing for them have not fallen upon me; and that I have not required a greater proportion of the resources of the country (particularly not bread) than is necessary for those of His Majesty; and I trust that your Excellency will see the propriety of adopting some arrangement which will provide effectually for the subsistence of the army which you will march to Lisbon; at the same time, that you will allow His Majesty’s troops to enjoy such of the resources of the country as I have above mentioned, which they require.

‘As it is now certain that General Loison has marched from Thomar towards Torres Novas, I do not see any inconvenience that can result to your Excellency from halting at Leyria this day, or perhaps to-morrow, at which time I hope you will have it in your power to make the arrangements for your supply which I have recommended.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*General Freire.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. Colonel Trant.

‘Calvario, 13th August, 1808.

$\frac{1}{2}$ past 4, P.M.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘I have just received your letter of this date, and I am concerned to find that the arrangements to enable the Portuguese army to take the field, in co-operation with the British troops, have been so much neglected as to render that measure impracticable. I have written to General Freire this day upon the subject of his supplies, upon which I have nothing further to say.

‘As to his plan of operations, I do not see what purpose it is to answer, in view to the result of the campaign; and I certainly can never give my sanction to anything which appears so useless, and so crudely digested, so far as even to promise to communicate with or aid the person who is carrying it into execution.

‘ I have one proposition to make to General Freire, that is, that he should send me his cavalry and his light infantry, and a corps of 1000 regular infantry, to be employed as I choose, and I engage to give these men their bread ; and for meat, wine, and forage, they shall fare as well as our troops. If he will accept of this proposition, let the troops join me to-morrow at Alcobaça. If he does not, I beg that he will carry on such operations as he may think proper.

‘ I shall execute the orders which I have received from my government, without the assistance of the Portuguese government ; and General Freire will have to justify himself with the existing government of Portugal, with his Prince, and with the world, for having omitted to stand forward upon this interesting occasion, and for having refused to send me the assistance which it is in his power to give.

‘ I propose sending the correspondence which has passed on this subject to the Bishop of Oporto.

‘ In respect to yourself, as it appears to me that no object is answered by your remaining with General Freire, with whom I do not see how I can have any communication, you may as well come away, if he should persist in his intention not to send me the cavalry or the infantry : otherwise, or if he should intend to co-operate more nearly in our plan of operations, I shall beg of you to stay with him.

‘ Believe me, &c. .

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Trant.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. Upon again reading over the plan of operations, it appears to me to be decided upon, as the army is to march this night ; if so, I see no reason whatever why you should stay with General Freire.’

‘ A. W.’

To Lieut. Colonel Trant.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Alcobaça, 14th August, 1808.

‘ The army arrived here at 10 this morning, the enemy having retreated from their position in the night, of which circumstance I beg you to acquaint General Freire.

‘ I now beg leave to communicate to you, for his inform-

ation, the few observations which I intended to make upon the plan of operations which he intended to adopt with his own corps.

‘ I have to observe, in the first place, that it is entirely foreign to any co-operation with me; and it must be considered as distinct in itself, and unconnected with my troops.

‘ It is obvious, that whether I am too weak to contend with General Junot, or sufficiently strong for him, there is nothing in common between the Portuguese troops and me. My object is to obtain possession of Lisbon, and to that I must adhere, whatever may be the consequence, till I shall have attained it, as being the first and greatest step towards dispossessing the French of Portugal. They may fight an action with me and retire, or they may retire without fighting, or, what I hope is least probable, they may defeat me.

‘ In the last hypothesis, I have no assistance from General Freire; and in the first two, which I hope are the most probable, I must give my attention to obtaining possession of Lisbon and the Tagus, and leave General Junot to retreat where he pleases, and to do what he pleases.

‘ I should like to know what it is most probable he will do, in case he should be either defeated by me, or retire and leave me to march unmolested to Lisbon? He will fall upon that which is most justly called the *noyau* of the Portuguese army—the new foundation and hopes of the monarchy—which will as certainly be destroyed as it exists, if General Freire persists in adopting this plan of operations.

‘ Let him contemplate the relative strength of the two armies; and let him reflect upon the consequences of an action between General Junot and me. With his superiority of cavalry it is possible that, supposing I am successful in the action, they will not remain sufficiently unbroken to be able still to destroy that which General Freire commands; and will Junot thus have any other object? But General Freire reckons upon my pursuing Junot, and not allowing this misfortune to befall the Portuguese troops: so I will, when I shall be certain of the possession

of Lisbon and the Tagus ; but positively not till that moment.

‘ Let us now examine why this plan is adopted ? The General says it is necessary in order to subsist his troops : I say it is not ! He could find some subsistence everywhere, and good arrangements would bring plenty. In this very town I got this day as much bread as would have subsisted the whole Portuguese army ; and I am convinced from what I see of the country next the sea coast, through which I shall march, that it is the richest in Portugal.

‘ I declare, that I think the plan of operations proposed is so defective and dangerous, that I would recommend to the General, if he will not accompany me, rather to remain at Leyria, or march here—and he can be supplied at either place—and to wait in security the event of a contest which must take place in a few days.

‘ The enemy are said to be at Obidos, where I shall march to-morrow.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Trant.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. The Portuguese detachment allotted to me are not yet arrived, but I conclude they will be here this evening.

‘ A. W.’

To Captain Bligh, H.M.S. Alfred.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Alcobaca, 14th August, 1808.

‘ The head of 120 carts are just about to leave this place, to bring away the bread and oats, for which I wrote this morning ; and I hope that they will return here, loaded, to-morrow. The dragoons and their horses will go in the morning, at daylight, for their saddles, &c., and I shall order them to return in the evening.

‘ The enemy have retired to Obidos, about twenty miles from hence ; and I propose to follow them in the morning, leaving the articles which you will land for me to follow. If they should quit Obidos, I shall occupy that place to-morrow ; and on the next day I shall reconnoitre Peniche. If the enemy should stay at Obidos, I shall either attack them or turn them on the next day ; that is, Tuesday. I should think that they will stay, as I imagine that Loison has joined the

detachment which was here with about 5000 men. They had 3000 or 4000 here.

‘ It might be very useful to me if you would appear off Peniche with your little fleet on Tuesday morning, the 16th instant. It is possible that I may not reconnoitre that place till Wednesday, or possibly not at all; as I may find another line of operation more convenient to me in a view to my ultimate destination. But if I should not go to Obidos, or if I should give up all thoughts of communicating with you at Peniche, I shall take care to send you a letter by this place, which will be forwarded to you from Nazareth

‘ I have not yet finally determined upon our next point of communication after Peniche, for the reasons which I have above stated. I rather believe it will be Ericeira, near Mafra; but upon this point I shall write to you again this night, after I shall have more perfectly ascertained roads, distances, position of the enemy, &c. Everything is going on well; but the Portuguese troops have not joined us.

‘ I propose to send you this night three French Commissaries, who were taken two days ago at Thomar. I shall write you a line with them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Captain Bligh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. If you should have an opportunity, let the Admiral and Malcolm know that you have heard from me.

‘ A.W.’

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Caldas, 16th August, 1808.

‘ I have the honor to inclose copies of letters which I have received some days ago from Mr. Stuart and Colonel Doyle, from Cornúã, and copies of letters which I have in consequence written to Sir Harry Burrard, to be delivered to him upon his arrival on the coast of Portugal.

I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Caldas, 16th August, 1808.

‘ I marched from Lavaos on the 10th, and was joined at Leyria on the 12th by the Portuguese troops under General

Bernardin Freire, consisting of between 5000 and 6000 men. But I am concerned to inform your Lordship that they have not accompanied me any farther. Since my arrival in this country, General Bernardin Freire, and the other Portuguese Officers, had expressed a wish that the British Commissariat should support the Portuguese troops from the British stores during the campaign; particularly in a meeting which I had with them at Oporto on the night of the 24th July, and in another at Monte Mor ó Velho on the 7th instant; and upon both these occasions I told them explicitly that it was impossible to supply their wants from the British stores; that those stores were formed with a view to the consumption of the British only, and that but during a short time; and that it was a proposition of a novel nature to require an army landing from its ships not only to supply its own consumption of bread, but likewise that of the army of the state to whose assistance it had been sent. I told the Portuguese Officers, however, that I believed I should not have occasion to call upon the country to supply bread during my march towards Lisbon; but that I should require beef, wine, and forage, all of which the Bishop of Oporto engaged should be supplied to me.

‘ Before I marched to Leyria, the Portuguese Officers earnestly urged my early advance, to secure a magazine which had been formed at that place, as I understood, for the use of the British troops, and my advance certainly saved it from the enemy. But I received no supply from the magazine, which was left entire for the use of the Portuguese army. On the evening, however, of the arrival of the Portuguese army at Leyria, some very extraordinary messages were sent to me respecting their supplies; and in a conversation which I had with him that night, General Freire expressed his anxiety upon the subject.

‘ The plan of the march for the next morning was communicated to him, and the hour for the departure of the Portuguese troops was fixed. Instead of making the march, however, as had been agreed upon, I received from General Freire a proposition for a new plan of operations, which was to take the Portuguese troops to a distance from the British army, by Thomar, towards Santarem, unless I should consent to feed the whole of them; and the pretext for the adoption of this plan was the probable want of supplies on the road

which I had proposed to take, and their great plenty in the proposed quarter; and that the Portuguese troops would be in a situation to cut off the retreat of the French from Lisbon.

‘ In my reply, I pointed out the inefficiency and danger of this plan, and requested the General to send me 1000 infantry, all his cavalry, and his light troops, which I engaged to feed; and I recommended to him either to join me himself with the remainder, or at all events to remain at Leyria, or at Alcobaça, or somewhere in my rear, where at least his own troops would be in safety. He has sent me the troops which I have required, to the amount of 1400 infantry, and 260 cavalry; but he has announced to me that he intends to persevere in his proposed plan of operations for the remainder of his army, notwithstanding that I have informed him that I have found resources in the country fully adequate to the subsistence of his troops.

‘ I have been thus particular in detailing to your Lordship the circumstances which have attended, for I am certain they have not occasioned, the separation of the Portuguese army from that of His Majesty. There must have been in the magazine at Leyria bread for the Portuguese troops for two days. I found at Alcobaça a sufficiency to last them one day, and more might have been procured; and this town would have afforded ample supplies.

‘ General Freire has been apprised of this state of the resources, and yet he perseveres in his plan; and I acknowledge that I can attribute it only to his apprehensions, which, however, he has never hinted to me, that we are not sufficiently strong for the enemy. I am convinced that he can have no personal motive for his conduct, as I have been always on the most cordial good terms with him; I have supplied him with arms, ammunition, and flints, and have done everything in my power for his army; and only on the day before he communicated to me the alteration of his plan for the march of his army, he voluntarily placed himself and his troops under my command.

‘ Having found the resources of the country more ample than I expected, I should certainly have undertaken to feed his army according to his desire; as I consider it of importance, on political rather than on military grounds, that the

Portuguese troops should accompany our march; only that I have found the British Commissariat to be so ill composed as to be incapable of distributing even to the British troops the ample supplies which have been procured for them; and I did not wish to burden them with the additional charge of providing and distributing supplies to the Portuguese army. Besides, as I have above explained to your Lordship, I do not believe the motive stated is that which has caused the determination to which I have adverted.

‘ I marched from Leyria on the 13th, and arrived at Alcobaca on the 14th, which place the enemy had abandoned in the preceding night; and I arrived here yesterday. The enemy, about 4000 in number, were posted about ten miles from hence at Roliga; and they occupied Obidos, about three miles from hence, with their advanced posts. As the possession of this last village was important to our future operations, I determined to occupy it, and as soon as the British infantry arrived upon the ground I directed that it might be occupied by a detachment consisting of four companies of riflemen of the 60th and 95th regiments.

‘ The enemy, consisting of a small picquet of infantry and a few cavalry, made a trifling resistance and retired; but they were followed by a detachment of our riflemen to the distance of three miles from Obidos. The riflemen were there attacked by a superior body of the enemy, who attempted to cut them off from the main body of the detachment to which they belonged, which had now advanced to their support; larger bodies of the enemy appeared on both the flanks of the detachments; and it was with difficulty that Major General Spencer, who had gone out to Obidos when he heard that the riflemen had advanced in pursuit of the enemy, was enabled to effect their retreat to that village. They have since remained in possession of it, and the enemy have retired entirely from the neighbourhood.

‘ In this little affair of the advanced post, which was occasioned solely by the eagerness of the troops in pursuit of the enemy, I am concerned to add that Lieut. Bunbury, of the 2d batt., 95th regiment, was killed, and the Hon. Captain Pakenham wounded, but slightly; and we have lost some men, of whose numbers I have not received the returns.

‘ Besides the corps of about 4000 men, commanded by

Generals Laborde and Thomière, which is retiring in front of the army by the sea road towards Lisbon, there is another corps, consisting of about 5000 men, assembled at Rio Mayor, under General Loison, which I conclude will retire by the great Lisbon road, and they will probably join near Lisbon with whatever troops can be spared from the defence of the fortifications.

‘Loison’s corps has lately been employed in Alentejo against a Spanish detachment of about 1000 men, and the Portuguese insurgents in that quarter, and with a view to the relief of Elvas. I understand that it has suffered much in the expedition, as well by the fatigue of the marches which it has made as by the opposition it has met with.

‘When I was at Alcobaça I communicated with Captain Bligh, of the *Alfred*, who was detained off Nazareth with a convoy of victuallers and ordnance store ships, and he landed a supply, which I hope to receive this evening; and he is now off Peniche, where I intend, if possible, to communicate with him to-morrow morning.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

MY DEAR LORD,

‘Caldas, 16th August, 1808.

‘I have but little to add to my letters of this day. We are going on as well as possible; the army in high order and in great spirits. We make long marches, to which they are becoming accustomed; and I make no doubt they will be equal to anything when we shall reach Lisbon. I have every hope of success.

‘The affair of the advanced posts of yesterday evening was unpleasant, because it was quite useless; and was occasioned, contrary to orders, solely by the imprudence of the Officer, and the dash and eagerness of the men: they behaved remarkably well, and did some execution with their rifles.

‘I send you the history of our separation from the Portuguese army, that you may communicate upon it with De Souza. If you should determine to form a Portuguese army, you must, if possible, have nothing to do with General Freire.

‘The fact is, they are afraid of the French; they are incapable of making any arrangement to feed their troops; and they are not a little afraid of them.

‘Our artillery horses are not what we ought to have. They have great merit in their way as cast horses of dragoons, and Irish cart horses, bought for 12*l.* each! but not fit for an army that, to be successful and carry things with a high hand, ought to be able to move.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD,

‘Villa Verde, 17th August, 1808.

‘The French General Laborde having continued in his position at Roliça, since my arrival at Caldas on the 15th instant, I determined to attack him in it this morning. Roliça is situated on an eminence, having a plain in its front, at the end of a valley, which commences at Caldas, and is closed to the southward by mountains, which join the hills forming the valley on the left. Looking from Caldas, in the centre of the valley and about eight miles from Roliça, is the town and old Moorish fort of Obidos, from whence the enemy’s picquets had been driven on the 15th; and from that time he had posts in the hills on both sides of the valley, as well as in the plain in front of his army, which was posted on the heights in front of Roliça, its right resting upon the hills, its left upon an eminence on which was a windmill, and the whole covering four or five passes into the mountains on his rear.

‘I have reason to believe that his force consisted of at least 6000 men, of which about 500 were cavalry, with five pieces of cannon; and there was some reason to believe that General Loison, who was at Rio Mayor yesterday, would join General Laborde by his right in the course of the night.

‘The plan of attack was formed accordingly, and the army, having broken up from Caldas this morning, was formed into three columns. The right, consisting of 1200 Portuguese infantry, 50 Portuguese cavalry, destined to turn the enemy’s left, and penetrate into the mountains in his rear. The left, consisting of Major General Ferguson’s

and Brig. General Bowes's brigade of infantry, three companies of riflemen, a brigade of light artillery, and twenty British and twenty Portuguese cavalry, was destined, under the command of Major General Ferguson, to ascend the hills at Obidos, to turn all the enemy's posts on the left of the valley, as well as the right of his post at Roliça. This corps was also destined to watch the motions of General Loison on the enemy's right, who, I had heard, had moved from Rio Mayor towards Alcoentre last night. The centre column, consisting of Major General Hill's, Brig. General Nightingall's, Brig. General C. Craufurd's, and Brig. General Fane's brigades (with the exception of the riflemen detached with Major General Ferguson), and 400 Portuguese light infantry, the British and Portuguese cavalry, a brigade of 9 pounders, and a brigade of 6 pounders, was destined to attack General Laborde's position in the front.

'The columns being formed, the troops moved from Obidos about 7 o'clock in the morning. Brig. General Fane's riflemen were immediately detached into the hills on the left of the valley, to keep up the communication between the centre and left columns, and to protect the march of the former along the valley, and the enemy's posts were successively driven in. Major General Hill's brigade, formed in three columns of battalions, moved on the right of the valley, supported by the cavalry, in order to attack the enemy's left; and Brig. Generals Nightingall and Craufurd moved with the artillery along the high road, until at length the former formed in the plain immediately in the enemy's front, supported by the light infantry companies, and the 45th regiment of Brig. General Craufurd's brigade; while the two other regiments of this brigade (the 50th and 91st), and half of the 9 pounder brigade, were kept up as a reserve in the rear.

'Major General Hill and Brig. General Nightingall advanced upon the enemy's position, and at the same moment Brig. General Fane's riflemen were in the hills on his right, the Portuguese in a village upon his left, and Major General Ferguson's column was descending from the heights into the plain. From this situation the enemy

retired by the passes into the mountains with the utmost regularity and the greatest celerity; and notwithstanding the rapid advance of the British infantry, the want of a sufficient body of cavalry was the cause of his suffering but little loss on the plain.

‘ It was then necessary to make a disposition to attack the formidable position which he had taken up.

‘ Brig. General Fane’s riflemen were already in the mountains on his right; and no time was lost in attacking the different passes, as well to support the riflemen as to defeat the enemy completely.

‘ The Portuguese infantry were ordered to move up a pass on the right of the whole. The light companies of Major General Hill’s brigade, and the 5th regiment, moved up a pass next on the right; and the 29th regiment, supported by the 9th regiment, under Brig. General Nightingall, a third pass; and the 45th and 82d regiments, passes on the left.

‘ These passes were all difficult of access, and some of them were well defended by the enemy, particularly that which was attacked by the 29th and 9th regiments. These regiments attacked with the utmost impetuosity, and reached the enemy before those whose attacks were to be made on their flanks.

‘ The defence of the enemy was desperate; and it was in this attack principally that we sustained the loss which we have to lament, particularly of that gallant officer, the Hon. Lieut. Colonel Lake, who distinguished himself upon this occasion. The enemy was, however, driven from all the positions he had taken in the passes of the mountains, and our troops were advanced in the plains on their tops. For a considerable length of time the 29th and 9th regiments alone were advanced to this point, with Brig. General Fane’s riflemen at a distance on the left, and they were afterwards supported by the 5th regiment, and by the light companies of Major General Hill’s brigade, which had come upon their right, and by the other troops ordered to ascend the mountains, who came up by degrees.

‘ The enemy here made three most gallant attacks upon the 29th and 9th regiments, supported as I have above stated,

with a view to cover the retreat of his defeated army, in all of which he was, however, repulsed; but he succeeded in effecting his retreat in good order, owing principally to my want of cavalry, and, secondly, to the difficulty of bringing up the passes of the mountains, with celerity, a sufficient number of troops and of cannon to support those which had first ascended. The loss of the enemy has, however, been very great, and he left three pieces of cannon in our hands.

‘ I cannot sufficiently applaud the conduct of the troops throughout this action. The enemy’s positions were formidable, and he took them up with his usual ability and celerity, and defended them most gallantly. But I must observe, that although we had such a superiority of numbers employed in the operations of this day, the troops actually engaged in the heat of the action were, from unavoidable circumstances, only the 5th, 9th, 29th, the riflemen of the 95th and 60th, and the flank companies of Major General Hill’s brigade; being a number by no means equal to that of the enemy. Their conduct therefore deserves the highest commendation.

‘ I cannot avoid taking this opportunity of expressing my acknowledgments for the aid and support I received from all the General and other Officers of this army: I am particularly indebted to Major General Spencer for the advice and assistance I received from him; to Major General Ferguson, for the manner in which he led the left column; and to Major General Hill, and Brig. Generals Nightingall and Fane, for the manner in which they conducted the different attacks which they led.

‘ I derived most material assistance also from Lieut. Colonel Tucker and Lieut. Colonel Bathurst, in the offices of Deputy Adjutant and Deputy Quarter Master General, and from the Officers of the Staff employed under them. I must also mention that I had every reason to be satisfied with the artillery under Lieut. Colonel Robe. I have the honor to enclose herewith a return of killed, wounded, and missing.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ *Lourinha, 18th August, 1808.*

‘ I have the honor to enclose a return of the killed and wounded in the affair between the outposts of the 15th instant, reported in my letter to your Lordship of the 16th.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army, under the command of Lieut. General the Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B., on the 17th of August, 1808.

| | Officers. | Non-commissioned Officers and Drummers | Rank and File. | Horses. | Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File. |
|----------------|-----------|--|----------------|---------|--|
| Killed | 4 | 3 | 63 | 1 | 70 |
| Wounded . . . | 20 | 20 | 295 | 2 | 335 |
| Missing . . . | 4 | 2 | 68 | .. | 74 |

To Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple.

‘ SIR,

‘ *Lourinha, 18th August, 1808.*

‘ I have the honor to inclose the copy of a letter which I have addressed to the Secretary of State, in which I have reported the circumstances of an action which I had with one of the enemy’s corps yesterday.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Sir Hew Dalrymple.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ *Lourinha, 18th August, 1808.*

‘ Since I wrote to you last night I have heard from Brig. General Anstruther that he is on the coast, off Peniche, with the fleet of victuallers and store ships, in

charge of Captain Bligh, of the *Alfred*, with a part of the force detached from England under Brig. General Acland, in consequence of the receipt of orders which I had left at Mondego Bay for General Acland, which he had opened.

‘ I have ordered Brig. General Anstruther to land immediately, and I have moved to this place in order to protect his landing and facilitate his junction.

‘ General Loison joined General Laborde in the course of last night at Torres Vedras, and I understand that both begin their march towards Lisbon this morning; I also hear that General Junot has arrived this day at Torres Vedras, with a small corps from Lisbon; and I conclude that the whole of the French army will be assembled between Torres Vedras and the capital in the course of a few days.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Gordon, Military Secretary to H.R.H.
the Commander in Chief.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Lourinha, 18th August, 1808.

‘ The army marched from Leyria on the 13th to Calvario, and on the 14th to Alcobaça, which place the enemy had abandoned in the night of the 13th. I was joined at Alcobaça by 1650 Portuguese troops, viz., 1000 regular infantry, 400 light troops, and 250 cavalry; and I engaged to feed these troops in the same manner as those of His Majesty are fed. The Portuguese General Freire stated, as his reason for not joining me with the whole corps, that he could not find subsistence for it on the route towards Lisbon, which I intended to take; and as I deemed it desirable on political, rather than on military grounds, to have with the British army a corps of Portuguese troops, I desired him to send the corps which joined me at Alcobaça, which I engaged to feed.

‘ On the 15th I marched to Caldas, in two columns. As the possession of the town and Moorish fort of Obidos was important to me, with a view to my future operations, I directed that it might be taken possession of by four com-

panies of riflemen, shortly after the infantry of the army had reached Caldas; and they were detached to Obidos, under Major Travers, of the 95th. The enemy's picquet, which was in the village, retired when Major Travers approached, and fired upon the riflemen, and were pursued by a small detachment to the distance of nearly three miles from Obidos. The riflemen were there attacked by a superior body of the enemy, who attempted to cut them off from the main body of the detachment, which had now advanced from Obidos to their support. Larger bodies of the enemy then appeared on both flanks of the detachment; and it was with difficulty that Major General Spencer, who had gone out to Obidos, when he heard that the riflemen had advanced in pursuit of the enemy, was enabled to effect their retreat to that village. In this affair, which was occasioned solely by the eagerness of the troops in pursuit of the enemy, we sustained a loss, of which I enclose a return. Captain Pakenham's wound is so slight that he has continued to do his duty with his regiment. The loss of the enemy in this affair was not inconsiderable, and much larger than that sustained by His Majesty's troops.

'The enemy having still continued in his position at Roliça, I attacked him on the 17th, and I enclose a copy of the letter which I have written to the Secretary of State, in which the particulars of this action are detailed. I have nothing to add to this letter, excepting to request you to represent to His Royal Highness my admiration of the conduct of the troops throughout the day.

'I heard this morning, at 9 o'clock, that General Anstruther had joined the convoy of victuallers and store ships stationed off Peniche, under Captain Bligh, of the *Alfred*, with 2500 men of the force detached from England, under Brig. General Acland. I have directed that this force may land in this neighbourhood; and I have moved here this morning in order to protect his landing, and favor his junction with me. They will, I hope, land to-morrow.

'General Loison joined General Laborde at Torres Vedras last night, and they retreated this morning at daylight; and General Junot, with a small corps from Lisbon, arrived at Torres Vedras at an early hour this day. I

imagine that the whole of the French troops will join immediately, with a view to impede my march upon Lisbon.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Gordon.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ *Lourinha, 18th August, 1808.*

‘ My dispatch of yesterday and of this day will inform you of the state of affairs here. I never saw such desperate fighting as in the attack of the pass by Lake, and in the three attacks by the French on our troops in the mountains. These attacks were made in their best style, and our troops defended themselves capitally; and if the difficulties of the ground had not prevented me from bringing up a sufficient number of the troops and of cannon we should have taken the whole army.

‘ They say that the French lost 1500 men, which is a large amount; but I think they had more than 6000 men in the action.

‘ As soon as Anstruther shall be landed I shall give you a good account of the remainder of the French army; but I am afraid I shall not gain a complete victory; that is, I shall not entirely destroy them for want of cavalry.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. I enclose a letter for Mr. Borough about Lake’s death, and one for Lord Longford, to tell him that his brother is quite well.

‘ A. W.’

To Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ *Lourinha, 18th August, 1808.*

‘ I have the pleasure to inform you that I beat Laborde’s corps yesterday, in an action of which the circumstances are detailed in the enclosed dispatch to Sir Hew Dalrymple, which I request you to peruse, and forward to him by the first opportunity. I hear that the enemy have lost 1500 men. Our loss is about 70 killed, about 350 wounded, and a few missing, Officers included.

‘ I expect to have another brush with the whole of his army in a day or two; and at all events to be in your neighbourhood before long. If Junot, who is with the army, should retire, I shall be at Mafra on the day after to-morrow, I hope; but I recommend to you not to land your marines, &c. till you hear further from me.

‘ 2500 men, under General Anstruther, are with Captain Bligh, and I propose to land them to-morrow.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Admiral*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Sir Charles Cotton, Bart.

To R. Borough, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR BOROUGH,

‘ Lourinha, 18th August, 1808.

‘ I do not recollect the occasion upon which I have written with more pain to myself than I do at present, to communicate to you the death of your gallant brother-in-law*. He fell in the attack of a pass in the mountains, at the head of his regiment, the admiration of the whole army; and there is nothing to be regretted in his death, excepting the untimely moment at which it has afflicted his family†, and has deprived the public of the services of an Officer who would have been an ornament to his profession, and an honor to his country.

‘ It may at the moment increase the regret of those who lose a near and dear relation, to learn that he deserved and enjoyed the respect and affection of the world at large, and particularly of the profession to which he belonged; but I am convinced, that however acute may be the sensations which it may at first occasion, it must in the end be satisfactory to the family of such a man as Colonel Lake, to know that he was respected and loved by the whole army, and that he fell, alas! with many others, in the achievement of one of the most heroic actions that have been performed by the British army.

‘ I cannot desire to be remembered to Mrs. Borough; but I beg you to

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *R. Borough, Esq.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

* Lieut. Colonel the Hon. G. A. F. Lake, 29th regiment.

† General Lord Lake, the father, had died early in the year.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.*

‘MY LORD,

‘Vimeiro, 20th August, 1808.-

‘I have had no opportunity of sending my dispatch of the 17th to your Lordship till this day, and I now transmit it by Captain Campbell†, my aide de camp, to whom I beg leave to refer your Lordship for any further information you may require; at the same time, I beg leave to recommend Captain Campbell to your Lordship as an Officer of great merit: he has served with me for some years in my family, and I have always had reason to be satisfied with his conduct.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Vimeiro, 20th August, 1808.

‘Anstruther is on shore, and I expect him in camp every moment. I shall be near Mafra to-morrow. The enemy have their advanced guard in front of Torres Vedras, and the main body of their army collected in the rear of that

* *Viscount Castlereagh to Lieut. General the Hon.*

Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.

SIR,

‘Downing Street, 19th August, 1808.

‘I have received, and laid before the King, your two dispatches of the 26th and 28th of July(a), giving a detail of your operations, from the time of your landing at Oporto till the disembarkation of your forces in the Mondego River, in immediate expectation of being reinforced by the division under Major General Spencer. This circumstance, connected with the surrender of General Dupont’s army, the retreat of Marshal Bessières, and the evacuation of Madrid, joined to the assistance you must have received from the Portuguese, will have enabled you to commence your operations without delay; and the fullest reliance is placed not less on your decision than on your prudence.

‘I am also to express His Majesty’s approbation of the authority you thought it incumbent upon you to give Major General Spencer, for making an advance of money to the Spaniards, and of your taking upon yourself the responsibility of that measure, in case Major General Spencer should have felt the necessity of acting in conformity to your instruction.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General*

‘CASTLEREAGH.

The Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.’

(a) There having been no dispatch of the 28th of July, it is supposed that this is a clerical error, and that the passage should run thus: ‘your two dispatches of the 26th of July and 1st of August.’

† Major General Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B.

town. I understand that they have got together everything that Portugal can afford.

‘Colonel Brown, who has got charge of my letters to you, has not had an opportunity of going on board ship till this day. I intended to have sent them by my aide de camp, Captain Campbell, in order that he might get the promotion usual upon such occasions; but I hope that I shall have another and a better occasion to send him home: if I should not, I trust that he will not lose his promotion by my having omitted to send him on the present occasion.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Viscount Castlereagh.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Captain Bligh, H.M.S. Alfred.

‘Vimeiro, 20th August, 1808.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

½ past 11, A.M.

‘I am much obliged to you for your letter of yesterday. I have just been down at Maceira, where I hope that you will land the bread, ammunition, &c., and the saddles. It appears a very good landing place, and there is a good road, and it is no great distance from thence here; but if you should think that place inconvenient, I will contrive to communicate with any other place at which you may land them.

‘I propose to march to-morrow towards Mafra; I shall be glad if you will be off Ericeira to-morrow evening. I shall contrive to communicate with you either to-morrow or next day, and to fix on the next place of rendezvous.

‘I apprehend no accidents; but I should like to keep the transports for a few days, in case of the occurrence of any. They might also be useful in turning any position the enemy might take in the neighbourhood of the Rock of Lisbon.

‘Believe me, &c.

Captain Bligh, H.M.S. Alfred.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘P. S. If General Acland should join you, keep him with you, and desire him to let me know it immediately.

‘A. W.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Gordon, Military Secretary to H.R.H.
the Commander in Chief.*

‘SIR,

‘Vimeiro, 20th August, 1808.

‘I avail myself of the delay which has taken place in the departure of the ship which will take my dispatches to Eng-

land, to acquaint you, for the information of the Commander in Chief, of the death of that gallant officer, Lieut. Colonel Stewart, of the 9th regiment, in consequence of the severe wounds he received in the action of the 17th; and I request that you will, at the same time, represent to his Royal Highness that the conduct of Major Molle, who was also wounded upon this occasion, was such during the action as to merit my warmest approbation; and I therefore beg leave to submit his name to the favorable consideration of his Royal Highness, to succeed to the lieutenant colonelcy unfortunately vacated by the decease of Lieut. Colonel Stewart.

‘Should Major Molle be promoted upon this occasion, I request you will be pleased to submit to his Royal Highness, that the succession should go in the regiment in favor of Captain Aylmer, Lieut. Finlay, and Ensign Curzon*.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Gordon.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Vimeiro, 21st August, 1808. 6, A.M.

‘Sir Harry Burrard will probably acquaint your Lordship with the reasons which have induced him to call Sir John Moore’s corps to the assistance of our army, which consists of 20,000 men, including the Portuguese army, which was to join this morning, notwithstanding former determinations to the contrary, and is opposed by, I am convinced, not more than 12,000 or 14,000 Frenchmen, and to halt here till Sir John’s corps shall join. You will readily believe, however, that this determination is not in conformity with my opinion, and I only wish that Sir Harry had landed and seen things with his own eyes before he had made it.

‘General Acland’s brigade landed last night.

‘The French are in and about Torres Vedras. Junot’s corps, which arrived last, is the advanced guard, and the others are in the rear, nearly on the ground to which Laborde retreated after the battle of the 17th.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

* The Hon. Wm. Curzon, afterwards killed at the battle of Waterloo.

*To Lieut. General Sir H. Burrard, Bart.**

‘SIR,

‘Vimeiro, 21st August, 1808.

‘I have the honor to inform you, that the enemy attacked us in our position at Vimeiro this morning.

‘The village of Vimeiro stands in a valley, through which runs the river Maceira; at the back, and to the westward and northward of this village, is a mountain, the western point of which touches the sea, and the eastern is separated by a deep ravine from the heights, over which passes the road which leads from Lourinha, and the northward to Vimeiro. The greater part of the infantry, the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 8th brigades, were posted on this mountain, with eight pieces of artillery, Major General Hill’s brigade being on the right, and Major General Ferguson’s on the left, having one battalion on the heights separated from the mountain. On the eastern and southern side of the town is a mill, which is entirely commanded, particularly on its right, by the mountain to the westward of the town, and commanding all the ground in the neighbourhood to the southward and eastward, on which Brig. General Fane was posted with his riflemen, and the 50th regiment, and Brig. General Anstruther with his brigade, with half a brigade of 6 pounders, and half a brigade of 9 pounders, which had been ordered to the position in the course of last night. The ground over which passes the road from Lourinha commanded the

** Lieut. General Sir H. Burrard to Viscount Castlereagh,
Secretary of State.*

‘MY LORD,

‘Maceira, 21st August, 1808.

‘The report, which I have the honor to enclose to your Lordship, made at my request by Lieut. General Sir A. Wellesley, conveys information which cannot but prove highly gratifying to His Majesty.

‘On my landing this morning, I found that the enemy’s attack had already commenced; and I was fortunate enough to reach the field of action in time to witness and approve of every disposition that had been, and was afterwards made by Sir A. Wellesley; his comprehensive mind furnishing a ready resource in every emergency, and rendering it quite unnecessary to direct any alteration.

‘I am happy on this occasion to bear testimony to the great spirit and good conduct displayed by all the troops composing this gallant army in this well contested action.

‘I send this dispatch by Captain Campbell, aide de camp to Sir A. Wellesley, no person being better qualified to give your Lordship information.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Viscount Castlereagh.’

‘HARRY BURRARD.’

left of this height, and it had not been occupied, excepting by a picquet, as the camp had been taken up only for one night, and there was no water in the neighbourhood of this height.

‘The cavalry and the reserve of artillery were in the valley, between the hills on which the infantry stood, both flanking and supporting Brig. General Fane’s advanced guard.

‘The enemy first appeared about 8 o’clock in the morning, in large bodies of cavalry on our left, upon the heights on the road to Lourinha; and it was soon obvious that the attack would be made upon our advanced guard and the left of our position; and Major General Ferguson’s brigade was immediately moved across the ravine to the heights on the road to Lourinha, with three pieces of cannon; he was followed successively by Brig. General Nightingall, with his brigade and three pieces of cannon, Brig. General Acland, and his brigade, and Brig. General Bowes, with his brigade. These troops were formed (Major General Ferguson’s brigade in the first line, Brig. General Nightingall’s in the second, and Brig. General Bowes’s and Acland’s in columns in the rear) on those heights, with their right upon the valley which leads into Vimeiro, and their left upon the other ravine, which separates these heights from the range which terminates at the landing place at Maccira. On the last mentioned heights the Portuguese troops, which had been in the bottom near Vimeiro, were posted in the first instance, and they were supported by Brig. General C. Craufurd’s brigade.

‘The troops of the advanced guard, on the heights to the southward and eastward of the town, were deemed sufficient for its defence, and Major General Hill was moved to the centre of the mountain, on which the great body of the infantry had been posted, as a support to these troops, and as a reserve to the whole army; in addition to this support, these troops had that of the cavalry in the rear of their right.

‘The enemy’s attack began in several columns upon the whole of the troops on this height; on the left they advanced, notwithstanding the fire of the riflemen, close to the 50th regiment, and they were checked and driven back only

by the bayonets of that corps. The 2d batt. 43d regiment was likewise closely engaged with them in the road which leads into Vimeiro; a part of that corps having been ordered into the churchyard, to prevent them from penetrating into the town. On the right of the position they were repulsed by the bayonets of the 97th regiment, which corps was successfully supported by the 2d batt. 52d, which, by an advance in column, took the enemy in flank.

‘ Besides this opposition given to the attack of the enemy on the advanced guard by their own exertions, they were attacked in flank by Brig. General Acland’s brigade, in its advance to its position on the heights on the left, and a cannonade was kept up on the flank of the enemy’s columns by the artillery on those heights.

‘ At length, after a most desperate contest, the enemy was driven back in confusion from this attack, with the loss of seven pieces of cannon, many prisoners, and a great number of Officers and soldiers killed and wounded. He was pursued by a detachment of the 20th light dragoons, but the enemy’s cavalry were so much superior in numbers, that this detachment has suffered much, and Lieut. Colonel Taylor was unfortunately killed.

‘ Nearly at the same time the enemy’s attack commenced upon the heights on the road to Lourinha: this attack was supported by a large body of cavalry, and was made with the usual impetuosity of French troops. It was received with steadiness by Major General Ferguson’s brigade, consisting of the 36th, 40th, and 71st regiments, and these corps charged as soon as the enemy approached them, who gave way, and they continued to advance upon him, supported by the 82d, one of the corps of Brig. General Nightingall’s brigade, which, as the ground extended, afterwards formed a part of the first line by the 29th regiment, and by Brig. General Bowes’s and Acland’s brigades; whilst Brig. General C. Craufurd’s brigade and the Portuguese troops, in two lines, advanced along the height on the left. In the advance of Major General Ferguson’s brigade, six pieces of cannon were taken from the enemy, with many prisoners, and vast numbers were killed and wounded.

‘ The enemy afterwards made an attempt to recover part of his artillery, by attacking the 71st and 82d regiments,

which were halted in a valley in which it had been taken. These regiments retired from the low grounds in the valley to the heights, where they halted, faced about, and fired, and advanced upon the enemy, who had by that time arrived in the low ground, and they thus obliged him again to retire with great loss.

‘ In this action, in which the whole of the French force in Portugal was employed, under the command of the Duc D’Abrantes in person, in which the enemy was certainly superior in cavalry and artillery, and in which not more than half of the British army was actually engaged, he has sustained a signal defeat, and has lost thirteen pieces of cannon, twenty-three ammunition waggons, with powder, shells, stores of all descriptions, and 20,000 rounds of musket ammunition. One General Officer has been wounded (Brenier) and taken prisoner, and a great many Officers and soldiers have been killed, wounded, and taken.

‘ The valor and discipline of His Majesty’s troops have been conspicuous upon this occasion, as you, who witnessed the greatest part of the action, must have observed; but it is a justice to the following corps to draw your notice to them in a particular manner: viz., the Royal artillery, commanded by Lieut. Colonel Robe; the 20th light dragoons, which has been commanded by Lieut. Colonel Taylor; the 50th regiment, commanded by Colonel Walker; the 2d batt. 95th foot, commanded by Major Travers; the 5th batt. 60th regiment, commanded by Major Davy; the 2d batt. 43d, commanded by Major Hull; the 2d batt. 52d, commanded by Lieut. Colonel Ross; the 97th regiment, commanded by Lieut. Colonel Lyon; the 36th regiment, commanded by Colonel Burne; the 40th, commanded by Lieut. Colonel Kemmis; the 71st, commanded by Lieut. Colonel Pack; and the 82d regiment, commanded by Major Eyre.

‘ In mentioning Colonel Burne and the 36th regiment upon this occasion, I cannot avoid adding that the regular and orderly conduct of this corps throughout the service, and their gallantry and discipline in action, have been conspicuous.

‘ I must take this opportunity of acknowledging my obligations to the General and Staff Officers of the army. I was much indebted to Major General Spencer’s judgment and

experience in the decision which I formed in respect to the number of troops allotted to each point of defence, and for his advice and assistance throughout the action. In the position taken up by Major General Ferguson's brigade, and in its advances upon the enemy, that Officer showed equal bravery and judgment; and much praise is due to Brig. General Fane and Brig. General Anstruther for their gallant defence of their position in front of Vimeiro, and to Brig. General Nightingall, for the manner in which he supported the attack upon the enemy made by Major General Ferguson.

'Lieut. Colonel G. Tucker, and Lieut. Colonel Bathurst, and the Officers in the departments of the Adjutant and Quarter Master General, and Lieut. Colonel Torrens and the Officers of my personal staff, rendered me the greatest assistance throughout the action.

'I have the honor to enclose herewith a return of the killed, wounded, and missing.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Lieut. General

Sir Harry Burrard, Bart.

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

'P. S. Since writing the above I have been informed that a French General Officer, supposed to be General Thiébault*, the chief of the Staff, has been found dead upon the field of battle.

'A. W.'

Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army, under the Command of Lieut. General the Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B., on the 21st of August, 1808.

| | Officers. | Non-commissioned Officers and Drummers. | Rank and File. | Horses. | Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File. |
|----------------|-----------|---|----------------|---------|---|
| Killed | 4 | 3 | 128 | 30 | 135 |
| Wounded . . . | 37 | 31 | 466 | 12 | 534 |
| Missing . . . | 2 | 3 | 46 | 1 | 51 |

* It was not General Thiébault.

Return of Ordnance and Ammunition taken in the Action of the 21st August, 1808.

‘ One 6 pounder, four 4 pounders, three 2 pounders, six 5½ inch howitzers, two ammunition waggons, twenty one Portuguese ammunition cars, forty horses, four mules.

‘ The above is only the number already arrived in the park, but from several accounts there are eight more taken from the enemy. The ammunition waggons and cars contain a portion of powder, shells, and stores of all descriptions, and about 20,000 rounds of musket ammunition.

‘ WM. ROBE, Lieut. Colonel,
Commanding Royal Artillery.’

To Lieut. General Sir Harry Burrard, Bart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Vimeiro, 22d August, 1808.

‘ According to the directions which I have received from the Secretary of State, I have the honor to enclose instructions which I had received from him, and a return of the troops which have been hitherto under my command.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Sir Harry Burrard, Bart.’

To H.R.H. the Duke of York.

‘ SIR,

‘ Vimeiro, 22d August, 1808.

‘ I have omitted to address your Royal Highness till I should have something to communicate deserving your Royal Highness’s attention; and I hope that the action which the troops fought yesterday will be deemed of that description.

‘ I wrote to Colonel Gordon on the 18th, from Lourinha, and gave him a detailed account of occurrences here up to that date. On the 19th I moved to Vimeiro, in order to be more certain of protecting the disembarkation of General Anstruther’s brigade, which I expected would have been made at Maccira. Brig. General Anstruther landed on that evening, and in the night of the 19th and 20th, about eight miles north of Maccira, and joined on the morning of the 20th. It was my intention to move, on the morning of the 21st, by the route of Mafra, by which I should have turned the left of the enemy’s position at, and in the rear of,

Torres Vedras; and I intended that Brig. General Acland's brigade, which appeared in the offing in the middle of that day, should be landed at Maceira in the evening, and join the army on that night. Lieut. General Sir Harry Burrard, however, arrived off Maceira on the evening of the 20th, and determined that the army should halt at Vimeiro till it should be reinforced by Sir John Moore's corps, which was to be re-embarked in Mondego Bay.

‘The disembarkation of General Acland's brigade was effected in the evening, and during the night of the 20th, and they joined the army about 6 in the morning of the 21st.

‘During the night of the 20th and 21st my patrols gave me intelligence of movements by the enemy; but as we were so very inferior in cavalry, my patrols could not go to any distance, and of course their reports were very vague, and not founded on very certain grounds. But I thought it probable that if I did not attack the enemy, he would attack me; and I prepared for the conflict at daylight in the morning, by posting the 9 pounders, and strengthening my right, where I expected the attack, from the manner in which the enemy had patrolled towards that point in the line during the 19th and 20th. He appeared, however, about 8 o'clock on the 21st, on the left, and an action commenced, of which a detailed account is given in the enclosed copy of a letter which I have written upon it to Sir Harry Burrard. I likewise enclose a plan of the ground, which will more clearly explain the nature of the different movements made by the enemy and by our troops.

‘I cannot say too much in favor of the troops: their gallantry and their discipline were equally conspicuous; and I must add, that this is the only action that I have ever been in, in which everything passed as it was directed, and no mistake was made by any of the Officers charged with its conduct. I think if General Hill's brigade and the advanced guard had moved upon Torres Vedras, as soon as it was certain that the enemy's right had been defeated by our left, and our left had pursued their advantage, the enemy would have been cut off from Torres Vedras, and we should have been at Lisbon before him; if, indeed, any French army had remained in Portugal. But Sir Harry Burrard, who was at this time upon the ground, still thought it advisable not to

move from Vimeiro; and the enemy made good their retreat to Torres Vedras.

‘ Sir Hew Dalrymple arrived this morning, and has taken the command of the army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Royal Highness
The Duke of York.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. I have not yet been able to procure a plan of the ground, and I therefore transmit this letter without it.

‘ A. W.’

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Vimeiro, 22d August, 1808.

‘ After I wrote to you yesterday morning, we were attacked by the whole of the French army, Sir Harry Burrard being still on board ship, and I gained a complete victory. It was impossible for troops to behave better than ours did; we only wanted a few hundred more cavalry to annihilate the French army.

‘ I have sent my report upon this action to Sir Harry Burrard, who will send it home. You will see in it that I have mentioned Colonel Burne, of the 36th regiment, in a very particular manner; and I assure you that there is nothing that will give me so much satisfaction as to learn that something has been done for this old and meritorious soldier*. The 36th regiment are an example to this army.

‘ Sir Harry did not land till late in the day in the midst of the attack, and he desired me to continue my own operations; and as far as I am personally concerned in the action, I was amply rewarded for any disappointment I might have felt in not having had an opportunity of bringing the service to a close, by the satisfaction expressed by the army that the second and more important victory had been gained by their old General. I have also the pleasure to add, that it has had more effect than all the arguments I could use to induce the General to move on, and I believe he will march to-morrow. Indeed, if he does not, we shall be poisoned here by the stench of the dead and wounded; or we shall starve, everything in the neighbourhood being already eaten up.

* This Officer was shortly afterwards rewarded by the government of Carlisle being conferred on him.

‘ From the number of dead Frenchmen about the ground, and the number of prisoners and wounded, I should think their loss could not be far short of 3000 men. The force which attacked us was very respectable, and probably not short of 14,000 men, including 1300 dragoons and artillery, and 300 chasseurs à cheval.

‘ Sir Hew Dalrymple arrived last night, and will land this morning.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ Au Quartier Général de l’Armée Anglaise,
Le 22 Août, 1808.

Suspension d’Armes arrêté entre Monsieur le Chevalier Arthur Wellesley, Lieutenant Général, et Chevalier de l’ordre du Bain, d’une part ; et Monsieur le Général de Division Kellermann, Grand Officier de la Légion d’Honneur, Commandeur de l’ordre de la Couronne de Fer, Grande Croix de l’ordre du Lion de Bavière, de l’autre part ; tous deux chargés de pouvoirs des Généraux respectifs des Armées Françaises et Anglaises.

‘ *Art. 1.* Il y aura à dater de ce jour une suspension d’armes entre les armées de Sa Majesté Britannique et de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale, Napoléon I., à l’effet de traiter d’une Convention pour l’évacuation du Portugal par l’armée Française.

Art. 2. Les Généraux en Chef des deux armées, et Monsieur le Commandant en Chef de la flotte Britannique à l’entrée du Tage, prendront jour pour se réunir dans tel point de la côte qu’ils jugeront convenable pour traiter et conclure la dite Convention.

Art. 3. La rivière de Sizandre formera la ligne de démarcation établie entre les deux armées. Torres Vedras ne sera occupé ni par l’une ni par l’autre.

‘ *Art. 4.* Monsieur Le Général en Chef de l’armée Anglaise s’obligera à comprendre les Portugais armés dans cette suspension d’armes, et pour eux la ligne de démarcation sera établie de Leyria à Thomar.

‘ *Art. 5.* Il est convenu provisoirement que l’armée Française ne pourra dans aucun cas être considérée comme prisonnière de guerre ; que tous les individus qui la composent

seront transportés en France avec armes et baggages, et leurs propriétés particulières quelconques dont il ne pourra leur être rien distrait.

‘ *Art. 6.* Tout particulier soit Portugais, soit d’une nation alliée à la France, soit Français, ne pourra être recherché pour sa conduite politique ; il sera protégé, ses propriétés respectées, et il aura la liberté de se retirer du Portugal dans un terme fixé avec ce qui lui appartient.

‘ *Art. 7.* La neutralité du port de Lisbonne sera reconnue pour la flotte Russe, c’est à dire, que lorsque l’armée ou la flotte Anglaise seront en possession de la ville et du port, la dite flotte Russe ne pourra être ni inquiétée pendant son séjour, ni arrêtée quand elle voudra sortir, ni poursuivie lorsqu’elle sera sortie, qu’après les délais fixés par les lois maritimes.

‘ *Art. 8.* Toute l’artillerie du calibre Français, ainsi que les chevaux de la cavalerie, seront transportés en France.

‘ *Art. 9.* Cette suspension d’armes ne pourra être rompue qu’on ne se soit prévenu quarante huit heures d’avance.

‘ Fait et arrêté entre les Généraux désignés ci dessus au jour et l’année ci dessus.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ Le Gén. de Div. KELLERMANN.

‘ *Article Additionel.* Les garnisons des places occupées par l’armée Française seront comprises dans la présente Convention, si elles n’ont point capitulé avant le 25 du courant.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ Le Gén. de Div. KELLERMANN.’

To Captain Pulteney Malcolm, H.M.S. Donegal.

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM,

‘ Ramalhal, 23d August, 1808.

‘ Torrens wrote to you on the night of the 21st to apprise you of the complete victory which we had gained ; one of the consequences of which has been a suspension of arms between the French and us, preparatory to the evacuation of the country by them ; the conditions of which I signed last night.

‘ Although I signed these conditions, I beg that you will

not believe that I entirely approve of the manner in which the instrument is worded.

‘ You will receive a public letter from me upon this subject this day, in which I have requested you to bring the whole of your fleet of transports to the mouth of the Tagus, with the exception of the horse ships, which are to go to England.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Captain Pulteney Malcolm,
H.M.S. Donegal.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. It would be very convenient to us if you would communicate with Captain Bligh as you pass by. I shall be much obliged to you if you will have another cask of my claret broken up and put in chests such as the last, and leave one of them with Bligh for me.

‘ A. W.’

To Captain Malcolm, H.M.S. Donegal.

‘ SIR,

‘ Ramalhal, 23d August, 1808.

‘ I have the honor to inform you that an agreement for the suspension of hostilities between the British and French armies, preparatory to the arrangement of a Convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the latter, was signed last night by the direction of the Commander in Chief.

‘ The Commander in Chief has desired me to inform you that he has received orders to send to England all the horse transports now in Portugal, with the exception of those which will have brought out the 18th light dragoons; and he concludes that you will receive orders from the Admiral to send them to England without loss of time. He wishes, however, that all the other transports, whether in the Mondego river, at Oporto, or off Maceira, should be brought to the mouth of the Tagus without loss of time; and he has desired me to request that you will give directions that they may be sent to that station.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Captain Malcolm,
H.M.S. Donegal.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Charles Stewart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Ramalhal, 25th August, 1808.

‘ Since I wrote to you last we have been very actively employed in this quarter, and with some success.

‘ On the 17th instant I attacked and defeated Laborde’s corps, consisting of about 6000 men, in the neighbourhood of Roliça, about six or seven miles to the south of Obidos. On the following day, the French troops under General Junot, General Loison, and General Laborde, joined in the neighbourhood of Torres Vedras, to the amount of from 12,000 to 14,000 men. I marched on the same day towards Lourinha, to protect the landing of a brigade of infantry under General Anstruther, which brigade joined me on the 20th at Vimeiro, near Maceira; and I was joined by another brigade of infantry, under General Acland, early in the morning of the 21st, which brigade had landed in the course of that night.

‘ The French army attacked me in my position at Vimeiro, on the 21st, at about 8 in the morning; and it was completely defeated, with the loss of thirteen pieces of cannon, and a vast number of killed, wounded, and prisoners. Sir Harry Burrard, who had come into the roads of Maceira on the night of the 20th, landed during the action on the morning of the 21st; and if I had not been prevented, I should have pursued the enemy to Torres Vedras on that evening, and, in all probability, the whole would have been destroyed.

‘ On the 22d, in the morning, Sir Hew Dalrymple arrived; and in the evening General Kellermann came in with a proposition to suspend hostilities, with a view to make a Convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French.

‘ In the agreement which Sir Hew entered into upon this occasion there was an article stipulating that the Russians should be allowed to use the port of Lisbon as a neutral port, which was referred to the Admiral, who has refused to consent to it; and the General has this day given notice to Junot that the suspension of arms will be at an end on the 28th at noon, unless a Convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French, by sea, should be agreed upon before that day.

‘ This is the general outline of the state of affairs here. Sir John Moore’s corps is in the roads of Maceira, and I believe is to be landed. Besides this, we have 6000 Portuguese troops at Lourinha; and I believe there is a detachment of Spanish and Portuguese troops about Santarem and Abrantes.

‘The retreat of the French is, however, open through Alentejo towards Elvas; and I have but little doubt that if we should not get them out of Portugal by sea, they will secure themselves in Elvas and Almeida, and we shall have the pleasure of attacking those places regularly, or of blockading them in the autumn. If we should be able to get them away by sea, it will be possible to push our troops into Spain at an early period.

‘I request you to furnish Colonel Doyle with such information from this letter as may be useful to him.

‘The French troops are now assembled at Cabeça de Montachique, and extending towards Mafra. We are behind Torres Vedras, which town is not occupied by either party.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Charles Stewart, Esq.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM HANDED TO SIR HEW DALRYMPLE* BY SIR A. WELLESLEY, FOR LIEUT. COLONEL MURRAY, CHARGED WITH THE NEGOTIATION FOR A CONVENTION.

‘Ramalhal, 23d August, 1808.

‘I. It would be very desirable to instruct Colonel Murray at an early hour this day, to urge the Admiral to have a communication with the Russian Admiral, in which the latter

* *Lieut. General Dalrymple to Lieut. Colonel Murray, Quarter Master General.*

‘Sir,

‘Ramalhal, 25th August, 1808.

‘I have the honor to enclose a letter, which you will deliver to the French Commander in Chief, and you will apprise his Excellency, that as General Kellermann appeared to attach much importance to the article respecting the Russians, and as it is exceedingly inconvenient and disadvantageous to the British army to be liable to the agreement for an unlimited suspension of hostilities, you will inform his Excellency, that I shall consider that to which I have agreed to be at an end at 12 o'clock at noon on the 28th.

‘In case his Excellency should manifest a desire to continue the negotiations for a Convention on the basis of the remaining articles of the agreement, I authorize you to enter upon and conclude it, with such Officer as shall be appointed by the Commander in Chief of the French army, upon the terms specified in the enclosed memoranda, subject to the ratification of the Admiral and myself; and in case you should find this disposition to exist in his Excellency's mind, and if you should enter upon the negotiation under these powers, you are authorized to apprise the Commander in Chief of the French army, that I shall have no objection to a renewal of the agreement for the suspension of hostilities for a definite period, to enable the Officers employed to bring the negotiations to their result.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel Murray.’

‘W. H. DALRYMPLE.

should be informed, that whatever might be the result of the negotiations between Sir Hew and the Duc D'Abrantes, the Russian fleet should not be molested if they conducted themselves as they ought in a neutral port, and took no part in the contest.

' II. If the Admiral should consent to this arrangement in favor of the Russians, and the Russians should be satisfied upon this point, the French Commander in Chief should be pressed upon the following points in the negotiation for the Convention.

' 1st. The fort of Peniche to be evacuated in two days; the forts of Elvas and La Lippe in four days; the fort of Almeida in five days. The French army to cross the Tagus, and evacuate Lisbon and all the forts on the Tagus in four days from the signature of the Convention, and to be prepared to embark in seven days, or as soon afterwards as the British Commander in Chief may appoint.

' The British army, in the mean time, to have the use of the port of Lisbon and the navigation of the Tagus.

' 2dly. The mode of paying for the hire of the transports to be settled.

' 3dly. The ports to be settled to which they are to go. Rochefort or L'Orient would answer best, as being the greatest distance from Spain and the Austrian frontier.

' 4thly. Security to be required for the transports going to the ports appointed, and for the return of the transports; as fifty of those sent with the army of Egypt were detained in France.

' 5thly. Some mode to be devised to make the French Generals disgorge the church plate which they have stolen.

' 6thly. An exchange of prisoners to be settled.

' 7thly. There are no horse transports; and the French must be permitted to leave Commissaries to sell the horses, or to hire vessels to transport them to France; but certainly not the cavalry itself.'

PLAN FOR THE OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY.

' Ramalhal, 26th August, 1808.

' 1. The whole army to march to-morrow morning, the 27th, to the heights on this side of Torres Vedras. This must depend upon the result of Colonel Murray's mission.

If Junot should declare himself ready to negotiate, the General would probably not be disposed to show his army so near the line of demarkation; if not, the more ready to appear to move the better.

‘ 2. On the 28th, the brigades, as follow, to march by their left to Sobral, viz.—

- ‘ Major General Hill’s.
- Major General Ferguson’s.
- Brig. General Nightingall’s.
- Brig. General C. Craufurd’s.
- Brig. General Fane’s.
- Brig. General Bowes’s.
- The 20th light dragoons.
- The Portuguese cavalry.
- The Portuguese infantry under Colonel Trant.
- One brigade of 9 pounders.
- Two brigades of 6 pounders.
- Spare ammunition, &c., being in Colonel Robe’s park.

‘ 3. The infantry of Lieut. General Moore’s corps, to the amount of 5000 or 6000 men, to be landed as soon as possible, and to be assembled in this camp. Three brigades of artillery and their horses, and the cavalry likewise, to be landed and assembled in the same place. It is supposed that this debarkation may be completed by the 28th in the evening.

‘ 4. On the 29th, in the morning, the troops which remain in this camp to march upon Enxara dos Cavalleiros, on the road to Cabeça de Montachique. The Portuguese army at Lourinha on the same day to St. Pedro de Codiera, on the road to Mafra, and the corps at Sobral to St. Antonio de Tojal. If it should be found that the French troops still remain in the position at Cabeça de Montachique, these troops will move on the following day, the 30th, by Loures, to attack the enemy at Cabeça de Montachique in the rear, while they will be attacked in front by the troops from Enxara dos Cavalleiros; and the Portuguese troops will on that day, the 30th, move to Mafra. These corps will communicate as follows: on the 28th by Runa to Ramalhal; on the 29th by Runa and Torres Vedras to Enxara dos Cavalleiros; on the 30th by the same route, unless the enemy should retire. If the enemy should retire, then by Cabeça de Montachique and Loures.

‘ 5. The remainder of the infantry of Sir John Moore’s corps to be landed as soon as possible after the first disembarkation of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. This corps of infantry to be assembled as a reserve in the camp at Vimeiro, and to march on the 30th by the road towards Mafra and Cintra, keeping up its communication with the sea, and receiving its supplies of provisions from the shipping.

‘ 6. All the ships now in the roads at Maccira to be moved to the mouth of the Tagus, with the exception of a victualler, an ordnance store ship, a hay and oat ship, and a medicine ship, to remain with Captain Bligh, who will communicate daily with the corps to be assembled in the camp at Vimciro, and to be marched by the route of Mafra.

‘ 7. The other corps to be victualled as follows:—The troops now in camp to receive three days’ bread for the 29th, 30th, and 31st, on the 28th in the morning at daylight. The corps to march to Sobral, to be attended by their brigade Commissariat mules, carrying three days’ bread, and three days’ meat to be driven with them. The horses of the cavalry and artillery on the 28th in the morning to receive three days’ grain for the 29th, 30th, and 31st.

‘ 8. Three days’ bread to be sent with this corps in waggons for the Portuguese infantry and cavalry.

‘ 9. The waggons in the Commissariat dépôt carrying above 100,000 lbs. of bread, and meat, spirits, &c., to attend the movement of the corps, to march on the 29th from camp to Enxara dos Cavalleiros. Calculating the consumption of these troops at 15,000 rations daily, they will have bread to last till the 4th of September.

‘ 10. In order to make this arrangement complete, it will be necessary to get up 560 bags of bread this day, the 26th, which it is supposed were landed yesterday; to lay the whole of the bread down in this camp to-morrow morning, the 27th; to land 960 bags more on the 27th at Maccira; and to send the empty carts on the 27th to Maccira, so that they may be full on the 28th, and ready to move on the 29th. The corps which will land and come on to the camp at

Torres Vedras on the 27th should have five days' bread with them, to the 31st inclusive.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lord Mulgrave, First Lord of the Admiralty.

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Ramalhal, 26th August, 1808.

‘As my command is at an end, I hope I may be permitted to trouble you with a few lines on the co-operation which I have received from the navy. I have long been in the habits of friendship and intimacy with Captain Malcolm, of the *Donegal*; but it is impossible for me to describe the zeal, the ardor, and the kindness with which he entered into all my views; and the whole army will bear testimony to the exertions which he and all the Officers of the navy acting under him made to provide for their convenience on the passage, to land them with celerity, and to provide for all their necessities and comforts when they were on shore. His views in all these respects were fully carried into execution by Captain Adam, of the *Resistance*, and Captain Cadogan, of the *Crocodile*; and, after our arrival on the coast of Portugal, by Captain Bligh, of the *Alfred*, from whom we received some most essential assistance. There were other Captains of the navy with whom we have had at different times occasion to communicate, and I must say that the same desire to render us every assistance in their power has animated them all; which I attribute in a great degree to the disposition which, throughout the service, has been manifested by Captain Malcolm, who was principally charged with its conduct.

‘I also beg leave to recommend to your Lordship's favor and protection Lieut. Fleetwood, the agent of transports, who superintended the fleet in which the army under my command was embarked. He is the most active, intelligent, and zealous of all the Officers that I have seen in that line of the naval profession, and he really deserves promotion. If his services should be continued in the transport line of the profession, benefit will be derived from his promotion, as his sphere will be enlarged, and the armies to which he may be attached in future will not suffer the inconvenience which

that under my command did, of having him superseded by an Officer without any of his qualifications, in the midst of the service. I have to add that Captain Malcolm is equally satisfied with Lieut. Fleetwood.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lord Mulgrave.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Commissioners of the Transport Board.

‘ GENTLEMEN,

‘ Ramalhal, 26th August, 1808.

‘ As Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple has taken the command of the army, which was lately under my orders, I take this opportunity of drawing your attention to the conduct of Lieut. Fleetwood, the agent of transports attached to that army. I cannot say too much in praise of his zeal, intelligence, and activity; and I have great pleasure in adding, that his conduct has given equal satisfaction to Captain Malcolm, of the *Donegal*, to whom the conduct of the naval part of the service was intrusted. I therefore hope that you will apply to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to promote Lieut. Fleetwood, and otherwise reward him as you may think proper.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Commissioners*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

of the Transport Board.

To Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple.

‘ SIR,

‘ Ramalhal, 26th August, 1808.

‘ I have the honor to enclose herewith a schedule of recommendations for promotion, in consequence of the casualties which took place in the action of the 21st instant, together with some memorials in support of these Officers’ claims, and also a memorial from Brevet Lieut. Colonel Davies, of the 36th regiment; all of which I request you will be pleased to forward to the Commander in Chief, for His Royal Highness’s favorable consideration.

‘ You will be pleased to observe, that I have recommended the succession in the 20th light dragoons, according to the seniority of the Officers, as they stand in the detachment at present serving with this army; and although it may interfere in some instances with the regimental priority of rank, I have considered the recommendation in favor of

the Officers named in the schedule as a justice due to the gallantry which that corps displayed in the action of the 21st instant, particularly in the case of Major Blake, who is a most deserving Officer.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Sir Hew Dalrymple.’

To Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple.

‘ SIR,

‘ Torres Vedras, 29th August, 1808.

‘ I have the honor to enclose herewith a letter from Brig. General Anstruther, covering a representation from Major Hull, of the 43d regiment, respecting the inadequacy of the present establishment of subalterns and non-commissioned officers to carrying on the duties of the 2d battalion of that corps in the field; and also a statement of the services of Major Hull*, whom I am induced to recommend for the lieutenant colonelcy, for the reasons stated in Brig. General Anstruther’s letter, should His Majesty be pleased to appoint an additional Lieutenant Colonel to the 43d regiment.

‘ I request that you will be pleased to forward these papers to the Commander in Chief for His Royal Highness’s favorable consideration.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Sir Hew Dalrymple.’

To Captain Pulteney Malcolm, H.M.S. Donegal.

‘ Torres Vedras, 29th August, 1808.

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM,

$\frac{1}{2}$ past 5, P. M.

‘ Captain Dalrymple arrived this morning with the Convention, signed by General Kellermann and Colonel Murray; but it was so objectionable in many parts, that a meeting of the General Officers was called to deliberate upon and settle the alterations to be made in it, which meeting I attended. The result of the meeting was a proposal to make certain alterations, which I acknowledge I do not think sufficient, although the treaty will answer in its amended form. In

* Afterwards killed in command of the 1st batt. 43d regiment, at General B. Craufurd’s affair at the Coa, on the 24th July, 1810.

the mean time the army remains on its present ground, very much against my opinion.

‘ I am afraid that I am so much connected with the credit of this army, that I cannot remain with it without falling as it will fall. If I could be of any use to men who have served me so well, I would stay with them for ever ; but as matters are situated, I am sure that I can be of no use to them ; I am convinced they cannot render any service, and I have determined to go home immediately.

‘ At the same time I must say that I approve of allowing the French to evacuate Portugal, because I see clearly that we cannot get them out of Portugal otherwise, under existing circumstances, without such an arrangement ; and we should be employed in the blockade or siege of the places which they would occupy during the season in which we ought and might be advantageously employed against the French in Spain. But the Convention, by which they should be allowed to evacuate Portugal, ought to be settled in the most honorable manner to the army by which they have been beaten ; and we ought not to be kept for ten days on our field of battle before the enemy (who sued on the day after the action) is brought to terms.

‘ I am quite annoyed on this subject.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Captain Pulteney Malcolm,*
H.M.S. Donegal.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

DEFINITIVE CONVENTION FOR THE EVACUATION OF PORTUGAL BY THE FRENCH ARMY.

‘ The Generals commanding in chief of the British and French armies in Portugal, having determined to negotiate and conclude a treaty for the evacuation of Portugal by the French troops, on the basis of the agreement entered into on the 22d instant, for a suspension of hostilities, have appointed the undermentioned Officers to negotiate the same in their names : viz., on the part of the General in Chief of the British army, Lieut. Colonel Murray, Quarter Master General ; and on the part of the French army, Monsieur Kellermann, General of Division, to whom they have given authority to negotiate and conclude a Convention to that effect, subject to their ratification respec-

tively, and to that of the Admiral commanding the British fleet at the entrance of the Tagus. These two Officers, after exchanging their full powers, have agreed upon the articles which follow :—

‘ *Art. 1.* All the places and forts in the kingdom of Portugal, occupied by the French troops, shall be delivered up to the British army, in the state in which they are at the period of the signature of the present Convention.

‘ *Art. 2.* The French troops shall evacuate Portugal, with their arms and baggage : they shall not be considered as prisoners of war ; and, on their arrival in France, they shall be at liberty to serve.

‘ *Art. 3.* The English government shall furnish the means of conveyance for the French army, which shall be disembarked in any of the ports of France between Rochefort and L’Orient inclusively.

‘ *Art. 4.* The French army shall carry with it all its artillery of French calibre, with the horses belonging to it, and the tumbrils supplied with sixty rounds per gun. All other artillery, arms, and ammunition, as also the military and naval arsenal, shall be given up to the British army and navy, in the state in which they may be at the period of the ratification of the Convention.

‘ *Art. 5.* The French army shall carry with it all its equipments, and all that is comprehended under the name of property of the army, that is to say, its military chest, and the carriages attached to the field Commissariat and field hospital ; or shall be allowed to dispose of such part of the same on its account, as the Commander in Chief may judge it unnecessary to embark. In like manner all individuals of the army shall be at liberty to dispose of all their private property of every description, with full security hereafter for the purchasers.

‘ *Art. 6.* The cavalry are to embark their horses, as also the Generals and other Officers of all ranks : it is, however, fully understood, that the means of conveyance for horses, at the disposal of the British Commander in Chief, are very limited. Some additional conveyance may be procured in the port of Lisbon.

‘ The number of horses to be embarked by the troops shall not exceed 600, and the number embarked by the

Staff shall not exceed 200. At all events, every facility will be given to the French army to dispose of the horses belonging to it which cannot be embarked.

' *Art. 7.* In order to facilitate the embarkation, it shall take place in three divisions, the last of which will be principally composed of the garrisons of the places, of the cavalry, the artillery, the sick, and the equipment of the army. The first division shall embark within seven days from the date of the ratification, or sooner if possible.

' *Art. 8.* The garrison of Elvas and its forts, and of Peniche and Palmella, will be embarked at Lisbon; that of Almeida at Oporto, or the nearest harbour. They will be accompanied on their march by British Commissaries charged with providing for their subsistence and accommodation.

' *Art. 9.* All the sick and wounded who cannot be embarked with the troops are intrusted to the British army: they are to be taken care of whilst they remain in this country at the expense of the British Government, under the condition of the same being reimbursed by France, when the final evacuation is effected. The English Government will provide for their return to France, which shall take place by detachments of about 150 or 200 men at a time. A sufficient number of French medical Officers shall be left behind to attend them.

' *Art. 10.* As soon as the vessels employed to carry the army to France shall have disembarked it in the harbours specified, or in any other of the ports of France, to which stress of weather may force them, every facility shall be given them to return to England without delay, and security against capture, until their arrival in a friendly port.

' *Art. 11.* The French army shall be concentrated in Lisbon, and within a distance of about two leagues from it. The English army will approach within three leagues of the capital, and will be so placed as to leave about one league between the two armies.

' *Art. 12.* The forts of St. Julian, the Bugio, and Cascaes, shall be occupied by the British troops on the ratification of the Convention.

' Lisbon and its citadel, together with the forts and batteries as far as the Lazaretto or Trafaria, on one side, and

Fort St. Joseph on the other, inclusively, shall be given up on the embarkation of the second division, as shall also the harbours, and all the armed vessels in it of every description, with their rigging, sails, stores, and ammunition.

‘ The fortresses of Elvas, Almeida, Peniche, and Palmella, shall be given up as soon as the British troops can arrive to occupy them ; in the mean time, the General in Chief of the British army will give notice of the present Convention to the garrisons of those places, as also to the troops before them, in order to put a stop to all further hostilities.

‘ *Art. 13.* Commissaries shall be named on both sides to regulate and accelerate the execution of the arrangements agreed upon.

‘ *Art. 14.* Should there arise any doubt as to the meaning of any article, it shall be explained favorably to the French army.

‘ *Art. 15.* From the date of the ratification of the present Convention all arrears of contributions, requisitions, or claims, whatever, of the French Government against the subjects of Portugal, or any other individuals residing in this country, founded on the occupation of Portugal by the French troops in the month of December, 1807, which may not have been paid up, are cancelled ; and all sequestrations laid upon their property, moveable or immoveable, are removed, and the free disposal of the same is restored to the proper owners.

‘ *Art. 16.* All subjects of France, or of powers in friendship or alliance with France, domiciliated in Portugal, or accidentally in this country, shall be protected.

‘ Their property of every kind, moveable and immoveable, shall be respected ; and they shall be at liberty either to accompany the French army or to remain in Portugal ; in either case their property is guaranteed to them, with the liberty of retaining or of disposing of it, and passing the sale thereof into France, or any other country where they may fix their residence : the space of one year being allowed them for that purpose.

‘ It is fully understood that shipping is excepted from this arrangement ; only, however, in so far as regards leaving the port ; and that none of the stipulations above mentioned can be made the pretext of any commercial speculation.

‘ *Art. 17.* No native of Portugal shall be rendered accountable for his political conduct during the period of the occupation of this country by the French army, and all those who have continued in the exercise of their employments, or who have accepted situations under the French Government, are placed under the protection of the British Commanders: they shall sustain no injury in their persons or property, it not having been at their option to be obedient or not to the French Government.

‘ They are also at liberty to avail themselves of the stipulations of the 16th article.

‘ *Art. 18.* The Spanish troops detained on board of ship in the port of Lisbon shall be given up to the General in Chief of the British army, who engages to obtain of the Spaniards to restore such French subjects, either military or civil, as may have been detained in Spain, without being taken in battle, or in consequence of military operations, but on occasion of the occurrences of the 29th of last May and the days immediately following.

‘ *Art. 19.* There shall be an immediate exchange established for all ranks of prisoners made in Portugal since the commencement of the present hostilities.

‘ *Art. 20.* Hostages of the rank of field Officers shall be mutually furnished on the part of the British army and navy, and on that of the French army, for the reciprocal guarantee of the present Convention. The Officer of the British army shall be restored on the completion of these articles which concern the army, and the Officer of the navy on the disembarkation of the French troops in their own country. The like is to take place on the part of the French army.

‘ *Art. 21.* It shall be allowed to the General in Chief of the French army to send an Officer to France with intelligence of the present Convention. A vessel will be furnished by the British Admiral to carry him to Bordeaux or Rochefort.

‘ *Art. 22.* The British Admiral will be invited to accommodate his Excellency the Commander in Chief and the other principal Officers on board of ships of war.

‘ Done and concluded at Lisbon, this thirtieth day of August, one thousand eight hundred and eight.

‘ GEORGE MURRAY, Quar. Mas. Gen.

‘ KELLERMANN, Général de Division.

ADDITIONAL ARTICLES TO THE CONVENTION OF THE
30TH AUGUST, 1808.

' *Art. 1.* The individuals in the civil employments of the army, made prisoners, either by the British troops or by the Portuguese, in any part of Portugal, will be restored, as is customary, without exchange.

' *Art. 2.* The French army shall be subsisted from its own magazines up to the day of embarkation, the garrisons up to the day of the evacuations of the fortresses.

' The remainder of the magazines shall be delivered over in the usual form to the British Government, which charges itself with the subsistence of the men and horses of the army, from the above mentioned periods until their arrival in France, under the conditions of their being reimbursed by the French Government for the excess of the expense, beyond the estimation to be made by both parties, of the value of the magazines delivered. The provisions on board the ships of war, in possession of the French army, will be taken on account by the British Government, in like manner with the magazines of the fortresses.

' *Art. 3.* The General commanding the British troops will take the necessary measures for re-establishing the free circulation of the means of subsistence between the country and the capital.

' Done and concluded, &c. &c., and signed as before.'

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

' Camp, North of Torres Vedras,
30th August, 1808.

' MY DEAR LORD,

' A Convention, signed by General Kellermann and Colonel Murray, for the evacuation of Portugal by the French troops, was brought here yesterday morning; but it was not ratified by the General, in consequence of his finding some fault with it. It was altered, but not as I thought as it ought to have been, and was returned to Junot yesterday afternoon. In the mean time, the army has halted in its position; with the only difference, that we have a corps in Torres Tedras, instead of three miles from that town. In short, in ten days after the action of the 21st, we are not

farther advanced ; or, indeed, as I believe, so far advanced as we should and ought to have been on the night of the 21st.

‘ I assure you, my dear Lord, matters are not prospering here ; and I feel an earnest desire to quit the army. I have been too successful with this army ever to serve with it in a subordinate situation, with satisfaction to the person who shall command it, and of course not to myself. However, I shall do whatever the Government may wish.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple.

‘ SIR,

Sobral, 1st Sept., 1808.

‘ As it is probable that you will take an early opportunity of communicating with England, I think it proper at this time to submit to you the enclosed state of the horses attached to the artillery, with the corps which has hitherto been under my command.

‘ As it was not deemed expedient that I should take with me horses belonging to the artillery, horses belonging to the Irish Commissariat were embarked for the purpose of drawing the artillery, which horses were of a very inferior description, being either cast horses from the dragoons, or horses purchased in Ireland at a very low price, viz., 12*l.* or 13*l.* each ; and they were never intended to be applied to this purpose.

‘ They have however performed the service hitherto, but with the aids and losses stated in the enclosed papers ; and you will observe that there are at this moment seventy six of them with incurable diseases.

‘ As these horses were never intended to perform the service of the artillery, and as I have every reason to believe that mules will not answer to draw our ordnance carriages, and that the country does not afford horses of a proper description, I cannot avoid recommending to you to call the attention of His Majesty’s Government to this subject at an early period ; and to require an immediate supply of 300 artillery horses to draw the brigades of ordnance which have been hitherto attached to this corps, if you should have reason to expect that you shall require any further active service from those guns.

‘ I had already apprised the Secretary of State of the inadequacy of these horses to the service required of them.

‘ While writing upon this subject, it is proper to remind you, that there is another brigade of 6 pounders belonging to the corps hitherto called mine, three pieces of which are in the ships, and three were left at Leyria, as the horses were unable to draw them on.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

Sir Hew Dalrymple.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Charles Stewart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Sobral, 1st Sept., 1808.

‘ In the last letter which I wrote to you I believe I informed you of our actions on the 17th and 21st of August ; and that the Commander in Chief had agreed to a suspension of hostilities with the French, with a view to the settlement of a Convention for their entire evacuation of Portugal.

‘ Since I wrote that letter I have received yours (I think) of the 19th of August, which I have given to Sir Hew Dalrymple, and he will of course write to you. I trouble you now only because Sir Robert Wilson’s departure for Oporto affords a favorable opportunity of sending a letter, and I consider it desirable that you should be apprised of the state of affairs here.

‘ The agreement for the suspension of hostilities, concluded on the night of the 22d of August, ended in a Convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French, signed on the 30th of that month. As far as I have learnt, the Convention contains nothing material, excepting that the French are to be taken to a port in France ; that they are to embark within seven days ; that till they are embarked they are to remain in possession of Lisbon and a circuit of two leagues ; and we are to have Fort St. Julian, Cascaes, and all the forts on the coast and in the interior, upon the ratification of the Convention.

‘ They are to give up the Spanish prisoners on the General engaging to use his good offices that Frenchmen taken in Spain, not having engaged in hostilities, should likewise be released.

‘ There is nothing else in the Convention that I have

heard of that is of any importance. The Russians, Danes, &c., are left at our mercy.

‘As far as I have any knowledge of them, I have many objections both to the agreement for suspending hostilities and to the Convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French. I approve, however, of the principal point in the latter, viz., to allow them to evacuate; and it is useless to trouble you with my objections to the mode in which that point has been brought about.

‘My reasons for thinking that we have done right in allowing them to evacuate are as follow:—

‘First. Sir Harry Burrard and Sir Hew Dalrymple having determined that they would bring Sir John Moore’s corps down to Lisbon, instead of placing it in a situation in which it would have the means of cutting off the enemy’s retreat across the Tagus, he would have been enabled to secure himself in Elvas and Almeida, and the campaign would have been spent in the siege or blockade of those places. Admitting that the army which will evacuate Lisbon will be immediately carried to the frontiers of Spain, I conceive it better to have that army in that situation, and our army acting in Spain, in co-operation with the Spanish troops, than to have the French troops occupying strong places in Portugal, and our army occupied in the siege or blockade of them.

‘Secondly. The Commander in Chief, and those who surround him, appeared very unwilling to advance towards Lisbon, even after our victory of the 21st of August, without the assistance of Sir John Moore’s corps; and as the period of his arrival at Maceira, the place of disembarkation, was very uncertain, and delays at this season of the year were very dangerous, and we had already had on the 22d of August some very bad weather, of which a continuance was certainly to be expected early in this month, when the fleet of transports, with which a communication was also lately necessary to us, must have quitted the coast, I considered our only chance of reaching Lisbon at all to be by negotiation.

‘If we had not negotiated we could not have advanced before the 30th, as Sir John Moore’s corps was not ready till that day. The French would at that time have fortified

their positions near Lisbon, which it is probable we should not have been in a situation to attack till the end of the first week in this month. Then, taking the chances of the bad weather depriving us of the communication with the fleet of transports and victuallers, and delaying and rendering more difficult and precarious our land operations, which after all would not have been effectual to cut off the retreat of the French across the Tagus into Alentejo, I was clearly of opinion that the best thing to do was to consent to a Convention and allow them to evacuate Portugal.

‘The detail of this Convention, and of the agreement for suspending hostilities, is a question of another kind, upon which it is useless that I should trouble you; and I write what I have above written only that you may be aware of the general grounds on which I acquiesced in the Convention, as far as its principal point goes, some of which, I believe, induced the General himself to consent to it.

‘I do not know what Sir Hew Dalrymple proposes to do, or is instructed to do; but if I were in his situation I would have 20,000 men at Madrid in less than a month from this time.

‘I propose recommending to him to arm and accoutre the Spanish troops, and to send them into Spain.

‘We, that is, my corps, are only twenty four miles from Lisbon, and I believe the army about the same distance, on the side of Mafra.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Charles Stewart, Esq.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the General Officers.

‘GENTLEMEN,

‘Zamujal, 3d Sept., 1808.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of this day, and I assure you that it is a source of great gratification to me to find that my conduct in the command, with which I was lately intrusted by His Majesty, has given you satisfaction.

‘As my efforts were directed to forward the service on which we were employed, I could not fail to receive your support and assistance; and to the cordial support and friendly advice and assistance which I invariably received from you collectively, and individually, I attribute the suc-

cess of our endeavors to bring the army in the state in which it was formed to meet the enemy on the days on which the gallantry of the Officers and soldiers was stimulated by your example, and their discipline aided and directed by your experience and ability.

‘ Under these circumstances my task has been comparatively light, and I imagine that its difficulty has been over-rated by your partiality ; but I have a pride in the reflection that as I should not deserve, so I should not possess, your regard, if I had not done my duty ; and with these sentiments, and those of respect and affection for you all, I accept of that testimony of your esteem and confidence which you have been pleased to present to me.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Generals Spencer, Hill,
and Ferguson,*

‘ *Brig. Generals Nightingall,
Bowes, Fane, and Craufurd.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*The General Officers who landed with the troops at the Mondego
to Lieut. General the Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp at St. Antonio de Tojal, 3d Sept., 1808.

‘ Anxious to manifest the high esteem and respect we bear towards you, and the satisfaction we must ever feel in having had the good fortune to serve under your command, we have this day directed a piece of plate, value 1000 guineas(a), to be prepared and presented to you.

‘ The enclosed inscription, which we have ordered to be engraved on it, expresses our feelings on this occasion.

We have the honor to be, &c.

‘ B. SPENCER, Major Gen.

‘ R. HILL, Major Gen.

‘ R. FERGUSON, Major Gen.

‘ M. NIGHTINGALL, Brig. Gen.

‘ B. F. BOWES, Brig. Gen.

‘ H. FANE, Brig. Gen.

‘ J. CATLIN CRAUFURD, Brig. Gen.

‘ *Lieut. General
the Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.*

“ INSCRIPTION.

“ From the General Officers serving in the British army, originally landed
“ at Figueira, in Portugal, in the year 1808, to Lieut. General the Right Hon.
“ Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B., &c., their Commander.

“ Major General Spencer, second in command, Major Generals Hill and
“ Ferguson, Brig. Generals Nightingall, Bowes, Fane, and Craufurd, offer
“ this gift to their leader, in testimony of the high respect and esteem they
“ feel for him as a man, and the unbounded confidence they place in him as
“ an Officer.”

(a) This piece of plate was afterwards augmented in value by the additional subscriptions of Generals Anstruther and Acland, and the field Officers of the army who served under the orders of Major General Sir Arthur Wellesley, at the battle of Vimieiro.

*Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State, to Lieut. General
the Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.*

‘Sir,

‘Downing Street, 4th Sept., 1808.

‘I received by your aide de camp, Captain Campbell, your dispatches of the 16th and 17th of August, the first containing the account of the affair at Alcobaga, which obliged the enemy to retire his advanced posts; the other of the 17th, containing the account of your attack, with the troops under your command, on the advanced corps of the enemy, in their formidable position near Obidos, and of their entire defeat.

‘These dispatches having been laid before His Majesty, I am to convey to you His Majesty’s entire satisfaction in the able, spirited, and decisive conduct you have displayed, by which so much credit has been reflected upon His Majesty’s arms, and the progress of the army towards the complete reduction of the enemy was so greatly facilitated.

‘His Majesty has also signified his royal pleasure, that his most gracious approbation should be signified by you to Major General Spencer, and to the Generals and other Officers under your command, for the skill, valor, and perseverance they exhibited, and to the troops in general, for the courage, coolness, and determination which appears to have marked their conduct.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Lieut. Gen. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.’

‘CASTLEREAGH.

*Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State, to Lieut. General
Sir Harry Burrard, Bart.*

‘Sir,

‘Downing Street, 4th Sept., 1808.

‘I received by Captain Campbell, aide de camp to Lieut. General Sir A. Wellesley, your dispatch of the 21st ult, enclosing the report to you from that General, of the signal victory obtained by His Majesty’s forces under his orders, when attacked, at Vimeiro, by the whole of the French force in Portugal, commanded by General Junot in person.

‘Having laid the same before His Majesty, I am directed by His Majesty to desire that you will signify to Lieut. General Sir A. Wellesley, that the disposition made by him to receive the enemy, and the skill and valor displayed by him in effecting their total defeat, have afforded His Majesty the highest satisfaction.

‘The conduct of Major General Spencer, and of the other Generals and Officers who so ably executed the orders they had received, and displayed so many instances of judgment and valor, is highly honorable to themselves and acceptable to His Majesty.

‘You will be pleased to communicate the satisfaction His Majesty feels in the deliberate and steady bravery by which his troops distinguished themselves, reflecting at once equal honor upon the character and discipline of his army—qualities by which alone success in war can be permanently looked for.

‘The delicacy and honorable forbearance which determined you, though present in the action, not to interfere with the arrangements previously made by Lieut. General Sir A. Wellesley, and then in progress of execution, has been observed by His Majesty with approbation.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Lieut. General

Sir H. Burrard, Bart.’

‘CASTLEREAGH.

To Captain Pulteney Malcolm, H.M.S. Donegal.

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM,

‘ Zambujal, 5th Sept., 1808.

‘ I received your letter of Saturday this morning, having been at Cintra yesterday morning, and not having returned here till late in the evening.

‘ I lament the situation of our affairs as much as you do, and I did every thing in my power to prevent it; but my opinion was overruled. I had nothing to do with the Convention as it now stands; and I have never seen it to this moment.

‘ I have not heard from your brother yet, but I suppose his letter is coming to me. I will see you soon if I can. I have stronger reasons, public as well as private, but I shall not decide hastily or in anger upon any subject.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Captain Pulteney Malcolm,*
H.M.S. Donegal.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. Give my best love to Cadogan, and tell him that I lament the result of our labors as much as he does, but that it is not my fault. I have only to regret that I put my name to an agreement of which I did not approve, and which I did not negotiate. If I had not done it, I really believe that they would not have dared to make such a Convention as they have made. Notwithstanding that that agreement was never ratified, and is now so much waste paper.

‘ A. W.’

To Lieut. Colonel Murray, Quarter Master General.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Zambujal, 5th Sept., 1808.

‘ I hope you will be able to make a good arrangement for the performance of the duty required from me in the Asturias, for which I deem myself incapable. If it were not so, I believe your experience of the zeal with which I served Lord Cathcart would convince you that I would not decline performing any duty which the Government could require from me. I shall not conceal from you, however, that I consider myself in a very different situation in this army from that in which Lord Cathcart placed me; and I acknowledge that I cannot venture to do many things which I did for him, because it is evident that there exists a want

of confidence which never existed in respect to me in any former instance. This, however, did not affect my decision in the service required of me yesterday, which I certainly should have undertaken if I had been capable of performing it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Murray.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple.

‘ SIR,

‘ Zambujal, 5th Sept., 1808.

‘ When I had the honor of recommending to you to appoint a successor to Captain Preval of the Foreign Engineers, as Captain of Guides, I apprised you of the bad state of health of that Officer, who had then requested me to apply to you for leave to go to England for his recovery, which request he has since repeated. I therefore beg leave to recommend that Captain Preval may have leave to go to England for the recovery of his health.

‘ I cannot make this request without, at the same time, mentioning my sense of Captain Preval’s services, not only in his capacity of engineer, but in that of Captain of Guides. In Portugal the services of an Officer in the latter capacity are most essential, there being no map of the country, and no person capable of giving information of a topographical nature; and of all those whose services have contributed to the success of the late operations, there is none who in his line stands higher than Captain Preval.

‘ Under these circumstances, I recommend this application for leave of absence to your favorable attention. And as his duty has been most laborious, and attended by some responsibility, I beg leave to recommend that he may have the pay and allowances of a Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General from the 1st of August, on which day he commenced to perform it. I have to mention that if the command of the army had remained in my hands, I should have given him that appointment, which I observe that you have given to his successor in the corps of guides.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*
Sir Hew Dalrymple.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘Zambujal, 12 miles N. of Lisbon,
5th Sept., 1808.

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Your brother Charles communicated to me your letter of the 20th of August to Sir Hew Dalrymple, of which Sir Hew himself communicated to me different parts yesterday; and I proceed to give you my opinion on the points to which it relates. I must apprise you, however, that our information here of the state of affairs in Spain is very defective; that we, or at least I, do not know what is the position, what are the numbers, what are the means, or what ought to be the objects of the French army in Spain; and I am equally ignorant of the state of the force of the Spaniards.

‘I rather believe, however, that the French army in Spain now consists of about 40,000 men, of which number about 5000 are cavalry, and that they are under the command of Marshal Bessières, and are stationed somewhere about Vitoria, in Biscay. The probability that they will be reinforced must depend upon the state of affairs in the other parts of Europe, of which I have no knowledge whatever; but if the attention of the French Government is not called to other quarters, we must expect that the French army in Spain will be increased at an early period to a very large amount.

‘The amount of the force with which operations can be carried on in Spain is another and a very material consideration which bears upon the whole question; and, from all that I have heard of the state of the resources in the country, I should doubt whether it will be practicable to carry on operations in Spain with a larger corps than 40,000 men. There may be other *corps de reserve*, and employed in operations on other lines, or on the same line, in the protection of convoys from France, &c.; but it is not probable that the corps in front will exceed 40,000 men. You must consider this, however, as a mere matter of opinion, founded upon general information of the state of the resources in Spain, in which I may be much mistaken.

‘The next point for consideration is the force of the Spaniards: I really know of nothing that they have in the shape of an army capable of meeting the French, excepting that under General Castaños. General Cuesta has some

cavalry in Castille; General Galluzzo some more in Estremadura; and Blake's army of Galicia may in time become an efficient corps. But those armies of peasantry, which in Murcia, Valencia, and Catalonia, have cut up French corps, must not be reckoned upon (at least at present) as efficient armies to meet the French troops in the field. It is most probable that they will not, and indeed cannot, leave their provinces, and if they could, no Officer could calculate a great operation upon such a body.

‘I doubt not that, if an accurate report could be made upon their state, they want arms, ammunition, money, clothing, and military equipments of every description; and although such a body are very formidable and efficient in their own country, and probably equal to its defence, they must not be reckoned upon out of it; and in any case it is impossible to estimate the effect of their efforts. In some cases equal numbers will oppose with success the French troops; in others, 1000 Frenchmen, with cavalry and artillery, will disperse thousands of them, and no reliance can be placed on them in their present state.

‘The result, then, of my information of the present state of the Spanish force to be opposed to the French, is, that there are about 25,000 men under Castaños, now ready, and about the same number under Blake in Galicia, upon whom you may reckon as efficient troops. All the rest may become so, and may be useful in different ways even at present, but you must not found the arrangement for a great military operation on their utility or efficiency. I understand that Government had promised 10,000 men to Castaños, and I have no doubt whatever that a corps well equipped, consisting of about 15,000 men, including a proportion of British cavalry and artillery, would be highly useful to him. This would make his army 40,000 men, of which the British corps would be the best troops that could be found anywhere; and this army, aided by the insurrection from the other kingdoms of Spain, would be the operating army against what I have supposed to be the French operating army. This British corps should advance from Portugal, to which kingdom it would be in the mean time a defence.

‘You should leave in Portugal a British corps of 5000

men, to be stationed at and in the neighbourhood of Lisbon with probably a small garrison in Elvas. The object in stationing this corps in Portugal is to give strength to the government which you will establish here, and to render it independent of the factions and intrigues by which it will be assailed on all sides.

‘ You ought to send to Lisbon, in the quality of the King’s Ambassador, a discreet person, who could superintend the management of the affairs of this country, particularly the expenditure of the money which you must supply for its wants, and its application to the purposes for which it will be given, viz., to provide a military defence.

‘ The next consideration is the employment of the remainder of the army now in Portugal, amounting by estimate to about 10,000 men, with an additional corps of 10,000 men assembled and ready in England, and some cavalry. I acknowledge that I do not think the affairs in Spain are in so prosperous a state as that you can trust, in operations within that kingdom, the whole disposable force which England possesses, without adopting measures of precaution, which will render its retreat to the sea coast nearly certain. Besides this, I will not conceal from you that our people are so new in the field, that I do not know of persons capable of supplying, or, if supplied, of distributing the supplies, to an army of 40,000 men (British troops) acting together in a body. Even if plenty could be expected to exist, we should starve in the midst of it, for want of due arrangement. But the first objection is conclusive. We may depend upon it that whenever we shall assemble an army, the French will consider its defeat and destruction their first object, particularly if Buonaparte should be at the head of the French troops himself; and if the operations of our army should be near the French frontier, he will have the means of multiplying, and will multiply, the numbers upon our army in such a degree as must get the better of them. For the British army, therefore, we must have a retreat open, and that retreat must be the sea.

‘ Our operations carried on from Portugal and the north of Spain would, as you truly observe, involve us in a line of operations much too long. The retreat would be difficult, if

not impossible. This objection, you will say, would apply equally to the corps of 15,000 men proposed to be employed with Castaños. First, I conceive that there is a great deal of difference between the risk of the loss of such a corps as this, and that of the loss of the whole of the disposable force of Great Britain. Secondly, it does not follow that, because the whole British army could not make its retreat into Portugal, a corps of 15,000 could not. Thirdly, it does not follow that this corps of 15,000 men would necessarily retreat upon Portugal; being a part of Castaños' army, it might retire with his troops into Andalusia, leaving the frontiers of Portugal to be defended by the Portuguese and the British corps of 5000 men, till those, or a part of them, would again be brought round to the Tagus, or could enter Portugal by Algarve. I conclude, then, that although this corps might be risked, and its retreat to the sea should be considered in some degree *en l'air*, that of the whole disposable force of Great Britain ought to be, and must be, saved.

‘The only efficient plan of operations in which the British troops can be employed, consistently with this view, is upon the flank and rear of the enemy's advance towards Madrid, by an issue from the Asturias. If it be true, as is stated by the Asturian deputies in London, that their country is remarkably strong, and that it is secure from French invasion—if it be true that the ports of Santander and Gijon, the former particularly, are secure harbours in the winter—and if the walls can give to both, or either, the means of making an embarkation, even if the enemy should be able to retreat through the mountains—the Asturias is the country we should secure immediately, in which we should assemble our disposable force as soon as possible, and issue forth into the plains, either by Leon or the pass of Reynosa. The army could then have a short, although probably a difficult communication with the sea, which must be carried on by mules, of which there are plenty in the country; it could co-operate with Blake's Gallician army, and could press upon the enemy's right flank and rear, and turn his position upon the Ebro, which it is evident he intends to make his first line. To secure the Asturias as soon as possible, you may depend upon it, is

your first object in Spain, and afterwards to assemble within that country your whole disposable force, after marching the detachment to Castañós.

‘ There are some points of detail which must be attended to in these arrangements. The army now in this country might either be marched into Leon, or it might be embarked and transported to Gijon or Santander. The latter would be the quickest operation; by the adoption of the former, its artillery, in its present form, might accompany it; but it must be recollected, that if the artillery should be kept in its present form, in case of retreat it must be left behind in the plains; as I understand there is no carriage-road across the mountains of Asturias.

‘ The troops, then, now in this country ought to be embarked in the Tagus, and sent to the Asturias; and ordnance carriages ought to be sent from England without loss of time, which can be taken to pieces, and carried by hand, or when put together can be drawn by horses. The reports, which will be made by the Officers sent to those countries, will state whether cavalry can pass through them: I should think they might; as I see that wherever a mule can go a horse can likewise. If so, the cavalry from England should likewise be landed in Asturias; if not, the cavalry should be landed at Coruña or Ferrol, and join the army in the plains, through the passes of Galicia, which we know are practicable for cavalry.

‘ There remains now to be considered only the operations of the Sicilian corps, consisting of 10,000 men. In the present state of affairs the Government will probably not deem it expedient to remove this corps from the Mediterranean. If the Spaniards should be able to make any head against the French on the left of their line in Catalonia, and on the Lower Ebro, this corps might reinforce that part of the Spanish insurrection, keeping its retreat always open to the sea. This, however, would be very difficult, the French being in possession of Barcelona; and probably the siege of that place, aided by the insurgents of Catalonia, would be the most this corps would perform. And whether the operation should be successfully included, or the corps should be forced to re-embark in consequence of the approach of the stronger French force, it would

materially aid the operations of the troops in the centre of Spain.

‘The result of all these operations, which must for the present be distinct, would be to confine the French to their line of the Ebro for the present, and eventually to oblige them to retire upon their own frontier. Time would be gained for the further organization of the Spanish government and force; by the judicious and effectual employment of which the British government would be enabled to withdraw its troops from Spain, to employ them in other parts of Europe. As for preventing the retreat of the French from Spain, it is quite out of the question. They have possession of all the fortresses on this side of the Pyrenees, through which mountains there are not less than forty passes by which troops could march. Besides, if it were possible under these circumstances to place an army in their rear, with the object of cutting them off from France, you might depend upon it that all France would rise as one man for their relief, and the result would be the loss of the army which should be so employed.

‘In respect to your wish, that I should go into the Asturias to examine the country, and form a judgment of its strength, I have to mention to you that I am not a draftsman, and but a bad hand at description. I should have no difficulty in forming an opinion, and a plan for the defence of that country, provided I was certain that it would be executed. But it would be an idle waste of my time, and an imposition upon you, if I were to go into that country with the pretence of giving you, or any General Officer you should employ there, an idea of the country; and it would be vain and fruitless to form a plan for the defence of the country which would depend upon the execution of another. Indeed, this last would only bring disgrace upon me, and would disappoint you.

‘Under these circumstances, I have told Sir Hew Dalrymple that I was not able to perform the duty in which you had desired I should be employed; that I was not a topographical engineer, and could not pretend to describe in writing such a country as the Asturias; and he appeared to think that some of the gentlemen of the Quarter Master General’s department might be more usefully employed on

this service. I hope you will not believe that I feel any disinclination to performing any service in which you may think I can be of use to you ; and that I have discouraged the idea of employing me on that proposed, solely from my incapacity of performing it as it ought to be performed, and from a certainty that you was not aware of the nature of the service which you required from me when you wrote to Sir Hew Dalrymple.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Zambujal, 5th Sept., 1808.

‘ You will receive from me by this opportunity a long letter upon our future operations. This relates solely to my private views. It is quite impossible for me to continue any longer with this army ; and I wish, therefore, that you would allow me to return home and resume the duties of my office, if I should still be in office, and it is convenient to the government that I should retain it ; or if not, that I should remain upon the Staff in England ; or, if that should not be practicable, that I should remain without employment. You will hear from others of the various causes which I must have for being dissatisfied, not only with the military and other public measures of the Commander in Chief, but with his treatment of myself. I am convinced it is better for him, for the army, and for me, that I should go away ; and the sooner I go the better.

‘ Since I wrote to you on the 30th, the Convention has been returned, ratified by Junot, but materially altered. I understand that we have not a sufficiency of the Tagus to give us a secure harbour ; we have not got the navigation of the river ; and as we did not insist upon having Belem castle, which was asked for by the alteration of the 29th, the transports cannot be watered without going into that part of the river occupied by the Russians and the French troops, to which I understand the Admiral will not consent. I have not seen the Convention, and I do not know what it contains.

‘ Believe me, &c. ’

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple.

‘SIR,

‘Zambujal, 6th Sept., 1808.

‘I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have received from Major General Ferguson, in which he excuses himself for having omitted to march from hence with troops yesterday morning, owing to indisposition; and he has desired me to request you would give him leave to go to England for a short time on urgent private affairs. It has come to my knowledge that Major General Ferguson was ordered from England at a very short notice, and he has made me acquainted with the nature of the business which induces him to wish to return there for a short time, which appears to be of great importance to his family, and of a nature to require his presence. I therefore take the liberty of requesting that he may have the leave of absence which he requires.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General*
‘*Sir Hew Dalrymple.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Bishop of Oporto.

‘Zambujal, near St. Antonio de Tojal,

‘MAY IT PLEASE YOUR LORDSHIP, 6th Sept., 1808.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship’s letter of the ———, and I have not failed to lay before the Commander in Chief, Sir Hew Dalrymple, the paper containing a memorandum of those points which your Lordship wished him to consider in the negotiation of any Convention with the French army. I conclude that his Excellency will address your Lordship upon those subjects.

‘I must inform your Lordship, that the battle of the 21st of August was the conclusion of my command of the British forces in Portugal. Indeed a senior Officer, Sir Harry Burrard, was in the field towards the close of the action, and directed the operations which were carried on after that battle was concluded. Sir Hew Dalrymple, the present Commander in Chief, landed on the morning of the 22d of August; and on that evening he negotiated in person with the French General Kellermann an agreement for the suspension of hostilities. I was present during the negotiation of this agreement; and, by the desire of the Com-

mander in Chief, I signed it. But, as I have above informed your Lordship, I did not negotiate it; nor can I in any manner be considered responsible for its contents.

‘ This agreement was followed by a negotiation with the French Commander in Chief, of a Convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French army, through the medium of Colonel Murray, the Quarter Master General of the army, which Convention has been concluded and ratified by the Commanders in Chief of both armies, and is now in the progress of execution. I have not seen this Convention, and cannot inform your Lordship of its contents; but I doubt not but that it will be laid before your Lordship by the Commander in Chief.

‘ I have thought proper to trouble your Lordship with this detailed account of the share which I have had in these transactions, in order that your Lordship may not attribute to me the omission to apprise you of their nature, which I am convinced was only accidental. But as I consider myself, and the army which I commanded, to be particularly obliged to your Lordship, such an omission would have been unpardonable in me; and I am happy to take this opportunity of relieving myself from the imputation of it by apprising your Lordship of the mode in which they were carried on, and of the share which I had in them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Bishop of Oporto.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. Colonel Murray, Quarter Master General.

‘ MY DEAR MURRAY,

‘ Zambugal, 6th Sept., 1808.

‘ I am sorry to be obliged to trouble you again about our money and Commissariat concerns. We have not now one shilling here: money is due to the Officers, to the troops, and to the people of the country. The money belonging to us, and allotted to pay these demands, and landed from the *Donegal* by my order, has been taken by Mr. Kennedy.

‘ The accounts of the Officers and soldiers of the army to the 4th of August are unsettled, for the reasons which I stated to you in my last letter upon this subject. The corps are separating, five battalions having already marched away; and the Deputy Paymaster, who alone can settle accounts,

pay balances and outstanding demands, is ordered away, and is now at head quarters, under the pretence that his powers are at an end, there being a senior Officer in the pay department present.

‘ I am well aware that his powers are at an end as to all current and future payments; but it is the first time that I have ever heard that a pay Officer, either dismissed or superseded in his office, was so far deprived of his powers as to be disabled from settling accounts and making payments, which ought to have been settled and made during the period in which his powers were in full force. Who is to settle these accounts and pay these demands, if Mr. ——— is disabled from doing so? Certainly not Mr. Smith, the present Deputy Paymaster General; for his powers, excepting under a special order from the Commander in Chief, cannot have a retrospect.

‘ I can assure you that I have no desire to retain these gentlemen who belonged to the army I commanded one moment longer than may be necessary to enable them to bring their concerns to a conclusion.

‘ I hope that you will be able to settle this point with the Deputy Paymaster General and Mr. Kennedy, and to send us Mr. ——— and the money immediately; if not, I must trouble his Excellency upon it.

‘ We should know where the Commissariat dépôt is, in order that I may send for bread for the troops for the 10th, 11th, and 12th, otherwise I shall not have it in time for the issue on the 10th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Murray.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple.

‘ SIR,

‘ Zambujal, 9th Sept., 1808.

‘ In reference to the order of the 8th instant, relative to the bâton and forage allowance to be issued to the troops, of which, for your convenience, I enclose a copy, I have the honor to enclose a copy of the orders which I received from His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief upon the same subject; in conformity with which I regulated the issues lately made to the troops under my command.

‘As the difference of the issue is considerable, particularly to the Officers of the inferior ranks of the army, which I am convinced it cannot be the intention of His Royal Highness should prevail, to the prejudice and disadvantage of those Officers who have served during the whole of the campaign in this country, I beg to know whether you have any objection to my ordering fresh returns for bāt and forage to be made out by the regiments, charging the sums for each rank according to the general orders of the 8th instant, and to my directing the late Paymaster General of the army, lately under my command, to pay the same, and charge those sums in his accounts to the 24th of August?’

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General*

Sir Hew Dalrymple.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘Zambujal, 12 miles N. of Lisbon,
9th Sept., 1808.

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Your brother Charles is, I imagine, at Lisbon, and will make you acquainted with the state of affairs there. I write to you only in reference to the recommendation I made you some days ago to appoint a proper person to be the King’s ambassador here. Since I wrote that letter I have heard so much of Lord Robert Fitzgerald, from various quarters, that I cannot avoid recommending you to turn your thoughts to him. I am but little acquainted with him myself; but I hear an excellent character of him.

‘I fear that Sir Hew will make a mistake respecting the appointment of a Regency at Lisbon. My intention was to have issued a proclamation, and to have called the Regency appointed by the Prince to re-assume their functions, with the exception of the members (by name) who had been confidentially employed by the French; and in the same proclamation, I should have desired the remaining *true* members of the Regency to fill up the vacancies by election, according to the powers given to them of electing successors to vacancies by the very act which appoints them.

‘I should then have exerted the influence, which I should have undoubtedly had at this moment over them, to induce

them to elect the Bishop of Oporto and others, who it is important should belong to the government; and thus the government would have been legally constituted, without the unnecessary interference of a foreign power.

'I have discussed the whole plan more than once with Sir Hew, and I have pointed out the mode of execution, &c.; but, instead of adopting it, I now hear that he is going to appoint a Regency, by his own authority; which measure will only add tenfold to the difficulties with which the new government will have to contend at its outset. I wrote to your brother, however, on this subject, to beg him to make one more effort to keep Sir Hew right; and, if I can, I will see your brother to-morrow.

'I send you two letters, which I wrote to Sir H. Burrard, besides the first which I sent you, which are important to show you my view of the campaign in this country.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Viscount Castlereagh.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple.

'SIR,

'Zambujal, 10th Sept., 1808.

'I had the honor of receiving, in the night, the letter which you wrote to me yesterday. My wish is, at all times, to render myself as useful as may be in my power to the Officer under whose command I may be serving; and this desire is limited only by the doubt which I may entertain of my fitness for the employment held out to my acceptance. The view which I have taken of the state of affairs in Spain has long ago suggested to me the propriety of placing in that kingdom a person of the description stated by yourself, possessing full powers, the means of exerting them on all parts of Spain, and of communicating and treating with all the local juntas of government.

'In order to be able to perform the important part allotted to him, this person should possess the confidence of those who employ him; and, above all, in order that he may recommend, with authority, a plan to the Spaniards, he should be acquainted with those of his employers, the means by which they propose to carry them into execution,

and those by which they intend to enable the Spanish nation to execute that which will be proposed to them.

‘ I certainly cannot consider myself as possessing those advantages, personally, which would qualify me for the situation you have proposed for me ; and you must be the best judge whether you have made up your own mind, and are enabled to instruct me, and are inclined to confide in me, to the extent which in my opinion will be necessary, in order to derive any general advantage from such a mission. It is true that one might be undertaken with more limited views and objects than those above adverted to ; and which are discussed in the letter which I have had the honor to receive from you ; and it might be confined to the mere arrangement with General Castaños, or the military committee at Madrid, of a plan for the remaining part of the campaign. This mission, however, would require a full and clear explanation of views and means ; and the person who undertakes it must have the confidence of his employer, and must be certain that the plan, which he would arrange under these circumstances, would be carried into execution.

‘ I beg that you will consider me ready to be employed in any manner you may think proper ; and I have above pointed out the powers and instructions which can alone, in my opinion, render the employment of any person, in the situation which you have held out to me, at all useful to the army or to the country.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*
Sir Hew Dalrymple.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Zambujal, 12th Sept., 1808.

‘ Nothing particular has occurred since I last wrote to you. I have been in Lisbon, and the French appear much dissatisfied with the mode in which the Convention is executed ; but I can give no opinion whatever whether their complaints are well or ill founded, as I have not seen the Convention, and am not accurately acquainted with its contents.

‘ I enclose copies of letters which have passed between Sir

Hew Dalrymple and me, respecting an offer which he made to send me to Madrid, upon which I think it probable that he will write to you, and, in my opinion, you will be a better judge on the subject by reading the letters.

‘The object of my letter was to show Sir Hew that a mission to Madrid was at present no light matter, in whatever view it were taken; and that the Officer who was to be sent there, if he were to do anything, must be instructed, and must be trusted.

‘I would not trouble you with this comparatively trifling subject, only that I am convinced that Sir Hew will tell you that I declined the mission to Madrid.

‘You will observe what he says of Castaños’s demand for cavalry, from which I should judge that he does not propose for, or to accept of infantry.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. Colonel Murray, Quarter Master General.

‘MY DEAR MURRAY, ‘St. Antonio de Tojal, 15th Sept., 1808.

‘I have received your note respecting Mr. Walsh and Mr. Kennedy. I do not know what influence my opinion respecting the former gentleman can have upon the measures of the latter respecting him, for it appears to me that the question between them is entirely one of justice and law, as far as I have acquired any knowledge of it. But as my opinion in favor of Mr. Walsh may be of use to him on other grounds, it is but fair towards him that I should make you acquainted with it.

‘When the army under my command landed in Portugal, a contract was made with a Mr. Archer, a merchant of Figueira, for the supply of beef for the troops, and it was soon found that Mr. Archer could not perform the contract at the rate at which he agreed to take it; and, in point of fact he gave notice of its discontinuance, at the specified time of one fortnight, before the army marched from Lavaos.

‘A contract was then made with Mr. Walsh, at a higher rate and upon different terms; and I understand that Mr. Walsh placed himself, for the remainder of Mr. Archer’s period of the contract, in the situation of Mr. Archer. I be-

lieve it is notorious throughout the army that they were well supplied with beef from that time forward.

‘The consumption was greater than 15,000 rations; and it is unnecessary that I should detail our marches to point out the difficulty of supplying it.

‘I believe the army which was under my command afforded a rare instance of a British army on its march, shortly after its landing in a foreign country, which did not experience any want. At the same time I must do Mr. Walsh the justice to add, that the bullocks which were consumed as beef were of the best kind, and were all brought from the north of Portugal, in order that the army might not be disappointed in its demand upon the country for draught cattle.

‘In this situation things stood, when, on the 20th, 5000 additional troops landed under Generals Anstruther and Acland, and I believe twice as many more, and many General Officers, staff, servants, &c., before the end of the month; and I have no doubt that the consumption of the army, which under my command was estimated at 16,000 rations, now amounts to nearly 40,000.

‘I cannot say at what period the contract was enlarged, but certainly not during the period that I had anything to say to the operations or means of the army; and at all events, supposing it were made commensurate to the increased demand on the 20th, would it have been unreasonable in Mr. Walsh to have asked for some indulgence in point of time for his supplies, considering that they must come from the countries to the northward, the French being still in possession of Lisbon, Alentejo, and everything about Lisbon?—But, in point of fact, has Mr. Walsh failed?

‘I do not know how he stands with the army; but I know that the troops here have always had fresh beef, excepting a part of them on one day. I know, also, that many bullocks were lost in the confusion, amongst the Commissariat, of the battle of the 21st; I believe some on the 17th; and I know that nearly a day’s consumption for the whole corps was lost by one Assistant Commissary on the night of the rain and thunder-storm, on the ground of Ramalhal.

‘If all these circumstances are taken into consideration, I think it will be found that Mr. Walsh has great merit in having supplied us as he has done. I know I never saw any

British contractor who did his duty so well; and that, at all events, Mr. Kennedy has no right, and no man has a right, to discontinue a contract legally made with him, without giving him the notice required by the terms of the contract itself. If Mr. Walsh has not performed his contract, nor given satisfaction to Mr. Kennedy, let him pay the penalty of non-performance; but do not let Mr. Kennedy do that which is illegal, and certainly unjust.

‘ Having written thus much in favor of Mr. Walsh, I must add, in justice to myself, that I was entirely unacquainted with that gentleman till I arrived in Portugal. I first saw him at Oporto, where he was introduced to me by Colonel Brown; and he interested himself in a supply of mules which the Bishop engaged to give for the army. His zeal for the success of our operations brought him to Figueira, where he found Mr. Archer unequal to the performance of the task which he had undertaken; and he undertook it, and has performed it, at all events, to the satisfaction of those persons who conducted the operations at that period.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Murray.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. In mentioning the difficulties with which Mr. Walsh had to contend, I have omitted to advert to those which occurred on the march and arrival of the bullocks with the army, by duties levied by the Bishop of Oporto, and other impediments incidental to their advance by the Portuguese army, upon which I had a correspondence with General Freire.

‘ A. W.’

To Lieut. General Sir John Moore, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Lumiar, 17th Sept., 1808.

‘ I write to you on the subject to which this letter relates with the same freedom with which I hope you would write to me on any point in which you might think the public interests concerned.

‘ It appears to me to be quite impossible that we can go on as we are now constituted; the Commander in Chief must be changed, and the country and the army naturally turn their eyes to you as their commander. I understand, however, that you have lately had some unpleasant discussions with

the King's Ministers, the effect of which might be to prevent the adoption of an arrangement for the command of this army, which, in my opinion, would be the best, and would enable you to render those services at this moment for which you are peculiarly qualified.

‘ I wish you would allow me to talk to you respecting the discussions to which I have adverted, in order that I may endeavor to remove any trace which they may have left on the minds of the King's Ministers, having the effect which I have supposed.

‘ Although I hold a high office under Government, I am no party man; but have long been connected in friendship with many of those persons who are now at the head of affairs in England; and I think I have sufficient influence over them, that they may listen to me upon a point of this description, more particularly as I am convinced that they must be as desirous as I can be to adopt the arrangement for the command of this army which all are agreed is the best.

‘ In these times, my dear General, a man like you should not preclude himself from rendering the services of which he is capable by any idle point of form. Circumstances may have occurred, and might have justified the discussions to which I have referred; but none can justify the continuance of the temper in which they are carried on: and yet, till there is evidence that it is changed, it appears to be impossible for the King's Ministers to employ you in the high situation for which you are the most fit, because during the continuance of this temper of mind there can be no cordial or confidential intercourse.

‘ In writing thus much I have perhaps gone too far, and have taken the permission for which it was the intention of this letter to ask; but I shall send it, as it may be convenient for you to be apprised of the view which I have already taken of these discussions, as far as I have any knowledge of them, in deciding whether you will allow me to talk to you any further about them. If you should do so, it would probably be most convenient to us both to meet at Lisbon, or I can go over to you, if that should suit you better.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

Sir John Moore, K.B.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. General Sir Harry Burrard, Bart.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Lumiar, 17th Sept., 1808.

‘I received yesterday your letter of the 15th, enclosing that which you have received from the Secretary of State respecting the action of the 21st August.

‘I beg that you will accept my acknowledgments for the handsome terms in which you have expressed yourself upon this occasion; and with your permission I shall communicate that letter to the General Officers and troops which were under my command.

‘At the same time I cannot avoid taking this opportunity of expressing how very sensible I was of the mark you gave me of your confidence during the action of the 21st, in allowing me to bring the operations of that battle to a close, and of your kindness to my friend Captain Campbell in making him the bearer of your dispatches.

Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. General

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Sir Harry Burrard, Bart.

To Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple

‘SIR,

‘Lumiar, 17th Sept., 1808.

‘The embarkation of the French troops having brought to a final close the operations of the army in Portugal, and as in the present state of the season some time must elapse before the troops can enter upon any other active operation; and as I understand you have sent Lord William Bentinck on the service for which you had thought me qualified, and it is not probable that there will be an opportunity for active service, or that you will require my assistance at this particular moment, or for some time to come, I am induced to request your permission to go to England.

‘The situation of my office of Chief Secretary in Ireland, of which the duties have been done lately by a gentleman who is now dead, renders it desirable, under these circumstances, that I should be in England as soon as possible, to ascertain whether it is His Majesty’s pleasure that I should continue to hold it, or that I should relinquish it. I have

therefore to request that you will give me leave to go to England by the first ship that shall sail.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General*
Sir Hew Dalrymple.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. Colonel Murray, Quarter Master General.

‘MY DEAR MURRAY,

‘Lisbon, 19th Sept., 1808.

‘I am going to-morrow, and I regret that it was so late when I reached head quarters yesterday that I could not endeavor to find you before I came away.

‘I do not conceal from you that I am not quite satisfied with our situation; but nothing should have induced me to go away if I had thought there was the smallest prospect of early active employment for the army; and I should not go now if my poor friend Mr. Trail were not dead, and if it were not necessary that I should be in England, if possible, to know whether I am to retain my office or to resign it, and if there were a probability of another early opportunity of going home. I intend to return as soon as I can.

‘I request you to command me if I can do anything for you. I shall not embark, I believe, before 12 to-morrow, and, at all events, you can write to me to the Irish office, London.

‘In regard to matters personal to myself, I shall not enter into them; I wish that Sir Hew had given me credit for a sincere desire to forward his views, whatever they might be; and I think I could have been of as much use to him as I believe I have been to other Officers under whose orders I have served. He is the only one of whom I have not been the right hand for some years past; and at the same time I must say that I felt the same inclination to serve him that I had to serve the others.

‘I have heard from Anstruther that the Bishop of Oporto will accept the office of President of the Regency.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Murray.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘The way, depend upon it, that is most agreeable to, as well as most for the interest of, the people of England, is to

conciliate the Spanish nation, and to bring the largest possible number of Spaniards into the field in the shape of an army; and I know from experience that the government will sanction any expense incurred with these views.

‘ I enclose a letter which I received some time ago from Lord Castlereagh, in which he conveys the King’s approbation of an order which I had given to General Spencer to make an advance of £100,000 to the Junta of Seville; and I understand that the King likewise approved of an advance of £10,000 made by General Spencer.

‘ Under the circumstances I conceive that Sir Hew will act upon sure grounds in incurring any expense for these people; and as they are already formed in regiments, and actually assembled under Officers, and want only arms to become efficient soldiers, they are just the people to whom arms ought to be given.

‘ I hope that the opinions which I have above given upon this occasion will be received as they ought to be; and that it will not be believed that I give them from any desire to interfere in what is no particular concern of mine.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Murray.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ London, 6th Oct., 1808.

‘ I have the honor to inform your Lordship that I arrived in London this day, by leave of the Commander of the Forces in Portugal; and having seen a copy of his Excellency’s letter to your Lordship, dated at Cintra, the 3d of September, in which it would appear, from an inaccuracy of expression, that I had agreed upon and signed certain articles “ for the suspension of hostilities on the 22d of August;” I beg leave to inform your Lordship that I did not negotiate that agreement; that it was negotiated and settled by his Excellency in person, with General Kellermann, in the presence of Lieut. General Sir Harry Burrard and myself, and that I signed it by his Excellency’s desire. But I could not consider myself responsible in any degree for the terms in which it was framed, or for any of its provisions.

‘ At the same time, adverting to the situation which I

had held in Portugal previously to his Excellency's arrival, I think it but just to inform your Lordship, that I concurred with the Commander of the Forces in thinking it expedient, on the 22d of August, that the French army in Portugal should be allowed to evacuate that kingdom, with their arms and baggage, and that every facility for this purpose should be afforded to them.

‘ I deemed this to be expedient, in the relative state of the two armies on the evening of the 22d, considering that the French army had then resumed a formidable position between us and Lisbon; that they had the means of retiring from that position to others in front of that city, and, finally, of crossing the Tagus into Alentejo, with a view to the occupation, in strength, of the forts of Elvas, La Lippe, and eventually Almeida.

‘ As Lieut. General Sir John Moore's corps had been diverted from the occupation of the position at Santarem which had been proposed for them, there were no means to prevent, and no increase of numbers could have prevented, the French army from effecting these objects.

‘ The British army, after waiting for and receiving its reinforcements, would thus have been precluded from the use of the Tagus for some time longer; and as it depended for its supplies of provisions and ammunition upon its communication with the fleet, which, in the end of August, would have become most precarious by the coast, it would have been involved in difficulties for the want of necessaries, which would have been aggravated by the increase of its numbers.

‘ To these circumstances, which affected the immediate situation of the army and its existence in Portugal, there were other considerations to be added respecting its future operations. I considered it most important that the British army in Portugal should be at liberty at an early period to march into Spain. Not only no arrangements for the march into Spain could be made, till the French should have evacuated Elvas and Almeida, and we should have possession of the Tagus and the Douro, but the army must have attacked and taken these places by regular sieges, before His Majesty could have restored the government of his ally, or could have moved his troops to the assistance of the

Spaniards. I need not point out to your Lordship the difficulties of these operations, their increase in the season in which they would have been undertaken, or the time which they would have lasted.

‘ These circumstances, affecting the situation, the objects, and the future operations of the army, were to be attributed to the fact, that the enemy occupied, in a military point of view, the whole of Portugal, having every stronghold in their hands; that their situation on the evening of the 22d of August enabled them still to avail themselves of these possessions, and to strengthen them as they might think proper; and I conceived that an army whose retreat was open, and which possessed such advantages, had a fair claim to be allowed to have the facility of withdrawing from the country.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State, to Lieut. General
the Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Downing Street, 13th Oct., 1808.

‘ Your letter of the 6th instant has been received, and laid before the King; and having also been brought under the consideration of His Majesty’s confidential servants, I am to acquaint you that a copy thereof will be communicated to Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple on his arrival in England.

‘ I am, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ CASTLEREAGH.

Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.’

*Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State, to H.R.H.
the Commander in Chief.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Downing Street, 29th Oct., 1808.

‘ I am to signify to your Royal Highness His Majesty’s pleasure, that a full investigation by a Court of Inquiry should be made as soon as possible into the late Armistice and Convention concluded in Portugal, and into all the circumstances connected therewith.

‘ It is considered, from the nature of the transaction, that the proceeding by a Court of Inquiry, in the first instance,

will best bring before His Majesty a full explanation of all the considerations and causes which may have influenced the conclusion of the said Armistice and Convention, and ultimately lead to a just judgment thereupon.

‘I am further to state to your Royal Highness the importance of giving to this inquiry every degree of solemnity and publicity which usage and precedent have in like cases admitted of; and that the court be specially instructed, not only to report an opinion upon the matter referred to them, but also to submit to His Majesty what it may be in their judgment fit to be done thereupon.

‘Your Royal Highness will be pleased to receive His Majesty’s pleasure, with respect to the proper measures for carrying these His Majesty’s commands into execution.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*His Royal Highness*

The Commander in Chief.

‘CASTLEREAGH.

To Captain Pulteney Malcolm, R.N.

‘MY DEAR MALCOLM,

‘London, 12th Nov., 1808.

‘I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 11th, and particularly so for the kindness towards me which has induced you to stay at home to be examined before the Court of Inquiry. It will meet on Monday, but, I imagine, will not proceed to the examination of evidence for a day or two.

‘When you come to town, I can give you a bed here, and you will be as heartily welcome as I have often been in your ships.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Captain Pulteney Malcolm.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘GEORGE R.

‘WHEREAS We were pleased in the month of July, 1808, to constitute and appoint Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple, Knight, to the command of a body of our forces employed to act on the coasts of Spain and Portugal, or in such other part of the Continent of Europe as he might afterwards be directed to; and the said Lieutenant General did, pursuant

to our instructions transmitted to him, proceed to Portugal, and did on the 22d of August, 1808, land in that country, and take upon himself the command of the said body of our forces accordingly; and whereas it appears that on the same day (22d August), and subsequently to his having assumed the command, an armistice was concluded*,—

‘ We think it necessary that an inquiry should be made, by the General Officers after named, into the conditions of the said Armistice and Convention†, and into all the causes and circumstances (whether arising from the previous operations of the British army or otherwise) which led to them, and into the conduct, behaviour, and proceedings of the said Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple, and of any other Officer or Officers, who may have held the command of our troops in Portugal, and of any other person or persons, as far as the same were connected with the said Armistice and Convention, in order that the said General Officers may report to us touching the matters aforesaid, for our better information.

‘ Our will and pleasure therefore is, and we do hereby nominate and appoint the General Officers of our army whose names are respectively mentioned in the list‡ annexed, to be a Board, of which we do hereby appoint General Sir David Dundas, K.B., to be President, who are to meet accordingly for the purposes above mentioned. And you are hereby required to give notice to the said General Officers, when and where they are to meet for the said examination

* See pp. 116 and 127, the Armistice and Convention already printed.

† The inquiry into the Convention (commonly called the Convention of Cintra, although framed and signed at Lisbon) was held at the Royal College at Chelsea, from the 14th of November to the 27th of December, 1808.

The proceedings are of too great length to insert in detail in this work; the compiler has therefore extracted those passages only in which Sir Arthur Wellesley, in his several addresses, narratives, questions and answers, appeared before the Court; in addition to which a summary of the proceedings is added. As is usual on Courts of Inquiry and Courts Martial, the questions are put to those who are examined, in the second person, through the Judge Advocate. They are answered sometimes in the second, and at other times in the third person, and are thus inserted in the proceedings. This will account for the want of perspicuity in the answers in this respect; but they are copied *verbatim* from the proceedings published ‘by authority.’

‡ Generals the Earl of Moira, Peter Craig, and Lord Heathfield; and Lieut. Generals the Earl of Pembroke, Sir George Nugent, and Oliver Nicholls.

and inquiry; and you are hereby directed to summon such persons as may be judged necessary by the said General Officers (whether the General Officers employed in the expedition or others) to give information touching the said matters, or whose examination shall be desired by those employed in the said expedition. And the said General Officers are hereby directed to hear such persons as shall offer to give information touching the same; and they are hereby authorized, empowered, and required, strictly to examine into the matters before mentioned, and to report a state thereof as it shall appear to them, together with their opinion thereupon; and also with their opinion whether any and what further proceedings should be had thereupon. All which you are to transmit to our Commander in Chief, to be by him laid before us for our consideration. And for so doing this shall be, as well to you as to our said General Officers and all others concerned, a sufficient warrant.

‘ Given at our Court at St. James’s, this first day of November, 1808, in the forty-ninth year of our reign.

‘ By His Majesty’s command,

‘ To

‘ J. PULTENEY.

‘ *Our right trusty and well beloved
Councillor, the Hon. Richard
Ryder, Judge Advocate General
of our Forces, or his Deputy.*’

‘ At a Meeting of the Board of General Officers appointed to inquire into the Convention, &c. in Portugal, by His Majesty’s Warrant bearing date the 1st day of November, 1808, at the Great Hall in Chelsea College, on Monday the 14th day of the same month.

‘ PRESIDENT.

‘ General Sir David Dundas, K.B.

‘ MEMBERS.

‘ General Francis Earl of Moira, General Peter Craig, General Francis Lord Heathfield, Lieut. General George Earl of Pembroke, K.G., Lieut. General Sir George Nugent, Bart., Lieut. General Oliver Nicholls.

Sir ARTHUR WELLESLEY addressed the Board as follows :—

‘ I hope that in delivering this my narrative to the Court I shall be permitted to make a few observations upon the paper which has been read by Sir Hew Dalrymple.

‘ I have as much reason to complain as he has that the writers in the newspapers should for some weeks past have amused the public with supposed accounts and comments on the late transactions in Portugal, and most particularly that they should have ventured to state some of them from what they call authority from me or my friends.

‘ I never said, nor ever authorized any body to say, and more I can venture to say, that no person connected with me, as my relations, friends, or aides de camp, or otherwise in the service, ever gave any authority to any publisher of a newspaper, or anybody else, to declare that I was compelled, or even ordered, to sign the paper to which my name appears. It is true that I was present when the Armistice was negotiated by the Commander in Chief, and I did assist in his negotiations, and I signed it by desire of the Commander in Chief: but I never said, and never will say, that the expression of the desire of the Commander in Chief was in the shape of an order which it was not in my power to disobey, much less of compulsion.

‘ I thought it my duty to comply with this desire of the Commander in Chief from the wish which I have always felt, according to which I have always acted, to carry into effect the orders and objects of those placed in command over me, however I might differ in opinion with them. I certainly did differ in opinion with the Commander in Chief upon more than one point in the detail of what I was thus called upon to sign, as I shall show hereafter; but as I concurred in and advised the adoption of the principle of the measure, viz., that the French should be allowed to evacuate Portugal, for reasons which I shall state at a future period, I did not think proper to refuse to sign the paper on account of my disagreement on the details.

‘ I have thought it necessary to say thus much upon this subject; and I now beg leave to deliver in a narrative of my proceedings from the time I took upon me the command of the army at Cork to the moment at which I delivered over

the command to Lieut. General Sir Harry Burrard, on the afternoon of the 20th.'

Sir Arthur Wellesley accordingly delivered in his narrative; which was laid upon the table, together with the narrative delivered in by Sir Hew Dalrymple.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, on a subsequent day, read the narrative, which he had before delivered in, as follows:—

‘GENERAL SIR DAVID DUNDAS,

‘MY LORDS AND GENTLEMEN,

‘Having received the directions of the Judge Advocate General to attend you here this day, with as much detailed information in writing as I may think proper to offer, of my proceedings from the time I sailed with the troops from Ireland to the time I gave up the command to Lieut. General Sir Harry Burrard, I have now the honor to submit to the Court of Inquiry copies of my dispatches to the Secretary of State, detailing my proceedings.

‘As these proceedings are fully detailed in the dispatches which contain an account of my motives for my actions at the moment I carried them into execution, I should be satisfied if the Court were to form an opinion upon a consideration of their contents; but as the Court have expressed a desire, at the same time, to have a narrative of my proceedings, I have drawn one out principally from the dispatches.

‘I sailed from Cork in the *Donegal* on the 12th of July; I went on board the *Crocodile* on the 13th, and sailed to Coruña, where I arrived on the 20th of July. I there found that the French had, on the 14th, defeated the armies of Castille and Galicia, under Generals Cuesta and Blake; but, having sounded the Junta respecting their wish to have the assistance of the army under my command, in the existing crisis of their affairs, they declared explicitly that they did not want the assistance of troops; but, eventually, arms and ammunition, and money immediately. A sum of £200,000 for their use had arrived on the 20th, and their requisition for arms and ammunition was sent home immediately. The Junta of Galicia at the same time expressed the greatest anxiety that the troops under my command should be em-

ployed in driving the French out of Portugal, as they were persuaded that the Spaniards of the north and south of the Peninsula could never have any decided success independently of each other, and could never make any great simultaneous effort to remove the French from Spain till they should be driven from Portugal, and the British troops in that kingdom should connect the operations of the northern and the southern Spanish armies. The Junta of Galicia, at the same time, strongly recommended to me to land in the north of Portugal, in order that I might bring forward and avail myself of the Portuguese troops which the government of Oporto were collecting in the neighbourhood of that city.

‘ I have to observe to the Court, that they will not see, in my dispatches to the Secretary of State from Coruña, the detail of the wishes and sentiments of the Junta on my plan of operations, because they did not come regularly within the scope of a military dispatch; but the subject is mentioned in my dispatch to General Spencer of the 26th July.

‘ I sailed from Coruña on the 22d, and joined the fleet off Cape Finisterre next day, and quitted it again at night, and went to Oporto, in order to hold a conference with the Bishop and the General Officers in the command of the Portuguese troops. On my arrival at Oporto, on the 24th, I received a letter from the Admiral, Sir Charles Cotton, in which he recommended to me to leave the troops either at Oporto or at the mouth of the Mondego river, and to proceed to Lisbon in a frigate, to communicate with him before I should determine upon the plan of operations and the landing place.

‘ The result of the conference which I had on the night of the 24th with the Bishop and the General Officers of the Portuguese army was an agreement, that about 5000 Portuguese troops should be sent forward to co-operate with me against the enemy; that the remainder of the Portuguese troops, amounting to about 1500, and a Spanish corps of about 1500 men, then on its march from Galicia, and another small Spanish corps of about 300 men, and all the Portuguese armed peasantry, should remain in the neighbourhood of Oporto, and in the province of *Tras os Montes*; a part to be employed in the blockade of Almeida, and a part in the defence of the province of *Tras os Montes*, which province was

supposed to be threatened by an attack from the French corps, under Marshal Bessières, since the defeat of the Spanish armies under Blake and Cuesta at Rio Seco, on the 14th of July.

‘The Bishop of Oporto likewise promised to supply the army under my command with mules and other means of carriage, and with slaughter cattle.

‘I sailed from Oporto on the morning of the 25th, and joined the fleet, and settled with Captain Malcolm that it should go to Mondego Bay; and I left it again that night, and went to the mouth of the Tagus to confer with the Admiral. I joined him on the evening of the 26th; and I there received letters from General Spencer, at Puerto Sta Maria, in which he informed me that he had landed his corps in Andalusia, at the request of the Junta of Seville, and he did not think it proper to embark it again till he should receive further orders from me; and he appeared to think that my presence in Andalusia, and the assistance of the troops under my command, were necessary to enable General Castaños to defeat General Dupont.

‘As I was of opinion that the most essential object for the Spaniards, as well as for us, was to drive the French from Portugal, and that neither his corps nor mine were sufficiently strong when separate to be of much service anywhere, and that when joined they might effect the object which had been deemed of most importance in England, and in Galicia, I immediately dispatched orders to General Spencer to embark his troops, unless he should be actually engaged in an operation which he could not relinquish without loss to the Spaniards, and to join me off the coast of Portugal.

‘The result of the information which I received from General Spencer, of the strength of the French army in Portugal, was, that they consisted of more than 20,000 men. The accounts of their numbers which I received from the Admiral, and had received from the Portuguese, did not make their force so large; but, upon the whole, I was induced to believe that they had not less than from 16,000 to 18,000 men. Of this number they had from 600 to 800 in the fort of Almeida, 600 or 800 in Elvas, 800 in Peniche, 1600 or 1800 in Setuval, and the remainder were considered about 14,000, disposable for the defence of Lisbon, and the forts on the Tagus. The whole of this disposable force

was at this time in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, excepting about 2400 men at Alcobaça, under General Thomière.

‘ I considered with the Admiral the propriety of carrying into execution any of the proposed plans of attack upon the Tagus, or upon the coast in the neighbourhood of the Rock at Lisbon; and it appeared to us both that all the attacks upon the river, which had been proposed to government, were impracticable; that the attack upon Cascaes Bay was likewise so; that a landing in any of the small bays in the neighbourhood of the Rock was a matter of considerable difficulty at any time, and that there was a risk that if a part of the army, or even the whole army were landed, the state of the surf which prevails upon the whole coast of Portugal might prevent the disembarkation of the rear in the one case, and of the stores and provisions which were necessary in the other. At all events, the disembarkation would be made in the neighbourhood of the whole disposable force of the French army; and the British troops would be exposed to their attack on their landing, probably in a crippled state, and certainly not in a very efficient state.

‘ By making our disembarkation in one of the bays near the Rock of Lisbon, it was certain that we should not have the advantage which, at that time, we expected to derive from the co-operation of the Portuguese troops.

‘ It appeared to us that the fort of Peniche, which was garrisoned by the enemy, would prevent the disembarkation under the shelter of that peninsula; and therefore it appeared to the Admiral and to me, that it would be most advisable to disembark the troops in the Mondego river.

‘ I quitted the Admiral off the Tagus on the 27th, and joined the fleet of transports off the Mondego on the 30th.

‘ I there received information from government, dated the 15th of July, that they intended to reinforce the army under my command with 5000 men, under the command of Brig. General Acland, in the first instance, and eventually with the corps, consisting of 10,000 men, which had been under the command of Sir John Moore in Sweden; and that Sir Hew Dalrymple was appointed to command the army. I was likewise directed to carry into execution the instructions which I had received, if I conceived that my force was sufficiently strong.

‘ Besides these dispatches from government, I received information on my arrival at the Mondego of the defeat of the French corps under Dupont by the Spanish army under Castaños, on the 20th of July; and I was convinced that General Spencer, if he did not embark immediately upon receiving intelligence of that event, would do so as soon as he should receive my orders of the 26th of July: I therefore considered his arrival as certain, and I had reason to expect the arrival of General Acland's corps every moment, as I had been informed that it was to sail from Harwich and the Downs on the 19th of July.

‘ I also received accounts at the same time that General Loison had been detached from Lisbon across the Tagus into Alentejo on the 27th of July, in order to subdue the insurrection in that province, and open the communication with Elvas. The insurgents had lately been joined by about 1000 men from the Spanish army of Estremadura, and the insurrection had made considerable progress, and was become formidable in Alentejo.

‘ I therefore considered that I might commence the disembarkation of the troops, without risk of their being attacked by superior numbers before one or both the reinforcements should arrive; and I was induced to disembark immediately, not only because the troops were likely to be better equipped, and more able to march in proportion as they should have been longer on shore, but because I had reason to believe that the Portuguese had been much discouraged by seeing the troops so long in the ships after the fleet had arrived in Mondego Bay; and I was certain they would suspect our inclination or our ability to contend with the French, if they had not been disembarked as soon as I returned from the Tagus. I therefore determined to disembark as soon as the weather and the state of the surf would permit us, and we commenced the disembarkation on the 1st of August.

‘ The difficulties of landing, occasioned by the surf, were so great, that the whole of the corps were not disembarked till the 5th, on which day General Spencer arrived, and his corps on the 6th. He had embarked at Puerto S^a Maria on the 21st of July, when he had heard of the defeat of Dupont by Castaños, and had not received the dispatches addressed

to him by me on the 26th of July. General Spencer disembarked on the 7th and 8th, on which night the whole army was in readiness to march forward.

‘ From the 1st of August to that day the time had been usefully spent in procuring the means for moving with the army the necessary stores, provisions, and baggage, and in arranging those means in the most advantageous manner to the different departments: the cavalry and the artillery received a large remount of horses, means were procured of moving with the army a sufficient supply of ammunition and military stores, and a seasonable supply of hospital stores; but I determined to march towards Lisbon by that road which passes nearest to the sea coast, in order that I might communicate with Captain Bligh, of the *Alfred*, who attended the movements of the army with a fleet of victuallers and store ships. The communication with this fleet, however, it was obvious, would be very precarious, as well on account of the state of the surf on the coast, in the different points of rendezvous which had been settled, as because it might happen that it would be more advantageous to the army to take another line of march, passing farther inland.

‘ I therefore made arrangements for carrying with the army such a supply of the articles of first necessity as should render it independent of the fleet till it should reach the Tagus, if circumstances should prevent the communication with the fleet, or should render it advantageous to relinquish it.

‘ In the same period of time I also armed the Portuguese troops, and ascertained, as far as lay in my power, the degree of their discipline and efficiency, and recommended and superintended their organisation. I offered such a sum of money as the funds of the army could afford, to defray any expense which it might be deemed necessary to incur in their equipment for the field, which was declined by the Portuguese General Officers; and I met these gentlemen at Monte Mor ó Velho on the 7th, and arranged with them the plan of our operations and march, which was delayed for the main body of the army till the 10th, at their desire, for the convenience of the Portuguese troops.

‘ On the 8th I wrote a letter to Sir Harry Burrard, which

I left with Captain Malcolm, of the *Donegal*, to be delivered to him upon his arrival at the Mondego, detailing all the circumstances of our situation, and recommending for his consideration a plan of operations for the corps under the command of Sir John Moore. The court will find the copy of this letter enclosed in my dispatch to Lord Castlereagh of the 8th of August.

‘ The advanced guard marched on the 9th, supported by the brigades under General Hill and General Ferguson, as I had heard that General Laborde had collected his own corps and General Thomière’s, consisting of from 5000 to 6000 men, in the neighbourhood of Leyria, which place he threatened, as it contained a magazine formed for the use of the Portuguese army. On the 10th the main body followed, and the advanced guard arrived at Leyria on the 10th, and the main body on the 11th.

‘ I received a letter from Mr. Stuart and Colonel Doyle at Coruña, on the 10th, detailing the inefficient state of the Galician army under General Blake; that that General had separated his troops, which consisted of infantry, from the cavalry under General Cuesta; and that neither were in a condition to act offensively against Bessières, or even to follow that General if he should march into Portugal, or to attack him if he should make any considerable detachment to that quarter. At the same time I received the intelligence of the retreat of Joseph Buonaparte from Madrid on the 29th July; and I concluded that Bessières, instead of moving out, or detaching towards Portugal, would cover the retreat of Joseph Buonaparte towards the French frontier. Whether he did so or not, it was obvious to me that I should have time for my operations against Junot before Bessières could arrive in Portugal to interrupt them; and it was probable that General Acland’s corps, or Sir John Moore’s, would arrive and land in Portugal before Bessières could come from the north of Spain.

‘ Adverting, therefore, to the advanced state of the season, the necessity of communicating with the sea coast, and the certainty that that communication would be nearly impracticable after the month of August, and to the still dispersed state of the French forces in Portugal, I considered it to be

important to endeavor to perform those operations to which the army was equal, and for which it was fully equipped and prepared, without loss of time.

‘ I communicated, however, the intelligence which I had received from Mr. Stuart, and my opinion upon it, to Sir Harry Burrard, in a letter which I addressed to him on the 10th of August; a copy of which, and of a private letter to Sir Harry Burrard, the court will find in my dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 18th of August.

‘ The Portuguese army, consisting of about 6000 men, including 5000 cavalry, arrived at Leyria on the 12th, where the whole force was then assembled.

‘ The French General Loison, who, I have informed the court, had been detached across the Tagus into Alentejo, on the 26th or 27th of July, with between 5000 and 6000 men, had withdrawn the greatest part of the garrison of Setuval, consisting of 1600 men, by which he had been joined, and he had immediately marched towards Evora, where he defeated and dispersed a Spanish detachment, consisting of 1000 men, and the force of the insurrection of Alentejo collected in that town; he then marched to Elvas, re-victualled that place, suppressed the insurrection, and re-established the French authority in Alentejo, and made arrangements for the purchase and collection of the grain of that province. He crossed the Tagus again at Abrantes, and marching down that river, he arrived at Thomar, about sixteen miles to the south east from Leyria, on the evening of the 11th, on which day the British army arrived at Leyria.

‘ The corps under Laborde was at the same time at Alcobaga, about sixteen miles from Leyria to the south west, and the object of the French Officers had evidently been to join at Leyria before the British troops could arrive there.

‘ This town is on the high road from Lisbon to the north of Portugal, to the eastward of which, and nearly parallel to the road, there is a chain of high mountains which runs from Leyria nearly to the Tagus, over which chain there is no good passage for carriages. In consequence of the early arrival, therefore, of the British troops at Leyria, General Loison was obliged to return to the southward before he could effect his junction with General Laborde, who was thus exposed to be attacked when alone, and was attacked

on the 17th of August. The court will find in my dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 16th of August, from Caldas, an outline of the operations of Loison's corps, of which what I have here stated is a more detailed account.

'All the arrangements for the march having been made, and communicated to the Portuguese Officers, the army marched on the 13th in two columns to Calvario, and on the 14th in two columns to Alcobaca, from whence General Laborde had retreated in the course of the preceding night. The Portuguese troops had not marched from Leyria as had been arranged, and as I had expected, under the pretence that they had no provisions; and I received on the 13th, in the evening, a letter from Colonel Trant, who was employed by me to communicate with the Portuguese General, in which he informed me of the General's intention to halt at Leyria, unless I should consent to supply the Portuguese troops with provisions from the British Commissariat on the march to Lisbon. He also explained a plan of operations, which General Freire proposed to carry into execution, by which he would have been left without any communication with the British army, exposed to be attacked by the French army, if they should choose to abandon the defence of Lisbon and the Tagus, and proceed to the northward and eastward, or even if they should be compelled to retire after an action with the British troops.

'In my reply to this communication I pointed out the impossibility of my complying with the demand for provisions, and the danger which would result from the adoption of the plan of operations proposed for the Portuguese corps.

'I urged the Portuguese General, in the most earnest terms, to co-operate with me in the deliverance of his country from the French, if he had any regard to his own honor, to the honor of his country, or of his Prince; and I pointed out to him the resources of which he could avail himself to feed the army. I then proposed to him that, if he should not march with his whole corps, he should send to join me 1000 regular infantry, all his light troops and his cavalry, which troops I engaged to feed, as the utmost I could undertake to perform in that way.

'These troops, in number, 1000 regular infantry, 400

light troops, and 250 cavalry, joined me at Alcobaça, on the evening of the 14th, with Colonel Trant, and remained with me during the remainder of the operations.

‘The main body of the Portuguese corps, instead of carrying into execution the plan of operations which I had originally proposed, or that which General Freire had substituted, adopted the measure of safety which I had recommended in the event of his determination not to join me, and remained at Leyria, and afterwards at Caldas and Obidos, till the 22d of August.

‘On the arrival of the army at Alcobaça, I immediately opened a communication with Captain Bligh, of the *Alfred*, who had been for two days waiting with the fleet of victuallers and store ships off Nazareth. A supply of bread and oats was immediately landed; and I appointed Peniche, which place I intended to reconnoitre, as our next point of communication.

‘The army marched on the 15th, in two columns, to Caldas, where it halted the 16th, to allow the Commissariat to come up, and to receive the supplies which had been landed at Nazareth. On the 15th in the evening there was a skirmish between the troops of the advanced guard of Laborde’s corps and our riflemen, in which the latter sustained some loss. But we kept possession of the post at Obidos, which commands the valley of Caldas.

‘The details of this affair are published in the Gazette, as are those of the action of the 17th.

‘Throughout that day we had reason to believe that General Loison, who had moved from Rio Mayor on the evening of the 16th, would be found on Laborde’s right, and the disposition for the attack was made accordingly.

‘During the action a French Officer, who was dying of his wounds, informed me that they had expected Loison to join them that day at 1 o’clock by their right, which was the reason for which they stood our attack; that their numbers were 6000; and that their loss had been severe. Intelligence to the same purport was received from other prisoners; and as a small patrol of French infantry appeared at no great distance from the left of our position on the 17th at dusk, and I heard that Loison’s corps was at that moment arriving at Bombarral, which was about five miles from the field of

battle, I conclude that the junction had been intended, and was prevented only by our early attack.

‘ At all events great caution was necessary in all the movements of that day; and indeed the nature of the ground over which the troops were obliged to move rendered a very rapid attack impossible.

‘ The two French corps joined on that night, and retired beyond Torres Vedras, which was ten miles from the field of battle towards Cabeça de Montachique. My intention was to march to Torres Vedras on the morning of the 18th; and the troops were under arms, and the orders for the march had been issued, when I received from General Anstruther an account of his arrival on the coast, and of his junction with Captain Bligh. My original intention had been to employ the corps under General Acland and General Anstruther in the siege of Peniche, if I should find it necessary to undertake it; or if I should not, to send them down the coast to effect a landing in some of the bays in the neighbourhood of the Rock of Lisbon, in the rear of the enemy, while I should press upon their front. But the disappointment which I experienced in the hope of co-operation of the Portuguese troops, which were with me in the action of the 17th, and above all, the determined and gallant resistance of the enemy in that action, induced me to be of opinion that I ought to land General Anstruther’s brigade, and General Acland’s when it should arrive, and to join those troops to the army.

‘ I therefore marched on the 18th to Lourinha, from whence I communicated again with General Anstruther, and on the 19th to Vimeiro, which appeared on the whole to be the position best calculated to secure the junction of General Anstruther, at the same time that it was a march in advance on our route. On account of the calms, the fleet which was anchored off the Berlings could not stand in till late on the 19th, and General Anstruther did not land till that evening, and he formed a junction with two brigades detached from our left on the morning of the 20th, and took his position in the advanced guard.

‘ Between the 18th and 20th the French corps had assembled at and about Torres Vedras, the troops last arrived under Junot forming the advanced guard, in a strong posi-

tion in front of the town ; and the divisions of Laborde and Loison, the main body, in another strong position behind it.

‘ Their cavalry was very active throughout the days of the 19th and 20th ; they covered the whole country, patrolled frequently up to our position, and on the 20th one patrol was pushed into the rear of our right, as far as the landing place at Maceira.

‘ Under these circumstances we could gain no detailed information of the enemy’s position, excepting that it was very strong, and occupied by their whole force.

‘ My intention was to march on the morning of the 21st, and orders were issued accordingly. I should have pushed the advanced guard as far as the heights of Mafra, and should have halted the main body about four or five miles from that place. By this movement the enemy’s position at Torres Vedras would have been turned, and I should have brought the army into a country of which I had an excellent map and topographical accounts, which had been drawn up for the use of the late Sir Charles Stuart* ; and the battle, which it was evident would be fought in a few days, would have had for its field a country of which we had a knowledge, and not very distant from Lisbon, into which town, if we had been successful, we might have entered with the retreating enemy.

‘ I was informed in the middle of the day of the 20th, that General Acland’s brigade was in the offing, and I made arrangements for their disembarkation as soon as they should arrive ; and in the evening of this day Sir Harry Burrard arrived in Maceira roads in the *Brazen*. He immediately assumed the command of the army.

‘ The Court will observe that the last of my dispatches to the Secretary of State is dated the 18th, and the account of my proceedings on the 19th and 20th, the two last days of my command, is made from memory, assisted by a reference to private letters written at the time ; and if the Court should wish it, it can be substantiated by evidence.’

Sir A. Wellesley delivered in copies of several dispatches, but which were not read, other copies having been already laid before the Board and read.

* Lieut. General the Hon. Sir Charles Stuart, K.B., brother of the first Marquis of Bute, and father of Lord Stuart de Rothesay. He had commanded a British force for some time in Portugal.

The Board desiring that Sir A. Wellesley's narrative should be again read, the Judge Advocate General accordingly read the same.

A paper containing questions prepared by the Board having been delivered to Sir A. Wellesley at their last meeting, Sir A. Wellesley now returned the same with his answers in writing. The questions, with the answers, were then read, viz.—

‘ Q. When did you receive orders to take the command of a considerable body of troops assembled at Cork ?

‘ A. I received the orders of His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief on the 15th of June. I received the instructions of the Secretary of State, of the 30th of June, in Dublin, on the 3d of July, and I set out from thence on the 5th, and arrived at Cork on the 6th of July.

‘ Q. When did you sail from Cork, and with what numbers ?

‘ A. I sailed from Cork on the 12th of July, with about 9064 men, including the 4th Royal Veteran Battalion, 275 artillery and drivers, and about 300 cavalry, of which 180 were mounted.

‘ Q. What were the orders and instructions under which you sailed, and the principal objects of your expedition ?

‘ A. The orders and instructions which I received are before the Court ; from the Commander in Chief, of the 14th of June, and from the Secretary of State, of the 30th of June. I have not copies of the instructions from the Secretary of State : I gave the originals to Lieut. General Sir Harry Burrard, and he returned me copies, which I have by some accident mislaid. The general object of the expedition was to aid the Spanish and Portuguese nations ; the principal object was to attack the French in the Tagus. But I considered myself authorized by my instructions to pursue any other object, if I thought it more likely to conduce to the benefit of the Spanish and Portuguese nations.

‘ Q. What were the particulars of your progress until you arrived in Mondego Bay ?

‘ A. The particulars of my progress are detailed in my dispatches of the 21st and 26th of July, and 1st of August, to the Secretary of State, and in my narrative.

‘ Q. What reasons determined your arrival in Mondego Bay, your subsequent landing on the 1st of August, your remaining there until the 9th, and your proceeding on that day towards Lisbon ?

‘ A. The reasons which determined my arrival and subsequent landing in Mondego Bay, on the 1st of August, are detailed in my dispatches to the Secretary of State of that date, in my letter to Sir Harry Burrard, of the 8th of August, and in my narrative. The reasons which occasioned my remaining there till the 9th of August, and my proceeding on that day towards Lisbon, are detailed in my dispatches to the Secretary of State, of the 1st and 8th of August, in my letters to Sir Harry Burrard, of the 8th and 10th of August, and in my narrative.

‘ Q. On your arrival at Mondego Bay, what knowledge had you of expected reinforcements from England, and what orders respecting them : did troops join you at Mondego Bay, and in what numbers ?

‘ A. On my arrival at Mondego Bay on the 30th of July, from the Tagus, I received a letter from the Secretary of State, dated the 15th of July, announcing that Brig. General Adland was ordered to sail with 5000 men to join me ; and that Sir Harry Burrard was ordered to sail with 10,000 men, which had been in Sweden under Sir John Moore, for the same purpose also that transports had been sent to convey to Portugal one regiment (the Buffs) from Madeira ; and I received orders, in a letter dated the 21st of July, from the Secretary of State, to give notice, by ships of war stationed off the coast, where I should be found ; and other orders to carry into execution the object of my instructions, if I should think my force sufficient : these are, I think, the heads of my instructions ; but I am not certain, as I have no copy of them. I was joined at the Mondego on the 6th of August by General Spencer, with 4314 rank and file, and 71 artillery and drivers.

‘ Q. On your march of the 9th August, what knowledge had you of reinforcements from England, and what orders respecting them ?

‘ A. The knowledge and orders as above detailed. There were reports by ships arrived from England, but nothing official on which I could rely.

‘ Q. What was the object of your march forward on the 9th, before the arrival of reinforcements from England ; what were your numbers ; and were any Portuguese corps on your left assisting, and with which you were in communication ?

‘ A. The objects of my march are stated in my dispatch to Sir Harry Burrard, of the 8th of August, and in my narrative. My numbers were upon the whole (having left the 4th Royal Veteran Battalion on board ship) about 12,300 rank and file. There was besides a Portuguese corps in communication with me on my left, consisting of about 6000 men, under General Freire ; exclusive of this Portuguese corps, there was a corps consisting of 1500 Spanish infantry, under the Marques de Valladares, and about the same number of Portuguese troops belonging to the defence of Oporto, and the blockade of Almeida, collected near Guarda, which moved towards Abrantes, in consequence of Loison’s march across the Tagus : it was thought he intended to go to Almeida.

‘ Q. What was your progress until you reached Caldas, in the neighbourhood of the enemy ?

‘ A. My progress is detailed in my narrative : I was with the army between Lavaos and Leyria on the 10th, at Leyria on the 11th and 12th, at Calvario on the 13th, at Alcobaça on the 14th, and at Caldas on the 15th of August.

‘ Q. In what manner was your army supplied with provisions during your march, and what resources did you draw from the country ?

‘ A. The army received biscuit, fresh meat, and wine ; the two latter drawn from the country. I had arranged with the Bishop when I was at Oporto, on the night of the 24th of July, that the government should take measures to supply us with slaughter cattle ; but in case of failure from this quarter, I had authorized a contract for slaughter cattle for the army with Mr. Archer, of Figueira, which was afterwards renewed with Mr. Walsh, of Oporto.

‘ Q. On your arrival at Caldas, what was the number and state of your horses, artillery, carriages, of your ammunition, provisions, and of your dependence for future supplies ?

‘ A. On the arrival of the army at Caldas, we had a sufficient number of horses to draw one brigade of 9 pounders,

and two brigades of 6 pounders, with the carriages attached to them. I must inform the Court, that the expedition which sailed from Cork under my command was originally destined to go to the coast of Spain, to be prepared to act as circumstances might require; and as it was very uncertain that the troops would ever land in Spain, and it was thought that the horses of the artillery would suffer and might be lost to the service by being kept so long in the transports, as it was probable we might be on the coast of Spain unemployed, it was expedient to equip the ordnance sent on the expedition with horses taken from the Irish Commissariat. These are generally horses cast from the cavalry, or bought at low prices, such as 12*l.* or 13*l.* each; and although not bad horses, they are not so good and efficient as those belonging to the artillery: about 298 were originally embarked in Ireland, and I believe all arrived safe at the mouth of the Mondego river; we lost four or five in the disembarkation, and there were eight or ten unfit for service; so that we had originally 282 Irish horses: besides this number, I gave twenty mares to the artillery, out of a number sent from Oporto by the Bishop; but of this the Court will see an accurate return in a letter from Sir Hew Dalrymple to the Secretary of State, read to the Court on Saturday. These mares answered well to carry the Officers and non-commissioned officers attached to the brigades, who are usually mounted, and the Irish horses were in the draught; we put two in addition to the usual numbers in each carriage, on account of the heaviness and badness of the roads, the heat of the weather, and their low condition. In this manner we got on very well, and had a sufficient number for all our purposes on our arrival at Caldas, not less I should think than 300. The ordnance consisted of eighteen pieces of cannon, of which there were one 9 pounder brigade, and two 6 pounder brigades, all complete in every respect, with the usual proportion of ammunition; besides which there was a quantity of spare ammunition for the 9 pounders carried upon the carts of the country; the exact amount I cannot now tell, but more than sufficient for a battle in the field.

‘The soldiers had each of them sixty rounds of musket ammunition; besides this quantity there were ninety mules

attached to the reserve of the artillery to carry musket ammunition, each mule with 2000 rounds; and there were 500,000 rounds on the carts. The army marched from Lavaos on the 10th of August, with seventeen days' bread, viz., four days' bread on the men's backs, three days' bread on mules, and ten on carts; there were, besides, five days' salt meat, and ten days' spirits. Of this quantity of course seven days' bread was consumed on the 16th; but nearly three days' bread was received at Nazareth on the 14th, so that on the 16th of August the army had fourteen days' bread. Besides the salt meat, the contract provided that there should always be three days' fresh meat in camp. I do not believe that, upon our arrival at Caldas, the contractor had fulfilled his contract to that extent; but the supply was regular, and it was certain that his bullocks were coming up regularly*.

' I do not recollect that at this time we had used either salt meat or spirits. We procured wine in nearly every village in the country; our dependence upon future supplies of bread was upon our communication with the shipping; and I had appointed Captain Bligh, of the *Alfred*, to communicate with the army off Peniche on the 16th or 17th. Our dependence of meat was upon the contractor (who, I must say, never failed us until the numbers of the army were increased) and upon the shipping; and for ammunition upon the same.

* ' Sir David Dundas,—The Court will observe in my letter to the Secretary of State, written from Caldas on the 16th of August, that a complaint is made of the inefficiency of the Commissariat.

' As conclusions may be drawn from this letter which it was never my intention should be drawn from it, I beg leave, in justice to the individuals composing the Commissariat attached to the army lately under my command, to state, that I did not intend to complain of their want of zeal in the service, or of any deficiency of exertion on their part.

' The fact is, that I wished to draw the attention of the Government to this important branch of the service, which is but little understood in this country. The evils of which I complained are probably to be attributed to the nature of our political situation, which prevents us from undertaking great military operations, in which the subsistence of armies becomes a subject of serious consideration and difficulty; and these evils consisted in the inexperience of almost every individual belonging to the Commissariat, of the mode of procuring, conveying, and distributing the supplies which were to be got for the use of the troops.

' I hope that the Court will allow this explanation to stand upon their minutes.'

‘ Q. Why did you direct your march to Lisbon by a road near the coast, in preference to another line near the Tagus ?

‘ A. I directed my march by the road of the coast for the reasons in my letter to Sir Harry Burrard, of the 8th of August, and in my narrative, and in my answer to the last question.

‘ Q. At Caldas, what information had you of the strength and position of the enemy, and what of your expected reinforcements.

‘ A. The information I had of the enemy at Caldas was, that General Laborde was in my front at Roliça, with General Thomière’s corps, which had been reported to me 2400 men, and his own, which had been reported 2600 ; in the whole 5000. Besides these troops, they were joined in the battle of the 17th by 400 men of the garrison of Peniche. I judged the strength of the French corps in that action to have been 6000 men, from the view I had of them, and that was the number reported to me during the action, as I have stated in my narrative: Laborde himself, however, says that they had not nearly that number. General Loison’s corps was at Rio Mayor during the whole of the 16th ; this corps was reported to be from 5000 to 7000 men ; they took 9000 rations from the country ; Loison’s corps marched from Rio Mayor about 7 o’clock in the evening of the 16th, and I heard of his march at 11 o’clock. Besides these corps of Loison’s, I heard at Caldas that Junot was on his march from Lisbon with 3000 or 4000 men ; I had no intelligence at Caldas of my expected reinforcements.

‘ Q. Where did you first meet with considerable opposition from the enemy ?

‘ A. I first met with considerable opposition from the enemy on the 17th of August near Roliça.

‘ Q. What were your proceedings from Caldas to Vimeiro ?

‘ A. My proceedings from my departure from Caldas until my arrival at Vimeiro are detailed in my dispatch of the 17th of August to the Secretary of State, and in my narrative.

‘ Q. What knowledge on the 20th had you of the enemy’s strength and position ?

‘ A. I knew on the 20th that all the enemy’s disposable force was collected at Torres Vedras; that the advanced guard was on the heights in front of the town, the main body to the southward of it. I had no particular details of their position; but I do not believe that they extended at all to their left towards the road to Mafra.

‘ Q. What were your intentions and proceedings with respect to moving forward next day ?

‘ A. I had ordered the army to march on the morning of the 21st, and I intended to march, and should have marched, as I have stated in my narrative.

‘ Q. How was the army circumstanced on the 20th with respect to provisions and ammunition, and what was your prospect as to future supplies and difficulties ?

‘ A. On the 20th the army had consumed five days’ of fourteen days’ bread it had on the 16th; but the fleet had arrived at Maceira, and the communication was open with it, and we received a supply of three days’ bread on that day, making twelve days’ bread for the original numbers. Two days’ salt meat and spirits had at this time been consumed, and the supply of fresh meat was complete. It must be observed, however, that the consumption of the army had been increased by above 4000 men, or one third of the original numbers who drew rations. This reinforcement landed with four days’ bread, therefore it may be calculated that the army, including these reinforcements, had in camp and the means of moving, on the 21st of August, above nine days’ bread.

‘ The Portuguese troops (1650 in number), whom I had engaged to supply with bread, were supplied in the first instance by some which the French had left behind at Alcobaça, and another quantity found at Caldas.

‘ The ammunition expended in the action of the 17th was replaced on the 20th of August; and all the equipments of the army were as complete as when we were at Caldas on the 16th.

‘ Q. What reinforcements, and at what places and days, joined you on your march from Caldas, and previous to your victory at Vimieiro on the 21st ?

‘ A. Brig. General Anstruther joined with his brigade, consisting of 2400 men, at Vimieiro, on the morning of the

20th, and Brig. General Acland, with his brigade, consisting of about 2750 men, at Vimeiro, on the night of the 20th.

‘ Q. What orders and instructions relative to your proceeding did you receive from England, from the 9th of August to the 21st ?

‘ A. I did not receive any orders or instructions from England relative to my proceeding between the 9th and the 21st of August.

‘ Q. When did you give up the command of the army to Lieut. General Sir Harry Burrard ?

‘ A. Sir Harry Burrard assumed the command of the army on board His Majesty’s sloop the *Brazen*, when I went on board that vessel on the evening of the 20th of August to report to him.

‘ Q. As you expected Sir Harry Burrard to arrive early in August, what steps did you take to give him previous information, and to acquaint him of your proceedings from time to time ?

‘ A. I wrote to Sir Harry Burrard on the 8th, 10th, and 12th of August ; and copies of my letters are before the Court. I sent him a copy of my dispatch of the 17th of August, addressed to the Secretary of State, to Captain Malcolm, of the *Donegal*, to be delivered to him ; besides this, I wrote to Captain Malcolm, of the *Donegal*, nearly every day.

‘ Q. What position do you understand did the enemy take on the evening of the 21st of August ?

‘ A. I understand that the enemy spent the evening of the 21st of August in endeavoring to form the different corps of their army again, and to regain Torres Vedras ; some of their corps arrived at Torres Vedras at about 12 o’clock at night of the 21st ; others not until late in the day of the 22d of August. When the French retired from the field at Vimeiro, they drew off to the northward towards Lourinha ; and from thence they got into the road to Torres Vedras.

‘ Q. What were the numbers of the enemy’s cavalry at the battle of Vimeiro ?

‘ A. As far as I could judge and learn, they had from 1200 to 1400 cavalry.

‘ Q. What were the numbers of British and Portuguese cavalry in said battle ?

‘ A. We had about 210 mounted men of the 20th dragoons, and 260 of Portuguese cavalry.’

The Board now proceeded further to examine Sir A. Wellesley.

‘ Q. Had Sir A. Wellesley any communication with Santander, or other means of knowing what was the wish of the inhabitants of Biscay, relative to assistance from the British army ?

‘ A. When I was at Coruña I received a letter from Sir Thomas Dyer, who was employed by His Majesty’s Government in communication with the Junta of Asturias, in which Sir Thomas informed me that, as I understood him, he had held out a prospect to the Junta of Oviedo, that the troops under my command would land in Asturias ; and he informed me that this communication had been received with satisfaction by the Junta at Oviedo, and he rather urged me to disembark at Santander, in order that I might attack the French corps which at that time had got possession of that city. I communicated with the Junta of Galicia upon this subject among others, who I conceived were interested in the position of the French corps at Santander, and I was informed by them that measures had been adopted which they thought likely to be effectual to drive this French corps from Santander, which measures afterwards proved to be successful. I had no communication whatever with any of the people of Biscay, which province was not, as I understood at that time, in insurrection against the French.

‘ Q. Had you any correspondence with the Spanish Generals, or did you make any suggestion to them on the importance of gaining the passes of the Pyrenees, and thereby preventing the entrance of French reinforcements into Spain ?

‘ A. I had no correspondence with the Spanish Generals.

‘ Q. Is the inference accurate that you thought the army under your immediate command adequate to the expulsion of Junot’s force from the positions at Lisbon, when you, in a letter dated the 10th of August, advised Sir Harry Burrard

to march with the expected reinforcements to Santarem to cut off the enemy's retreat?

‘ A. I did consider the force which marched from Lavaos under my command to be sufficient to deprive the French of Lisbon and of the forts upon the Tagus.

‘ Q. What alteration, if any, took place in that opinion in consequence of the actual arrival of Lieut. General Sir John Moore with the division under his orders?

‘ A. No alteration whatever in respect to the actual capacity of the army, from its strength, to obtain possession of Lisbon and of the forts upon the Tagus.

‘ Q. You have stated that you would have undertaken the supply of the Portuguese troops had it not been for the insufficient construction of the British Commissariat. Is this conclusion from that statement just — that the country afforded considerable supplies of provisions, if due means could be applied to collect them?

‘ A. The country afforded us no provisions excepting beef and wine, and I believe that from the time I landed in Portugal to the time I quitted the army on the 20th of September, the troops only received biscuit from the ships. As I have stated in my narrative, a small quantity of bread was left behind by the French at Alcobaça, and a small quantity at Caldas, and besides this, after I had given up the command when the army arrived in the neighbourhood of Torres Vedras, a small quantity of flour was got, which had likewise been left behind by the French. While I commanded the army this bread supplied the consumption of the Portuguese troops, 1650 in number, who were with me, and afterwards I believe that the Officers of the army received some baked bread from the Commissariat. But I am of opinion that no exertion would have drawn from Portugal a supply of bread sufficient for that army. My opinion, as stated in my letter, and in my explanation of my letter, went to the arrangement and distribution of supplies as well as to the collection of them.

‘ Q. The answer to the former question having nearly restricted itself to bread and flour, to what extent could beef or other articles of sustenance have been furnished by the country?

‘ A. Wine could be procured in the villages occupied by

the army, in almost every one of its positions, in sufficient quantities for one day's or probably two days' consumption; but I have seen the wine exhausted, in more than one instance, when the army has halted more than one or two days in the same place, and I believe that latterly the Commissary General was not able to supply the troops with wine. As long as I commanded the army there was no want of fresh beef; and as the carts of the country were drawn by bullocks, the draught cattle might have been killed for food for the troops; but without resorting to this resource, it was very soon found that the supplies of cattle for slaughter were not sufficient in Portugal for a large army. And in point of fact, before I quitted the army, a very large proportion, I believe more than half, was fed upon salt provisions, and I believe the whole army has since received nothing else. The cattle on which the army under my command was fed, supplied under the contracts with Mr. Archer and Mr. Walsh, all came from the north of Portugal, and, excepting ten or twelve head received at Leyria, and the same number at Caldas, I do not recollect that the country which was the immediate seat of our operations ever supplied us with any.

‘ Q. The Portuguese General, Freire, in his letter of the 2d September to Sir Hew Dalrymple, states that the fort of Peniche had been on the point of surrendering to him—How was the fact ?

‘ A. I never heard of it : it could not have occurred during the time I commanded the army, as neither that General nor his corps were near that fort.

‘ Q. Did you understand that the Juntas in Spain were in general at first averse to a British force landing in Spain ?

‘ A. I did understand that the Junta of Galicia were not desirous of having the co-operation of a British army with their own troops under the command of General Blake. They were not averse to our landing in Spain, as they consented to my landing in Vigo, if I should find it convenient, and indeed recommended that measure, as Vigo was the only port which could afford protection to our transports on the west coast of the Peninsula, excepting the Tagus. I also understood that the Junta of Seville, and the persons in authority in Andalusia, had no very great desire that General Spencer's corps should co-operate with General

Castañes, although they were desirous that General Spencer's corps should land at Puerto S. Maria, and eventually cover General Castanos' retreat, in case he should have been defeated by Dupont. I wish to explain to the Court, that this opinion is formed from my communications with the Junta of Galicia as far as respects them : and in those communications they expressed a most anxious desire that we should carry on our operations in Portugal, and drive the French out of that kingdom, and that afterwards the British army should be the point of connexion between the northern and southern armies of Spain.

‘ Q. Did you receive communications of similar wishes from any of the chief Juntas or persons in authority in Spain ?

‘ A. None.

‘ Q. Was the expulsion of the French from Portugal, in your opinion, of essential service to the Spaniards ; and had the British force, in the first instance, landed in Spain, might not the French force under Junot have been employed against Spain ?

‘ A. I consider the expulsion of the French from Portugal as an object of the greatest consequence to the Spanish nation. There is no doubt whatever, that if the apprehension of the employment of the disposable force of Great Britain in Portugal had been removed from the mind of the French General, in Portugal, he might have moved a large proportion of his army into Spain.’

Sir Arthur Wellesley, on being asked by the Board, said he had no persons whom he wished to call as witnesses.

CAPTAIN PULTENEY MALCOLM, of His Majesty's ship *Donegal*, was examined by the Board.

‘ Q. Were you employed on the coast of Portugal in assisting and forwarding the movements of the army during any and what period of Lieut. General Sir Arthur Wellesley's command on that coast ?

‘ A. The whole of the time that Sir Arthur Wellesley commanded.

‘ Q. State in general the difficulties or facilities that present themselves in landing troops, or horses, or artillery, or provisions, on the coast of Portugal from the Tagus to

Oporto, in the months of August and September, and whether you actually experienced any and what difficulties on the above occasion.

‘A. There is always a very great difficulty in landing on the coast of Portugal in those months, owing to the swell, which causes a considerable surf upon the beach. At Mondego Bay there is a river, but at the mouth of the river there is a bar on which generally there is a very considerable surf. During the time that I was there, there were only four or five days that we could pass it without danger in common boats, but at the Mondego we got a large supply of boats of the country, schooners, and larger boats, which facilitated the landing very much. I know of no other place between Oporto and the Rock of Lisbon where boats of the country could have been procured, except at Ericcira: I was not there, but I understand that boats could have been procured there. I believe, also, that boats could have been procured, and that the landing is tolerable, at Peniche, but I have not seen it; the latter place was in possession of the enemy. During the whole time we were employed landing the troops, we constantly experienced very great difficulty and danger in landing the troops, both at the Mondego and Maceira.

‘Q. Could the boats of the country obtained at the Mondego be carried to the southward?

‘A. They would have been of no use at any other part, because they could not land on the open beach.

‘Q. Between the Mondego and the Tagus are there any bays, or protecting promontories, where a fleet of transports can anchor in safety in those months and in boisterous weather?

‘A. No, none. The whole coast is exposed to westerly winds, and the anchorage very bad. The prevalent winds are from the north, but about the end of August they frequently blow from the south west, as we experienced. I believe that under the Berlings off Peniche there is a shelter for a few ships, but the anchorage is not good. The river Mondego will admit ships not drawing more than eleven feet of water, for about twenty or twenty five vessels.

‘Q. (By desire of Sir Arthur Wellesley.)—Do you recollect that on one night in August you were obliged to

put to sea in the *Donegal* from the roads of Maceira—that you made the signal to the transports to put to sea—that many anchors were lost, and how many, to the best of your recollection?

‘A. On the 20th August the wind came from the south-west. I weighed, and made the signal for the convoy so to do—the convoy then consisted of 230 or 240 vessels. About one half of the convoy succeeded in getting under weigh, the others were obliged to remain at anchor. Next day the wind shifted, and on my return to Maceira roads I found about sixty of the convoy had lost their anchors in attempting to weigh, and I have no doubt, had the breeze increased to a common gale, that many of the vessels would have been lost; they were then mostly reduced to their last anchor, and the bottom is very rocky. The transports, on board which Sir John Moore’s troops were, were very badly found, and not calculated to beat off a lee shore.

‘Q. Do you recollect that many boats were swamped in the surf at Maccira, and particularly some flat-bottomed boats, and how many were lost entirely?

‘A. The boats in landing at Maccira were almost constantly filled in going in by the surf. I suppose we lost about twenty entirely, and several men: six or seven belonging to the artillery and German Legion were drowned. The day before (the 30th August) I left Maccira I could only find thirty or forty boats from all the fleet that were fit for service, although carpenters had been constantly employed all the night in repairing them.’

Sir Arthur Wellesley observed, that he wished to make some observations upon Sir Hew Dalrymple’s narrative, which he would reduce to writing, and, by permission of the Board, read to them at some future period of the inquiry.

Sir Arthur Wellesley now read the following address:

‘GENERAL SIR DAVID DUNDAS,

‘MY LORDS AND GENTLEMEN,

‘The Court will permit me, I hope, to begin the address with which I have to trouble them with some few observations upon that part of Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple’s

narrative which refers to the operations of the army while under my command in Portugal, in which, of course, I feel much interested.

‘ It appears that the General had at a very early period conceived an opinion that I had undertaken an operation of extreme difficulty and hazard; and yet he entertained the intention of leaving me to conclude it as I could, and of joining at the Mondego the reinforcements expected from England. Indeed, he states that he acted upon this intention, and that he communicated it to me by his aide de camp; but I can assure the Court that yesterday was the first time I heard of it.

‘ I do not mean now to extenuate the difficulty and the hazard of the enterprise which I undertook when I commenced my march from the Mondego; I am addressing myself to persons too well acquainted with the operations of war not to appreciate them; but I contend for it, notwithstanding the opinion as at present stated, of an Officer of so much more experience than myself, that the means which I had in my power, those which I expected, and the measures which I adopted and recommended, were more than adequate to overcome the difficulties, and remove the risks of the operations which I conducted, excepting those inseparable from all military operations.

‘ The Court have already before them, in my dispatches to the Secretary of State, to Sir Harry Burrard, and my narrative, the reasons which induced me to land, and to march without waiting for further reinforcements; upon which I would wish to rely. But what has fallen from Sir Hew Dalrymple renders it necessary for me to trouble them with something further upon this part of the subject.

‘ The questions, as arising out of his statement, are, whether I was in the first instance sufficiently strong to get the better of the enemy in the field; and if I were, whether I adopted the best means of getting the better of him.

‘ In respect to my strength, in comparison of the army of the enemy, I do not desire to be judged by the result of the campaign, as far as it was conducted by me, but by the commencement, at which time the measures were adopted, from which, as it was truly stated, it would not have been easy, and I certainly had no inclination to withdraw.

‘ My strength then consisted of nearly 13,000 British troops, and I had the assistance of 6000 Portuguese troops, from whose co-operation I expected to derive advantages; in which expectation, I admit, I was subsequently disappointed. But I will ask this Court, what would have been said, and deservedly said, and felt of me, throughout the army and the country, and by the government by which I was intrusted, if with such a force I had hesitated to advance upon the enemy? I have already told the Court, in my narrative, that I did not believe his force was more than 16,000 to 18,000 men, only 14,000 of which number could be disposable in the field. The largest account we received, which was deemed an exaggerated one, of the strength of the enemy, made them 20,500, and even admitting those numbers to be correct, the troops disposable for the field could not have equalled in numbers those which I had under my command and co-operating with me.

‘ It appears that I was not mistaken upon this subject, for, in point of fact, the largest number at which I have ever heard the French force estimated in the battle of the 21st of August was 16,000 men; and I, who saw them, did not think they had more than 14,000; every man of which, excepting the cavalry, who remained untouched, were actually engaged, and particularly General Kellermann’s reserve.

‘ Now if all this be true, I may fairly conclude, that if the enterprise was hazardous and difficult, I was not without means of bringing it to a fortunate conclusion.

‘ The next question is, whether, having adequate means in my power, I adopted proper measures to effect my object. Sir Hew Dalrymple says, that, by the line of march I adopted, all the strong positions were in the hands of the enemy; but I can assure him that he will find it very difficult to adopt any line of march in Portugal which will not afford strong positions to an enemy acting on the defensive. But there was one advantage attending the line which I adopted, which was, that it rendered the enemy’s superior cavalry useless, in the way in which he ought and would have employed it, if I had adopted any other line.

‘ If I had adopted the line by the high road from Lisbon, to the north by Santarem, I must have kept up my communication with the Mondego; which would have weakened

my force for operations in the field, and after all, the enemy with his cavalry must have broken in upon it. By adopting the line by the sea coast, and depending for my supplies upon the shipping, my communication was so short that it defended itself; I was enabled to keep my force collected in one body; and I had my arsenals and magazines close to me whenever I required to communicate with them.

‘ Having taken this line myself, I proposed that by Santarem to Sir Harry Burrard, for Sir John Moore’s corps; by which it might have been adopted with safety, as I was upon the sea line.

‘ The Lieutenant General has stated, that by the line I adopted I left all the strong positions in the enemy’s hands. I do not know what positions were in the enemy’s hands of which I could have deprived him, or he could have been deprived by the adoption of any other line of march.

‘ If the march had been made, as I had ordered it on the 21st of August in the morning, the position at Torres Vedras would have been turned; and there was no position in the enemy’s possession excepting that in our front at Cabeça de Montachique and those in the rear of it; and I must observe to the Court, that if Sir John Moore’s corps had gone to Santarem as proposed, as soon as it disembarked in the Mondego, there would have been no great safety in these positions, if it was, as it turned out to be, in our power to beat the French in the field.

‘ I will not follow the example of Sir Hew Dalrymple in entering into a discussion on the probable effects of the battle of the 21st of August, if a certain line of action had been adopted, because an Officer supposed to be concerned in that question is not present; and I dare say that opportunities will not be wanting of entering into that part of the subject.

‘ It has been my misfortune to have been accused of temerity and imprudence, as well as of excess of caution, in the late transactions in Portugal; but without appealing to the result of what happened at the moment I gave over the command of the army, I may safely assert, that whatever might be the difficulty of the operation I had undertaken, means existed to bring it to a fortunate conclusion; that there was no ground for the apprehension for my safety,

which Sir Hew Dalrymple seems to have entertained; and that under the instructions which I had received, I should have been blamed deservedly if I had not commenced my operations as soon as I thought I had a sufficient force.

‘The next point to which I shall take the liberty of drawing the attention of the Court is the share which I am supposed to have had in the negotiation of the Armistice and the Convention. In that part of the question which I have discussed hitherto I am wholly and solely responsible; in that part which follows, I am held responsible for the advice I am supposed to have given in character, at least, if not in person and in my profession.

‘It is important for me, therefore, to show what advice I really did give, in what view I gave it, and what would have been the result, if the measures which I recommended had been pursued.

‘I did recommend and concur in the measure of allowing the French to evacuate Portugal with their arms and baggage; and here I must observe, that it was particularly understood in the negotiation of the Armistice, that in the words “property of all descriptions,” was to be included only military baggage and equipment; that this understanding was carried into execution by a separate article of the Convention; and that the commissioners for executing the Convention acted upon this principle.

‘When the measure of allowing the French to evacuate Portugal was to be taken into consideration, viz., on the evening of the 22d of August, it was necessary to review the situation, the means, and the resources of the two armies, and our own objects.

‘The enemy had collected their forces after the defeat of the 21st, and were about to resume the position of Cabeça de Montachique, from whence their retreat was open to other positions in front of Lisbon, and from thence across the Tagus into Alentejo. They had all the facilities in their power to make these movements, and when they should have reached Lisbon, the possession of that river by the forts and by the Russian fleet, and the great number of boats of which they would have had the use, would have

enabled them to cross in one body, covered by the citadel and the high grounds; and they would scarcely have lost their rear guard. In Alentejo they had provided ample supplies.

‘As I have stated in my narrative of my proceedings from the 12th of July to the 20th of August, Loison had re-established the French authority in that province, during his expedition towards Elvas in the month of July, and the grain which it had produced was purchased for the use of the French army. I know this circumstance, not only from the reports of the country, but from intercepted letters written to Loison by the French agents in Alentejo, which were shown to me.

‘On their arrival in that province, the French would have had to march, unmolested, by the finest road in Portugal, to Elvas, which is a fortress at least of the second order among the fortresses in Europe; where they would have placed a part of their corps in garrison, and they would have sent the remainder across the upper Tagus to Almeida. This place was already provisioned in some degree; and that part of their force, which the French would have detached to Almeida, would have experienced no difficulty in relieving the distant blockade kept up by the Portuguese peasantry, and in throwing in such quantities of provisions as they would have required.

‘Sir John Moore’s corps had been ordered, on the evening of the 20th, to join the army; for which corps a disposition had been proposed for the purpose of preventing the French from carrying into execution the plan of operations which I have supposed, and which it is certain they would have adopted after their defeat in the field. Sir John Moore’s corps could have supported itself at Santarem, as proposed, only by keeping up its communication with the Mondego; because the victuallers and transports could lie in safety in that river only; and the country on the banks of the Mondego, and under the authority of the government of Oporto, could alone furnish the means of keeping up that communication to any efficient purpose. When Sir John Moore’s corps, therefore, was called down to join the army, it could operate only as it was intended by Sir Harry Burrard that

it should operate, in immediate aid and communication with that under my command, depending for its subsistence upon the means which had been provided for the army, and the whole bearing upon the enemy's front.

' Our operations, when we should have joined, would have been those of a superior army pressing upon an inferior on its retreat; but nothing which we could have done would have cut off this retreat; the enemy must have been in Lisbon before us; the Tagus would have been the enemy's to the last moment of their passage; and, after they should have crossed, the necessity of possessing ourselves of the forts on the river, and the Russian fleet in the first instance, and the want of boats, which the enemy would have carried off, would have given them ample time to make all their arrangements in Alentejo before our troops could reach them.

' But in carrying on these operations we should have been involved in many difficulties and distresses, which might have again placed in a state of risk all the objects of the campaign.

' The communication with the shipping on the coast of Portugal is at all times precarious; and becomes more so towards the end of August, and is at length quite impracticable. In fact, many boats were swamped in the last week in August, vessels lost their anchors, and more than once the fleet was obliged to go to sea in danger. On the 22d of August there were eleven days' bread in camp for the original force which marched from Lavaos on the 9th and 10th of August; the troops which he had landed on the 20th had brought four days' bread for themselves, and the supply for the whole might have been for eight or nine days, and no means could be procured of moving a larger quantity: no bread whatever could be procured in the country, and, in point of fact, I believe that, excepting a few thousand rations of bread left behind by the French at Alcobaça, Caldas, and Torres Vedras, and which were given to the Portuguese troops, the country supplied not a single ration from the time the troops landed till I came away on the 20th September.

' It was obvious, then, that when Sir John Moore's corps should land at Maccira, and should nearly double the consumption of the army, without increasing the means of

procuring and conveying its supply, there was a risk of its being in want.

‘ Sir John Moore’s corps could not be expected to be on shore and in a situation to commence its operations till the end of August, during which period the enemy would have fortified his position at Cabeça de Montachique, and in the rear towards Lisbon ; and it would have been unreasonable to expect to be able to force or turn them in less than ten days. During the whole of this period, as well as during the time that would be employed in landing Sir John Moore’s corps, the whole army would have subsisted, and would have depended, upon the means which had been collected and provided for the subsistence of half of it ; and it would have been certain of a supply only at the time it should reach and be in possession of the river Tagus so as to admit the transports.

‘ After we should have obliged the enemy to cross the Tagus, and we should have possessed ourselves of the forts on that river, and of the Russian fleet, and we should have crossed that river with the British army, we must have placed ourselves in a situation to invest Elvas for a blockade or a regular siege. In either case, the army would have been exposed to the effects of a bad climate in the worst season of the year ; and in the latter case, they would have had to move the means for the siege from Abrantes, beyond which place the Tagus would not have carried them, to the scene of action, a distance of not less than 60 miles.

‘ After having performed this operation, the army would have been obliged to renew it in order to obtain possession of Almeida.

‘ I am convinced that we should not have had possession of Elvas till late in December ; and I think it more than probable that we should have been glad to allow the French to evacuate Portugal in that month instead of August, if we had persevered, after having sustained the loss of a great part of our army by sickness, and of three months of most valuable time with reference to further operations.

‘ I conceived that the objects of His Majesty and of the Spanish nation were, that the British army should co-operate with the Spanish armies.

‘ I believed that the only mode in which the operations of

the Spanish corps could be brought to bear upon the same object, was by the influence which the co-operation of a British army would give to the government; and I believed that it was important to the Spanish nation to have the co-operation of 30,000 British soldiers in Spain, to receive the assistance of 4,000 Spanish soldiers, who were prisoners to the French, and of about 2,000 who were employed in Portugal.

‘ I considered these objects to be so important as to counterbalance the disadvantage of throwing 20,000 additional French troops, at no very remote period, upon the Pyrenees; that the Spanish nation would gain, even upon a comparison of numbers, not less than 16,000 good troops; but, if I were not mistaken in my political speculations upon this subject, they would likewise acquire strength in their own union, the amount of which could not be estimated; which strength, I well knew, they could acquire from no other source excepting Portugal, if a British army were to give it to them, as I knew that this country could not afford to send out another army of sufficient strength.

‘ I may have been mistaken in my speculations upon this subject; but, in point of fact, the Spanish nation do now enjoy the very advantages from the Convention to which I have above referred, and which I had in contemplation at the time the Armistice was negotiated; and besides these advantages they have acquired another, viz., the service of the army of Estremadura, consisting of between 14,000 and 16,000 men, a part of them cavalry, which had been employed on the frontiers of Portugal, and have been equipped from the stores of Elvas, and are on their march towards the frontiers of France; and not a man of the French army which evacuated Portugal under the Convention has yet been brought, or can be brought for some time, upon the frontiers of Spain.

‘ In reference to political and military objects, then, at least in my view of them, the measure of allowing the French to evacuate Portugal was an advantage.

‘ If I was mistaken in my view of this advantage, it was a mistake into which I fell with the Spaniards themselves; for the army of Dupont, which was really in a situation to

be obliged to surrender, was allowed to evacuate Andalusia by sea, and to serve again, under the Convention made by the Spanish General Castaños.

‘ If, however, it was an advantage, there is another question attending it, which is, was it disgraceful *per se*? I am not now discussing the detail of the Convention; but the mere measure of allowing the French to evacuate Portugal.

‘ Those who argue upon this part of the subject contend, that the French ought to have been forced to lay down their arms. It is certainly a very desirable object, at all times, to oblige the army of an enemy to lay down its arms; but the question here was one of means. I wish that those who think that the French ought to have been obliged to lay down their arms had reviewed the history of all or of any of the armies which have been forced to adopt that extremity, and had compared their situation with that of the French army in Portugal. Those armies have invariably been surrounded by bodies superior in numbers, in equipments, or in efficiency; and have been distressed, or in the utmost danger of immediate distress, for the want of provisions, and without hope of relief. I need not point out to this Board, that the French army in Portugal were not in that situation, and were not likely to be in such a situation. In fact, they had the military possession of Portugal; they had their magazines in the country, the fortresses, and the harbours; and they incurred no risk of distress from the want of provisions; but we, who were to oblige them to lay down their arms, did incur that risk, till we should obtain possession of the Tagus. But this is not all. Let the measure of allowing the French to evacuate Portugal be compared with other measures of the same description which have been not only approved, but deservedly, in my opinion, extolled in this country. Let the situations of the garrisons of Cairo and Alexandria be compared with the situation of the French army in Portugal; and I believe it will be admitted that the latter possessed advantages which the former did not; at the same time that those who had to decide upon this measure in Portugal knew that there must have been other objects for the British troops in that country, which the situation of Europe, at the time of the

Convention in Egypt, did not hold out to the British troops employed there.

‘ But although I concurred in the general principle of the measure of evacuation, and advised it, I did not agree in all the details either of the Armistice or of the Convention.

‘ In the first place I must inform this Board that in the first interview I had with Sir Hew Dalrymple, after his arrival in Portugal, on the morning of the 22d of August, I, who am supposed to have been his adviser, and am here now for no crime excepting my supposed advice, had reason to believe that I did not possess his confidence; nay, more, that he was prejudiced against the opinions which I should give him. I had an opportunity of talking to him upon business that morning, as I can prove; in consequence of which I formed this belief; of which, if it is desired, I will state the grounds. I may have been mistaken in it; but I certainly entertained it, as I can prove, if the Board wish it, by an examination of those to whom I confided it.—But I think the Board will be inclined to admit that I might have had grounds for believing that Sir Hew Dalrymple was prejudiced against the opinions which I should give him, when they shall recollect his own account of the opinions he entertained of the operations I had conducted even before he landed.

‘ General Kellermann arrived at the advanced sentries of the British army between 1 and 2 o'clock of the 22d, and sent in a flag of truce to announce that he wished to speak to me, who, of course, he supposed commanded the army.

‘ It is true, as stated by Sir Hew Dalrymple, that there was an alarm in the camp when he arrived, which was occasioned by a Portuguese Officer who had come from General Freirc, at Lourinha, and who represented General Kellermann's escort, which he had seen, as the whole French army.

‘ The Commander of the Forces was to do me the honor of dining with me on that day, and as he was then riding into the village of Vimeiro, I asked him whether I should go up to the out-posts and speak to General Kellermann? His answer was No; that the General had desired to speak to him, the Commander of the army, and that he would receive him at my quarters.

‘ General Kellermann was brought there, and he arrived at about half-past 2.

‘ Shortly after his arrival, Sir Hew sent for me into the room in which they were, and communicated to me the object of General Kellermann’s mission, which was repeated by Kellermann in my presence, and he afterwards read from a paper a memorandum of the wishes of the French Commander in Chief.

‘ Sir Hew Dalrymple, Sir Harry Burrard, and I withdrew into an inner room to deliberate upon Kellermann’s propositions; but we had not the paper, as I had refused to take it, conceiving that the negotiation then going on ought to be confined to a mere suspension of hostilities. When we had gone into the inner room, I told Sir Hew Dalrymple that I considered that it was advisable to allow the French to evacuate Portugal, for reasons upon which I am afraid I have already delayed the Court too long; and I said that I did not conceive that there existed any objections at that moment to granting the French a suspension of hostilities for forty eight hours, for the purpose of negotiating a Convention for the evacuation of Portugal. Whether Sir Hew acquiesced in my opinion upon this subject, or I in his, I do not recollect, nor is it material; but I know that we all agreed that there was no objection to allow the French to evacuate Portugal by sea.

‘ I then told Sir Hew that I thought there was an objection, in point of form, to allow the negotiation then going on to extend to other objects than the mere suspension of hostilities; and that for that reason I had declined to take from Kellermann the paper which he had read to us; but of which I told him that I accurately remembered all the particulars. He was of opinion, however, that as long as we agreed upon the material point, viz., that the French should be allowed to evacuate Portugal by sea, it was useless “to drive them to the wall upon a point of form;” and in this manner this objection was overruled.

‘ After dinner the negotiation with Kellermann was continued. The first point which was discussed was the property which the French were to carry off with them, which was explained by him to mean only the “*military baggage and equipments.*”

‘ The next point of difficulty was that respecting the Russians, which at first stood in a form different from that in which it stands in the Armistice; and upon this point I stated to Sir Hew Dalrymple my opinion, that the French ought not to be allowed to stipulate for the Russians at all. He would not allow the article in respect to the Russians to stand as at first proposed by Kellermann, under which they would have returned to the Baltic unmolested; and, in point of fact, the French General at first consented, as I understood, to leave out the stipulation in respect to the Russians, on the ground that it was a point referable to the Admiral. He brought it forward again, however, in the shape in which it now stands, and the Commander of the Forces consented to allow it to remain in the treaty, with the condition, that, if the Admiral did not agree to it, it must be struck out.

‘ When General Kellermann first proposed the arrangement in respect to the Russians, as it now stands in the Armistice, the Commander of the Forces, Sir Harry Burrard, and I, withdrew into the inner room; and I told his Excellency what had passed between Admiral Sir Charles Cotton and me, upon this subject, in a conference which I had with the Admiral, when I was at the mouth of the Tagus, on the 26th and 27th of July.

‘ The Admiral had then told me, that he had heard that the Russian Admiral intended to remain neutral in the contest between the British and the French troops; and would claim the neutrality of the port of Lisbon; and Sir Charles Cotton asked me what I thought upon that claim? I told him that I thought the only way of getting rid of it was, to be so quick in our operations, that there would be no time for the Portuguese to make it before he would attack the Russian fleet; and that it was a subject upon which it would be necessary to make a reference to England.

‘ I pointed out to Sir Hew, however, that this was a claim which might be made by the Russians on their own account, or by the Portuguese in favor of the Russians, but not by the French.

‘ The Commander of the Forces appeared to be of opinion that as the question was, in fact, understood by Kellermann to be referable to the Admiral, it was not important whether this agreement was in the arrangement or not.

‘ It is true, as stated by Sir Hew Dalrymple, that there was a long, and the longest, discussion, upon this point relating to the Russians; but it related to a claim made by General Kellermann, that the Russian fleet should be allowed to depart from Lisbon, and that the British fleet should not be allowed to pursue them for a limited time. The Commander of the Forces, however, insisted that they should have no more in the port of Lisbon than the rights of a neutral nation; and this point was yielded by General Kellermann.

‘ The next point of importance was that relating to the length of time during which the suspension of hostilities should last; and Sir Hew Dalrymple admits that I proposed to limit the duration of the suspension of hostilities to forty eight hours only, whereas that he preferred the proposal of General Kellermann, that the suspension should be unlimited in the first instance, and followed by a limited suspension of forty eight hours when either party should wish to put an end to it.

‘ I shall consider presently the advantage which I conceived the limited term of suspension had over the unlimited term, in the then situation of the two armies. But I shall now consider this circumstance in another point of view. First, I am called the negotiator of this instrument, and in this important point the plan of the French General is adopted instead of mine, by the Commander of the Forces. But, secondly, I am called the adviser of these measures, and for this crime of advice I am here. Now although I must submit to incur disgrace and punishment, where I shall be found to deserve those misfortunes, I must say that I think it is a new measure of punishment which appears invented for me; that I, a subordinate Officer, am to be punished for advising measures which were not conducted according to my advice.

‘ I say that this point was most important in a view to the state of our resources, to the state of the season, and to the tone in which the Convention should be negotiated; and above all, it was important in a view to the threats of the French in respect to the Russians. If there was any foundation for those threats, which I acknowledge I imagined there was, and that they would have received assistance from

the Russians ; if the Admiral refused his consent to the article respecting the Russian fleet, which I was sure he would do ; it was most important that if the negotiations should then be broken off, and notice given of the conclusion of the suspension of hostilities, a period of forty eight hours should not be allowed to the French to equip and prepare the Russians before we should begin our operations.

‘ If we derived any advantage, which I contend we did not, from prolonging the suspension of hostilities, I was sure that we could always prolong it.

‘ But whatever may have been the opinion of the Commander of the Forces on the 22d, and whatever may be Sir Hew Dalrymple’s opinion now, he was of a different opinion on the 25th of August ; and, in point of fact, when he began to negotiate, he did at my suggestion give notice of the conclusion of the suspension of hostilities in forty eight hours from noon of the 26th of August, as appears by his instructions of the 25th of August to Lieut. Colonel Murray.

‘ After the articles were settled, Sir Hew Dalrymple says, that General Kellermann asked him who should sign the Armistice, and he said himself, and he was about to sign it, when General Kellermann informed him that my name was in the title, and that it was not usual for an Officer of the rank of Commander in Chief to sign an instrument with one of inferior rank.

‘ I am afraid that Sir Hew Dalrymple’s memory has not served him very well upon this occasion ; if my name had been at that time inserted in the title of the instrument, as the negotiator of it, General Kellermann could have no reason to ask who was to sign it ; and if this question was asked by General Kellermann after the instrument was drawn up, and Sir Hew Dalrymple was about to sign it, he was about to sign it without reading the instrument ; for if he had read it, he would have seen that my name was used in it.

‘ The fact is, that when the terms had been generally settled, General Kellerman was dictating the fair copy of the instrument to the Officers who were writing it, and before he wrote or dictated the title, he asked Sir Hew Dalrymple who was to sign it ? and Sir Hew said himself. General Kellermann then represented that he (Sir Hew), being Com-

mander in Chief, ought not to sign an agreement with an inferior Officer, and proposed that I should sign it.

‘ Sir Hew Dalrymple then came into another room, where I was, and told me that General Kellermann had proposed that I should sign the instrument, and he asked me whether I had any objections to doing so. My answer was, that I would sign any paper he wished me to sign.

‘ It may not be very important at what period Sir Hew Dalrymple had intended to sign the instrument; but this is very obvious, that he had intended to sign it, which he would not have done, if I had negotiated it; and indeed the very question asked by General Kellermann showed who was the negotiator; for if it had been me, or if it had been Sir Harry Burrard, there would have been no doubt, and the question would have been useless; but as Sir Hew Dalrymple was the negotiator himself, and it was not regular for an Officer commanding in chief to sign an agreement with an Officer of inferior rank, General Kellermann was obliged to inquire who should sign; and in point of fact proposed me.

‘ I repeat that I was not in the room at the time this conversation between General Kellermann and Sir Hew Dalrymple took place; but as I went into the room more than once while the Officers were writing the instrument, which was after I had been asked and had consented to sign it, I know it must have been when the title was making out, and not when the whole was drawn up.

‘ When it was drawn up I read it over, and at the table gave it to Sir Hew Dalrymple to read, with an observation, that it was an extraordinary paper. He answered that it did not contain anything that had not been settled, and I then signed it.

‘ This is the mode in which this agreement was negotiated; and I repeat that I never considered myself in any manner responsible for its contents, or for the manner in which it was drawn up.

‘ It is perfectly true that I advised the principle of the arrangement, that I assisted the Commander in Chief in discussing the different points with General Kellermann, and that I gave him my opinion when he asked it, and when I thought it desirable to give it him. But I was not the

negotiator, and could not be, and was not so considered, the Commander of the Forces being present in the room deciding upon all points, and taking part in all discussions. If indeed the Commander of the Forces had given me instructions to negotiate this instrument, and I had then negotiated and signed it, I might have been responsible for its contents, or at all events for the manner in which it was drawn up; but as it is, my signature is a mere form.

‘ But this instrument, about which so much has been said, and respecting which I have troubled the Court so much at length, is in point of fact a dead letter; it was never ratified by any of the parties in whose name it was concluded, and no one article in it was ever carried into execution, excepting that by which hostilities were suspended.

‘ From the beginning, my object had been to keep the Russians clear from the French. I have shown that I endeavored to effect that object in the negotiation of the Armistice; and I will now show the subsequent measures which I adopted with a view to effect the same object in the subsequent negotiations.

‘ At 3 o'clock on the morning of the 23d, the army marched under my command to Ramalhal. Licut. Colonel Murray had been sent off from Vimieiro at an early hour, to communicate to the Admiral the contents of the agreement for suspending hostilities, and upon my arrival at the ground at Ramalhal, I gave to the Commander of the Forces a paper, of which what follows is a copy*.’

‘ The object of the paper was to get the Russians out of the hands of the French; and I did think that it was a matter of indifference what arrangement was made with them, or what became of the Russian fleet, provided it was not allowed to return to the Baltic. I was, and am still of opinion, that the best arrangement would have been to leave them in the port of Lisbon, on the ground of its neutrality. Two events might have occurred, either of which would have placed them in our hands; and in the mean time the Officers and seamen would not have been sent back to Russia to co-operate in the war against the Swedes.

* See pp. 120, 121.

‘ One of the events is the declaration of Russia against the Spaniards and Portuguese, the other the re-entry of the French into Portugal. But whatever may have been the nature of the terms to be granted to the Russians, it appeared to me most important that the French should have nothing to do with the negotiations affecting their fleet.

‘ I beg to observe to the Court that it always occurred to me, that one of the practical effects of the Convention with the French for the evacuation of Portugal must have been to give to the Russians the benefit of the neutrality of the port of Lisbon.

‘ The Convention must have provided for the occupation of the forts of the Tagus by the British troops, and at this time the Portuguese flags would be hoisted. It would be impossible for the British Admiral to go in and attack the Russians while the arrangement under the Convention should be in the course of execution; and while they would have continued in this state the Russians would have time to claim, and the Portuguese to grant, the neutrality of the port. The question then must have been referred to the British Government, and would have been discussed between them and the Portuguese.

‘ I do not know whether Sir Hew Dalrymple sent instructions to Lieut. Colonel Murray according to the recommendation contained in the paper which I have just read; but I rather believe he did not, as he appeared to be convinced that the Admiral would not agree to the terms proposed for them under the 7th article of the agreement for suspending hostilities. Lieut. Colonel Murray returned to Ramalhal from the Admiral in the night of the 24th, and having called upon me to inform me that the Admiral would not consent to the terms proposed for the Russians, I desired him to tell the General that, in my opinion, he ought to inform the French Commander in Chief, as soon as possible, that he should consider the suspension of hostilities at an end in forty eight hours.

‘ I waited upon Sir Hew Dalrymple at daylight on the morning of the 25th, in company with Captain Malcolm of the Navy; and, in his presence, I told him that I thought that he ought immediately to put an end to the suspension of hostilities, on the ground of the Admiral's dissent from

the articles, without specifying which of them; and to leave it to the French Commander in Chief to renew the negotiation for the evacuation of Portugal, if he should think proper, but that we ought to lose no further time in advancing.

‘ I then pointed out to Sir Hew Dalrymple the practical inconvenience which resulted at that moment from his having allowed the French a suspension of hostilities for an unlimited period of time, followed by a limited period of forty eight hours.

‘ Sir Hew Dalrymple told me that as soon as Lieut. Colonel Murray should have rested himself he would draw up a report of what had passed between him and the Admiral, on which he should be better able to form his opinion.

‘ In the course of that morning he sent for me again, and he showed me the report which Lieut. Colonel Murray had made. I again recommended to him to put an end to the suspension of hostilities, on the ground of the Admiral’s dissent, without entering into details, and to leave it to the French Commander in Chief to recommence the negotiation for the evacuation, if he should think proper. Sir Hew Dalrymple was, however, of a different opinion, and determined to communicate, through Lieut. Colonel Murray, to the French Commander in Chief the Admiral’s sentiments on the agreement for suspending hostilities; because Lieut. Colonel Murray informed us that, when he was leaving the *Hibernia*, with Junot’s aide de camp, the latter had asked him whether anything had passed with the Admiral likely to break off the negotiation, and had urged the propriety of informing Junot if that was the case. The Lieut. Colonel had replied, that he did not think that anything had occurred which ought to preclude further negotiation.

‘ The Commander of the Forces having thus determined that he would communicate to the French Commander in Chief, in detail, the Admiral’s sentiments on the Armistice, Lieut. Colonel Murray’s instructions were drawn, by which he was ordered to give notice of the end of the suspension of hostilities in forty eight hours; and he was authorised to negotiate a Convention with the French for the evacuation of Portugal, on the terms contained in the paper which I had delivered to the General on the 23d of August, and which I have just read to the Court.

‘ Thus, then, between the 23d and 25th, I took two opportunities of endeavoring to effect the object I had in view, viz., to separate the Russians from the French; and I really believe that, if the Commander of the Forces had not been influenced by his desire to perform with good faith that to which he thought Lieut. Colonel Murray had bound him by his conversation with Junot’s aide de camp, and had not stated to Junot the detail of the Admiral’s sentiments respecting the Russians, the negotiation would have been continued with the French only, and the Russians would have been left to their fate.

‘ But the Court will see that I made another effort to effect this same object on the 27th, and that, in point of fact, it was effected; and that the General gave orders that the negotiation should be broken off entirely, if it was not so understood.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Murray went to Lisbon on the 25th; and on the 27th, in the morning, Sir Hew Dalrymple sent for me and Sir John Moore, and not Sir Harry Burrard, as stated by Sir Hew Dalrymple, to communicate to us a letter received from Lieut. Colonel Murray, and another from Junot.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Murray reported that Junot had agreed to continue the negotiation without reference to the article of the Armistice relative to the Russians; and that the suspension of hostilities would terminate at a particular hour named, unless the negotiation, in which he was engaged with General Kellermann, should be brought to a conclusion.

‘ General Junot appeared, by his letter, to think that the suspension of hostilities was still indefinite, and to consider the negotiation of the Military Convention as depending upon the negotiation of a Naval Convention between the British and the Russian Admirals.

‘ I recommended to the General to instruct, and I drew for him instructions to Lieut. Colonel Murray, which are in the collection of papers dated the 27th of August, which I will now read, by which he was directed to call upon General Kellermann to explain and reconcile the difference between his (Lieut. Colonel Murray’s) statement and the General’s intention, and that contained in Junot’s letter to Sir Hew Dalrymple; and to break off the negotiation, and

to come away within the period limited for the suspension of hostilities, if this explanation should not be satisfactory; but that if the explanation should be satisfactory, he was to continue the negotiations; and if further time was necessary to enable him to bring them to a conclusion, he was permitted to suspend hostilities for a further period of twenty four hours. Lieut. Colonel Murray was also directed to inform General Kellermann that it was expected that, in future, Junot should confine to the channel of Lieut. Colonel Murray any communication he had to make to Sir Hew Dalrymple.

‘ Sir Hew Dalrymple says, in his narrative, that there was but little difference between Junot’s letter and Lieut. Colonel Murray’s. I have not got Lieut. Colonel Murray’s letter, but, as well as I recollect, the difference was very material. At all events, it appears from the letter of the 27th, that Junot’s notion was inconsistent with the intention of the Commander of the Forces, which intention was to allow the French to have nothing to say to the Russian negotiation; and that was what Lieut. Colonel Murray was ordered to set right in this letter written by me.

‘ I never saw the answer to this letter, nor do I know any thing further of the negotiation till the 29th; but I believe the Court will be of opinion, that if the plan detailed in that letter had been carried into execution, there would have been no occasion for treating with the Russians and the French at the same time.

‘ On the 28th, that part of the army which had been originally under my command marched to the neighbourhood of Torres Vedras, leaving General Anstruther’s and General Acland’s brigades, and a part of Sir John Moore’s corps, which had been landed, in the camp at Ramalhal.

‘ On the 29th, in the morning, Sir Hew Dalrymple sent for me to Ramalhal, where I went to take into consideration a Convention which had been agreed upon between General Kellermann and Lieut. Colonel Murray, and had been ratified by General Junot, dated the 28th of August. There were present at Head Quarters, Sir Harry Burrard, Sir John Moore, Lieut. General Hope, Lieut. General Mackenzie Fraser, and myself; and the Convention was taken into consideration article by article.

‘ It was altered in many important particulars.

‘ 1st. The article respecting property was placed on a proper footing; the French were to be allowed to carry off only their military equipments; and were to restore property of all descriptions which had been taken from the churches or the inhabitants of Portugal.

‘ 2dly. The security given to the purchasers of property from the French was not afforded by the alteration made.

‘ 3dly. The French were to find the transports for their own cavalry.

‘ 4thly. The Commander of the Forces engaged to use his good offices, instead of stipulating for indemnity, for the inhabitants of Portugal in the French interest, during the time they should remain in Portugal.

‘ 5thly. The French were required to evacuate all the forts on the right of the Tagus immediately, as far up as Belem; and Lisbon itself, when the second division should embark.

‘ I was most anxious, and pressed upon Sir Hew Dalrymple that they should be required to evacuate Lisbon, and to cross the Tagus forthwith, according to the plan recommended in the paper which I had given him on the 23d, in order to give us possession of the harbour, and the use of the navigation of the river; because, as I told him, he would not be able to conduct the service, and do all that would be necessary to refit the army, unless he should have a free and easy communication between every corps of the army and the transports; that this would be impossible even with the possession of Belem, if the French were to continue in Lisbon with a circuit of three leagues; and that the navigation of the Tagus, at an early period, was necessary in a view to the future operations of the army.

‘ Sir Hew Dalrymple overruled this proposition of mine, and directed that the article might stand as I have above stated, viz., giving to the French a circuit of two leagues round Lisbon, with a league of distance between their posts and ours; and to us the possession of all the forts on the right bank of the Tagus, including Belem.

‘ I beg that the Court will not understand, that this meeting of the Lieutenant Generals of the army, at Sir Hew Dalrymple’s quarters, or that any of the meetings which I

had with him during the course of these negotiations, were at all of the nature of councils of war. They were merely meetings of General Officers with whom the Commander of the Forces chose to converse on the subjects then under his consideration; but, whatever might be the opinion of any, or the whole of those Officers, he decided for himself; and, in this last meeting of the 29th of August, he decided for himself upon every proposition.

‘ I never knew for what reason the improvements made in the Convention in this meeting of the 29th of August were not carried into execution. I returned to Torres Vedras after the meeting was concluded; head quarters were moved there on the following day, the 30th; but I did not see the Commander in Chief, and I marched to Sobral with my division on the morning of the 31st.

‘ When I was near Sobral, I received a message from the Commander in Chief, acquainting me that the Convention had arrived, signed by General Kellermann and Lieut. Colonel Murray, and desiring to see me; but I was so far from Torres Vedras, that I conceived I should not be able to arrive there in time, and I did not go; and the Court will see that my name is not in the list of those Officers who were present at this meeting, as read by Sir Hew Dalrymple. I understand, however, that the Commander in Chief ratified the Convention on that day, without any of the alterations made by the meeting of General Officers on the 29th of August; and, in point of fact, I never saw the Convention till I arrived in England.

‘ I have now stated to the Court all that I had to do with the treaties, and the opinions I gave to the Commander of the Forces at different periods while they were negotiating; and I really believe that if a Convention for the evacuation of Portugal had been concluded according to the terms which Sir Hew Dalrymple admits I recommended to him on the 23d of August, and with which he actually instructed Lieut. Colonel Murray on the 25th of August, the country would have been satisfied.

‘ But there is one article in the Convention particularly disapproved of in this country, of which I approved, notwithstanding that it is not contained in that paper which I gave to the Commander of the Forces on the 23d.

‘ It relates to the Spanish prisoners, who were certainly at the time of the Convention completely and entirely in the power of the French. The Court will observe that the principle upon which I thought that any Convention ought to be made with the French was, that they had the military possession of the country; and that their retreat was open to Elvas and Almeida: they had in their power to do as they pleased with their Spanish prisoners; and I conceived that they had a fair claim to be allowed for them in the negotiation. The exchange of the Frenchmen taken in Spain, not in military operations, for these Spaniards, appeared to me to be not an unreasonable arrangement; and it was one to which I had reason to believe the Junta of Galicia, at least, would not object. The only objection which I saw to the article was, that the Commander of the Forces engaged to obtain the release of the Frenchmen, instead of engaging to use his good offices to obtain their release; and he appears to have directed that an alteration might be made in this article, by his letter to Lieut. Colonel Murray of the 29th of August, which I heard read to the Court.

‘ It will be necessary that I should call evidence to support part of this statement; but I will trouble the Court as little as possible. I have called no evidence yet; and I beg leave now to declare, that the Officers at home from the army are here on leave of absence, either on account of their health or their private affairs; and have not been called, and are not detained by me.’

LIEUT. COLONEL TORRENS was examined by Sir Arthur Wellesley’s desire :—

‘ Q. Do you recollect my having had a conversation with you on the night of the 22d of August, or the morning of the 23d, respecting my having signed the Armistice?

‘ A. At daylight on the morning of the 23d, Sir Arthur Wellesley mentioned to me the occurrences which had taken place the evening before; and mentioned that he had signed the Armistice by the desire of Sir Hew Dalrymple, although he totally disapproved of many points in it, and of the tone of the language in which it was drawn up.

‘ Q. Did I state to you what parts of it I disapproved of?

‘ A. You principally stated that you disapproved of the

article that provided for the neutrality of the Russians, and of the forty eight hours which had been given to the enemy, from the termination of the Armistice, before hostilities should again commence.

‘ Q. Do you recollect my having expressed to you great uneasiness on the 22d, upon finding that I did not possess the confidence of the Commander in Chief?

‘ A. I do recollect that Sir Arthur Wellesley did express, after he had had a meeting with the Commander of the Forces upon his landing at Maceira, that he had to regret that it was apparent that he had not the confidence of the Commander of the Forces, or words to that effect.

‘ Q. Did I state to you my reasons?

‘ A. You did.

‘ Q. State them?

‘ A. Sir Arthur Wellesley told me, that upon the landing of Sir Hew Dalrymple, he had gone to him to represent to him the necessity of an advance, and that he stated his reasons for thinking it necessary. Sir Hew Dalrymple replied, that he had just arrived, and was consequently unable to form any judgment upon the matter; upon which, an Officer of the Staff spoke apart to Sir Hew Dalrymple, and then followed Sir Arthur Wellesley, and told him, it was the desire of the Commander of the Forces that he should make preparations for the march of the army, and give what orders he thought necessary for it.

‘ Q. Was that Officer of the Staff Lieut. Colonel Murray?

‘ A. Yes.

‘ Q. Do you recollect that I told you that Lieut. Colonel Murray had spoken to the Commander of the Forces upon the necessity of marching, in consequence of my having urged that necessity upon him (Lieut. Colonel Murray) after the Commander of the Forces had declined to attend to my recommendation?

‘ A. I certainly did understand from Sir Arthur Wellesley that Lieut. Colonel Murray had urged the necessity of an advance to the Commander of the Forces, in consequence of having had a conference with him, Lieut. Colonel Murray, on the subject; but I cannot recal to my recollection whether, or not, Sir Arthur Wellesley told me that he had had this conference with Lieut. Colonel Murray after he had urged the matter himself to the Commander of the Forces.

CAPTAIN MALCOLM was again examined by Sir Arthur Wellesley's desire :—

‘ Q. Do you recollect to have waited upon the Commander in Chief, Sir Hew Dalrymple, in company with me on the morning of the 25th of August ?

‘ A. I do.

‘ Q. Do you recollect Sir Arthur Wellesley having recommended to the Commander in Chief, to announce to General Junot the termination of the suspension of hostilities in forty eight hours, without reference to the detail which had been received of the sentiments of the Admiral, respecting the article of the Armistice regarding the Russians, and to leave to General Junot to renew the negotiation if he thought proper ?

‘ A. Yes, I do.

‘ Q. Will you state what passed ?

‘ A. On my going into the room, Sir Hew Dalrymple informed Sir Arthur, that the Admiral would not agree to that part of the Armistice that regarded the Russian fleet ; Sir Arthur replied that he thought so. Sir Hew asked Sir Arthur for his opinion as to what steps ought to be taken ; Sir Arthur said, he thought it most advisable to inform General Junot in general terms that the Admiral disapproved of the Armistice ; that he saw no necessity for pointing out the particular article which he disapproved, and proposed that General Junot should be told that the suspension was to be at an end in forty eight hours, as had been agreed upon by the Armistice, and to leave it to General Junot to propose terms again if he thought proper.’

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY now read an extract of a General Order of the 27th of August last, (1808,) which was admitted by Sir Hew Dalrymple, viz.—

‘ Extract from General Orders, by Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple, &c.

‘ GENERAL ORDERS.

‘ *Parole—Portugal.*

‘ Head Quarters, Ramalhal, 27th August, 1808.

‘ The rapid and skilful march, performed by the army commanded by Lieut. General Sir Arthur Wellesley, marked in its progress by the talent of the General and the gallantry

of the troops, and terminated by a victory greatly glorious to both, seemed to have accomplished the immediate object in view, without further operation in the field.

‘Should that expectation be disappointed, the army will again advance, greatly augmented by the arrival of troops much more valuable from their composition than their numbers; and if by this means there will remain less opportunity for the army at large to acquire renown by the encounter of an army so greatly inferior in force, there will be greater occasion to display patience and cheerfulness under such privations as the exhausted state of the country and other circumstances must necessarily produce.

‘H. CLINTON, Adjutant General.’

The Board now proceeded to question MAJOR GENERAL SPENCER, by desire of Sir Arthur Wellesley:—

‘Q. Were you aware that it had been arranged with Captain Malcolm, that the *Alfred* should attend the movements of the army along the coast from the Mondego, in charge of the victuallers and store ships, as that ship was armed with 24 pounders, and the ammunition for sieges expected from England was for 24 pounders?

‘A. The *Alfred*, a seventy four gun ship, was ordered, by Sir Arthur Wellesley’s wish, for the express purpose of supplying the army with whatever heavy ordnance the Commander in Chief might require.

‘Q. Were you aware that, before the army was in a situation to attack Peniche, or any other fortified place, the ordnance store ship, loaded with ammunition for 24 pounders and heavy mortars and stores for them, had joined the fleet, in charge of the *Alfred*?

‘A. It joined the fleet a long time before they could have been required.’

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY was questioned by the Board:—

‘Q. Had you heavy artillery on travelling carriages in the ordnance store ship.

‘A. There were mortars, but no guns in the ordnance store ship.’

LIEUT. COLONEL TORRENS was asked, by Sir Arthur Wellesley's desire,—

‘ Q. Do you recollect, that on the day the army marched from Vimeiro to Ramalhal, I wrote a paper as soon as the army had taken up its ground, for the use of Sir Hew Dalrymple, which I gave you to copy, to the following purport :—

‘ “ 1st. It would be very desirable, &c., to *Ramalhal*, 23d August, 1808*?”

‘ A. When the army took up its ground at Ramalhal on the 23d August, Sir Arthur Wellesley wrote the memoranda which he has just read to the Court, and I copied it.

‘ Q. Did I then take the original to Sir Hew Dalrymple ?

‘ A. Immediately after I copied it, Sir Arthur Wellesley himself carried the original to Sir Hew Dalrymple.’

C. B. Wollaston, Assistant Deputy Judge Advocate General to the Right Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.

‘ SIR,

‘ 10th December, 1808.

‘ I have the honor to inform you, by the desire of General Sir David Dundas, that the Board of Inquiry will on Tuesday next request of you to state all your proceedings from the time when you met Sir Harry Burrard on board ship, on the 20th of August, till the morning of the 22d, when Sir Hew Dalrymple arrived and took the command; and to specify the several interviews which you had with Sir Harry Burrard during that period, the nature of the reports you made to him, the propositions (if any) which you laid before him, and the orders or directions which you received in consequence, with such explanatory reasons as occurred at the time in support of such propositions.

‘ I am desired to add, that the Board may have some other questions to propose to you, but they would be glad to have the amount of the above set forth in the shape of a narrative, in order to save time.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ C. W. WOLLASTON,

‘ *The Right Hon.*

Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.’

‘ Ass. Dep. Judge Adv. Gen.

* See pp. 120, 121.

Sir Arthur Wellesley now read a paper in answer to the above letter, as follows :—

‘ GENERAL SIR DAVID DUNDAS,

‘ MY LORDS AND GENTLEMEN,

‘ Having been out of town at Brighton, I did not receive, till my return yesterday afternoon, the letter of the Judge Advocate General, of the 10th of December, in which the Court have called upon me for a narrative of all my proceedings from the time I saw Lieut. General Sir Harry Burrard, on the 20th of August, till the morning of the 22d, when Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple arrived, and an account of the several interviews I had with, and the reports I made to, Lieut. General Sir Harry Burrard in that interval.

‘ I beg leave to inform the Court, that if the time which by accident has been allowed me to draw up this narrative had been longer, I should have asked their permission to decline to make it in the present stage of their proceedings. I am perfectly ready to answer verbally, or in writing, any questions which the Court may put to me, and to give them every information in my power; but Lieut. General Sir Harry Burrard was my Commanding Officer, and it rests with him to give such a narrative as he may think proper of all the circumstances which occurred during the period before referred to; and I have no doubt whatever that it will be perfectly correct.

‘ I may possibly feel it necessary afterwards to address observations to the Court, and to call certain witnesses before them, for which I shall hope for their indulgence.’

SIR HARRY BURRARD now read a narrative of his proceedings, from which the following is extracted :—

‘ About the close of the action, when it was evident that the enemy must be everywhere repulsed, Sir Arthur came up to me and proposed to advance: I understood he meant the movement to be from our right and towards Torres Vedras, with some circumstances I cannot now relate, as they are imperfect in my memory, it not having struck me at the time, or till very lately, that it would be necessary for me to account for every thing that passed on this subject: I answered that I saw no reason for altering my former resolution

of not advancing, and, as far as my recollection goes, I added that the same reasoning which before determined me to wait for the reinforcements had still its full force in my judgment and opinion.

‘ I am certain Brig. General Clinton and Lieut. Colonel Murray were with me at the time, (with others of my Staff,) for they both immediately afterwards assured me, that in their opinion I had well decided.

‘ Q. (By desire of Sir Arthur Wellesley to Sir Harry Burrard.)—Did you ever hear that it was a standing order of the army when under my command, that the troops, when ordered to march, should cook a day’s provision?

‘ A. I think I have.

‘ Q. The troops having on the 20th had orders to march on the 21st, would they not have in their havresacks, during the action of the 21st, the provision for that day?

‘ A. Certainly, if they had received orders to march.

‘ Q. Did I not inform you on the evening of the 20th that I had ordered the army to march on the following morning?

‘ A. I understood from Sir Arthur that he intended to march, and very probably he told me that he had ordered it.

‘ Q. Having stated to the Board that I proposed to you on the field of battle to pursue the enemy—upon one occasion, do you recollect my having proposed it to you a second time, in consequence of a message which I had received from General Ferguson?

‘ A. I do remember that Sir Arthur did mention something of the kind to me, and, if I understood him right, it was to pursue on the left where there was open ground, and where the enemy’s cavalry might have acted: General Ferguson’s brigade was then much in advance.

‘ Q. Do you recollect that the ground in front of the position of General Fane’s and General Anstruther’s brigades was bounded by a hill covered with pine, to which the right flank of those brigades would have been exposed, if they had pursued that part of the enemy’s army engaged with and defeated by them?

‘ A. I know there was a hill in their front, and some pine wood on it.

‘ Q. Do you recollect that in describing to you the dispo-

sition I had made of the army, and the orders which I had given to the different corps, I informed you that I had ordered General Fane and General Anstruther not to be induced to quit their position on any account, without receiving orders from me?

‘ A. I was informed that General Fane’s and General Anstruther’s brigades were not to advance to follow the enemy; but I did not understand that it was an order that had been given to them before they were engaged. Whether Sir Arthur told me, or somebody else, I do not recollect.

‘ Q. Do you recollect that the plan according to which I proposed to you to follow up our advantages was to move the brigade upon the right wing, General Hill’s, General Fane’s, and General Anstruther’s upon Torres Vedras by the high road, and to follow the beaten enemy with the other five brigades and the Portuguese troops?

‘ A. I did not understand it in that detail: I understood that Sir Arthur Wellesley intended to march the brigades from his right upon Torres Vedras. The rest I do not recollect as part of the plan mentioned to me.

‘ Q. Do you recollect the first time I proposed to you to pursue the enemy, I mentioned the plan of the march to Torres Vedras, and the second time the pursuit of the left to what you consider open ground?

‘ A. I did not consider them as one and the same plan; I thought that General Ferguson’s brigade was getting too far, and I wished it to be stopped; but I do not know that Sir Arthur Wellesley mentioned it as the plan of the pursuit of the enemy by the right to Torres Vedras, and in front, with the other brigades.

‘ Q. Was the period, at which you state that you saw one of the corps of General Ferguson’s brigade in advance, and in a run, before or after you had decided that the enemy should not be pursued, and before or after the last attack made by a corps of French infantry upon the 71st and 82d regiments?

‘ A. I think the attack made upon the two corps last mentioned was the very last of the action. What I have before said of the 71st must have happened prior to that.

‘ Q. Were not the 36th and 40th regiments in the same brigade with the 71st, and on the same ground, and this

brigade supported by the 29th regiment, and in the rear by the brigades of General Bowes and General Acland, in column of brigades, throughout the action; and, at its close, by that of General C. Craufurd and the Portuguese detachment close on the left?

‘A. I believe they were. The exact situation of the Portuguese, and the brigade with them, I cannot speak to so well.’

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY, by the Board :—

‘Q. Was the high road which our right must have taken to Torres Vedras nearer to it than that which the enemy, who was engaged on our left, must have taken, to have reached that place?

‘A. I should think it was; the enemy must have gone by the road which falls into the high road from Lourinha to Torres Vedras. Our right would have marched by the direct road from Vimeiro to Torres Vedras.’

Sir Arthur Wellesley was further questioned by the Board :—

‘Q. Had our troops followed promptly their first success, was there in your opinion a probability of our being able to have intercepted a great part of the French army that had been repulsed by our left wing, and who were retiring and in confusion?

‘A. The enemy’s left, which was engaged with our right, retired by a road which leads along the heights towards Lourinha, on a different side of the valley from that on which our left stood, and it began to retire at much about the same time that the attack began upon the left, consequently the left could not have been immediately employed in pursuit of those troops which had been engaged on our right. Those troops I believe continued in confusion in the woods which were on that side of the valley during a considerable part of the day, and this confusion was considerably increased, and its duration lengthened, by the attack made by our cavalry. I certainly think that if the left wing of the army had followed up its advantages as I proposed, not only many prisoners would have been taken belonging to the left wing of the French army, but likewise belonging

to the right, and that the whole of them were in such confusion, that, giving them full credit for great facility and discipline in forming after having been broken, it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, to form again.

‘ Q. From the suggestion mentioned by you as having come from Major General Ferguson, for following the French on the left, it should appear that some pause, if not a close of the action had then taken place : whence did that cessation occur ?

‘ A. When the enemy were beaten on the left, I went to Sir Harry Burrard, who was on the field of battle, and proposed to him the pursuit of the enemy. I did it in the way of a continuance or a renewal of the discussion I had had with him in the *Brazen* on the preceding evening, and I told him that that was his time to advance ; that he ought to move the right wing to Torres Vedras, and pursue the beaten enemy with the left. I also stated to him that we had twelve days’ provisions in camp, and plenty of ammunition for another battle. Sir Harry Burrard was of opinion that our advantages ought not to be followed up, much for the same reasons as he had stated the night before, and he desired that I would halt the troops on the ground which they then occupied : at this time the 71st and 82d were in a valley, the 40th and 36th immediately in their rear on the side of the valley, and the other troops formed in succession for their support. Nearly about the same time the last attack was made by a body of the enemy’s infantry upon the 71st and 82d, and was repulsed, as is stated in my report to Sir Harry Burrard ; and it was after that, as well as I can recollect, that General Ferguson sent his aide de camp, Captain Mellish, to inform me that great advantages might be derived from the continuance of our advance ; and I took Captain Mellish to Sir Harry Burrard to endeavor again to prevail upon him to allow us to continue in the pursuit of our advantages.

‘ Q. Then it was not exactly the pursuit of fugitives, but a movement after a repulsed enemy, which you recommended to Sir Harry Burrard ?

‘ A. Certainly ; the second proposition did not go to the

pursuit of the French army in the shape of fugitives, although they were still in great confusion.

‘ Q. At the close of the action on our left, was any considerable part of the enemy that had engaged our right then in sight?

‘ A. No.

‘ Q. [By desire of Sir Harry Burrard to Sir Arthur Wellesley.] If our army had preserved their order in pursuing, must not the French have gained ground of them in retiring in very loose order; and if our infantry broke in their pursuit, would not the enemy have had a good opportunity of acting with their cavalry?

‘ A. In order to answer that question, I must state to the Court what I conceive would have been the operations of the two armies if the plan proposed had been adopted. By the march of the right to Torres Vedras, the enemy would have been cut off from Lisbon by the nearest road to that place; if they had retired upon Torres Vedras in the state of confusion supposed by the question, they would have been between two bodies of our troops. If they had chosen to go round by the other road to Lisbon, by Villa Franca and Alemquer, it is perfectly true that infantry not formed would have got faster over the country than infantry which would have been under the necessity of preserving its order; but I conceive that an army in that situation, followed even at a slower rate by a victorious enemy, is absolutely incapable of forming or of appearing again in the shape of an army. There is no doubt but that our infantry must have kept its order and the connection between one corps and another in this proposed pursuit; but by its order I do not mean at all times a formation in line.

‘ Q. Do you know what number of guns the enemy retreated with?

‘ A. According to their order of battle, they had twenty one guns in the action: we took thirteen and a great number of ammunition waggons; and if the statement of the order of battle is correct, which I believe it is, they had eight left.

‘ Q. How do you know that the reserve infantry of the enemy were engaged?

‘ A. I know it from several circumstances ; first, I saw them engaged ; secondly, several prisoners belonging to the reserve were taken, and are now in England ; thirdly, General Kellermann, who commanded the reserve, told me they were engaged, and General Junot, who commanded the army, told me that he attributed the loss of the battle to the impetuosity of the reserve, whom he could not restrain ; and lastly, I heard from many French Officers that every corps in the army, excepting the cavalry, was engaged.

‘ Q. Having said you saw the reserve engaged, how did you know that it was the reserve engaged at the time ?

‘ A. I knew it from the period at which they were introduced into the action ; I knew it also from the circumstances of the line of march by which they approached to the attack of our troops ; and by comparing what I saw with the accounts given to me by the French Officers, of the line of attack adopted by that corps of the French army.

‘ Q. Might not there have been a second line of infantry, as well as a reserve, in an attack of that sort.

‘ A. Such was the nature of the country, that any number of troops might have been concealed in it, and might have been destined to co-operate in the attack, and it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for us to see them ; but I had seen nearly the whole, if not the whole, of the French troops on their march in columns in the morning, and, judging from the numbers I saw, and comparing those numbers with those which I conceived to be the numbers of their disposable troops for action in the field, I did not conceive that they had any second line besides the reserve, although it might have been possible to conceal such a body of troops in the hills. I must also mention that I saw the tails of their columns.

‘ Q. What was the distance of the right of General Hill’s brigade from the left of General Ferguson’s at the close of the action ?

‘ A. I should think nearly three miles. I must however observe that, from the nature of this action, the right and left wings of both armies were disconnected ; that there was a valley which ran from the point near where the action finished to Vimeiro, which separated the left wing of the

British army from the right wing, and also disconnected the two wings of the French army. At the same time, such was the nature of the ground, and it was so completely occupied by the troops which were on it, which troops were so completely supported by those in their rear, that we could feel no inconvenience from this circumstance.'

MAJOR GENERAL SPENCER was further questioned, by desire of Sir Arthur Wellesley,—

'Q. Whether the line of infantry, which you saw, was seen by you after the attack had been repulsed by our left, or do you mean after the attack had been repulsed by General Fane and General Anstruther's brigades ?

'A. After the attack of the whole.

'Q. Was that line of French infantry formed near the road to Torres Vedras, or is that part of the scene of action which was to the northward, and lay towards Lourinha ?

'A. It was towards the northward, and near the Torres Vedras road.

'Q. Having mentioned that you heard of the arrival of a body of French infantry of 3,000 or 4,000 men on the evening of the 21st—did you hear this report from any authority, excepting the general report in the country ?

'A. I did not hear of it from any authority, but it was the report in the camp.

'Q. Were you present when I recommended to Sir Harry Burrard to continue the pursuit of our advantages on the field of battle on the 21st of August ?

'A. I was not.

'Q. Did you, as second in command to Sir Arthur Wellesley in that action, consider the defeat of the enemy to be so decided as to warrant his pursuit ?

'A. I considered the enemy as beaten in the centre and left, and should have supported Sir Arthur Wellesley in that opinion.'

MAJOR GENERAL FERGUSON was further questioned, by desire of Sir Arthur Wellesley :—

'Q. Were you present when I proposed to Sir Harry

Burrard, on the field of battle, on the 21st of August, to continue the pursuit of our advantages?

‘ A. I was not: I was with my brigade.

‘ Q. Do you recollect, that after you had received an order to halt, you sent Sir Arthur Wellesley a message by Captain Mellish, to inform him that, if allowed to continue to advance, you could gain important advantages?

‘ A. I did send such a message.

‘ Q. Describe to the Court what those advantages were.

‘ A. A column of the enemy completely broken, and consisting, in my opinion, of from 1,500 to 2,000 men, had, in their confusion, gone into a hollow, and were thereby placed in a situation to have been cut off from their main body, by a movement in advance by the corps under my command.

‘ Q. Did you consider that part of the enemy with which the troops under your command were engaged on the 21st of August to be so beaten as to render it expedient to continue the pursuit of our advantages?

‘ A. As they had lost all their artillery, and were retiring in the utmost confusion, it certainly was my opinion that our army should have continued to advance.

‘ Q. Did you see any troops formed at the end of the action, excepting cavalry.

‘ A. None regularly formed; some battalions of their infantry occasionally halted, in my opinion, for the purpose of carrying off their wounded.

‘ Q. (By the Board.) From whom did you receive the order to halt which has been alluded to by Sir Arthur Wellesley?

‘ A. I understood from Sir Harry Burrard.

‘ Q. Under what circumstances did that order find you?

‘ A. With one battalion in front of the village of Pereganza, and another battalion in the rear of it to support the advance. The village of Pereganza was the last hollow where the enemy made a stand, and were driven out of it by the 71st regiment, which is the battalion alluded to in the advance of the village: the enemy were then retiring in the greatest confusion.

‘ Q. (By the Board.) Had you had heavy artillery on travelling carriages, with proper horses, would the nature

of the roads have allowed you to carry them forward with the army by Torres Vedras to Lisbon; or could such guns have been transported by the draught oxen of the country?

‘A. In my opinion, certainly not.’

LORD BURGHERSH, a Captain in the 3d regiment of dragoon guards, was examined by desire of Sir Arthur Wellesley:—

‘Q. Was your Lordship present when I recommended to Sir Harry Burrard, on the field of battle, on the 21st of August, to continue the pursuit of our advantages?

‘A. I was.

‘Q. Was your Lordship also present during the conversation I had with Sir Harry Burrard in the *Brazen*, on the evening of the 20th of August?

‘A. I was.

‘Q. Does your Lordship recollect Sir Arthur Wellesley having on that occasion recommended to Sir Harry Burrard to continue our operations, according to the plan on which they had been conducted by Sir Arthur Wellesley till that moment, and his having pointed out to Sir Harry Burrard, particularly, the inconveniences and disadvantages which would result from his bringing Sir John Moore’s corps from the Mondego to join the army?

‘A. I remember Sir Arthur Wellesley having recommended to Sir Harry Burrard to allow the army to move forwards on the morning of the 21st, as it had been ordered; as a reason for that, that the army was so near the French army as to make it no longer doubtful that one of the two must attack; and that by advancing, the British army would act on the offensive, and, in Sir Arthur Wellesley’s opinion, reach Mafra before he should be forced to a general engagement; and, by reaching that position, he should have turned the French positions, and come more immediately in front of Lisbon, with which ground he was so acquainted as to make him anxious to meet the enemy upon it. As an objection to waiting for General Sir John Moore’s corps, he thought it must be at least ten days before they could be landed and become servicable at Vimeiro.

‘Q. Does your Lordship recollect, that, when I urged Sir Harry Burrard, on the field of battle, on the 21st of

August, to continue the pursuit of our advantages, I began the conversation by a reference to our discussion of the preceding evening?

‘A. I do not perfectly remember the manner in which Sir Arthur Wellesley pressed it to Sir Harry Burrard. I remember his urging him to advance, giving as a reason, that his right was some miles nearer to Torres Vedras than the enemy; that he had four brigades that had not been engaged; and that Torres Vedras was the pass by which the enemy must retire to Lisbon.

‘Q. Does your Lordship recollect that Sir Arthur Wellesley urged Sir Harry Burrard to march the right wing of the army upon Torres Vedras, and to continue the pursuit of the enemy with the troops which had been just then engaged with the left wing?

‘A. I do; saying at the same time that, in his opinion, by that movement no part of the French army could reach Lisbon.’

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY was examined by desire of Sir Harry Burrard:—

‘Q. Did the French cavalry patrolle on the night of the 19th of August, how near the British camp, and where?

‘A. I do not recollect that the French cavalry patrolled very near the British camp on the night of the 19th of August; they certainly did so very early on the morning of the 20th. A division of the British army had been detached at an early hour on that morning, under General Spencer, towards Lourinha, to facilitate the junction of General Anstruther’s brigade, which had landed in a bay to the southward of Peniche. This division was posted upon a height between Lourinha and Vimeiro, and the French cavalry patrolled very close to it.

‘Q. Do you think it possible for 16,000 or 17,000 men to commence a march within nine miles of a French army that has cavalry far out-numbering your own, without its being known to the French in an hour’s time?

‘A. I think, that under certain circumstances of country and of position, it is possible for an army to march, and that the march should not be known to the enemy at the distance of nine miles in less than two, if not three hours.

‘ Q. Was not Torres Vedras nine miles from Vimeiro; and is it not the general practice of all armies to be under arms before daylight; and was it not the practice in the English army?

‘ A. Torres Vedras is about eight or nine miles from Vimeiro; the British army was always under arms an hour before daylight.

‘ Q. Are there no cross roads, or other means by which the French could approach your march in your way to Mafra?

‘ A. Yes.

‘ Q. Is there not a road from Torres Vedras, that, by coming by Ponte do Rol, would bring the enemy within reach of you, near the creek, by Fort Porto Novo?

‘ A. There is a road, I believe, from Torres Vedras to Ponte do Rol.

‘ Q. Are not the creeks formed by mountain torrents, with a bar that is dry in summer?

‘ A. Yes.

‘ Q. Do not those mountain torrents generally form difficult passes, with steep hills or mountains on their sides?

‘ A. Yes.

‘ Q. Is not Torres Vedras much nearer to Mafra than Vimeiro, and how much?

‘ A. I should imagine that Torres Vedras must be about twelve miles from Mafra; Vimeiro cannot be less than from seventeen to nineteen miles.

‘ Q. If the French had fallen back upon Mafra from Torres Vedras, when you quitted Vimciro, could they not have been reinforced by all the men that could possibly be spared for a short time from Cascaes and the other forts; and did you know that there was no good position near Cintra and Colares?

‘ A. I conceive that the enemy could not have been at Mafra before us, if we marched as we always did, before day in the morning. If we could have got to Mafra before them, their line of retreat must have been by Cabeça de Montachique. I always estimated the force which the French had in Lisbon, St. Julian, and Cascaes, and the batteries, to be 3,000 men: they were troops in whom much confidence was not placed for operations in the field,

being principally Hanoverians, Italians, and people from Dalmatia; and as the Admiral was anchored off Cascaes with the fleet, and had with him the Royal Veteran Battalion for the purpose of alarming the enemy upon those points, and it was settled with him that, as we should advance, he should make a disembarkation with the Veteran Battalion and the marines of the fleet, in some of the bays in the neighbourhood of the Rock of Lisbon, I conceived that the French would not have ventured to weaken the garrisons of the forts on the Tagus and on the sea coast.

‘ Q. Did you mean to attack Cascaes or St. Julian, and how did you propose to procure heavy cannon, if necessary ?

‘ A. I did mean to attack both Cascaes and St. Julian ; and I always considered that those operations would have followed the battle which it was evident we should have in the field with the enemy. It had been settled in England, that I should have the use of the heavy cannon I wanted from the ships of the fleet, and ammunition for 24 pounders, and mortars with ammunition were sent from England in a store ship, and joined the fleet before we were in a situation to undertake any siege. I conceive that when the enemy should have been defeated in the field, and I should have been in possession of the right bank of the Tagus, and of the sea coast, as far as the Rock of Lisbon, I should have been able to land the artillery I should have required for the siege of those places, if not in Cascaes Bay, where the horses of the 18th dragoons landed in the beginning of September, or in Paço d’Arcos, in some of the bays between Cascaes and Cape Roca.

‘ Q. Are you sure you could have landed heavy cannon from the ships, and in any weather, and had you proper carts, or other conveyance, for moving the cannon to the points where they might be wanted ?

‘ A. I cannot be certain that I could have landed heavy cannon from the ships, because this must have depended upon the state of the weather, which is very precarious ; but I thought it very probable that the weather would have allowed me to land heavy cannon in one of those bays ; and it is now certain that it would, as the horses of the 18th dragoons were landed in Cascaes Bay.

‘ Q. How many days did you think it would have taken

you to get possession of Cascaes or St. Julian, or would you have attacked them both together; and how long would it have taken you to take both by siege?

‘A. I never made my mind up to that point: they are neither of them very strong, although it would have been necessary to break ground before both; and I do not conceive that the army would have been sufficiently strong to undertake both sieges at the same time.

‘Q. Is not Lisbon nearer Santarem than Santarem is to Lavaos, on the Mondego?

‘A. Santarem is about fifty six miles from Lisbon, and it is about the same distance from Lavaos.

‘Q. Could not the French have seized all the mules of Lisbon, and with them the horses and mules of the royal stables, and would it not have assisted them very much in going to Santarem?

‘A. Certainly; they had great resources of every description, which could have been of use to them in any expedition of that description.

‘Q. Could not their cavalry have marched to Santarem in a short time, had they been pressed, and their infantry crossed over to Aldea Galega; and is not that the high road to Elvas?

‘A. Their cavalry could have moved with great celerity to any point; and there were boats in sufficient numbers in the Tagus, and at their command, to pass the French army to Aldea Galega at once.

‘Q. Could you not from Caldas or Obidos (after the action of the 17th) have reached Santarem before the force under Sir John Moore could equip and march from the Mondego for that place; and had not you as good means of equipment as that army could find after you left the Mondego; and could you not have received biscuit from S. Martinho or Nazareth, from the victuallers, had you so wished?

‘A. After the action of the 17th I was nearer Santarem than Sir John Moore’s corps was when it was in the Mondego, and could certainly have arrived there before Sir John Moore could have arrived in a state of equipment from the Mondego. I conceive that there were two distinct lines of operations in Portugal, and two modes of supporting those operations; one by the sea coast, and depending upon the

communication with the coast for supplies of all kinds ; the other by Santarem, and depending for its support upon its communication with the Mondego. There was shelter in that river for the small victuallers and transports, which then in fact would have become a *depôt*, and the country on the banks of the Mondego, which was settled and organised under the government of Oporto, would have afforded means, even after the army under my command was equipped, of keeping up the communication between the Mondego and Leyria, which place would have furnished the means of communicating with the army at Santarem. As there was no shelter for the transports at S. Martinho and Nazareth, and those places had not been settled under the government of Oporto, and Nazareth had been burnt by the French, the *depôt* could not have been formed at those places ; and if it had been possible to have formed it, there would have been no means of communicating ; therefore, I conceive that after the action of the 17th of August, it was not expedient that I should change my line of operations in a view to those reasons only, and that it was best that the corps which should take the line of Santarem should communicate with the Mondego.

‘ Q. Do you not think that the victuallers that would have provisioned Sir John Moore’s corps at Santarem would also have victualled you had you been there ?

‘ A. If I had been at Santarem, and all the previous arrangements had been made for supporting the corps under my command at that place, as detailed in my letters of the 8th, 10th, and 12th of August, to Sir Harry Burrard, I conceive that the corps under my command might have been victualled.

‘ Q. Is it not double the distance from Santarem to Lvaos, on the Mondego, as it is from Caldas to Santarem ; and do you suppose it was impossible to land General Anstruther’s brigade anywhere, so as to join you at Caldas ?

‘ A. I should think it about forty miles, if not more, from Caldas to Santarem. I was not informed of the arrival of General Anstruther’s brigade till the morning of the 18th of August ; they were then off the Berlings, to the southward of Caldas, and I could not have landed them nearer to Caldas than where they did land, without sending them back to the

northward against the wind, and either halting in my position, or falling back to Caldas again, after the action of the 17th of August, to facilitate a junction.

‘ Q. How far was it from where General Anstruther landed to Obidos ?

‘ A. From fifteen to twenty miles.

‘ Q. How far is it from Santarem to Monte Mor ó Novo, on the high road from Aldea Galega to Elvas and Fort La Lippe ?

‘ A. Monte Mor ó Novo is about sixty miles.

‘ Q. Did not the event prove that it was possible for the cavalry of Sir John Moore’s army, with his artillery horses and his light regiments, to land at Maccira and follow the army ?

‘ A. Yes.

‘ Q. Might not the rest of the force have landed at Maccira, formed a depôt of provisions, and taken a position there, at the same time that the reinforcements most wanted would have joined your division ?

‘ A. I conceive that the formation of a depôt of provisions and stores at any point on the coast was very precarious, and, in the end of August and beginning of September, became daily more so. It might have been effected in a long course of fair weather, but it was an operation which could not be calculated upon.

‘ Q. Had the artillery horses landed, could not those with your army have been given over to the Commissariat, or a proportion of the worst from each corps ?

‘ A. They might have been disposed of in that or any other manner; but it would have been useless to give them to the Commissariat, as there were no carts with the Commissariat, or in the country, which could be drawn by horses.

‘ Q. If the horses of the artillery had been landed, could not the waggons have also been landed, and have been made useful for the Commissariat ?

‘ A. I conceive that there were not more waggons with the artillery than were required to carry the stores of the artillery; but those waggons might be employed to carry provisions, if the Commander in Chief of the army should think proper.

‘ Q. Was there no ground at or near Mafra or Lisbon fit for cavalry to act on ?

‘ A. In my opinion cavalry can be used with advantage in nearly all parts of Portugal, not in large bodies anywhere, but everywhere in small ; and there was ground between Mafra and Lisbon on which cavalry could have acted with advantage.

‘ Q. Did you not understand that the 18th light dragoons embarked in the river Thames on the 25th and 26th July, and had you not just cause to expect them off Maceira by the 21st or 22d August, or was it intended that they should proceed further, without running down the coast for intelligence ?

‘ A. I do not recollect that I ever heard at what time the 18th light dragoons embarked ; as well as I can recollect, I imagined that they were to come from England with Sir John Moore’s corps.’

Sir ARTHUR WELLESLEY was also asked by the Board :—

‘ Q. The possibility of the French army’s crossing the Tagus, had the terms proposed by General Junot been rejected, and thereby engaging the British army in a tedious and difficult campaign has been stated by you : could not General Junot have so transported his forces across the Tagus immediately after the 22d of August ?

‘ A. I do think he might.

‘ Q. How is this conclusion to be resisted ; that General Junot thought the conditions of the Convention more advantageous to the French interest than the protracting the campaign in the manner which is represented to have been in his power ?

‘ A. When I considered the expediency of allowing the French to evacuate Portugal by sea, I took into consideration the British interests and British objects only, and the objects of their allies, as connected with those of Great Britain. I considered that the French army, from the relative situation of the two armies in Portugal, and from its having the military possession of the country, had a fair military right to withdraw by sea with their arms and baggage ; and I do not think it necessary for me to account for the motives of General Junot in preferring the evacu-

ation by sea to another line of operation; which, without wishing to say anything personally disrespectful of him, might have been bad or unworthy motives, as well as views for the interests of his country.'

LIEUT. COLONEL TORRENS was again examined by Sir Arthur Wellesley:—

'Q. Were you present in the *Brazen* when I had a conversation with Sir Harry Burrard, on the evening of the 20th of August last?

'A. I was.

'Q. State what you recollect.

'A. I was present in the *Brazen* when Sir Arthur Wellesley made his report to Sir Harry Burrard, upon the arrival of that Officer in Maceira roads. Sir Arthur Wellesley represented to him the state of the army under his command, and the situation of that of the enemy, and the principle on which he had conducted the operations from the landing at Mondego; and further stated, that he had issued orders for the march of the army the next morning. Sir Harry Burrard replied that he did not consider it advisable to advance from that position till the army should be reinforced by the division under the command of Sir John Moore. Sir Arthur Wellesley observed, that he thought it of the utmost importance to push forward by the way of Mafra, with a view of turning the enemy's left flank, and to endeavor to bring the French army to the issue of a battle in the field, as near to Lisbon as possible, that we might avail ourselves of a short distance from the Tagus, by following up the victory, so as to prevent the French crossing that river. And he further stated, that he was desirous of this contest taking place near to Lisbon, having an actual survey of all the country in the vicinity of that town. Sir Arthur Wellesley further added, that if Sir John Moore's corps should be brought down to Maceira, Sir Harry Burrard must relinquish all the advantage which might have been expected from his marching that body upon Santarem, with the view of cutting off the retreat of the French army by the northward. Sir Harry Burrard again repeated, that he thought it advisable to bring down Sir John Moore's corps, to render certain those operations which appeared to

him to be doubtful. Sir Arthur then asked Sir Harry Burrard whether he had received his letters of the 8th and 10th of August, which recommended the march of this reinforcement upon Santarem. Sir Harry replied that he had received those letters; but he did not in my presence make any comment or observation upon that proposed operation. Sir Harry Burrard then wrote a letter to Sir John Moore, which I did not see; but I understood it to be an order for him to come down the coast with his division. I beg leave to state, that to the best of my recollection this is the substance of the conversation that passed, though I cannot pledge myself to the exact words.

‘ Q. Do you recollect my stating to Sir Harry Burrard the probability that if we did not move to attack the French, they would attack us ?

‘ A. I do remember Sir Arthur Wellesley making that observation to Sir Harry Burrard, and adding at the same time, that a great expenditure of provisions would be occasioned by waiting on that ground for Sir John Moore, who could not be expected for some days.

‘ Q. Do you recollect my stating to Sir Harry Burrard the probable increased difficulties of supplying the army with provisions when its numbers should be increased, without any proportional increase of means ?

‘ A. I do perfectly recollect your making that observation.

‘ Q. Do you recollect my stating to Sir Harry Burrard the probability that, if the enemy did not attack us, they would fortify their positions between our army and Lisbon, during the delay of our march; and my stating to him the difficulty of turning fortified positions with cannon in that country, on account of the narrowness of the roads ?

‘ A. I do, perfectly; adding at the same time that the badness of the roads, as well as the narrowness of them, would render the turning of the enemy’s flank in any position he might take up extremely difficult.

‘ Q. Do you recollect my sending you with orders to General Fane’s and General Anstruther’s brigades before or immediately at the commencement of the battle of the 21st of August ?

‘ A. I do recollect Sir Arthur Wellesley sending me with orders, both to General Fane and General Anstruther, at the commencement of the battle of the 21st of August.

‘ Q. What were they?

‘ A. Sir Arthur Wellesley desired me to ride as fast as I could to General Anstruther and to General Fane, and to convey to them his orders that they should not move from the position which they occupied in front of the village of Vimeiro, without further directions from Sir Arthur. On my arrival at that position, I found that General Fane had advanced a little way in front, and was engaged with some French light troops. I followed him, and delivered those orders, and he consequently retired: this was about half-past nine in the morning; but I cannot speak with any degree of accuracy.

‘ Q. Did I state to you the reason for giving those orders, and what was it?

‘ A. Yes, partly: I understood from Sir Arthur Wellesley that those orders originated from the nature of the ground in front of that position, which would render it ineligible to remove from it, particularly as he observed a large French column forming in the wood in front, and evidently preparing to make a vigorous attack upon the centre.

‘ Q. Were you present when I recommended to Sir Harry Burrard, on the field of battle, on the 21st of August, to continue the pursuit of our advantages?

‘ A. I was.

‘ Q. State what passed?

‘ A. Immediately after we had defeated the right column of the French army, which had made its attack upon our left, and were then retreating in a precipitate manner, Sir Arthur Wellesley rode to Sir Harry Burrard, and said, “Sir Harry, now is your time to advance; the enemy are completely beaten, and we shall be in Lisbon in three days. We have a large body of troops, which have not been in action; let us move them from the right on the road to Torres Vedras, and I will follow them with the left.” Sir Harry Burrard replied, that he thought a great deal had been done, very much to the credit of the troops; but that

he did not think it advisable to move off the ground in pursuit of the enemy. Sir Arthur Wellesley remarked at the time that the troops were perfectly ready to advance, having provisions ready cooked in their havresacks, according to the orders of the day before.

‘Q. Do you recollect my mentioning that the troops had plenty of ammunition; that there was twelve days’ bread in camp for the original number of the army, and a sufficiency of every kind of store in the reserve for the artillery?’

‘A. I recollect Sir Arthur Wellesley mentioning that there was plenty of ammunition; that the mules with the reserve musket ammunition were in the rear of the brigades; that we had abundance of ordnance stores and plenty of provisions; but I cannot call to my recollection whether he specified at that time the number of days’ provisions we had in camp.

‘Q. Did I order the army on the 20th to march on the morning of the 21st?’

‘A. You did.

‘Q. Did I countermand those orders when I returned from the *Brazen* on the evening of the 20th?’

‘A. Sir Arthur Wellesley countermanded those orders immediately on his arrival in camp on the evening of the 20th, in consequence of directions he had received from Sir Harry Burrard to that effect.

‘Q. (By desire of Sir Harry Burrard.) How long a time elapsed from the French being defeated in the centre till the end of the action?’

‘A. The right column of the French arrived at the point of attack on our left in about ten minutes or a quarter of an hour after his left column was defeated by our centre: I cannot speak with any accuracy as to the length of the action on the left—it might probably be an hour, more or less.

‘Q. When Sir Arthur Wellesley asked me whether I had received his dispatches of the 8th, 10th, and 11th of August, did I tell him that I had sent them to Sir John Moore by Colonel Donkin from S. Martinho?’

‘A. I do not recollect that Sir Harry Burrard made that communication in my presence.’

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY then addressed the Board as follows:—

‘ GENERAL SIR DAVID DUNDAS,

‘ MY LORDS AND GENTLEMEN,

‘ Two or three points have been adverted to in the narrative of Sir Harry Burrard, and some circumstances have been stated in evidence, upon which I wish to trouble the Court with some observations.

‘ The first and principal of these is the reason stated by Lieut. General Sir Harry Burrard for not deeming it expedient to place Lieut. General Sir John Moore’s corps at Santarem, as proposed by me in my letters of the 8th, 10th, and 12th of August, which are before the Court, because, as Lieut. General Sir Harry Burrard states, it would not, in his opinion, have been sufficiently strong to oppose the enemy, if he had retreated by that road.

‘ I beg to refer the Court to my dispatches of that period, which I consider the fairest documents to which I can refer, as when they were written I had certainly no notion that the subjects to which they related would ever have become the topic of discussion here. The Court will see, that in these dispatches I always considered the possession of Lisbon and of the Tagus to be the great object of the campaign both to us and the French; that for this object a battle would be fought in the field, in which I thought I had reason to expect success; and that the enemy would, after this battle, endeavor to retire across the Tagus to Elvas, or along the right bank of the Tagus by Santarem towards Almeida.

‘ If the Court will refer to the paper drawn by the French engineer, laid before them by Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple, they will see that these are the lines of retreat recommended by the Officers of the engineers to the French Commander in Chief. Now the occupation of the position at Santarem by Sir John Moore’s corps was calculated to cut off these lines of retreat; in the first supposed case, by the facility and celerity with which the Tagus would have been crossed; in the second, as it was upon the road which the enemy must have taken. But as I set out with the certainty, that the French would not—nay, could not—abandon Lisbon and the Tagus, without fighting a battle for those

possessions, I may conclude that, after that battle, they would have been so much weakened as that Sir John Moore's corps would have been a match for them; and, at all events, it is not to be supposed that, if this battle had been fought, they would not have been followed by a part, if not the whole of the army, which, in this supposition, would have defeated them.

‘ Indeed the Court will have observed, by my correspondence with Sir Harry Burrard, that I considered this position at Santarem to be so little dangerous, and, at the same time, so advantageous, that if the brigades of Brig. Generals Acland and Anstruther had been equipped to act independently of any other body of troops, I should have ordered those brigades to occupy it.

‘ The next point on which I wish to observe is the mode in which I proposed and intended that this corps should be supplied at Santarem. The Court will see this mode, and all the difficulties which attended it, discussed in my letters to Sir Harry Burrard; and I have no doubt whatever that he would have been able to procure carts in the country, on the Mondego, to enable him to form at Leyria the proposed dépôt, and at that place the means of moving what should be required to Santarem.

‘ I also wish to say a few words upon the strength of the corps under my command, in comparison with that of the enemy.

‘ I marched from Lavaos on the 10th of August with 13,000 men, and I was joined by and expected the co-operation of 6,000 Portuguese troops: I was disappointed in this expectation on the 13th of August, when I was engaged in an operation against a detachment of the enemy, which promised the utmost success, from which I could not with propriety withdraw, and which ended in the battle of the 17th of August.

‘ On the 18th I heard of the arrival of General Anstruther's brigade, and on the 20th, in the evening, when Lieut. General Sir Harry Burrard decided that he would alter the principle on which we had before carried on our operations, General Acland was arrived in Maccira roads with his brigade, and he was landed on that night. The force then consisted of between 16,000 and 17,000 men, British troops, and 1650 Portuguese troops, actually in camp. We had

been successful in the action of the 17th, and the army was in the highest order and the highest spirits; well equipped, supplied with twelve days' provisions for the original number, and everything it required for its future operations.

' In discussing and considering the propriety of the decision of Lieut. General Sir Harry Burrard, or of my previous operations, it would not be fair to estimate the enemy's force at larger numbers than 20,000 men, of which they were reported to consist, by General Spencer, in his report to Government from the mouth of the Tagus. From this number the garrisons of Elvas, Almeida, and Peniche were to be deducted, which I always reckoned at 2,000 men; then there were the forts of St. Julian, Cascaes, the citadel of Lisbon, Bugio, Belem, and the batteries on the Tagus and the coast, as far as the Rock of Lisbon, which would have required at least 3,000 more. This would have left the enemy with only 15,000 men for operations in the field, while we had above 18,000 men.

' If it is contended that the estimate of the enemy's strength ought to be made according to their embarkation returns, instead of according to General Spencer's return of their force, a deduction ought to be made, from the amount of 24,000, of the real numbers of the garrisons of Almeida, Elvas, and Peniche, and of 3,000 men for the garrisons upon the Tagus and upon the coast; and, if but a small allowance is made for non-combatants, it will still turn out that the force to be met in the field did not exceed 15,000 or 16,000 men.

' From this statement it will appear that the force of 3,000 or 4,000 men, which it was reported had arrived at Torres Vedras after the action, could not have existed; and, in point of fact, it was a report circulated by General Junot, and indeed the fact was published in the newspapers of Lisbon, with other false accounts of the circumstances of the action.

' In respect to other points I shall not observe upon them, as the evidence is before the Court, who will judge of it. I consider it proved and admitted that I recommended on the evening of the 20th of August that the army should not halt, and that the proposed disposition for Sir John Moore's corps should not be altered; that the enemy were com-

pletely defeated in the action of the 21st of August, on all points of attack, and that I proposed to Sir Harry Burrard the pursuit of them.

‘The Court have before them my reasons for advancing on the 10th of August, and for thinking that I was strong enough for the enemy; and for recommending to Lieut General Sir Harry Burrard a perseverance in the plan of operation which I commenced; and, in my evidence of yesterday, my reason for thinking that most beneficial consequences would have resulted if the enemy had been pursued.

‘Upon all these points of difference of opinion between Lieut. General Sir Harry Burrard and me, the Court will form their judgment upon the evidence.

‘I think it necessary, however, to detain the Court for a short time upon another part of the subject which has been under their consideration.

‘Although I am decidedly of opinion that the most decisive consequences would have resulted from the march as proposed, and the pursuit of the enemy on the 21st of August after the battle, yet it does not follow that the measure of allowing the French to evacuate Portugal was not right on the evening of the 22d.

‘On the 21st of August the enemy were defeated and in confusion; and I have explained the grounds which I have for thinking that the most advantageous consequences would have resulted from a pursuit. On the 22d, in the evening, when the question of the evacuation was considered and decided, the enemy was no longer in confusion, and they had resumed the position of Cabeça de Montachique, between us and Lisbon.

‘The relative situation of the two armies was then to be taken into consideration, as well as in the other case; but that of the French army had been materially improved by our omission to pursue our advantages; and we were then to look to our relative means of annoying each other, and our own objects. I have already detailed to the Court, in a former statement, the relative situation and means of the two armies at that period of time; and I conceive that the battle of the 21st of August could be taken into consideration in the discussion of the question, whether the French should be allowed to evacuate Portugal or not, only in this

way, viz., that it was a trial of strength between the two contending armies, and it proved the superiority of that of His Majesty. It was also clear to me that the French would not risk another action; that their object was to secure a retreat across the Tagus; and that they would use their positions in front of Lisbon to facilitate and secure that object.

‘As I have already explained to the Court, we had no means on the 22d of preventing them from effecting that object, from which I did, and do still think, it was important to us to preclude them, excepting by a Convention for the evacuation of Portugal.’

Sir ARTHUR WELLESLEY was asked by Sir Harry Burrard :

‘Q. Had not the British army the same means of advancing by Mafra on the morning of the 23d, when Sir Hew Dalrymple ordered it to march, as it had on the 20th, when Sir Arthur Wellesley intended it should march; and does Sir Arthur Wellesley know that the French would not have risked another battle, nor attempted his flank upon his march, or been at Mafra before him?’

‘A. I do think the army might have marched to Mafra with as much facility on the 23d as I thought it might on the 21st. There was this difference, however, that on the 23d I believe Mafra was occupied by a French corps, and there was none there on the 21st. I must also state to the Board, that the object of the march to Mafra would on the 23d have been defeated, because, as I have just informed them, there was no chance of bringing the French to another action.—They would have acted, according to my opinion, in Portugal as they did in Egypt; they tried their strength once in the field, and, having failed, they would in Portugal have continued to retreat till they could have got into safety. I do not believe that any corps could have fallen on the flank of the march on the 23d, because no Frenchman remained in Torres Vedras, or nearer than Cabeça de Montachique, on the evening of the 22d.

‘Q. Did that French corps that was at Mafra retreat from Torres Vedras, and was that the nearest way to Lisbon, or to go up the country?’

‘A. That French corps must have been in the action, and

must have retreated through Torres Vedras. The shortest road from Torres Vedras to Lisbon, and of course up the country, is not through Mafra, but it is in my opinion entirely consistent with an intention to cross the Tagus, and retreat up the country, to occupy all the forts which were likely to impede or delay the advance of the British troops.

‘ Q. (By the Board to Sir Arthur Wellesley.)—Would your occupation of Torres Vedras on the evening of the 21st have prevented the French from gaining the Cabeça de Montachique ?

‘ A. Our occupation of Torres Vedras on the evening of the 21st would have placed us on the shortest road from the position of the two armies to Cabeça de Montachique, as we should have been in a situation, by a subsequent movement, to occupy, not only Cabeça de Montachique, but the other positions in front of Lisbon, before the French could have reached them.

‘ Q. Would not the French, in the course of the retreat from the field of battle, have passed through Torres Vedras previous to the time that the British army could arrive there ?

‘ A. The French, as I explained in my evidence yesterday, retreated from all points of attack to the northward, apparently with an intention of falling in with the road from Torres Vedras to Lourinha, by which they had advanced to the attack. I conceive that, after the action was over, the right of our army in particular was nearer to Torres Vedras than the enemy, and therefore I should think that the right of our army would have been at Torres Vedras before any part of the enemy could have reached that town in their retreat.

‘ Q. General Spencer yesterday described a line of the enemy at the distance of three miles : was that corps further from Torres Vedras than the right of the British army ?

‘ A. I cannot say that I recollect to have seen that corps. According to General Spencer’s description, he saw it formed about an hour after the enemy had been defeated upon our left, and, as he said, to the northward and upon the road to Torres Vedras. If that is an accurate description of the

position of that corps, it must have been much about the same distance from Torres Vedras as our right was.

‘ Q. Had the army advanced at the time you recommended it, would not our right have been nearer to Torres Vedras by pushing on than that corps which was said to have been formed an hour after the action had taken place ?

‘ A. I should conceive that that corps must have been on the ground on which General Spencer states he saw it, or at no great distance from it, about the time that I proposed to Sir Harry Burrard to pursue the enemy, although probably not formed

‘ Q. Do you think that the French corps which attacked your right retired upon Torres Vedras, or took another route ?

‘ A. The right of the army, properly so called, was not attacked. The attack was made upon the right of the centre, and all the French troops which attacked General Fane’s and General Anstruther’s brigades retired to the northward, as I have before explained, with the exception possibly of some small detachments, of which, however, I saw none.’

Sir ARTHUR WELLESLEY addressed the Board as follows :

‘ GENERAL SIR DAVID DUNDAS,

‘ MY LORDS AND GENTLEMEN,

‘ At a former meeting of the Court, Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple expressed a wish that the Court should have before it a copy of the letter which I was supposed to have addressed to the Bishop of Oporto on the 24th of August ; and I then told the Court that I would lay before them all the letters I had written to the Bishop of Oporto, of which I had copies among my papers.

‘ I find that I have the copies of only two letters, although I have written many, which I now lay before the Court [*these letters were not deemed necessary, and were therefore withdrawn*] ; and I should have taken an earlier opportunity of laying those letters before the Court, only that one of them relates to transactions in which Sir Harry Burrard was a party ; and I was unwilling to make it public during his absence.

‘ In respect to the letter supposed to have been written by me on the 24th of August, I repeat that I have no recollection of having written it; and I have no copy of it; and I think it probable, from an inaccuracy of the date, from the address, and some of the expressions, that I did not write it; but I adopt as my own all the sentiments which it contains.

‘ It congratulates the Bishop upon the prospect of the evacuation of Portugal by the French, which the Court will have observed I always considered a subject of congratulation; and it states that the agreement for the suspension of hostilities contains nothing else that is remarkable, excepting a stipulation that the port of Lisbon should be considered a neutral port in respect to the Russians.

‘ It is well known and admitted, that there was another part of that agreement to which I entertained objections; but in respect to the Portuguese, it did contain nothing remarkable, excepting this stipulation; and this remark, if I wrote the letter, rather tends to confirm that which I have always stated were my sentiments in respect to this stipulation.

‘ This mode of laying a private letter before a Court is not regular, any more than the mode of calling for a letter of this description; but if the Court should be desirous of seeing this, or any other letters of mine to the Bishop of Oporto in an official shape, they may call for them at the office of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, through which channel, I doubt not, they can be procured.’

Sir HARRY BURRARD now addressed the Board as follows :

‘ I trust the Board of Inquiry will not think it improper to grant me the liberty to offer a few observations upon what happened on the 21st of August, when it was my opinion (unswayed, I trust, by any unworthy motives) that it was not expedient to follow the enemy towards Torres Vedras.

‘ In the first place, I did not believe that the enemy’s whole force was engaged in that action; neither do I think that it is proved it was known to have been so in fact, when it was proposed to me to advance from the right.

‘ I very freely acknowledge that I did not understand that a corps of such considerable numbers as is stated was cut off from the main body of the enemy on the left of our position ; but it was impressed upon my mind that they were towards Major General Ferguson’s front, inclining towards their own force ; and I considered it improper to attack them in that situation.

‘ This appeared so much the more necessary to me, as I had determined, from the situation our right appeared to me to be in, not to advance to Torres Vedras, and I still think that I determined properly.

‘ The extensive line the British army occupied was not in favor of our advancing. The distance from right to left was, I still think, four miles.

‘ The centre of the enemy had been necessarily disengaged an hour and a half ; time enough for them to have formed a line near three miles distant in our front, with eight pieces of cannon, and a large body of cavalry, of which we had none.

‘ At the time Sir Arthur Wellesley came up to me, and publicly proposed to me to advance, I felt the situation it placed me in, and that it was not likely my determination should please a British army, who had so much signalized itself ; that will, I believe, be sufficient proof that I acted to the best of my judgment, and those who know me will be convinced, very much against my feelings.

‘ My sentiments on the uncommon situation in which I then stood were well known to those of my staff about me. The want, at this moment, of every one of those gentlemen who were with me on the 21st of August, I sincerely feel and regret, and am convinced the Board will also feel for the person who stands in so unusual a predicament ; at the same time, if there has been any error in judgment, it is all my own ; I decided for myself, from what I saw and heard, and take most decidedly the whole responsibility upon myself.

‘ But I trust that the Board, upon a review of the whole case, will have sufficient reason to be convinced that it would have been unwise to have risked much, when so superior a force was at hand to reinforce the British army, which must

have rendered vain the future efforts of the enemy, and have decided the contest with less loss to the public service than by what I conceive a precarious operation.'

Sir ARTHUR WELLESLEY again addressed the Board, viz.—

'I trust that the Court will permit me to address a few words to them upon this occasion.

'Although I did differ, and do still differ, in opinion with Lieut. General Sir Harry Burrard, respecting the measures adopted immediately after the battle of the 21st of August, I hope it will not be deemed presumptuous in me as an inferior Officer to declare to the Court and to the public the opinion which I have always entertained, that Sir Harry Burrard decided upon that occasion upon fair military grounds, in the manner which appeared to him to be most conducive to the interests of the country; and that he had no motive for his decision which could be supposed personal to me, or which as an Officer he could not avow.'

'Sir HARRY BURRARD was further examined by Sir Hew Dalrymple:—

'Q. Was not Sir Harry Burrard present at the conference with General Kellermann at Vimeiro, on the subject of the Armistice on the 22d of August?

'A. I was called in by Sir Hew Dalrymple.

'Q. Had I not, in your opinion, reason to presume, from what passed on that occasion, that both Sir Arthur Wellesley and yourself cordially approved the Convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French troops, as a general measure, and that you both seemed to acquiesce in the several arrangements ultimately settled for the Armistice?

'A. I did, and I thought Sir Arthur Wellesley did so generally: there were a great many objections stated at times, which upon conversation were given up.

'Q. Did I not send for you and Sir Arthur Wellesley on the morning of the 25th of August, after the arrival of Lieut. Colonel Murray from on board the British Admiral's ship, to consider upon the measures next to be pursued, and again on the morning of the 27th, for a similar purpose?

'A. I was sent for, I believe, on both those occasions; but I made no memoranda of the dates.

‘ Q. Was not a treaty signed by Lieut. Colonel Murray, but which I refused to ratify, read article by article, in presence of yourself, Sir John Moore, Lieut. Generals Hope, Mackenzie Fraser, and Sir Arthur Wellesley; and were not the observations and proposed alterations on each article written down by Sir Arthur Wellesley?

‘ A. The whole of that is true, to the best of my knowledge and recollection.

‘ Q. Was not the definitive Convention ratified in your quarters at Torres Vedras, in presence of yourself, Sir John Moore, Lieut. General Hope, and Lieut. General Mackenzie Fraser; and have I not just grounds to believe that none of those Lieutenant Generals disapproved of the measures of ratifying that treaty?

‘ A. They were present at the time, called in by Sir Hew Dalrymple, and I saw him sign it; and from the characters of such men, I do not suppose that they would have allowed him to do so, without stating their objections, if they had any. Of their sentiments I know no further.

‘ Q. (By desire of Sir Arthur Wellesley.) Do you recollect that, when the Armistice was negotiated, General Kellermann read from a paper a statement of the wishes of the French Commander in Chief?

‘ A. I do recollect that after some conversation he took a paper out and read it.

‘ Q. Do you recollect my refusing to take that paper, and telling the Commander of the Forces, when we went into the inner room, that I had done so, because I thought that the agreement then to be negotiated ought to be confined to a suspension of hostilities.

‘ A. I think I recollect Sir Arthur’s refusing a paper, but I do not recollect the precise conversation that passed on that occasion?

‘ Q. Do you recollect the use of these words by the Commander of the Forces, “that as there was no difference of opinion upon the substance of the negotiation, it was not worth while to push the French to the wall upon the form?”

‘ A. I think those sentiments were expressed; but I cannot at this time recollect who it was that said them.

‘ Q. Do you recollect that the demand of the French in favor of the Russians would, in the first instance, have gone

to allow the Russians to return to the Baltic with their fleet ?

‘ A. I must say that I was very often in and out of the room; that I had dispatches to send to England; and I cannot exactly recollect that circumstance.

‘ Q. Do you recollect my having said to the Commander of the Forces, that you and I having been employed last year to bring one fleet out of the Baltic, could not but advise him not to allow another to return there, and that the Commander of the Forces, in consequence, determined that he would not allow the article to stand as it was at first proposed ?

‘ A. I recollect Sir Arthur Wellesley having made use of those expressions.’

REPORT.

‘ MAY IT PLEASE YOUR MAJESTY,

‘ We, the underwritten General Officers of the army, in obedience to your Majesty’s warrant, which bears date the 1st day of November, 1808, commanding us strictly to examine and inquire into the conditions of a suspension of arms, concluded on the 22d August, 1808, between your Majesty’s army in Portugal and the French force in that country; and also into a definitive Convention, concluded with the French General commanding on the 31st August following, &c., &c.; most humbly report to your Majesty, that it appears that the operations of the army under Sir Arthur Wellesley, from his landing in Mondego Bay, the 1st of August, until the conclusion of the action at Vimeiro, the 21st of August, were highly honorable and successful, and such as might be expected from a distinguished General at the head of a British army of 13,000 men, augmented on the 20th and 21st to 17,000, deriving only some small aid from a Portuguese corps (1600 men), and against whom an enemy not exceeding 14,000 men in the field was opposed; and this before the arrival of a very considerable reinforcement from England under Lieut. General Sir John Moore, which, however, did arrive, and join the army from the 25th to the 30th of August.

‘ It appears a point on which no evidence adduced can enable the Board to pronounce with confidence, whether or not a pursuit after the battle of the 21st could have been efficacious ; nor can the Board feel competent to determine on the expedience of a forward movement to Torres Vedras, when Sir Harry Burrard has stated weighty considerations against such a measure. Further it is to be observed, that so many collateral circumstances could not be known in the moment of the enemy’s repulse as afterwards became clear to the army, and have been represented to the Board. And considering the extraordinary circumstances under which two new Commanding Generals arrived from the ocean and joined the army, (the one during, and the other immediately after, a battle, and those successively superseding each other, and both the original Commander, within the space of twenty four hours,) it is not surprising that the army was not carried forward until the second day after the action, from the necessity of the Generals being acquainted with the actual state of things and of their army, and proceeding accordingly.

‘ It appears that the Convention of Cintra, in its progress and conclusion, or at least all the principal articles of it, were not objected to by the five distinguished Lieutenant Generals of that army ; and other General Officers who were on that service, whom we have had an opportunity to examine, have also concurred in the great advantages that were immediately gained to the country of Portugal, to the army and navy, and to the general service, by the conclusion of the Convention at that time.

‘ On a consideration of all circumstances, as set forth in this Report, we most humbly submit our opinion that no further military proceeding is necessary on the subject ; because, howsoever some of us may differ in our sentiments respecting the fitness of the Convention in the relative situation of the two armies, it is our unanimous declaration, that unquestionable zeal and firmness appear throughout to have been exhibited by Lieut. Generals Sir Hew Dalrymple, Sir Harry Burrard, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, as well as that the ardor and gallantry of the rest of the Officers and soldiers on every occasion during this expe-

dition have done honor to the troops, and reflected lustre on your Majesty's arms.

'All which is most dutifully submitted.

' DAVID DUNDAS, General.

' MOIRA, General.

' PETER CRAIG, General.

' HEATHFIELD, General.

' PEMBROKE, Lieut. General.

' G. NUGENT, Lieut. General.

' 22d Dec. 1808.'

' OL. NICOLLS, Lieut. General.'

*H.R.H. the Commander in Chief to Lieut. General
Sir Hew Dalrymple.*

' SIR,

' Horse Guards, 20th January, 1809.

' In obedience to His Majesty's commands to me, received through the Secretary of State, I transmit to you the enclosed copy of a paper containing the decision which His Majesty has taken upon the review of the proceedings of the Board of Inquiry, together with the copy of Lord Castlereagh's dispatch, which accompanied it.

' I am, &c.

' FREDERICK,

' Lieut. General

' Commander in Chief.

Sir Hew Dalrymple.'

*Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State, to H.R.H.
the Commander in Chief.*

' SIR,

' Downing Street, 18th January, 1809.

' The proceedings of the Board of General Officers, appointed by His Majesty to inquire into, and to report upon, the Armistice and Convention, lately concluded in Portugal, which were communicated to me by the Judge Advocate General, at the desire of your Royal Highness, for the information of His Majesty's Ministers, having been fully considered, and their opinion thereupon humbly submitted for His Majesty's consideration, I have received the King's commands to transmit to your Royal Highness the decision His Majesty has taken upon the review of these proceedings, a copy of which your Royal Highness will receive enclosed ;

and to desire that your Royal Highness will be pleased to cause the necessary communication to be made to Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple accordingly.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Royal Highness*
the Commander in Chief.

‘ CASTLEREAGH.

Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State, to H.R.H.
the Commander in Chief.

‘ Downing Street, 18th January, 1809.

‘ The King has taken into his consideration the report of the Board of Inquiry, together with the documents and opinions thereunto annexed.

‘ While His Majesty adopts the unanimous opinion of the Board, that no further military proceeding is necessary to be had upon the transactions referred to their investigation, His Majesty does not intend, thereby, to convey any expression of His Majesty’s satisfaction at the terms and conditions of the Armistice or Convention.

‘ When those instruments were first laid before His Majesty, the King, reserving for investigation those parts of the definitive Convention in which His Majesty’s immediate interests were concerned, caused it to be signified to Sir Hew Dalrymple, by His Majesty’s Secretary of State, that His Majesty, nevertheless, felt himself compelled at once to express his disapprobation of those articles in which stipulations were made directly affecting the interests or feelings of the Spanish and Portuguese nations.

‘ At the close of the inquiry, the King (abstaining from any observations upon other parts of the Convention) repeats his disapprobation of those articles, His Majesty deeming it necessary that his sentiments should be clearly understood, as to the impropriety and danger of the unauthorized admission into Military Conventions of articles of such a description, which, especially when incautiously framed, may lead to the most injurious consequences.

‘ His Majesty cannot forbear further to observe, that Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple’s delaying to transmit, for his information, the Armistice concluded on the 22d

August, until the 4th September; when he, at the same time, transmitted the ratified Convention, was calculated to produce great public inconvenience, and that such public inconvenience did, in fact, result therefrom.

*' His Royal Highness
the Commander in Chief.'*

' CASTLEREAGH.'

Sir Arthur Wellesley, on his return from Portugal after the battle of Vimeiro, had resumed the duties of his office as Chief Secretary for Ireland; and the Court of Inquiry held at the Royal College at Chelsea having concluded, he proceeded in the month of December to Dublin.

Parliament having reassembled in January, 1809, he returned to London to attend the House of Commons; and on the 27th of January, when in his place, he received the Thanks of the House for his conduct at the battle of Vimeiro, by the Speaker, in the following terms :—

*' LIEUT. GENERAL SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY,—*After the events of last year, it was impossible that Parliament should reassemble without directing its earliest attention to the services of the British army in Portugal; and amidst the contending opinions which have prevailed upon other questions, the public voice has been loud and general in admiration of your splendid achievements.

' It is your praise to have inspired your troops with unshaken confidence and unbounded ardor; to have commanded, not the obedience alone, but the hearts and affections of your companions in arms; and having planned your operations with the skill and promptitude which have so eminently characterised all your former exertions, you have again led the armies of your country to battle with the same deliberate valor and triumphant success which have long since rendered your name illustrious in the remotest parts of this empire.

' Military glory has ever been dear to this nation, and great military exploits in the field and upon the ocean have their sure reward in royal favor and the gratitude of Parliament. It is, therefore, with the highest satisfaction, that,

in this fresh instance, I now proceed to deliver to you the Thanks of this House; and I do now accordingly, by the command and in the name of the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, thank you for the distinguished valor, ability, and conduct displayed by you on the 17th and 21st of August last in Portugal; on the latter of which days you obtained at Vimeiro, over the army of the enemy, a signal victory, honorable and glorious to the British arms.'

Sir Arthur Wellesley rose and made the following answer :—

'MR. SPEAKER,—I beg leave to express my acknowledgments to the House for the high honor which they have conferred upon me, by the notice which they have taken, and the approbation they have conveyed, of my conduct during the time I commanded His Majesty's troops in Portugal.

'No man can value more highly than I do the honorable distinction which has been conferred upon me—a distinction which it is in the power of the representatives of a free people alone to bestow, and which it is the peculiar advantage of the Officers and soldiers in the service of His Majesty to have held out to them as the object of their ambition, and to receive as the reward of their services.

'I beg leave to return to you, Sir, my thanks for the handsome terms in which your kindness—I ought to say your partiality—for me, has induced you to convey the approbation of the House.'

The House of Lords passed the following resolutions, which were communicated to Lieut. General Sir Arthur Wellesley :

'House of Lords, 23d January, 1809.

'Resolved, *Nem. dissent.*,—That the Thanks of this House be given to Lieut. General the Right Hon. Sir Arthur Wellesley, K B., for the distinguished valor, ability, and conduct displayed by him on the 17th and 21st August last in Portugal; on the latter of which days he obtained at Vimeiro, over the army of the enemy, a signal victory, honorable and glorious to the British arms.

‘ Resolved, *Nem. dissent.*,—That the Thanks of this House be given to Major General Spencer, Major General Hill, Major General Ferguson, Brig. General Acland, Brig. General Nightingall, Brig. General Fane, and Brig. General Bowes, and the several Officers of the army, for their skill and gallant exertions against the enemy, in the battles of Roliça and Vimeiro, by which they reflected so much lustre on His Majesty’s arms.

‘ Resolved, *Nem. dissent.*,—That the House doth highly approve of, and acknowledge, the steady and disciplined valor displayed by the non-commissioned officers and private soldiers of the army on the above occasion, and that the same be signified by the commanders of the several corps, who are desired to thank them for their distinguished and exemplary conduct.’

To these resolutions, conveyed to him by the Lord Chancellor, Lieut. General Sir Arthur Wellesley wrote the following answer :—

To the Right Hon. the Lord Chancellor, &c.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ London, 28th January, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship’s letter of the 24th instant, containing copies of the unanimous resolutions of the House of Lords, conveying the approbation of their Lordships of my conduct and that of the General and other Officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers comprising the army which I commanded in Portugal, and their Lordships’ desire that I should communicate their Lordships’ vote to the respective General Officers and to the Officers commanding the corps employed in the service in that country.

‘ I have received the mark of distinction which the House of Lords have conferred upon me with sentiments of gratitude and respect proportionate to the high sense I entertain of the greatness of the honor which it carries with it; and I shall have great pleasure in communicating to the Officers and the troops the distinguished reward of their exemplary conduct which their Lordships have conferred upon them.

‘ I beg leave, at the same time, to express to your Lord-

ships my thanks for the expressions of personal civility with which your Lordship has conveyed to me the commands of the House.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ *the Lord Chancellor.*’

According to the stipulations of the Convention of Cintra*, the French army under General Junot was embarked in British vessels, and landed at La Rochelle in October, 1808. The British army being thus left disposable for other services, the greater part of it was detached into Castille, under the command of Lieut. General Sir John Moore, and was joined on the Duero in December by an additional force from England, which had landed at Coruña.

In the month of November, the French armies having been greatly reinforced, and the Spaniards having been successively defeated at Tudela, and in other battles, the city of Madrid fell again into the hands of the enemy. Buonaparte, who had arrived to superintend in person the operations in Spain, directed, in the month of December, a combined movement of several corps, under the command of Marshal Soult, against the army under Sir John Moore, which consequently retreated into Galicia; and a battle took place on the 16th January, 1809, at Coruña, where Sir John Moore was killed in the hour of victory.

In the mean time Lieut. General Sir John Cradock† had been appointed to the command of the British troops remaining in Portugal; and that country, after the battle of Coruña, again became the seat of active military operations, Marshal Soult having invaded its northern provinces from Galicia, and taken possession of Oporto on the 29th March,

* It was erroneously called the ‘Convention of Cintra,’ from that document having been forwarded by Lieut. General Sir Hew Dalrymple to the Secretary of State in a dispatch, dated Cintra, 3d September, 1808. The error, however, having become habitual, it has been retained.

† Now General Lord Howden, G.C.B.

1809. Lisbon was consequently thrown into alarm; and the Regency having urgently implored the aid and protection of the British nation, reinforcements were directed to be embarked, and Lieut. General Sir Arthur Wellesley, having resigned the office of Chief Secretary in Ireland and his seat in Parliament, was again sent to command in Portugal.

MEMORANDUM ON THE DEFENCE OF PORTUGAL.

‘ London, 7th March, 1809.

‘ I have always been of opinion that Portugal might be defended, whatever might be the result of the contest in Spain; and that in the mean time the measures adopted for the defence of Portugal would be highly useful to the Spaniards in their contest with the French.

‘ My notion was, that the Portuguese military establishments, upon the footing of 40,000 militia and 30,000 regular troops, ought to be revived; and that, in addition to these troops, His Majesty ought to employ an army in Portugal amounting to about 20,000 British troops, including about 4000 cavalry. My opinion was, that even if Spain should have been conquered, the French would not have been able to overrun Portugal with a smaller force than 100,000 men; and that as long as the contest should continue in Spain this force, if it could be put in a state of activity, would be highly useful to the Spaniards, and might eventually have decided the contest.

‘ It is obvious, however, that the military establishments of Portugal could not be revived without very extensive pecuniary assistance and political support from this country; and the only mode in which it appeared to be safe or even practicable to give this assistance and support, or to interfere at all in a military way in the concerns of Portugal, was to trust the King’s Ambassador at Lisbon to give or withhold such sums as he might think necessary for the support of military establishments only, and to instruct him to see that the revenues of Portugal, whatever they might be, were in the first instance applied to the same objects. By the operation of these powers and instructions, it is probable that he would have had a complete control over the measures of the

Portuguese government; and we might have expected by this time to have in the field an efficient Portuguese army.

‘As it was not possible, however, to adopt these measures at that time, and as the attention of the government has necessarily been drawn to other objects, it is probable that the military establishments of Portugal have made but little progress; and in considering the extent of the British force required for the defence of that country, and the other measures to be adopted, the small extent of the Portuguese force, and the probability of an early attack by the enemy, must be considered on the one hand; and, on the other, the continuance of the contest in Spain, and the probability that a very large French force will not be disposable in a very short period of time for the attack upon Portugal.

‘I would still recommend the adoption of the political measures above suggested, with a view to the revival of the military establishments in Portugal. It is probable that the expense of these measures will not in this year exceed a million sterling. But if they should succeed, and the contest should continue in Spain and in Portugal, the benefit which will accrue from them will be more than adequate to the expense incurred.

‘The British force employed in Portugal should in this view of the question not be less than 30,000 men, of which number 4000 or 5000 should be cavalry, and there should be a large body of artillery.

‘The extent of force in cavalry and artillery, above required, is because the Portuguese military establishments must necessarily be deficient in these two branches; and British or German cavalry and artillery must be employed with the Portuguese infantry.

‘The whole of the army in Portugal, Portuguese as well as British, should be placed under the command of British Officers. The Staff of the army, the Commissariat in particular, must be British; and these departments must be extensive in proportion to the strength of the whole army which will act in Portugal, to the number of detached posts which it will be necessary to occupy, and in a view to the difficulties of providing and distributing supplies in that country. In regard to the detail of these measures, I re-

commend that the British army in Portugal should be reinforced as soon as possible with some companies of British riflemen, with 3000 British or German cavalry; that the complement of ordnance with that army should be made thirty pieces of cannon, of which two brigades of 9 pounders; that these pieces of ordnance should be completely horsed; that twenty pieces of brass (12 pounders) ordnance upon travelling carriages should be sent to Portugal, with a view to the occupation of certain positions in the country; that a corps of engineers for an army of 60,000 men should be sent there, and a corps of artillery for sixty pieces of cannon.

‘I understand that the British army now in Portugal consists of 20,000 men, including cavalry. It should be made up 20,000 infantry at least, as soon as possible, by additions of riflemen and other good infantry, which by this time may have been refitted after the campaign in Spain.

‘The reinforcements may follow, as the troops shall recover from their fatigues.

‘The first measures to be adopted are to complete the army in Portugal with its cavalry and artillery, and to horse the ordnance as it ought to be. As soon as this shall be done the General and Staff Officers should go out; as it may be depended upon that as soon as the newspapers shall have announced the departure of Officers for Portugal, the French armies in Spain will receive orders to make their movements towards Portugal, so as to anticipate our measures for its defence. We ought therefore to have everything on the spot, or nearly so, before any alarm is created at home respecting our intentions.

‘Besides the articles above enumerated, 30,000 stands of arms, clothing and shoes, for the Portuguese army, should be sent to Lisbon as soon as possible.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To His Excellency Dom Domingos de Souza Coutinho.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Portsmouth, 13th April, 1809.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 9th instant, and I am much flattered by the regret you express that it was not in my power to wait upon you on Saturday last. I considered it important, however, not to delay my

* Afterwards Conde de Funchal.

departure for one moment after I had received my instructions from His Majesty's Ministers, and I had made all the arrangements to which it was necessary that I should attend previous to my departure from England. If I had suspected that I should have been detained here by contrary winds till this time*, I should have had great pleasure in waiting upon you. I am likewise much flattered by your expressions of satisfaction upon my appointment to command in Portugal. I only hope that I may arrive there in time to be of any service, and you may depend upon my making every exertion which zeal for the Portuguese nation and for the honor of His Majesty's arms can induce me to make.

I shall pay attention to the different subjects to which you have referred in your letter; and I shall do everything in my power to satisfy the government and people of Portugal in respect to them, and to conciliate their good will upon all others.

'I recommend to you to mention to Mr. Canning your wishes, that a part of the ammunition and arms intended for the kingdom of Portugal should be sent to Oporto; and that the ammunition should be sent out made up, rather than that the materials should be sent; as he will be more able than I am to effect the alterations which you desire.

'I am apprehensive, however, that to send a part of the arms and ammunition intended for Portugal to Oporto may interfere with another arrangement which Mr. Canning had in contemplation, to make Lisbon the depôt of all the stores intended by Great Britain for the service of His Majesty's allies in the Peninsula.

'Believe me, &c.

'*His Excellency*

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Dom Domingos de Souza Coutinho.

To the Right Hon. John Villiers.

'MY DEAR VILLIERS,

'Lisbon, 23d April, 1809.

'I shall attend to your suggestion in respect to the Commanding Officer of the artillery and chief Engineer.

* The *Surveillante* frigate, in which Sir Arthur Wellesley sailed, was very nearly lost in very bad weather, at the back of the Isle of Wight, in the night after quitting Spithead.

† Now Earl of Clarendon.

‘Upon considering the subject well, I think it best that Beresford should come here, unless he should apprehend any inconvenience to the public service from his absence from his corps, principally on the score of its discipline. I write to him on this subject; and shall be obliged to you if you will order a boat for him to Santarem.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. John Villiers.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Lisbon, 23d April, 1809.

‘ I arrived here yesterday, having had a passage of one week from Portsmouth. The fleet having on board my horses, the two regiments of heavy dragoons, and some horses for the artillery, sailed, I believe, on the day after I did, and may be expected in a day or two. The 24th foot may likewise be expected from Jersey, and likewise a brigade of light infantry from England, and a regiment of hussars.

‘ The expectation of the immediate arrival of some of these troops, and the consideration of the various different arrangements to be made, and which can be made only here, in respect to transport, commissariat, staff, the defence of Lisbon and the Tagus, and eventually the defence of the Eastern frontier, during the absence of the army to the northward, supposing it should be decided to undertake the expedition against Soult, will, I fear, detain me here for a few days; and it occurs to me that time will be saved, and much advantage will result from your being here. Accordingly I wish that you could make it convenient to yourself to come here as soon as possible.

‘ If, however, you should be of opinion that it would be inconvenient to the public service, on account of the state of discipline of the Portuguese troops, or for any other reason, that you should absent yourself from them; or if the journey should be inconvenient to yourself, I request you not to come; and I must only delay deciding upon those points of the subject on which it is advisable that I should have your opinion till we meet.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. Pray let Cradock know if you should determine to come down.

‘ A. W.’

To Lieut. General Sir John Cradock, K.B.

‘MY DEAR CRADOCK,

‘Lisbon, 23d April, 1809.

‘Mr. Villiers will have informed you of my arrival here yesterday, and of the concurrence of my opinion with that which you appear to entertain in respect to the further movement to the northward.

‘I conclude you will have determined to halt the army at Leyria. I think that before any further steps are taken in respect to Soult, it would be desirable to consider the situation of Victor, how far he is enabled to make an attack upon Portugal, and the means of defence of the Eastern frontier, while the British army shall be to the northward; and eventually the means of the defence of Lisbon and the Tagus, in case this attack should be made upon this country.

‘All these subjects must have been considered by you, and I fear in no very satisfactory point of view, as you appear to have moved to the northward unwillingly; and I should be glad to talk them over with you, in order to be able to consider some of them, and make various arrangements which can be made only here. I have asked Beresford also to come, if he should not deem his absence from the Portuguese troops in their present state likely to be disadvantageous to the Portuguese service, and I have desired him to let you know whether he will come or not.

‘It might possibly also be more agreeable and convenient to you to see me here than with the army, and if this should be the case, it would be a most desirable arrangement to meet you here: I beg, however, that you will consider this proposition only in a view to your own convenience and wishes. If you should come down, I should be much obliged to you if you would bring with you the Adjutant and Quarter Master Generals, the Chief Engineer, the Commanding Officer of Artillery, and the Commissary General.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Sir John Cradock, K.B.’

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Lisbon, 24th April, 1809.

‘I arrived here the day before yesterday, and I propose

* Mr. Frere was Ambassador to the Court of Spain, and as such accompanied the Central Junta wherever it went. It was at this time at Seville,

to take the command of the army in this country, as soon as I shall have communicated with Sir J. Cradock.

‘ I conclude that Sir John has kept you informed of the movements of the French in the north of Portugal. I do not find that there has been any material alteration lately in their position. They have not passed the Vouga, to the southward, nor have they extended themselves into Tras os Montes since the loss of Chaves. But they have made some movements towards the Tamaga, which divides Tras os Montes from Minho; and it is supposed they intend to acquire for themselves the option of retreating into Spain through Tras os Montes, if they should be pressed by the British troops.

‘ I intend to move towards Soult, and attack him, if I should be able to make any arrangement in the neighbourhood of Abrantes, which can give me any security for the safety of this place during my absence to the northward.

‘ I am not quite certain, however, that I should not do more good to the general cause by combining with General Cuesta in an operation against Victor; and I believe I should prefer this last, if Soult were not in possession of a part of this country which is very fertile in resources and of the town of Oporto, and if to concert the operations with General Cuesta would not take time which might be profitably employed in operations against Soult.

‘ I think it probable, however, that Soult will not remain in Portugal when I shall pass the Mondego: if he does, I shall attack him. If he should retire, I am convinced that it would be most advantageous for the common cause, that we should remain on the defensive in the north of Portugal, and act vigorously in co-operation with Cuesta against Victor.

‘ In the first place, I do not know that, singly, I should be equal to the French force in Galicia; and I am convinced that a movement of the British force into that province, inasmuch as it would oblige the French to collect their force, would put an end for the moment to the war of the peasantry, which has hitherto been so successful, has been so distressing to the enemy, and, in fact, prevents them from doing all the mischief which their position would enable them to do.

‘ An operation against Victor is attended by these advantages. If successful, it effectually relieves Seville and Lisbon, and in case affairs should take such a turn as to enable the King’s Ministers to make another great effort for the relief of Spain, the corps under my command in Portugal will not be removed to such a distance from the scene of operations as to render its co-operation impossible, and we may hope to see the effect of a great effort made by a combined and concentrated force.

‘ It is true, that Galicia and other parts, which might be relieved by a different and a more dispersed application of our force, will continue for some time longer in the possession of the enemy; but this must be recollected, that the relief of Galicia is certain, if this great effort, which I have supposed may be made, should be successful; and it is probable that relief procured by these means would be permanent.

‘ I am convinced that the French will be in serious danger in Spain only when a great force shall be assembled which will oblige them to collect their troops; and this combined operation of the force in this country, with that under General Cuesta, may be the groundwork of further measures of the same and a more extended description.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will communicate to me any information you may have of the strength and position of the different French corps now in Spain.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. H. Frere.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. John Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Lisbon, 24th April, 1809.

‘ I enclose my letter to Mr. Frere, which, you will observe, is important; and it is very desirable that it should not fall into the hands of the enemy, or that, if it does, he should not at an early period discover its contents. If you should think that the messenger is in any danger of being taken, it will be necessary, I should think, either to caution him particularly to destroy this letter, or to put it into cypher.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. John Villiers.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Lisbon, 24th April, 1809.

‘ Having heard from the Admiral that he intends to send the *Statira* to England at an early hour to-morrow morning, I shall not suffer that opportunity to pass by without writing to you, although I have but little to tell you.

‘ I arrived here on Saturday, and found that Sir John Cradock and Beresford had moved up the country to the northward with the troops under their command respectively, the former to Leyria, and the latter to Thomar. Sir John Cradock does not, however, appear to have entertained any decided intention of moving forward; on the contrary, indeed, he appears, by his letters to Mr. Villiers, to have intended to go no farther, till he should hear that Victor’s movements were decided; and, therefore, I consider affairs in this country to be exactly in the state in which, if I found them, it was the intention of the King’s Ministers that I should assume the command; and accordingly I propose to assume it as soon as I shall communicate with Sir John Cradock. I have written to him and to General Beresford, to apprise them that I conceive advantages will result from our meeting here, and I expect them both here as soon as possible.

‘ In respect to the enemy, Soult is still at Oporto, and he has not pushed his posts to the southward farther than the river Vouga. He has nothing in Tras os Montes, since the loss of Chaves, of which you have been most probably apprised; but he has some posts on the river Tamaga, which divides that province from Minho; and it is supposed that he wishes to secure for himself the option of retreating through Tras os Montes into Spain, if he should find it necessary.

‘ General Silveira, with a Portuguese corps, is in Tras os Montes; but I am not acquainted with its strength or its composition.

‘ General Lapisse, who commands the corps which it was supposed, when I left England, was marching from Salamanca into Portugal, has turned off to his left, and has marched along the Portuguese frontier to Alcantara, where he crossed the Tagus, and thence he went to Merida, on the

Guadiana, where he is in communication with, indeed I may say part of, the army of Victor. He has an advanced post at Montijo, nearer to the Portuguese frontier than Merida. Victor has continued at Medellin since the action with Cuesta. He is either fortifying himself at that post, or making an entrenched camp there. Cuesta is at Llerena, collecting a force again, which it is said will soon be 25,000 infantry, and 6,000 cavalry, a part of them good troops. I know nothing of the Marques de la Romana, or of anything to the northward of Portugal.

‘I intend to move upon Soult as soon as I can make some arrangement on which I can depend for the defence of the Tagus, either to impede or delay Victor’s progress, in case he should come in while I am absent.

‘I should prefer an attack upon Victor in concert with Cuesta, if Soult was not in possession of a fertile province of this kingdom and of the favorite town of Oporto, of which it is most desirable to deprive him; and if any operation upon Victor, connected with Cuesta’s movements, would not require time to concert it, which may as well be employed in dislodging Soult from the north of Portugal, and to bring the British army to the Eastern frontier.

‘If the light brigade should not have left England when you receive this letter, I trust that you will send them off without loss of time; and I request of you to desire the Officer commanding them to endeavor to get intelligence as he shall go along the coast, particularly at Aveiro, and the mouth of the Mondego; and I wish that he should stop at the latter place for orders, if he should find that the British army is engaged in operations to the northward, and that he should not have already received orders at Aveiro.

‘The 23d light dragoons might also receive orders to a similar purport. The hussars, I conclude, will have sailed before this time.

‘We are much in want of craft here, now that we are going to carry on an operation to the northward. Constant convoys will be necessary, and the Admiral does not appear to have the means in his power of supplying all that is required of him. The 24th regiment arrived this day.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Lisbon, 24th April, 1809.

‘ I have arranged to send the transports to Cork to bring here 1100 horses, of which 800 are supposed to belong to the 23d light dragoons, and 300 to the Commissariat; but I have not been able to carry into effect that part of the arrangement which was settled in England in respect to these Commissariat horses, for their care on their passage; as the men of the English Commissariat, who were to have been sent to Ireland in the empty transports for this purpose, are with the army at Leyria, and the transports would be delayed for some days, if I were to detain them till they should return from the army.

‘ I therefore beg leave to suggest to you to have directions given to Lieut. Colonel Seymour*, of the 23d light dragoons, to have 100 men with Officers and non-commissioned officers of the 23d, attached to the horses of the Commissariat, to take care of them on the passage from Cork to Lisbon.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Lisbon, 25th April, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to inform you, that I received directions from the Secretary of State, to request you to send tonnage to Cork of the horse ships now in the Tagus, to convey to Lisbon 1100 horses under such convoy as you may think necessary.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you would give directions upon this subject, in order to carry into execution the wishes of His Majesty’s Government.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Lisbon, 27th April, 1809.

‘ I arrived here on the 22d instant, and having communicated with Lieut. General Sir John Cradock to put me in

* Afterwards Serjeant at Arms.

orders on the 25th, I have assumed the command of the army.

‘ The whole of the British army in Portugal are assembled at Leyria and Alcobaça, with the exception of the 2d batt. 30th regiment, in garrison at Lisbon; of the 16th light dragoons, on its march to join the army; and of the 2d batt. 24th regiment, the 3d dragoon guards, and the 4th dragoons, just landed.

‘ The corps of Marshal Soult is still in the north of Portugal, occupying the city of Oporto, with its advanced posts at Ovar. It is engaged with its left in an attack upon General Silveira on the Tamaga, with a view to open the province of Tras os Montes, for its communication with Spain.

‘ The corps of General Lapisse, which had advanced from Salamanca, and had threatened an attack upon the province of Beira, has marched along the frontiers of Portugal to Alcantara, where it crossed the Tagus; and it is now joined with that under the command of Marshal Victor, at Merida, upon the Guadiana.

‘ The corps of Marshal Victor has been upon the Guadiana since the defeat of the Spanish army under General Cuesta, with its advanced posts south of that river.

‘ General Cuesta is at Llerena; and I understand, by a communication from Mr. Frere to the Secretary of State, a copy of which has been sent here, that the Spanish government are taking measures to reinforce that General; and that he will move into Portugal, if Victor should take advantage of the absence of the British army engaged in operations to the northward of Portugal.

‘ Under these circumstances, I have determined forthwith to move to the northward. I purpose to take with me 6,000 Portuguese troops, and the whole of the British troops now in Portugal, with the exception of the 2d batt. 30th regiment, the 2d batt. 24th regiment, the brigade of infantry under the command of Major General Mackenzie, and the 3d dragoon guards and 4th dragoons.

‘ These troops, with about 7,000 Portuguese infantry and cavalry, will be left upon the Tagus to watch the movements of the enemy upon the frontier, and to guard the passages over the river, between Abrantes and Santarem.

‘ As soon as the enemy shall have evacuated the north of

Portugal, it is my intention to return to the Eastern frontier of the kingdom, and to co-operate with the Spanish General, Cuesta, against the army of Marshal Victor.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Lisbon, 27th April, 1809.

‘ Upon the arrival of General Beresford at Lisbon on the 25th instant, he informed me that he had had some communication with a French Officer, through the means of M. —, at Oporto, which announced a disposition in the Officers of Soult’s corps to revolt, and to seize Soult and other principal Officers of the army.

‘ On the night before last, a French Officer, by the name of —, arrived here, accompanied by Major Douglas*, who had been sent by General Beresford to the French advanced posts to confer with him ; and I had yesterday an interview with this Officer.

‘ He informed me that great discontent and dissatisfaction with the measures of Buonaparte prevailed throughout the French army, and particularly in the corps of Marshal Soult, which had suffered, and was still suffering, extreme distress ; that dissatisfaction had long prevailed on various accounts, particularly the conscription, but had been greatly increased by a sense of the injustice of the measures adopted in respect to Spain, and the seizure of the King ; and that a large proportion of the Officers of the army of Soult were determined to revolt, and to seize the General and other principal Officers of the army, supposed to be particularly attached to the interests of Buonaparte, if that army should be pressed by the troops under my command, so as to oblige Soult to concentrate in situations chosen with a view to their defence rather than with a view to their subsistence.

‘ — having met Major Douglas between the advanced posts of the two armies, and his communications having there appeared to the Major to be so important, that he thought it desirable that — should see General Beresford,

* Major General Sir James Douglas, K.C.B., then Lieutenant Colonel in the Portuguese army.

he proposed that — should come to Lisbon. I draw your Lordship's attention to this fact, as it removes a suspicion which might otherwise attach to the whole subject.

'The objects of these communications appear to be—first, to prevail upon us to press upon Soult's corps; and, secondly, to give to — and two other Captains of the French army passports to go to France.

'In respect to the first of these objects, your Lordship is aware that I had adopted a plan of operations which would have effected it; and I must add, that in the different conversations with Major Douglas, General Beresford, and me, —, in pressing that plan upon us, advised us to watch the movements of the enemy on the left of the Tagus, while we should be engaged in operations to the northward. He was, at the same time, entirely ignorant of the situation of Victor, and of all the other French corps in Spain, excepting that of Ney.

'In respect to the second object, I asked — particularly the reason he had for wishing to go to France at all, and those he had for wishing to go before any blow should be struck. His answer was, that he wished to go in order to communicate to Generals —, —, —, and others dissatisfied with the existing order of things, the measures which the Officers of Soult's army had in contemplation, and which would certainly be adopted if the army should be at all pressed by us; and that he wished to go at an early period, because it was certain that as soon as Buonaparte should receive intelligence of the event, he would seize all suspected of being adverse to him, and would put an end to the hopes which were entertained that the same measures would become general throughout the French army.

'In the existing situation of affairs in Portugal I have considered it proper to refuse to attend to these communications. I have therefore asked the Admiral to give to — passports for himself and two other Captains of the French army to go to France by sea; in which — says they will experience no difficulty, as Soult allows vessels of all nations to quit Oporto; and the Commanding Officers of the regiments to which they belong, being parties to the plan of revolt, are desirous and have the power to permit them to go.

‘ I have pledged myself no further ; and I have particularly desired General Beresford, in delivering his passports to —, to request that he will inform his friends in the French army, that he asked from me, and only obtained, passports to go to France ; that I wish them success in the accomplishment of their objects ; but that the line which I shall take upon them must depend upon the circumstances in which the French army shall stand at the moment the Officers may seize their General.

‘ I acknowledge that I do not entertain any hopes that I shall be enabled to effect more to the northward than oblige Soult to retreat from Portugal. If circumstances should enable me to do more, the question whether the operations against the French army ought to be carried to extremities, or they should be allowed to seize their General and place themselves under our protection, becomes one of greater difficulty ; upon which I am desirous, if possible, of having the opinion of His Majesty’s Government.

‘ Your Lordship will observe, that I have not thought it proper to discourage the disposition which appears to prevail among the French Officers ; at the same time that I have taken care not only not to pledge myself to any particular line of conduct, but that those concerned should understand that I do not consider myself pledged by anything that has passed.

‘ The successful revolt of a French army might be attended by the most extensive and important consequences ; whereas their defeat, or what is a more improbable event, their surrender, would affect only local interests and objects, excepting that either of these events would add to the reputation of His Majesty’s arms.

‘ In the consideration and decision of this question much must depend upon the minute circumstances attending the situation in which each of the armies shall be placed at the moment ; but I consider it my duty to give the earliest intelligence to His Majesty’s Ministers, in order, if possible, that I may have the advantage of their opinion, and His Majesty’s commands, before I shall have to decide upon the line which I shall adopt.

I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Lisbon, 27th April, 1809.

‘ I have but little to add to my public dispatches of this date. I fully believe in the intentions of the French Officers to revolt. The existence of this intention is confirmed by the recollection of what dropped from nearly every individual of the French army with whom I conversed when I was in this country last year, and it is highly probable on other grounds. I doubt, however, whether it will be quite so easy to carry their intentions successfully into execution as their emissary appears to imagine; and I also doubt whether it follows of course, as is generally imagined by those with whom I have conversed here upon this subject, that the successful revolt of this corps would be followed immediately by that of others; and I am convinced that the mode proposed by —, which will be explained to you by Colonel Bayley, to accomplish that object, would not answer that purpose. It is, however, very certain, that the successful revolt of one French army would have a great effect, particularly in this part of the world; and would probably do more for Spain than Spain would ever do for itself.

‘ In case there should be an opportunity, I should not wait for a revolt, but shall try my own means of subduing Soult.

‘ If this army should revolt, or, indeed, at all events, I anxiously recommend to you to set all your emissaries to work in France. I have no doubt of the detestation of Buonaparte by the people of that country. There is a very clever fellow in communication with Mr. —, who ought to be useful to you.

‘ I shall be much obliged to you if you will get all the Officers gazetted, who have been recommended for promotion, as serving in the Portuguese army.

‘ I shall set out for the army to-morrow morning.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. General Sherbrooke.

‘ MY DEAR SHERBROOKE,

‘ Lisbon, 27th April, 1809.

‘ I have received your letter of the 25th, and I assure you that I derive great satisfaction from the renewal of our old

connection and friendship ; and that I am convinced I shall derive the greatest advantage from your advice and assistance.

‘ It is my intention to advance forthwith upon Soult ; accordingly, I request you, as soon as you shall receive this letter, to send an Officer of the Quarter Master General’s department to Coimbra, to arrange the quarters there for the whole of the British army with you, including the 16th light dragoons, which are ordered forward, excepting Major General Mackenzie’s brigade, which you will find otherwise disposed of in this letter. The Officer will arrange at Coimbra for the reception not only of the British troops, but of about 6,000 Portuguese troops, including 350 Portuguese cavalry.

‘ You will then commence your march on the 29th as follows : General Hill’s corps, with the cavalry under General Cotton, to Condeixa ; Guards, and Stewart’s brigade, German light dragoons, and one brigade of artillery, from Leyria to Pombal ; the troops at Alcobaça to Leyria ; and the troops at Caldas to Alcobaça.

‘ On the 30th, General Hill’s corps, and General Cotton’s cavalry to Coimbra ; Guards, Stewart’s brigade, cavalry, and artillery, to Condeixa ; Tilson’s and Campbell’s brigades of infantry and one brigade of artillery to Pombal ; General Murray’s and General Sontag’s brigades to halt at Leyria ; General Cameron’s brigade from Alcobaça to Leyria.

‘ On the 1st of May, Guards, &c., cavalry and artillery to Coimbra ; Tilson’s and Campbell’s brigades and artillery from Pombal to Condeixa ; General Murray’s and General Sontag’s brigades and artillery from Leyria to Pombal ; General Cameron’s halt at Leyria.

‘ On the 2d of May, Tilson’s and Campbell’s brigade and artillery to Coimbra ; General Murray’s and Sontag’s brigades and artillery from Pombal to Condeixa ; General Cameron’s brigade from Leyria to Pombal.

‘ On the 3d of May, General Murray’s and Sontag’s brigades and artillery to Coimbra ; General Cameron’s from Pombal to Condeixa.

‘ On the 4th of May, General Cameron’s brigade to Coimbra.

‘ General Mackenzie’s brigade, and a brigade of 6 pounders,

to march on the 29th to Ourem, where he will halt till he shall find that the Portuguese troops have passed on their march from Thomar to Coimbra. He will then march to Thomar. He shall receive further instructions from me for his guidance.

‘ Since writing the above, I have received your letter of the 26th. I have ordered the 16th light dragoons to move to Leyria, having taken measures for supplying them with forage at Rio Mayor, and having directed the Commanding Officer to carry on three days’ forage upon the backs of his horses. When they shall arrive at Leyria, I request you to order them on with any one of the divisions of infantry, and you will then reduce that division by one brigade, and add that brigade to General Cameron’s, which will move up the last.

‘ General Cameron, having arrived at Alcobaça, need not make any alteration in this arrangement. He may march on the 29th from Alcobaça to Leyria, halt there on the 30th and 1st of May, and move on the 2d according to the arrangement.

‘ I propose to leave this place to-morrow, and shall be at Leyria by the 29th, if possible, or at latest on the 30th, and I shall then go on to Coimbra.

‘ An Assistant Commissary must attend General Mackenzie to Ourem, and he should take with him, if possible, three days’ provisions. The troops marching forwards should also take with them three days’ provisions, if possible; and if that cannot be done, measures should be adopted, either to send that quantity after them or to receive it on the road from Coimbra. A Commissary should likewise be sent to Coimbra, to prepare for the reception of the troops.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Sherbrooke.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Junta of Spanish Estremadura.

‘ GENTLEMEN,

‘ Lisbon, 28th April, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor to receive the representation which you addressed to me yesterday, and I assure you that I am not insensible to the dangers which threaten the southern provinces of Spain and the kingdom of Portugal.

‘ With every disposition to meet and avert those dangers, I am concerned that I have it not in my power to do all that I wish; and, particularly as the security of the kingdom of Portugal being the principal object entrusted to me, I cannot divert from it the forces which are necessary for the accomplishment of all the other objects which you have recommended to my attention.

‘ You must be aware that the forces of this kingdom are but in their infancy in respect to organization, discipline, and equipment; and it is not with troops in this state that any reasonable expectation can be formed of success against the veteran and disciplined troops of France, notwithstanding that I have every confidence in the valor, the zeal, and the loyalty of the troops of Portugal.

‘ The safety of Portugal must therefore depend upon the exertions of the troops of His Majesty; and I cannot venture to employ their services out of this kingdom, although ultimately for its advantage and safety as well as for the general advantage, till the enemy who has invaded Portugal shall have been removed.

‘ There are some points, however, of your paper to which it is in my power to give immediate attention.

‘ 1st. A corps has been ordered to take the field from the garrison of Elvas, and to act, as an army of observation, in co-operation with a similar corps from the garrison of Badajoz.

‘ 2d. The corps under the command of Sir Robert Wilson is no longer in the neighbourhood of Alcantara, but has crossed the Mondego, and has approached the Douro. I doubt whether the corps under the command of Colonel Le Cor is sufficiently strong to occupy Alcantara, but I shall inquire if it should be so; and I shall be happy to have it in my power to comply with your wishes in this respect.

‘ 3d. Upon this last point I must refer you to the commencement of this letter. I wish, and I hope soon to have, an opportunity of concerting operations with General Cuesta, and it will give me pleasure if they should be satisfactory to the Junta of Estremadura.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Don Jose Gallego,*
Don Frederico Moratti, &c. &c.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Mr. Boys, Deputy Paymaster General.

‘SIR,

‘Lisbon, 28th April, 1809.

‘In order to obviate every inconvenience that might arise from the want of proper authority for granting warrants, for the regular payment of the subsistence for the troops who are, or may be hereafter stationed, at Lisbon, I have judged it expedient to authorise Lieut. Colonel Walsh, of the 9th foot and Town Major of Lisbon, to grant warrants on Mr. Hunter, who will remain as Deputy Paymaster General at Lisbon. You will therefore be pleased to direct him to pay all such warrants as may be regularly transmitted from Lieut. Colonel Walsh, with the estimate which will accompany them, for the subsistence only of such corps or detachments as may require it.

‘You will be pleased to take especial care that His Majesty’s regulations are in all respects strictly observed.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘J. P. Boys, Esq.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. Colonel Walsh, Town Major of Lisbon.

‘SIR,

‘Lisbon, 28th April, 1809.

‘As great inconvenience and delay to the service would arise to the troops stationed at Lisbon, and such as may hereafter arrive, unless some Officer on the spot is duly authorised to issue warrants to the Deputy Paymaster General, who will be stationed at Lisbon, for the purpose of providing for their subsistence, I do hereby empower and authorise you to grant warrants for the subsistence of the troops, only upon the proper estimates being laid before you, strictly conforming to His Majesty’s regulations upon this subject; and you will be pleased to cause the same to be duly examined, and keep a regular account of the number of warrants so issued, together with the amounts of each, in order that the same may be submitted to me from time to time, as opportunities may offer.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel Walsh.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Villa Franca, 29th April, 1809.

‘ I write in the chance that this letter may still find the packet at Lisbon, to inform you that I have received a very bad report indeed of the state of the artillery horses lately arrived from England with the heavy dragoons, being very old, diseased, and out of condition. I shall receive it officially probably in a day or two, when I shall transmit it to England. In the mean time, I think it proper to acquaint you with the state of these horses, and to recommend that for that reason, as well as because it would be very desirable to attach a troop of horse artillery to so very large a body of cavalry as we shall have, that a troop of horse artillery should be sent out.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Villa Franca, 29th April, 1809.

‘ I received yesterday your letter of the 21st instant, together with one from General Cuesta, and one from Don Martin de Garay. I send you a copy of the answer which I have written to the former, and my answer to the latter. According to my instructions, I think that I ought not to have any communication with the Spanish Government excepting through you; and if you should be of the same opinion, I request you to tell Don Martin that I can communicate with him only through you, and acquaint him with my sentiments as contained in the enclosed letter.

‘ I hope that the Spaniards will adhere to their determination of acting upon the defensive, till I shall return to the eastward. They should reinforce Cuesta as much as possible. He has only 19,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry, as he tells me in his letter of the 23d.

‘ It will also be very desirable that Cuesta should observe the motions of the French if they should enter Alentojo, and follow them, if their object should be to invade Portugal, which, however, is very improbable. At all events, if they should invade Portugal, we shall not be without a force

upon the Tagus, and in the passes in the mountains between Alcantara and Abrantes.

‘ I recommend that Cuesta should observe Victor’s movements in Alentejo, because it is not impossible that he might enter that province with a view to an invasion of Andalusia. It is very improbable, however, that, in the present state of the French force in Spain, he will move at all, till he shall have heard of Soult.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Right Hon. J. H. Frere.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. In respect to the 40th regiment, I certainly must have it; but in the state in which affairs are at present I think it best that it should remain at Seville till I shall be able to fix upon a safe route for it. ‘ A. W.’

To His Excellency Don Gregorio Cuesta.

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Franca, 29th April, 1809.

‘ I had the honor of receiving yesterday your Excellency’s letter of the 23d April, and I assure your Excellency that it will give me great satisfaction to co-operate with your Excellency, as far as it may be in my power, to defeat those forces of the enemy which threaten the cities of Seville and Lisbon.

‘ Your Excellency must be aware of the state of the Portuguese army: a commencement has only lately been made to organize and discipline it; and although I have the utmost reliance on the valor, the zeal, and the loyalty of the troops of Portugal, I cannot at this moment consider them in such a state of discipline as to confide to their exertions the safety of Portugal, especially committed to my care, against the further attempts which may be made upon it by the disciplined troops of France, which have already invaded, and are in possession of, an important part of this kingdom.

‘ Under these circumstances, my attention has necessarily been directed, in the first instance, to remove from Portugal the further evils with which both Spain and Portugal are threatened by Marshal Soult; and the greatest part of the army under my command is now on its march for that purpose. A small detachment of British troops, with one of Portuguese troops, will remain upon the Tagus, to watch the movements

of the enemy, and to guard the passages of that river, in case the enemy should direct his attack upon this country.

‘ If I should succeed in removing Marshal Soult from the north of Portugal, I intend to go forthwith with all the troops under my command (consisting of about 25,000, of which nearly 4,000 will at that time be cavalry), to the Eastern frontier of Portugal, in the neighbourhood of Elvas; and I shall be happy to co-operate with you in any plan which may be agreed upon for the attack of Marshal Victor.

‘ In the mean time, a detachment of the garrison of Elvas has been directed to take the field, in co-operation with a similar detachment of the garrison of Badajoz, to act as a corps of observation in that quarter; but I cannot avoid taking this opportunity of recommending that this corps should not be exposed to the attack of the enemy, or to be cut off from the garrisons to which the parts of it respectively belong.

‘ In the present situation of affairs, all that we can require is time; and that we should not lose our men, or any of the valuable positions which we still possess. In a short time we shall all be enabled to co-operate in a vigorous attack upon the enemy; and till that period shall arrive, it is not very material whether he acquires a little more of the open country, provided we do not lose any of the men who are destined to defend the valuable points and positions which remain in our hands.

‘ Your Excellency is mistaken respecting the position of Sir Robert Wilson’s corps. He has been removed to the neighbourhood of the Douro, to confine himself to that quarter. I consider the position of Alcantara, however, to be so important at this moment, in respect both to the defence of Portugal and to our future designs upon Marshal Victor, that I shall give directions that it should be occupied by a Portuguese corps, if it should be possible to form one fit for that purpose. I shall be obliged to your Excellency, if you will give directions that any Portuguese or British corps, which may go to Alcantara, may be received there.

‘ I have written to your Excellency a long letter in English, understanding that you have under your command Officers in your confidence who can explain it to you, in which I have taken the liberty of giving my opinions with great

freedom. I hope that your Excellency will receive them, as they are intended, as a mark of my sincere desire to be of use to you, as far as is in my power at present; which I hope and believe, from the situation of the enemy, I shall have still better opportunities of proving to you before much time shall elapse.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Don Gregorio Cuesta,*
Commander in Chief:

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To His Excellency Don Martin de Garay.

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Franca, 29th April, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letter of the 21st instant, and I am happy to find that the plan of operations which I had adopted for the troops under my command, immediately upon my arrival in this country, and upon which they have already marched, viz., to remove Marshal Soult from the north of Portugal, is approved of by the Supreme Junta. As soon as that operation shall be performed, it is my intention to collect the whole of the army under my command on the Eastern frontier of Portugal, and to co-operate by every means in my power with General Cuesta in an attack upon Marshal Victor.

‘ In the mean time, I cannot sufficiently recommend a strict defensive position in all quarters. In the present situation of affairs, we have every reason to hope that in a short time we shall all be able to co-operate in a vigorous attack upon the only remaining force of the enemy; in which attack we have every reasonable prospect of success, if we do not lose any of the valuable positions which we still possess, or the men who defend them, in fruitless attacks of the enemy in the plains.

‘ It cannot be a matter of much importance whether they possess, for a short time longer, more or less of the plains of La Mancha, provided the Spanish troops do not incur the risk of sustaining a fresh defeat by the superior cavalry of the enemy, and, by diminishing the strength and efficiency of the corps destined to defend the passes of the Sierra Morena, risk the loss of those important positions, and of all that remains that is valuable.

‘ I do not conceive that the enemy are now in a situation to

undertake anything of importance, particularly till they hear of Marshal Soult; and if this be true, there is every prospect of ultimate success, if we should wait till all can join in the attack of Marshal Victor.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Don Martin de Garay.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Villa Franca, 29th April, 1809.

‘ I was in hopes that I should have seen you yesterday, but I was so much occupied, that I could not go to you, and I was not able to leave town till three o'clock: I shall be at Rio Mayor this day.

‘ I received yesterday a letter from Mr. Frere, of which I wished to communicate to you the enclosures, but I now send you copies of them. It is evident to me that the French, without the co-operation of Soult, are unequal to any attempt, so that I shall have time for everything; and it is likewise obvious that, for once, we are all agreed upon the general plan of our operations.

‘ I likewise enclose to you letters from Cuesta, and from the Spanish minister, Don Martin de Garay, to me, which I beg of you to return to me, and my answers, which I request of you to have copied, and send me the copies. I have sent my answer to Mr. Frere, because I think I ought not to have any communication with the Spanish minister, excepting through him. I likewise send you a letter from Edward Paget, who is expected.

‘ In my hurry yesterday I forgot to speak to Bandeira respecting Mrs. Canning's orange trees; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will get them and send them to her.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. General Sherbrooke.

‘ MY DEAR SHERBROOKE,

‘ Leyria, 30th April, 1809.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 30th: that by the returning dragoon on the mule did not reach me.

‘ I am afraid I shall be obliged to stop here to-morrow, in order to give a little rest to my horses, which are not very

well able to get on after being so long at sea: however, I shall get on if I can.

‘ I wish the troops, &c. to live, while at Coimbra, on what that place can afford; as I wish to collect there all that the Commissary can bring forward.

‘ I enclose a memorandum for an Officer of the Quarter Master General’s department, whom I beg you will send as soon as possible to Figueira, at the mouth of the Mondego.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Sherbrooke.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General Mackenzie.*

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Leyria, 30th April, 1809.

‘ I wish you to remain at Ourem till the 3d May, as two squadrons of the 16th light dragoons will march into that town on the 2d; and I am afraid that you will experience inconvenience if you go there before they shall have passed through.

‘ Your corps is destined to watch the movements of Marshal Victor, and to guard the passes into Portugal, while I shall be employed to the northward.

‘ I have not yet had time to write your instructions, but I hope to be able to send them to you on to-morrow or the day following.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Mackenzie.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General Mackenzie.

‘ SIR,

‘ Leyria, 1st May, 1809.

‘ The corps of troops placed under your command is destined to watch the movements of the enemy on the Eastern frontier of Portugal, and to guard the passes into this country on the right of the Tagus, during the period that the main body of the British army under my command will be employed on the Douro. It will consist, besides the brigade of infantry and the artillery which marched from hence with you, of the 2d batt. 24th regiment, now on its march from Lisbon to Santarem; and of the 3d dragoon guards and 4th dragoons, lately arrived from England; and which

* Afterwards killed at Talavera.

corps will begin their march to Santarem and Golegão to-morrow.

‘ Besides these troops, those enumerated hereafter have been placed under your orders by Field Marshal Beresford :

One battalion 1st regiment.

One do. 3d do.

Two do. 4th do.

Two do. 13th do.

One do. 15th do.

Three squadrons of Cavalry at Golegão.

Two squadrons of Cavalry at Abrantes.

Three regiments of Militia at Abrantes.

Three regiments of Caçadores* at Abrantes and Villa Velha, under Colonel Le Cor.

800 Yagers.

350 men collected from the late garrison of Oporto.

‘ The enemy are collected on the Guadiana, with their head quarters at Merida, and their numbers are stated to be about 30,000 men.

‘ They have in their front a Spanish army, with General Cuesta, at Llerena, which army was defeated in the month of March, and has since been reinforced to the amount of 20,000 men. As the enemy did not pursue their advantage upon that occasion, and from the contents of several intercepted letters, I judge that they do not consider themselves sufficiently strong to venture to penetrate into the province of Andalusia, till they can have the co-operation of Marshal Soult ; on the other hand, I doubt whether they are sufficiently strong to make a detachment into Portugal, in order to try to communicate with Soult.

‘ By this measure they will expose themselves to be attacked, and will be attacked by Cuesta, who is receiving reinforcements.

‘ However, the object of the corps placed under your command is to guard against this possible, though not very probable, attempt ; and I now proceed to communicate to you my notions of the probable line of attack of the enemy, and to suggest to you the different points of your defensive line.

‘ If the enemy should invade Portugal, it will be either

* Light troops, ‘ chasseurs.’

between the Tagus and the Guadiana, or north of the Tagus by Alcantara, or by both lines of attack.

‘ If he should make his attack between the Tagus and the Guadiana, he may endeavor to cross the Tagus at Villa Velha, at Abrantes, at Santarem, or even lower down, at Salvaterra. I understand that the river will not be fordable anywhere for a month, and therefore the enemy must intend to seize the boats in the river, if he should now make his attack by this supposed line. The civil government will be required to give directions, that, upon the first alarm, its Officers may exert themselves to collect the boats, particularly on that part of the river below Abrantes; and you will do everything in your power to assist them.

‘ If they should succeed in crossing the river above Punhete, you will defend, as long as may be in your power, the positions on the Zezere. If you should find that they attempt the passage lower down, and are likely to succeed in effecting it, particularly in the neighbourhood of Salvaterra, you will leave the upper parts of the Tagus, and the positions on the Zezere, to be defended by the Portuguese light troops and militia; and you will take care to keep yourself, with the British troops, in such a position, in respect to the enemy, as that you shall have your communication open with Lisbon. If you should be under the necessity of retreating, you will do it gradually, defending every position that can be defended, particularly Villa Franca and Bucellas, Lumiar and Sacavem, &c. &c.; and you will adopt every measure in your power to gain time for me to come to your assistance.

‘ If the enemy should direct his attack solely by the line of Alcantara, it will be necessary that you should carry your whole force into the mountains between Castello Branco and Abrantes, where I understand Colonel Le Cor now is with his caçadores and yagers. You will find the positions in those mountains very strong; but they are turned by the new road from Capinho, near Covilhão, to Cardigos; and, if the enemy should take that road, you must defend the Zezere, as before pointed out.

‘ In the view of rendering it more difficult for the enemy to make his attack north of the Tagus, I have requested

Marshal Beresford to make arrangements for occupying Alcantara with a garrison; by which measure, as long as the river shall continue full, the enemy will be obliged to go round by the bridge of Almaraz, and give you more time for your defensive arrangements.

‘As Alcantara is not a very good post, you will take care that the garrison is withdrawn, as soon as it shall have answered the purpose of obliging the enemy to look for another passage.

‘From the circumstances which I have above mentioned respecting the state of the enemy’s force, it is not probable that they will attack by both of the lines which are open to them. If they should, you will oppose them in the mountains by the caçadores, yagers, and the militia, and keep your regular troops on the right for the defence of the Tagus—in the first instance, of the Zezere, and eventually to cover Lisbon.

‘I understand from Marshal Beresford that an Officer of engineers is employed in the construction of works to defend the passage of the Tagus at Abrantes. You will urge the completion of those works; and you will be so kind as to have the Tagus examined, with a view to discover in what places it is likely to be fordable in the dry season, particularly between Punhete and Salvaterra; and you will have works constructed for the defence of the passage, in the first instance, at those places to which any principal road leads on the other side.

‘You will direct your Commissary to correspond with the Deputy Commissary General at Lisbon respecting supplies of provisions, if the country should not be able to afford you supplies in sufficient quantities. As you will have your communication open by the river, you cannot be in want.

‘There is a *depôt* of military stores at Santarem, from which you will draw such supplies of that description as you may require.

‘The persons employed at Badajoz and Elvas, and elsewhere on the frontier, to give intelligence of the enemy’s movements, will be directed to correspond with you; and I shall have persons placed on the road between your head quarters and me, for the purpose of keeping up a constant communication between us.

‘ Besides the defence of the points referred to, it is very desirable that, till their service should be otherwise called for, the assistance of our troops should be given to discipline the Portuguese regular regiments. I request you to quarter the Portuguese regiments and the British regiments as much as possible together; and urge the Commanding Officers of the latter to aid the former, as much as may be in their power, in training and disciplining their soldiers.

‘ I need not point out the advantage which must result from this mode of employing the leisure which it is probable the troops will have, particularly to your corps, if the army should be employed to the northward till the Tagus may become fordable.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Mackenzie.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. In the enumeration of Portuguese troops which will be placed under your command, I have omitted to mention three brigades of artillery at Santarem.

‘ In case you should want any heavy ordnance for the batteries on the Tagus, you will write to Mr. Villiers for it, and it will be sent up the Tagus.

‘ A. W.’

To the Right Hon. John Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Pombal, 1st May, 1809.

‘ I arrived here this day, and shall be at Coimbra to-morrow. I have written General Mackenzie’s instructions, of which I shall send you a copy. In the mean time it is very desirable that some arrangements should be made to secure the boats upon the Tagus, as far down as Salvaterra, upon the first alarm of invasion. This can be effected only by means of the civil authorities of the country, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will concert measures with the Government for that purpose.

‘ General Mackenzie may require heavy ordnance for the batteries which he will have constructed upon the Tagus; and I have desired him to write to you if he should require any, and I shall be obliged to you if you will apply to the Government for what he may require. There is a report in the country that the French had forced the passage of the

Tamaga on the 27th. I know Silveira still held his ground on the 26th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General Mackenzie.

‘ MY DEAR MACKENZIE,

‘ Coimbra, 2d May, 1809.

‘ In explanation of that part of my instructions relative to the collecting of the boats on the Tagus, on the approach of the enemy, I beg it may be understood that the boats must be either destroyed or carried down the river below Salvaterra, where the river is broad enough to place them out of the reach of musketry from the opposite bank; and also to take the precaution of placing a guard over them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Mackenzie.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. John Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Coimbra, 2d May, 1809.

‘ I received your letter of the 30th of April last night; and I now enclose you the copy of my instructions to Major General Mackenzie, in which you will see that the point of attack by Salvaterra has been considered and means of defence suggested, and that all the measures ordered in those instructions have in view the ultimate defence of Lisbon itself, if Portugal should be invaded by a part of Victor’s corps, during my absence to the northward. I should not be at all surprised if a small corps were pushed in, but nothing but a large one will answer to oblige General Mackenzie to retire. If the Government look well after the boats, the whole of Victor’s army would not be able, at present, or I believe for a month to come, to cross the Tagus.

‘ A garrison has been ordered into Alcantara. I agree with you about the 40th, and I enclose a letter for Mr. Frere, which I beg you to peruse and forward. I shall write to the Admiral respecting transports for this corps.

‘ I understand that the corps which came from the neighbourhood of Caceres consisted of cavalry only, and returned to Merida.

‘ It is not impossible, however, that Victor, if obliged to

remain on the defensive till he shall hear of Soult, will send a corps into Portugal to get intelligence of him; but no corps will make any impression by the Tagus at this season of the year, if the Government will look well after the boats on that river; and a small corps will make no impression in an attack by Alcantara, supposing that they should anticipate us in the possession of that place. We mean to fortify all the fords on the river at and above Salvaterra; and you will observe the directions which I have given to Mackenzie on the subject; but we must have a little time.

‘I am obliged to you for your offer to procure me assistance to copy my dispatches; but I have plenty of that description. The fact is, that, excepting upon very important occasions, I write my dispatches without making a draft, and those which I sent to you were so written before I set out in the morning, and I had not time to get them copied before they were sent, which is the reason why I asked you to return me copies of them.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Coimbra, 2d May, 1809.

‘I received your letter of the 30th last night, and accept with pleasure your offer to send to Puerto S^{ta} Maria transports to convey the 40th regiment to Lisbon. I have written to Colonel Kemmis orders to march to Puerto S^{ta} Maria; and I shall be very much obliged to you if, with the infantry transports, you will send also transports to convey round 100 horses and mules, in order that the regiment may be enabled to march immediately upon its arrival at Lisbon.

‘I am much obliged to you for the information which you send me of our convoy. I hope it will soon arrive, as it is much wanted. We have had very bad weather, yet I arrived here this day, and the troops will all be here by the 4th.

‘I give no credit to the report of the defeat of the French: they may have been ill treated in a skirmish of the advanced guards, but I doubt whether the main body on either side is inclined to fight.

‘ I understand that the French corps which had appeared at Caceres has returned to Merida.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Coimbra, 2d May, 1809.

‘ I arrived here this day, and the army will be collected in this town and neighbourhood on the day after to-morrow.

‘ In making my arrangements for the defence of the Tagus, and of the frontiers on the north bank of that river, to be occupied by my detachments during my absence, I find that I shall be very bare of troops without the 40th regiment ; and I shall feel still greater inconvenience from the want of them, when I shall return from the expedition to the northward and shall move to the frontiers of Spain ; as at that time I shall be obliged to send two battalions to Gibraltar, and detachments equal in strength to two more to England, according to the instructions which I have received, which must be obeyed as soon as the enemy shall have retired from Portugal.

‘ I am anxious, therefore, that the 40th regiment should be sent to me as soon as possible, more particularly as they can be of no use at Seville ; and I avail myself of the offer of the Admiral to send transports to Puerto S^{ta} Maria to bring them to Lisbon.

‘ I shall be obliged to you to send to Colonel Kemmis the enclosed orders to march to Puerto S^{ta} Maria, there to embark for Lisbon, and if you will ask the Spanish Government to afford every facility for the march of the regiment under his command.

‘ I have no news from this quarter. I understand that Soult has moved the greatest part of his force towards the Tamaga, I suppose with an intention of retreating through Tras os Montes into Spain.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. H. Frere.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Kemmis, 40th Regiment.

‘ SIR,

‘ Coimbra, 2d May, 1809.

‘ I beg that, as soon as it may be convenient after you shall have received this order, you will march with the regiment under your command, from Seville to Puerto S^{ta} Maria, by such route as may be settled for you by the Government of Spain; and you will there embark in transports which will have been sent round for the regiment, and will proceed to Lisbon, where you will receive further orders.

‘ As it might be inconvenient to the Officers of the regiment to part with the horses and mules which they may have, and as they would be unable to take the field immediately upon their arrival at Lisbon, if they should part with them, I have requested the Admiral to send to Puerto S^{ta} Maria transports to convey the horses and mules, as well as the regiment.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Kemmis, 40th Reg.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDA OF AN ARRANGEMENT FOR THE COMMISSARIAT.

‘ 1. There shall be attached to each brigade of infantry, to each regiment of cavalry, to the artillery, and to head quarters, an Assistant Commissary, with a sufficient number of clerks, interpreters, &c.

‘ 2. The troops shall march from Coimbra, with three days’ bread on their backs: the cavalry and artillery with three days’ forage.

‘ 3. The Assistant Commissaries with brigades, regiments, &c., to have cattle for their brigades and regiments for three days.

‘ 4. The Assistant Commissaries with brigades and regiments should likewise have with them bread for their brigades and regiments for three days.

‘ 5. This bread must eventually be carried on mules; but till mules can be provided to carry the whole, the mules now with the Commissariat should be divided among the brigades and Commissaries to carry a portion of the bread, and waggons to carry the remainder.

‘ 6. The Assistant Commissaries and others attached to brigades will, on their route through the country, do every-

thing in their power to procure supplies. If they cannot procure them in time for the use of the brigades or regiments, to which they will be attached, they will order them to be prepared for the succeeding troops on the march, or they will order them to the next depôt to be formed; and they will invariably report to the succeeding Commissary, and as soon as possible to the Commissary General, the success which they have had in procuring supplies.

‘ 7. All requisitions on the country must be made by the Officers of the troops on the Assistant Commissaries, who will report these requisitions to the Commissary General as soon as made.

‘ *Coimbra, 2d May, 1809.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDA FOR THE COMMISSARY GENERAL ON THE EXPEDITION INTO THE NORTH OF PORTUGAL.

‘ 1. The troops will march in two principal columns, the right composed of about 6,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry, by the route of Vizeu to Lamego; the left of about 20,000 infantry and 1,400 cavalry, by the route of Vouga towards Oporto.

‘ 2. A depôt for six days for 30,000 men, and 5,000 horses, should be formed at Coimbra. This should be carried forward by the waggons of Coimbra, in its due proportions, to Vizeu and Vouga respectively; which waggons should commence their march two days after the troops shall have set out. These waggons should return as soon as they shall have performed this service, and fresh waggons procured at Vizeu and Vouga to carry on the supplies.

‘ 3. A Commissary to be sent to Vizeu to collect supplies for the column proceeding by that route. This column should set out from Vizeu with the same quantity of provisions as it has on setting out from Coimbra.

‘ 4. On the arrival of the troops at Vizeu, a Commissary to be sent forward to make arrangements for supplying the troops at Lamego on their arrival there.

‘ 5. On the —, a Commissary to be sent to Aveiro to prepare supplies of bread, forage, &c., for the troops at that place. This bread, &c., will be embarked at Aveiro, and carried by boats to Ovar, from whence the troops and bri-

gade Commissaries should start with the same supply as from Coimbra. A depôt should be formed at Ovar, and kept up for the troops advancing on that line for five days, by which the troops should be supplied by carts hired at Ovar and in the neighbourhood, in their advance to and till their arrival at Oporto.

‘ *Coimbra, 2d May, 1809.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ *Coimbra, 3d May, 1809.*

‘ I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 1st.

‘ I shall send in a flag of truce to Soult, on the subject of the exchange of the British Officers who are his prisoners, as soon as I shall be prepared to let him know in another manner that we are here.

‘ I know nothing more that bears upon the subject on which Bayley is gone to England, excepting the greatest civility from the French Officer at the outposts to Colonel Trant, lately, when he had a communication with them by a flag of truce. One of the Officers whom he saw was mentioned by my friend as being of his party. I do not understand from any intelligence that I have seen that any corps is coming to Alcantara.

‘ The movement from Truxillo, mentioned by Captain Mayne, is of heavy cannon, to Merida, which, whatever may be the enemy’s intention, cannot be destined for the invasion of Portugal by Alcantara. If, indeed, we occupied Alcantara, the heavy cannon might be intended to deprive us of that point; but the French are well aware that we do not occupy Alcantara, as Lapisse passed through that place very lately with his division.

‘ I have not heard of any movement on the frontier, excepting that of the cavalry to Caceres, adverted to in my letter of yesterday.

‘ You will have seen that I had alluded to the necessity of intelligence of the enemy’s movements for General Mackenzie, upon which subject, as well as others, I propose to make arrangements with Beresford as soon as he shall arrive.

‘ It would be well, however, if you could correspond with General Mackenzie, and find out where he will have his

head quarters from time to time, and ask Forjaz to desire his friends upon the frontier to write to Mackenzie. The latter, however, should receive this intelligence, and provide for his own security.

‘Beresford will be here to-night.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Trant.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Coimbra, 3d May, 1809.

‘I received in the night your letter of 8 P.M., and this morning that of half past 9 P.M. In respect to the first, I have only to request that you will keep your position till I shall be in readiness, not only to move to you, but to push on to Oporto. In respect to the second, I beg you to convey the enclosed letter in any way you can to the Captain of the *Nautilus*.

‘As we shall have some troops at Mealhada, on the road to Vouga, to-morrow, on their march towards Vizeu; and as it is desirable your friends should not see more of our troops than is absolutely necessary, and should know nothing of our operations, I request you to bring or send them word to Martede, three leagues from hence on the road to Aveiro, and let me know at what hour they will be there.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Trant.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Trant.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Coimbra, 3d May, 1809.

‘I have just now received your letter of this day. Lieut. Colonel Douglas is gone to Aveiro to reconnoitre the road for me; and I have sent the party of dragoons to join him, and I have desired him to take them into the town of Aveiro to-morrow night, for the purpose mentioned by you. If the dragoons should fall in with Colonel Douglas, I have desired him to send to you at Agueda, and you need not go over to Aveiro; but if the dragoons should not find Colonel Douglas, and you should not hear from him, it will be necessary that you should go over to Aveiro to-morrow night, to meet them, and to receive the persons expected.

‘I have accordingly given instructions to the Officer of

the Staff, who will go with the dragoons to find Colonel Douglas or you, and as soon as he shall find either, he will return.

‘ I will meet you and your friends at Fornos, one league from hence on the road to Vouga, at the hour you shall name on the 5th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Trant.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. Colonel Douglas is not yet gone, and he shall take the dragoons; and you may do as you please, either go to Aveiro or not—only send him word.

‘ You will do well to send away the dragoons as soon as you get out at Aveiro. ‘ A. W.’

To Lieut. General the Hon. Edward Paget.

‘ MY DEAR PAGET,

‘ Coimbra, 4th May, 1809.

‘ I have assembled the main body of the army at this place, with a view to an operation against Soult, for reasons into which it is unnecessary that I should enter at present, but which I shall detail to you when we meet; and we have a detachment of British and Portuguese troops on the Tagus, to watch Victor’s movements, and to guard the passes into Portugal north of that river.

‘ I should wish you to join this corps, and I recommend you to come up by Villa Franca, Rio Mayor, Leyria, Pombal, and Coimbra. You will find forage at all these places, but at no others on the road.

‘ If General Fane should be with you, I wish him to join the brigade of heavy dragoons, which I have been obliged to leave with the corps upon the Tagus, on account of the want of forage upon the road to this place; and let General Erskine come up to command the 1st hussars and 23d dragoons, which corps have been ordered into the Mondego, where they will be landed.

‘ I shall put all this in orders as soon as I shall know who is arrived: in the mean time it will be convenient to all parties to know their destination. I hope to march on the 7th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General
the Hon. E. Paget.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Coimbra, 4th May, 1809.

‘ In the letter which I wrote to General Paget, and sent to you from Villa Franca, I told him that I wished General Erskine to join the brigade of heavy dragoons on the Tagus, if General Fane was not come out; and I have every reason to be apprehensive that General Fane will have been detained in England to attend Parliament, and I did not advert to General Erskine’s seniority to General Mackenzie, over whom it would be inconvenient to place him at the present moment.

‘ In case that Paget should not have arrived, I enclose another letter for him, in which I have rectified this mistake; and in that case, I beg you to deliver the enclosed letter, instead of that transmitted to you from Villa Franca, which I will thank you to return to me.

‘ Of course you will not say anything upon this subject to anybody. If Paget should have arrived without Fane, the inconvenience cannot be avoided, and we must make the best of it; and I really believe that I should have every reason to place confidence in General Erskine, if he had been a little longer in Portugal. If you should have given the other letter to Paget, I request you to return the enclosed.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Coimbra, 4th May, 1809.

‘ Since I wrote to you yesterday, we have heard that the French had forced the bridge of the Tamaga on the 2d, and that Silveira had retired across the Douro to Lamego. The French also appear to have pushed a detachment across the Douro at Ambos dos Rios.

‘ On the other hand, we hear from Oporto, that they are blowing up magazines of gunpowder, which looks like an immediate evacuation.

‘ Since I wrote to you yesterday, I have received intimation that I am to see two persons to-morrow on the business on which Bayley went to England.

‘ I had a conversation with Beresford last night, on a subject on which you spoke to me before I left Lisbon, viz., the settling the person who should have powers to sign for and bind the Portuguese Government by his acts, if such a measure should be necessary; and I agree entirely with Beresford, that whether it be he or me, the Portuguese Government must be the persons who shall decide. I wish, therefore, that you would arrange this matter with Forjaz; and I acknowledge that I shall not be sorry if they should decide either that I shall not bind them by any act of mine without Beresford’s concurrence, or that Beresford alone shall bind them. Lest Forjaz should think that we have any notion of another Convention, I do not know whether it would not be advisable that you should state to him the object of our conferences with the person who came to Lisbon. However, that is a point on which your better knowledge of his discretion will enable you to form a more correct judgment than I can.

‘ Beresford’s corps marches to-morrow, and mine will move on the 7th, if we should find that Silveira has really retired, of which we have as yet no official accounts.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. We are very much in want of money, and till we can bring our resources to bear, it will be a great convenience if you would give us back half of the sum of money which the Commissary lately advanced to you, and send it up to us as soon as possible.

‘ A. W.’

To Captain Dench, H.M.S. Nautilus.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Coimbra, 4th May, 1809.

‘ Colonel Trant has communicated to me the intelligence you have transmitted to him, for which I am much obliged to you.

‘ You will much oblige me also if you will direct all convoys coming down the coast with troops or stores, to put into the Mondego, as I wish to land the troops in that river, with a view to the operations which I am about to carry on to the northward.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Captain Dench.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. General Sir John Cradock, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR CRADOCK,

‘ Coimbra, 5th May, 1809.

‘ I enclose copies of letters which I brought from England with me, relative to the relief of two regiments at Gibraltar, by two battalions from this army, which you will observe it appears to have been intended by the Secretary of State should have been made by sending, in the first instance, from hence the two regiments to relieve those coming from Gibraltar.

‘ These letters were written before the Secretary of State was aware of the situation of affairs in this country, and knew of the demand and pressure for troops; otherwise, I am convinced that he would have desired that the relief might be commenced by sending to this country from Gibraltar, at least, one of the two regiments.

‘ What I have to request is that, if you should view this matter in the same light I do, you would consent to send to Portugal, on your arrival at Gibraltar, one of the regiments, in the room of which a regiment shall be sent from hence on its arrival. If you should consent to this arrangement, I would further request you to ask the Admiral to send forthwith to Gibraltar 1,500 tons of shipping to convey the regiment to Portugal.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Sir John Cradock, K.B.’

To Dom Miguel Pereira Forjaz.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Coimbra, 5th May, 1809.

‘ I have received the letter which your Excellency has addressed to me, conveying to me the commission of Marshal General of the armies of Portugal, which the Regency, acting in the name of the Prince Regent, have conferred upon me.

‘ I beg that you will do me the favor to present to the

* One of the ministers of Portugal, through whom the communications and correspondence passed to the Government of the Regency of Portugal. Although in subsequent communications with Mr. Stuart, there are some remarks not complimentary to Dom Miguel Forjaz, ample justice followed a more intimate acquaintance with his merits, and the Duke of Wellington afterwards found Dom Miguel Forjaz to be the ablest man in the Peninsula.

Regency my best acknowledgments for the great honor which they have conferred upon me, which I hope I shall merit by the zeal with which I shall endeavor to promote the interests and to provide for the security of the kingdom of Portugal; and I also request that you, Sir, will accept my thanks for the handsome expressions in which you have conveyed to me the pleasure of the Regency.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Dom Miguel Pereira Forjaz.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To W. Huskisson, Esq., Secretary to the Treasury.

‘ MY DEAR HUSKISSON,

‘ Coimbra, 5th May, 1809.

‘ I promised to let you know the state of our money concerns upon my arrival in this country, and I am concerned to have to give you so bad an account of them.

‘ Instead of 400,000*l.*, which you and I expected from the accounts that I should have found in Portugal, I have found not quite 100,000*l.*, and this sum was in Spanish coins, which could not have been circulated in Portugal, excepting at a considerable loss, and without revealing to the dealers in money at Lisbon the fact of our want of money, which would have raised the expense of drawing bills excessively. I have therefore sent the Spanish gold to Cadiz to be exchanged for dollars; and I am now here with the whole army, about to proceed to the attack of Soult, with only 10,000*l.*, and with monstrous demands upon us.

‘ The estimate of the expenses in Portugal amounts to about 200,000*l. per mensem* upon a rough estimate. Of this sum, however, a large proportion, 50,000*l. per mensem*, is paid by the Deputy Paymaster General, and ought to be drawn for by him on the Paymaster General. Another large proportion, the amount of which I do not know, is paid by the Ambassador, and ought to be drawn for by him; and the remainder of the expense properly defrayed by the Commissary General.

‘ I have desired this Officer to send to the Treasury an accurate estimate of his demands under these three heads, that you may not conceive that, after having provided for the pay of the army, in the Army Estimates, and for the subsidy to Portugal, you have besides to provide a sum

for the military operations in this country, amounting to 2,500,000*l. per annum.*

‘ You may depend upon it that I shall keep the expenses as low as possible. I have already made arrangements for sending home a quantity of transport and victualling tonnage; and as soon as I can look a little more about me, and if I should have some good fortune, I intend to send home the whole.

‘ I think, however, from all that I have heard of the possibility of procuring money for bills at Lisbon, at Cadiz, and at Gibraltar, to which last places we have sent, that it will be necessary that you should occasionally send specie here. I recommend that you should send 100,000*l.* in silver to Portugal, as soon as possible after you shall receive this letter; and I will apprise you from time to time of the necessity which may exist for sending more. This advantage will certainly result from sending us money occasionally from England; viz., that of enabling us to command and keep down the expense of drawing bills in all the money markets, which advantage is no small one.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *W. Huskisson, Esq.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ Coimbra, 6th May, 1809,

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

½ past 1 P.M.

‘ I enclose a letter from Douglas: I have besides received a letter from him stating that he will be this day in the neighbourhood of Mealhada with our friends. I have appointed him to be near Fornos, at half past 6 this evening.

‘ I likewise send you some letters from Trant. You have omitted to leave me a statement of the rations of your troops, or an account of the period to which they are victualled. You have also omitted to tell me where the interpreters attached to the brigades are to get horses and mules.

‘ I wish much to see Arentschildt*.

‘ Your troops made but a bad figure this morning at the review. The battalions very weak, not more than 300 men;

* An Officer of the Artillery of the King’s German Legion, in the Portuguese army.

the body of men, particularly of the — regiment, very bad; and the Officers worse than any thing I have seen.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. Mr. Rawlings has informed me that you have taken away forty mules which he had got from the magistrates here. We must keep clear of each other in our requisitions, otherwise all will sink. If our Commissary is to supply the Portuguese troops when engaged in an operation of this kind, we must have all the supplies the country can afford.

‘ A. W.’

To Major General Mackenzie.

‘ MY DEAR MACKENZIE,

‘ Coimbra, 6th May, 1809.

‘ I have received your letter of the 3d.

‘ You will receive with this letter a copy of all the orders issued to the army; and you will consider as applicable to yourself that order which allows one interpreter to every Officer commanding a brigade, to which Portuguese troops are attached, and you will take an interpreter.

‘ General Beresford and the Government at Lisbon have Spanish and Portuguese correspondents on the frontier, and there are Officers employed to give intelligence to the Commander in Chief, respecting whom the Quarter Master General will write to you, and they are all directed to correspond with you.

‘ I have written to Lisbon to request that there may be a daily post between Abrantes and this place, during the time that I am to the northward, and between this place and the army. In case you should have anything very important to communicate, send off an *Officer, post*, and his expenses shall be paid.

‘ General Beresford informed me that he had settled your relative situation with General Miranda, and, as I understood him, had apprised you of the arrangement he had made.

‘ In case of the approach of an enemy, you are to move the troops as you may think proper, without reference to him; but reporting to him for his information. Before the enemy shall approach, you are to suggest to him to make any movement of which you may be desirous. If he should

make any difficulty about moving troops as you may wish, tell him that you make it in compliance with directions from me.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Gen. Mackenzie.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. John Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Coimbra, 6th May, 1809.

‘ I enclose for your information a letter which I have received from Lisbon, relating to our communications. What appears to be the best is this. First, that there should be a daily post from Coimbra to Lisbon, and, *vice versâ*, through Thomar. Secondly, that there should be a daily post from Abrantes to Thomar, and *vice versâ*; by which means we shall be enabled to correspond, not only with Lisbon, but with Abrantes, General Mackenzie’s head quarters, daily.

‘ Pray arrange this matter with the Government at an early period.

‘ My troops move to-morrow.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Coimbra, 7th May, 1809.

‘ I think it proper to draw your Lordship’s attention at this early period to the state of the cavalry horses in Portugal; and I enclose a paper, containing an account of the number deficient at the present moment, and of the number unserviceable in each regiment. The deficiencies in the 3d dragoon guards are stated to have been occasioned by the want of forty horses to complete it, when that corps was sent from England, and by the loss of a transport, containing twenty six horses, run down by one of His Majesty’s ships on the passage; those in the 14th light dragoons, by the ordinary casualties of the service, and by glanders caught in the transports in which they came from England.

‘ Your Lordship will observe that the 14th light dragoons have cast no horses for fourteen months, and they have now sixty four horses unserviceable.

‘ As it is of the utmost importance to keep up the cavalry to its full numbers, and as no horses can be procured in Por-

tugal, I take the liberty of recommending that a remount for each of the regiments, to the amount stated in the enclosed paper, may be sent from England at an early period.

‘ In case your Lordship should think proper to attend to this recommendation, I further beg leave to recommend that the horses sent may not be those collected at the depôts of the regiments respectively, which I understand are generally too young for immediate service ; but horses either drafted or purchased for the purpose, and of the description and in the condition to perform the services which will be immediately required of them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Coimbra, 7th May, 1809.

‘ Before I left Lisbon I made arrangements for sending to England all the tonnage, containing provisions of every description, and 5,000 tons of infantry transports, which quantity I intended, and do still intend, further to increase by the whole amount of the transports in Portugal, if I can either beat or cripple Soult.

‘ I do not know whether this arrangement has been carried into execution, as the Agent of Transports is the worst hand I have seen of that description, and you are aware that the transports are not solely under my directions. I write to inform you, however, what I intended ; and to tell you that if you wish that I should arrange this branch of the service on the most economical plan for the public, you will send out Lieut. Fleetwood, whom I had with me last year in Portugal, to be Agent of Transports in charge of the whole fleet. Commissioner George is well acquainted with him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Coimbra, 7th May, 1809.

‘ I have received your letters of the 4th and 5th, and I am very much obliged to you for the plans which you propose to adopt in aid of General Mackenzie’s measures for fortifying

the Tagus, and for removing the boats from the river in the event of invasion by the enemy.

‘ The victuallers and other store ships are not yet arrived at Figueira; but the hussars are arrived there, under convoy of Captain Mudge, and I have written to him to beg that he will land them.

‘ I am much obliged to you for sending the horse transports for the use of the 40th regiment. I do not know whether there are any transports for them at Cadiz; but as you will probably think it necessary to send convoy for them, you might probably send transports, if it is not certain that there are some at Cadiz. I am certain that Mr. Frere will consent to their departure from Seville.

‘ I am much obliged to you for the orders which you have given to Captain Grainger of the *Semiramis*. I had already sent out a schooner with a letter addressed to any Officer going down the coast with a convoy having troops on board, to request him to put into the Mondego; and I expect the arrival of a brigade of light troops, as well as the 23d light dragoons and the hussars.

‘ General Beresford's corps moved the day before yesterday. My advanced guard marched this morning; and I hope that in a few days we shall be in possession of Oporto. I am afraid that the loss of the bridge of Amarante will prevent us from doing more than hurry the enemy out of Portugal.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Captain Mudge, R.N.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Coimbra, 7th May, 1809.

‘ I have received your letter of yesterday evening, and I am much obliged to you for the newspapers you have transmitted.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will be so kind as to land at Figueira the troops which have come from England under your convoy, with the exception of the men of the 2d batt. 24th regiment, whom I should wish to have sent to Lisbon, that battalion being stationed upon the Tagus.

‘ As I have before had cavalry landed in the Mondego, I

have reason to apprehend that you will experience difficulty in landing those which you have brought: the best mode of effecting our object we found to be to send into the river all the vessels whose draught of water would permit their passing the bar, where we experienced no difficulty in disembarking them. In respect to those vessels whose draught of water would not permit them to pass the bar, we disembarked the horses from them with the boats of the country, of which large numbers are to be found at Buarcos and Figueira, and thus took the horses across the bar in these boats, and landed them with ease.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Captain Mudge, R.N.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Coimbra, 7th May, 1809.

‘ Our friend came to Aveiro yesterday; and I saw him last night at a fire on the road between Fornos and Martede.

‘ He says there are two parties now in the army: one, to seize at all events; the other, who wish to seize only in case the person persists in declaring himself King. He had two plans to propose: one that we should endeavor to draw S—— into a snare by persuading some of the people in this part of the country to address him to declare himself King, and even that I should write to recommend the same measure to him, as one most likely to pacify Portugal and Spain; the other, that we should make our dispositions, and attack forthwith, taking care to cut off their retreat by a strong corps upon the Douro and even at Villa Real.

‘ In respect to the measures proposed for my adoption, I declared that I could have nothing to do with them, as the inevitable result would be to deprive me of the confidence of the Portuguese. In respect to the attack, I told our friend that I would make it as soon as I could, but that the time must depend upon circumstances.

‘ He said that if S—— could be induced to declare himself King, the whole army of Laborde and Loison would declare against him, and *lead the army back into France.*

‘ I could not exactly understand by what road the French were to march after having made good their retreat to Villa Real: he said, towards Benavente in Spain. However, it is

not impossible that they might endeavor to pass the Douro and to go by Lamego, which place indeed our friend mentioned at one time, though he did not say where they were to go from Lamego. He shewed me a paper very ably drawn up, as he said, by an Officer of rank, pointing out their different lines of retreat, which states a decided preference for that of Villa Real, but to what point from Villa Real is not stated; and I observe that there are several roads which lead through Villa Real, to Braganza, to Chaves, &c. Our friend particularly cautioned me against the employment of too small a corps to cut them off at Villa Real.

‘ Now upon all this the question is, what we shall do; my opinion is, that we are not sufficiently strong in British troops to make such an attack upon Oporto as will oblige them to evacuate that town, and to post such a corps at Villa Real as will effectually cut them off. We must be content therefore with preventing them from crossing the Douro; and this can be done only by your being at Lamego as soon as possible, that is to say, by the 10th or 11th at latest.

‘ I conceive that your corps will be at Vizeu on the 8th, and may be at Lamego on the 10th: if I make my attack on the outposts on the Vouga at Ovar and Oliveira on the 9th, as I intended, it will be known at Amarante on the morning of the 10th: the French are in strength at that point; and on the same day they may seize Lamego, supposing that to be their object. I propose therefore to delay my attack on the outposts till the 10th, in hopes to give you time to occupy Lamego and the banks of the Douro before the enemy at Amarante shall know of it.

‘ In respect to your occupation of Villa Real, it would be a most important and decisive step if you could venture upon it, supposing the enemy not to have anticipated you; but I acknowledge that I should not like to see a British brigade, supported by 6000 or 8000 Portuguese troops, in *any but a very good post*, exposed to be attacked by the French army; and I must observe that they would have every facility and probably time to attack you at Villa Real before I could arrive in a situation to assist you, by breaking the bridges Oporto and Amarante; and by defending the passages of the Douro and the Tamaga by rear guards.

‘ I therefore recommend to you not to occupy Villa Real,

even if you should find the French have not anticipated you, unless you should know that the post is of such a description as that you will certainly be able to hold it for two or three or more days.

‘ In all this view of the case, the loss of the bridge of Amarante is a great misfortune, and is the greater from the manner in which it was lost. Our friend says it was carried by the French making two false attacks on the right, under cover of which they mined the barricade on the bridge, which was very strong, and blew it up in the morning at daylight ; threw a column over it which surprised the Portuguese asleep ; and they were unable to blow it up as they had intended ; and the French carried everything before them. He says that the French *courent sur les Portugais comme s'ils étaient des lièvres*. He says that the French have not lost above two or three hundred men in all their attacks in Portugal, and advised me strongly not to put any trust in the Portuguese troops.

‘ Some of the Colonels of your regiments have just been here to say that they cannot march, having no money to pay for the mules and muleteers attached to their corps to carry certain baggage. I have desired that money may be advanced to them, on the account of the Portuguese Government, by our Paymaster General, which must be repaid ; but we ought to have had an account of all these wants before we took them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Coimbra, 7th May, 1809.

‘ I met last night —, for the first time since I had seen him at Lisbon.

‘ He told me that the French army was at this time divided into two parties ; one, which intended to seize Soult at all events, and to carry into execution the plan he had before communicated to me ; the other, consisting of —, —, and even those connected with Buonaparte, who were determined to seize Soult if he should declare himself King of Portugal, of which he has manifested an intention. This latter party would then lead the army into France, where it

is understood that Buonaparte wishes to have it. But — thinks that if Soult was once seized, everything would go on as *his* friends wished.

‘ He then made two propositions to me : one, that I should make my arrangements to attack them immediately, taking care to cut off their retreat into Spain ; the other, that, if I would not make my attack immediately, I should endeavor to prevail upon the inhabitants of some of the towns in Portugal with which I was in communication, to petition Soult to take upon himself the government of Portugal as King ; and that I should even go so far as to advise him myself to take that step as the most likely to secure the peace of Portugal and Spain, and to lead to the overthrow of Buonaparte.

‘ In answer to these propositions, I told —, as to the first, that I should certainly operate upon Soult as soon as I should be ready. In regard to the second, I told him that I could not take any measures to induce the people of Portugal to act as he proposed, without incurring the risk of leading them to believe that I was unworthy of their confidence.

‘ He then gave me a good deal of information respecting the strength, the position, and the plans of the enemy, and of the detestation of Soult generally prevailing in the army ; all of which was confirmed by Monsieur —, who came with him ; and I sent him back without his having seen any of our troops, or knowing that we had such numbers collected here.

‘ I firmly believe what he says respecting the prevailing discontent, and I think it not improbable that —, and others attached to Buonaparte, aware of it, and apprehensive of its effects, would turn it so far to account of Buonaparte, as to induce the army to seize their General, for being guilty of an ambitious abuse of his authority and disobedience of the orders of the Emperor. And if they are really in a scrape, which I acknowledge I doubt, they would make use of this act, if possible, to induce us to allow them to go away.

‘ This is certainly the case if —, —, and others of that party knew of —’s communications with us, which I cannot find out.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. John Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Coimbra, 7th May, 1809.

‘ I enclose a copy of a letter which I wrote this day to Beresford, and a letter to Lord Castlereagh, in respect to Captain —, which is open for your perusal. Forward the latter to England, and return the former.

‘ I have received your letter of the 5th. The measures proposed respecting the boats are very judicious. I shall be happy to receive any reinforcements sent to me; but I do not think I ought to ask for any. I have sent to Lisbon two Officers of engineers with orders respecting the defence of Lisbon, the Tagus, Palmella, and Setuval.

‘ Elvas has, I understand, a garrison of 10,000 men, which ought to be sufficient, but I shall inquire upon that subject.

‘ I have written a very fine letter on my appointment as Marshal.

‘ I send by this opportunity a packet of army letters, and my dispatches for England, which I request you to forward by the first opportunity.

‘ I enclose a letter from General Sherbrooke, which I beg you to peruse, and to act upon it as you may think proper.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Coimbra, 7th May, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to inform you, that, in conformity with the intention which I announced to your Lordship on the 27th of April, I have assembled the army at this place, with the exception of the 2d batt. 30th regiment, employed to garrison Lisbon, and the detachment on the Tagus, under the command of Major General Mackenzie.

‘ The whole were assembled here on the 5th instant, and, on the same day, a detachment consisting of one brigade of British infantry, and one squadron of British cavalry, and a corps of about 6,000 Portuguese troops, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, moved towards Vizeu, under General Beresford, in order to operate upon the enemy's left; while I shall move upon his right at Oporto, with the main body of the

British army, and two battalions of Portuguese infantry. The British advanced guard commenced its march this morning.

‘ The enemy remains nearly in the same positions, as well on the Eastern frontier, and in the northern provinces of this kingdom, as he did when I wrote last. No alteration whatever, that I know of, has been made in the positions of the French army on the Guadiana; and the only difference in this quarter is, that the Portuguese General, Silveira, has been defeated upon the Tamaga, and the French have obtained the possession of the bridge of Amarante on the 2d instant. This acquisition is important, inasmuch as it affords them the facility of retreating through the province of Tras os Montes.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Coimbra, 7th May, 1809 .

‘ My dispatch of this date will give you a notion of the state of affairs here. I think that I shall soon settle this part of the country in some way or other; and I shall then turn my attention entirely to Victor.

‘ I think it probable that Cuesta and I shall be more than a match for the French army on the Guadiana, and that we shall force them to retreat. The tenor of my instructions will then become important; and, unless they are altered, I shall be obliged to halt at the moment I shall have removed from the Portuguese frontier the danger by which it is threatened; possibly at that time at which the continuance of my advance might be most important to the cause of the Spaniards.

‘ I wish the King’s Ministers to consider this point, and to give me a latitude to continue my operations in Spain, if I should consider them important to the Spanish cause and consistent with the safety of Portugal.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. G. Canning.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

Coimbra, 7th May, 1809.

‘ My dispatches and letters to Lord Castlereagh will inform you of the state of affairs here. I think we are getting on, and that we may make something of the Portuguese army. We want arms, however, and caps for the men; and the pay of the Officers must be increased.

‘ Villiers informed me that he had written to you for permission to use the King’s name in the grant of this increase of pay, which he appeared to think so important, as to induce him to delay the execution of the orders he had received to recommend the increase of pay to the Government till that authority should reach him.

‘ I acknowledge that, provided the increase of pay is granted, it is not of material importance whether the King’s name is used, or not, in the grant. On principle, I should say it ought not, as the King can have no right to claim an interference in a domestic concern of this description in any mode excepting by advice, with which advice the Officers of the army might not be made acquainted; but such is the state of the Government of this country at present, that I conceive that they would feel such an interference but little, if at all; and it is better that Mr. Villiers should be gratified, even in this irregular wish, than that the measure should be delayed by any further consideration and discussion of it.

‘ I therefore beg of you either to grant or refuse, as soon as possible, the authority for which Mr. Villiers has asked to use the King’s name, in the grant of the increase of pay to the Officers of the Portuguese army, which is really necessary on all grounds, but particularly in reference to the *regime* which has lately been adopted in respect to them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. G. Canning.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Captain Mudge, R.N.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

Coimbra, 8th May, 1809.

‘ Since I wrote to you yesterday, I have heard that some men and horses for the 20th light dragoons are come out in the fleet under your convoy, which men and horses should

go to Lisbon, as well as the detachment of the 24th foot, mentioned to you yesterday.

‘ Till I shall receive from the Officers of the army a return of the troops in the convoy, I request that you will have disembarked only the horses and men in the 1st hussars, the men of the staff corps, and those of the 87th regiment.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Captain Mudge, R.N.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Coimbra, 8th May, 1809.

‘ We halted yesterday to give General Beresford time to get forward, and we shall proceed with our operations to-morrow.

‘ You will receive from the Quarter Master General a paper, fully explanatory to you of all that it is intended you should perform ; to which I have only to add—first, that you will find the boats ready for you at Aveiro, and will have to get boatmen only, in which Douglas, whom I send to you, will assist you ; secondly, that I mean you should bring up to-morrow night in such a place as that the enemy cannot discover you, in that part of the river or lake of which the banks are swampy ; thirdly, that you should land your light infantry below the town, where it is certain the enemy never is, in order to secure the unmolested disembarkation of the remainder of your corps at Ovar, where it is possible the enemy may have a small patrol.

‘ I recommend to you to cook a day’s provisions at Aveiro for your men for the 10th, and to refresh your men at Ovar, while you are waiting there to learn the progress of General Cotton with his cavalry.

‘ Having communicated with that General, you will then move from Ovar by the road which leads from Ovar to Feira, till that road meets the great road from Coimbra to Oporto. You will halt there till you shall be joined by the cavalry. My intention is to push the enemy as far as I can on the 10th, even into Oporto if possible.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Hill.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

' SIR,

' Coimbra, 8th May, 1809.

' I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 6th, and I have given directions for the issue of båt and forage to the naval and marine Officers employed to garrison the forts on the Tagus.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.'

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Senior Officer of His Majesty's Navy at Figueira.

' SIR,

' Coimbra, 8th May, 1809.

' I am in daily expectation of the arrival of a convoy of provisions and stores from Lisbon at Figueira, and as I purpose to move forward the army to-morrow, I shall be obliged to you, when the convoy shall arrive, to send them to Aveiro, where I shall transmit further directions for them.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *The Senior Officer,*
Royal Navy, Figueira.'

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.

' MY DEAR SIR,

' Quinta de la Graciosa, 9th May, 1809.

' I have just received your letter of the 4th, and I am very much obliged to you for having given me such immediate intelligence of the march of a French corps from Aragon, probably directed to the relief of Marshal Ney, or of Marshal Soult. I have not yet heard from any other quarter of the approach of this corps to the frontiers of Portugal, and yet we have garrisons in Chaves, Braganza, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Almeida. It is possible, therefore, it may have been stopped, or its destination altered.

' The troops under my command have commenced their operations against Marshal Soult, one column having marched by Vizeu towards Lamego, and another under my own command being on its march towards Oporto. This last will cross the Vouga, on which are the enemy's outposts, to-morrow morning.

' I do not think that the intelligence which you have communicated to me, even if it were confirmed, should

induce me to alter my plan, till the enemy's force from Aragon should be nearer to us.

‘ In respect to Soult, I shall omit nothing that I can do to destroy him ; but as he has lately forced the important point of the bridge of Amarante, and has since taken possession of Villa Real, I am afraid that it is not in my power, with the force which I have at my disposal, to prevent him retreating into Spain.

‘ The question will then remain for consideration, whether it is best for Portugal and the general cause that I should turn my attention to Victor's corps, and remain upon the defensive in the north of Portugal ; or that I should follow Soult, or attack Ney in Galicia, and leave the east of Portugal on the defensive.

‘ The solution of this question will depend very much upon the extent of the enemy's force in Galicia and the Spanish provinces bordering upon the north of Portugal.

‘ If the safety of Portugal should be seriously threatened in that quarter, you will see by my instructions I must consider that my principal object, and I must therefore remain in the north. If, on the other hand, nothing should remain in the Spanish provinces bordering on the north of Portugal, excepting the corps of Ney and Soult, I conceive I should act in the best manner for Portugal, and for the whole of the Peninsula, by co-operating in a plan to oblige Victor to retreat, or, if possible, in his defeat.

‘ I fear that the letters which I have already written to General Cuesta, and for Don Martin de Garay, will have prevented you from making use of my name to induce the Junta Militar to adopt the plan of offensive operations in La Mancha ; in the same manner as my promise to return to co-operate with General Cuesta, after I should have obliged Soult to withdraw from the north of Portugal, has prevented you from promising that co-operation as a condition in case the Spaniards should carry on those proposed operations.

‘ My reason for recommending that defensive measures should be adopted everywhere was, that the troops not absolutely necessary for defence in any point might be sent to reinforce General Cuesta, who, by his own account, did not appear to me to be sufficiently strong to defend the

important point which he occupies, and upon which all seems to me to depend.

‘ An offensive operation in La Mancha might be of use to me and to the north of Spain, by diverting the French corps said to be destined for this quarter, and on its march from Aragon, if there should be no reserve in the neighbourhood of Madrid. Whether there should be such a corps or not, it might be fatal to Cuesta, to the seat of government, and to all the important interests in the south of Spain; and as the French would always have it in their power to draw towards Madrid the corps supposed to be on its march from Aragon, this offensive operation would give them but little uneasiness for the safety of that city. In this consideration of the subject, I have supposed that this operation would be successful, which is by no means certain.

‘ However, upon all these points, the decision must turn upon an accurate knowledge of relative numbers, and of the position of corps, which I acknowledge I do not possess; and I ought to have refrained from giving General Cuesta, or Don Martin de Garay, through you, my opinion upon this subject. But I do not think I could, with propriety, have avoided informing General Cuesta of my intentions, in case I should succeed in removing Soult from Portugal, or in defeating him.

‘ I have just heard that the Marques de la Romana is in the neighbourhood of Monterey, and I shall endeavor to communicate with him there. If he should be at Monterey, it is possible that he has heard of the movement of the French corps from Aragon, and that he has drawn back towards the frontiers of Portugal.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. H. Frere,*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Marques de la Romana.

‘ MONSIEUR LE MARQUIS,

‘ Quinta de la Graciosa,
ce 9 Mai, 1809.

‘ Le Chevalier Wilson ayant fait savoir au Maréchal Beresford que vous étiez auprès de Monterey, je vous écris pour vous faire savoir que je suis en marche pour attaquer le corps du Maréchal Soult à Oporto; et que je passerai le Vouga demain. Le Maréchal Beresford est à present à

Vizeu, et sera demain, ou le jour suivant, à Lamego. L'ennemi ayant défait le corps du Général Silveira a occupé le pont d'Amarante et la ville de Villa Real; c'est donc probable qu'il compte faire sa retraite, ou le long du Douro vers Zamora, ou par Braganza, ou par Chaves en Galicie.

' J'ai reçu aujourd'hui des nouvelles de Seville, du 4 de ce mois. Les armées des deux cotés sont postées comme elles l'ont été depuis un mois. Monsieur Frere me mande qu'un corps, censé être de 16,000 hommes, a quitté l'Aragon le 14 du mois passé, et doit passer par Tudela le 16; son but est, à ce qu'on dit, de donner la main au Maréchal Ney.

' Je n'ai pas eu de nouvelles de ce corps; et je vous serai bien obligé de me faire savoir si vous en avez reçu.

' J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

' *Le Marquis de la Romana.*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Marshal Beresford.

' Quinta de la Graciosa,
9th May, 1809.

' MY DEAR BERESFORD,

' I enclose an extract of a letter which I have just received from Mr. Frere, announcing the march of a French corps from Aragon towards this part of the Peninsula.

' Before I had received your letter of the 7th, I thought it possible that Soult might have heard of this corps, as Trant sent me a report this morning that the enemy had his whole force in Villa Nova and south of the Douro, where he was intrenching himself; but since the receipt of your letter, stating that Romana is at Monterey, I think it most probable that he has heard of the movement of this corps to reinforce Ney, and that he has withdrawn in consequence towards the frontiers of Portugal.

' Whether this corps is coming here, or wherever it may be going, I see no reason for altering our plan of operations, at least till we shall hear that they are nearer us; and therefore I shall cross the Vouga to-morrow morning, and lose no time in proceeding to Oporto.

' The British troops who marched with you went away provided with bread for six days, and with meat and forage for three days, as did the Portuguese battalions in the British brigade, I believe. I have ordered the Commissary General to send for six days' of every thing from Coimbra

for 10,000 men ; besides that a Commissary is sent to Vizeu to prepare provisions for you.

‘ I enclose a letter for Romana, which I beg of you to forward. I consider the letter I wrote to you the other day as entirely applicable to the present situation of affairs, unless indeed the enemy should really have crossed the Douro, and should intend to fight us on this side of the river. In that case you might cross and attack him at Villa Real, without risk of great loss ; and, therefore, and for every reason, I recommend to you to collect as many boats, high up, as you can lay your hands upon.

‘ If I can spare them, you shall have the cavalry after tomorrow. Send people to Braganza, Chaves, Ciudad Rodrigo, and even to Zamora, if you can, to transmit intelligence of this corps from Aragon.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘ Convento do Grijó, 11th May, 1809.

‘ If the French should weaken their corps about Amarante and Villa Real, so as to give you any reason to hope that you can do anything against them, then I wish you to attack them, and take any opportunity of getting possession of either of these points. But remember that you are a Commander in Chief of an army, and must not be beaten ; therefore do not undertake any thing with your troops, if you have not some strong hopes of success.

‘ I have a plan to reinforce that point also, if the French should cross the Douro, and pretend to defend themselves at Oporto by so doing.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. John Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ 6 A.M., 11th May, 1809.

‘ I have just time to tell you, that we drove in the enemy’s cavalry, and other posts, north of the Vouga, yesterday, and gained ground as far as Oliveira. We attempted to surprise the cavalry, which attempt failed, for causes into which it is not necessary to enter ; and afterwards we did not do as much

as we ought against the cavalry. With the infantry we gained a good deal of ground.

‘I hope that we shall have finished with Soult before the reinforcements can arrive of which Frere has given intelligence.

‘They tell me that the Portugese riflemen, the students I believe, behaved remarkably well.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘P.S. We took one piece of cannon.

‘A. W.’

To the Right Hon. John Villiers.

‘MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘6 P.M., 11th May, 1809.

‘I wrote to you this morning to apprise you of our operations of yesterday; I have now the pleasure to inform you, that we have been still more successful this day. We have completely beaten a corps of about 4000 infantry that was opposed to us in two affairs, first with its outposts, and afterwards itself. The corps engaged were the 1st battalion of detachments, two battalions of the German Legion, and Colonel Doyle’s battalion of the 16th Portuguese regiment. This last regiment behaved remarkably well. Recollect that in talking upon this subject, you do not forget to mention the name of the Colonel of the regiment, who was in the field I know, for I had given him a piece of my mind in the morning. Two squadrons of cavalry, one of the 16th and one of the 20th, under Charles Stewart, also did great execution.

‘The enemy shewed but little cavalry, and made no great stand. Indeed General Murray’s movement with the German Legion upon their left flank, and that of the Portuguese battalion upon their right, would have made any troops quit their position.

‘I do not know whether they propose to give us another field day on this side of Oporto, but I should think not, as they did not shew their cavalry this day. If they should do so, I shall have my whole corps upon them. This day I had only the advanced guard.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘P.S. We have lost some few men killed and wounded, and have taken some.

‘A. W.’

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Oporto, 12th May, 1809.

‘ I had the honor to apprise your Lordship on the 7th instant, that I intended that the army should march on the 9th from Coimbra, to dispossess the enemy of Oporto.

‘ The advanced guard and the cavalry had marched on the 7th, and the whole had halted on the 8th, to afford time for Marshal Beresford with his corps to arrive upon the Upper Douro.

‘ The infantry of the army was formed into three divisions for this expedition, of which two, the advanced guard, consisting of the King’s German Legion, and Brig. General R. Stewart’s brigade, with a brigade of 6 pounders, and a brigade of 3 pounders, under Lieut. General Paget; and the cavalry under Lieut. General Payne; and the brigade of Guards, Brig. General Campbell’s and Brig. General Sontag’s brigades of infantry, with a brigade of 6 pounders, under Lieut. General Sherbrooke, moved by the high road from Coimbra to Oporto: and one, composed of Major General Hill’s and Brig. General Cameron’s brigades of infantry, and a brigade of 6 pounders, under the command of Major General Hill, by the road from Coimbra to Aveiro.

‘ On the 10th in the morning, before daylight, the cavalry and advanced guard crossed the Vouga, with the intention to surprise and cut off four regiments of French cavalry, and a battalion of infantry and artillery, cantoned in Albergaria Nova and the neighbouring villages, about eight miles from that river, in the last of which we failed; but the superiority of the British cavalry was evident throughout the day. We took some prisoners and their cannon from them; and the advanced guard took up the position of Oliveira.

‘ On the same day Major General Hill, who had embarked at Aveiro on the evening of the 9th, arrived at Ovar, in the rear of the enemy’s right; and the head of Lieut. General Sherbrooke’s division passed the Vouga on the same evening.

‘ On the 11th, the advanced guard and cavalry continued to move on the high road towards Oporto, with Major General Hill’s division in a parallel road which leads to Oporto from Ovar.

‘ On the arrival of the advanced guard at Vendas Novas,

between Souto Redondo and Grijó, they fell in with the outposts of the enemy's advanced guard, which were immediately driven in; and shortly afterwards we discovered the enemy's advanced guard, consisting of about 4,000 infantry and some squadrons of cavalry, strongly posted on the heights above Grijó, their front being covered by woods and broken ground. The enemy's left flank was turned by a movement well executed by Major General Murray, with Brig. General Langwerth's brigade of the King's German Legion; while the 16th Portuguese regiment of Brig. General Richard Stewart's brigade attacked their right, and the riflemen of the 95th, and the flank companies of the 29th, 43d, and 52d of the same brigade, under Major Way, attacked the infantry in the woods and village in their centre.

' These attacks soon obliged the enemy to give way; and Brig. General the Hon. Charles Stewart led two squadrons of the 16th and 20th dragoons, under the command of Major Blake, in pursuit of the enemy, and destroyed many and took several prisoners.

' On the night of the 11th the enemy crossed the Douro, and destroyed the bridge over that river.

' It was important, with a view to the operations of Marshal Beresford, that I should cross the Douro immediately; and I had sent Major General Murray in the morning with a battalion of the King's German Legion, a squadron of cavalry, and two 6 pounders, to endeavor to collect boats, and, if possible, to cross the river at Avintas, about four miles above Oporto; and I had as many boats as could be collected brought to the ferry, immediately above the towns of Oporto and Villa Nova.

' The ground on the right bank of the river at this ferry is protected and commanded by the fire of cannon, placed on the height of the Serra Convent at Villa Nova; and there appeared to be a good position for our troops on the opposite side of the river, till they should be collected in sufficient numbers.

' The enemy took no notice of our collection of boats, or of the embarkation of the troops, till after the first battalion (the Buffs) were landed, and had taken up their position, under the command of Lieut. General Paget, on the opposite side of the river.

Bathurst and the Officers of my personal staff; and I have every reason to be satisfied with the artillery and Officers of engineers.

‘I send this dispatch by Captain Stanhope, whom I beg to recommend to your Lordship’s protection: his brother, the Hon. Major Stanhope, was unfortunately wounded by a sabre whilst leading a charge of the 16th light dragoons on the 10th instant.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Viscount Castlereagh.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Return of Ordnance captured on the 12th May, 1809.

Ten 12 pounders; twelve 8 pounders; eighteen 4 pounders; sixteen 3 pounders; two howitzers.

Abstract of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing in the Army under the command of Lieut. General the Right Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B., in action with the French Army under the command of Marshal Soult, on the 10th, 11th, and 12th of March, 1809.

| | Officers. | Serjeants. | Rank and File. | Horses. | Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File. |
|----------------|-----------|------------|----------------|---------|---|
| Killed | 1 | — | 42 | — | 43 |
| Wounded . . . | 17 | 1 | 150 | — | 168 |
| Missing . . . | — | — | 17 | — | 17 |

To Marshal Beresford.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘Oporto, 12th May, 1809.

‘I wrote to you at 12, to inform you that the enemy had left this town, excepting their small guards, and that my troops are passing over.

‘As soon as one battalion, the Buffs, had passed, the enemy made a most furious attack upon them, which they continued for about two hours. We threw over reinforcements as fast as we could; but the most we could do was to send over the remainder of Hill’s brigade and the Portu-

guese battalion, which corps defended themselves most gallantly, and we ended by obtaining a complete victory.

‘ We have taken some pieces of cannon, how many I cannot say, many prisoners, killed vast numbers; and the infantry went off towards Valongo and Amarante in the utmost confusion. Some of the cavalry went the same way.

‘ I am much afraid that we shall not be able to march till the day after to-morrow.

‘ I have received your letter of the 9th. Keep Villa Real if you can do so with safety, and depend upon my being close upon the heels of the French. I shall state my movements exactly as soon as I can.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Captain Grainger, R.N., commanding off Oporto.

‘ SIR,

‘ Oporto, 12th May, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to communicate to you that the troops under my command have gained possession of the town of Oporto, after having defeated the enemy. And I have to request that you will have the goodness to allow Captain Dench, of H. M. S. *Nautilus*, to convey my dispatches to England, and to communicate the information to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Captain Grainger, R.N.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Marshal Soult.

‘ MONSIEUR LE MARECHAL,

‘ Oporto, ce 12 Mai, 1809.

‘ Vous savez que vous avez laissé dans cette ville un grand nombre de malades et de blessés, dont vous pouvez être sur que je prendrai le plus grand soin, et qu'autant que je le pourrai, personne ne leur fera du mal. Mais vous avez oublié de laisser avec eux des Officiers de Santé pour les soigner. Je ne crois pas qu'on doive se fier aux Officiers de Santé de la ville d'Oporto; et je vous préviens que je n'ai pas un plus grand nombre d'Officiers de Santé, qu'il ne me faut pour le service des troupes qui sont sous mes ordres.

‘ Je vous prie donc d'en envoyer ici un nombre suffisant pour le soin de tous les malades et blessés de l'armée

Française que vous avez laissés ici, et je vous promets que quand ils auront guéri les malades, ils vous seront renvoyés.

‘ Vous avez quelques Officiers et soldats de l’armée Anglaise, prisonniers de guerre, et je serai bien aise d’établir avec vous un cartel d’échange pour ceux de l’armée Française que j’ai en mon pouvoir.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *Le Maréchal Soult.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. John Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Oporto, 13th May, 1809.

‘ I informed you of our success on the 11th. We forced the passage of the Douro yesterday. The enemy attacked us upon the disembarkation of the first of our troops, and we completely defeated them with the loss of many men, guns, &c. All our troops were in Oporto last night.

‘ Paget, I am sorry to say, was wounded in the right arm, which was amputated, and he is doing well. Our loss has not otherwise been great.

‘ I shall send you a copy of my dispatch to England which I shall send from hence, if I can get the Officer of the Navy to go with it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. Soult was in the action, and the enemy are off to Amarante. We follow them immediately. ‘ A. W.’

PROCLAMATION.

‘ Arthur Wellesley, Commander of the British army in Portugal, and Marshal General of the armies of H. R. H. the Prince Regent.

‘ Inhabitants of Oporto !—The French troops having been expelled from this town by the superior gallantry and discipline of the army under my command, I call upon the inhabitants of Oporto to be merciful to the wounded and prisoners. By the laws of war they are entitled to my protection, which I am determined to afford them; and it will be worthy of the generosity and bravery of the Portuguese nation not to revenge the injuries which have been done to them on these unfortunate persons, who can only be con-

sidered as instruments in the hands of the more powerful, who are still in arms against us.

‘I therefore call upon the inhabitants of this town to remain peaceably in their dwellings. I forbid all persons not military to appear in the streets with arms; and I give notice that I shall consider any person who shall injure any of the wounded or of the prisoners as guilty of the breach of my orders.

‘I have appointed Colonel Trant to command in this town till the pleasure of the Government shall be known; and I have ordered him to take care that this Proclamation is obeyed.

‘*Head Quarters,*

Oporto, 13th May, 1809.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Hon. Berkeley Paget.

‘MY DEAR BERKELEY,

‘Oporto, 13th May, 1809.

‘I am much concerned to have to inform you that poor Edward was wounded yesterday in the right arm, and that it has been necessary to amputate it. He is however doing remarkably well, and is in good spirits.

‘He crossed the Douro with the first of the troops, who were afterwards attacked; and he was shot at an early period in the hand, and through the great artery of his arm, and was obliged to leave the field.

‘I cannot express to you how much I regret the loss of his assistance, or how much the joy of the whole army on account of this success has been damped by the misfortune of him who has been the principal promoter of it. I hope, however, that he will soon recover.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Hon. Berkeley Paget.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

‘MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘Oporto, 13th May, 1809.

‘I now enclose the copy of my dispatch to Lord Castle-reagh, of which you will communicate such parts as you may think proper to the Government. I have written a short letter to Forjaz, containing the outline of our proceedings.

‘ I have appointed Colonel Trant to be Commandant of Oporto, and the troops under his command to be the garrison, till the orders of the Government shall be given. I have also appointed the former Corregidor to be Corregidor till the orders of Government should be known. It was necessary to make this appointment, in order to get the supplies which the place could afford.

‘ I have also issued a Proclamation, calling upon the inhabitants to leave any prisoners, and the sick and wounded, unmolested.

‘ The Government will of course receive copies of all these papers; and I shall be obliged to you if you will urge them to confirm these acts of mine, particularly the last.

‘ Soult had arrested Captains —, —, and the principal conspirators, on the 10th of May. I have found the orders for their arrest and their being put “*au secret*.” I have just learnt that Captain — has made his escape, and has come in.

‘ We took a Portuguese who was Commissary to the French. I believe he ought to be tried for treason.

‘ I enclose a letter found among Soult’s papers.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General J. Murray.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Oporto, 13th May, 1809.

‘ Information is just arrived that the enemy have burnt their artillery, and have retreated precipitately to the left, and are gone towards Valença and the Minho. I wish you immediately to send a patrol, either of cavalry or mounted riflemen, if you can get mules or horses, and endeavor to ascertain whether this information is correct, transmitting immediate intelligence to me, that I may take my measures accordingly. I hope to hear from you by 12 o’clock this night. I trust you will push your patrols, if possible, to Penafiel. General Silveira is said to be at Amarante.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General J. Murray.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To His Excellency the Bishop of Oporto.

‘ MAY IT PLEASE YOUR LORDSHIP, ‘ Oporto, 13th May, 1809.

‘ I cannot avoid taking the liberty of congratulating your Lordship upon the late successes of the army, which have had the effect of freeing this city from the oppression under which it has suffered from French tyranny. I am happy to have been instrumental in effecting this great object.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
the Bishop of Oporto.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To His Royal Highness the Duke of York.

‘ SIR,

‘ Oporto, 13th May, 1809.

‘ Although your Royal Highness unfortunately is no longer at the head of the army, I am convinced that you cannot but be interested in their success; and I therefore enclose to you the copy of a dispatch which I have written to the Secretary of State, giving an account of the operations of the troops under my command, up to yesterday.

‘ We failed in cutting off the enemy’s cavalry on the morning of the 10th, principally from the badness of the roads leading to and from the bridge over the Vouga, which delayed the march in advance till so late an hour in the morning that we could not turn the position of the enemy unperceived; and I believe that the guide with the cavalry missed his road.

‘ The advanced guard of the infantry, however, in the course of that day, were in the rear of the enemy’s cavalry, and they were saved from destruction only by going off at a great rate. The infantry were so near to them at Oliveira, as to go into the town at one end when they went out at the other.

‘ On the 11th, the enemy tried their usual manœuvres with their sharpshooters in the woods, but our troops and the Portuguese got the better of them; and the movement of Major General Murray upon the flank was decisive of the whole position.

‘ In the action of yesterday, our position was vulnerable only on the right. The left was completely defended by the fire of the artillery from the Serra Convent, and the troops

were posted in a field enclosed by a high stone wall, which defended their front from the fire of the enemy's artillery from the only height in the neighbourhood of the position; and this height was not sufficiently large to contain any body of the enemy's infantry. The pressure upon the right of our troops was strong till Major General Murray made his appearance from Avintas.

'It is impossible to say what induced Soult to be so careless about the boats on the river, particularly near Oporto; or to allow us to land at all at a point so interesting to him as that which we occupied. I rather believe we were too quick for him, and that he had not time to secure the boats on all the points necessary to protect the retreat of his corps.

'The troops have behaved remarkably well in every instance; and I cannot conclude this letter without telling your Royal Highness that the brigade of Guards are in every respect the example and the object of admiration of the whole army. They have not yet been engaged with the enemy; but I have no doubt but that they will acquit themselves as well in that respect as they do in all others.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*His Royal Highness
the Duke of York.*

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. the Commander in Chief.

'SIR,

'Oporto, 13th May, 1809.

'I cannot adopt a better mode of making you acquainted with the operations of the army under my command in this country, than by transmitting to you the copy of my dispatch of yesterday's date to the Secretary of State.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*The Right Hon.*

The Commander in Chief.

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Marshal Beresford.

'MY DEAR BERESFORD,

'Oporto, 14th May, 1809.

'The enemy are certainly off by Braga. Whether any of them still remain at or about Amarante is a point about which I am not yet certain. Mellish saw fires last night near Penafiel; therefore, it is not impossible but that Loison

may have remained there last night to cover the retreat of Soult.

‘ I have desired General Murray, who is on that road, to ascertain that point; and if he finds from the report of his aide de camp, who went on when Mellish returned, that Loison is still there, he is to move on towards Amarante, to communicate with you, and to proceed to Chaves, by which movement that road into Spain will be cut off.

‘ If Loison is not there, Murray is to proceed to Braga, to join the rest of my corps, and I recommend to you to proceed to Chaves.

‘ Soult destroyed his guns and blew up his ammunition yesterday morning at about half a league on this side Penafiel, and then went off towards Braga.

‘ My troops are in march towards Braga and Ponte de Lima. I shall go towards Braga. I have just received yours of the 12th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General Murray.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, Oporto, $\frac{1}{2}$ past 12 A.M., 14th May, 1809.

‘ If I should find it to be decided that they have gone to Braga, I shall follow them that way, and move straight upon Braga immediately.

‘ Loison had, at Amarante and in the neighbourhood, 4500 men. If Silveira and Beresford united have been able to keep him in check, and to induce Soult to think that he could not retreat by the road which he intended to take, Loison must be lost, by leaving him in the hands of Beresford and Silveira. I therefore think the best thing for you, as well as for us to do, is to move upon Braga.

‘ I shall be able, however, to decide better when I shall receive Mellish’s report; in the mean time, I wish you to halt at Valongo till I can write to you after having received it; and inquire whether there is a road from Valongo to Villa Nova de Famalicão by which guns or infantry can march.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Murray.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General Murray.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Oporto, 14th May, 1809.

‘ As Mellish reports that he saw fires in the direction of Penafiel, it is evident that there must be somebody still thereabouts ; and I think it not impossible that Loison may have waited to cover the retreat of the others between Amarante and Penafiel. I wish you, therefore, particularly if this intelligence be confirmed by the reports of your aide de camp, to move towards Penafiel, and at all events to ascertain what is in Amarante this day. You might at the same time communicate with Beresford’s corps, either by Amarante itself, or by a ford or ferry at Serra de Liberação, over the Tamaga, about a league to the southward ; or from Penafiel by Ambos dos Rios, across the Douro, and thence to Beresford’s quarters, which are between Amarante, Lamego, and Villa Real.

‘ The road to the ferry at the Tamaga stretches off at Castro, one league from Penafiel, where you will get on to Amarante. If you should find them gone, it would be most desirable that you should push for Chaves. From Braga, if the enemy have gone there, they must go out of Portugal either by Valença, or somewhere across the Minho, or by Chaves, as they came in. If they go by Chaves, which is not unlikely, when they find that you press them, you will intercept them at Chaves.

‘ If your aide de camp should have sent you word that they are all positively gone, Loison and all, towards Braga, move from Valongo towards Braga with your corps, and get on as far this day as you can.

‘ I send one column of the army by Ponte de Lima, and another by Braga. I shall go myself by Braga.

‘ If your artillery should impede your march on any of these roads, leave it, and order it back to Oporto.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Murray.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. Since writing the above, I have heard from Beresford, and there is every reason to believe he is at this time at Amarante.

‘ A. W.’

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Oporto, 14th May, 1809.

‘ I may as well make use of the time I am waiting here for the last reports from General Murray, to apprise you of the result of the attempts in the French army to seize Soult.

‘ On the 9th instant, Captain —— was seized on his return to this place, after his last interview with me. His papers were likewise seized, among which were found the English passports, and he could not deny that he had had communication with me.

‘ I think it appears that he had been endeavoring to gain over the French General, ——, who revealed the secret to Soult. Captain —— had formerly been aide de camp to General ——, and he made Soult promise that he should have his life and liberty. Captain —— had afterwards the weakness, at the persuasion of the Gendarmerie who had the charge of him, to reveal the names of some of his fellow conspirators, who were likewise seized. I have the original orders for their seizure and confinement “*au secret*.” They were all marched away as prisoners after the battle of the 12th; and yesterday morning, Captain —— having made an attempt to shoot the Captain de Gendarmerie, who, he thinks, contributed to deceive and induce him to reveal the names of his accomplices, escaped and came into Oporto. He escaped by the advice of Colonel —— of the dragoons, one of the principals of the conspiracy, who conceived that when Captain —— should be gone, there would be no evidence against himself. Captain —— says that he does not think that Soult will dare to injure —— or the others. From all this, it is evident that there was a conspiracy, and it is probable that it was extensive, and it has been put an end to, probably only for the moment, by the weakness, or indiscretion, or treachery of ——, who, Captain —— says, mentioned the name of General —— as one of the conspirators.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Oporto, 14th May, 1809.

‘ You will have heard from Beresford that the movement upon the Douro has answered all the purposes we wished for it. Loison was stopped at Amarante.

‘ Soult finding this yesterday morning, destroyed his guns, and blew up his ammunition, about half a league on this side Penafiel, and went off towards Braga. My troops are in march towards Braga and Ponte de Lima.

‘ I have desired Beresford to go to Chaves, at all events, to stop them by that road, and Murray to go there with the King’s German Legion, if he should find that Loison still hangs about Amarante, and if he is not able to defeat him in the first instance.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL TRANT.

‘ Oporto, 14th May, 1809.

‘ 1. The 20th dragoons and a brigade of infantry are expected. If they should arrive here they must be ordered to Figueira, where they will receive orders to disembark.

‘ 2. All the guns left by the French in Oporto, whether French or Spanish; all those left in the neighbourhood of Penafiel, or elsewhere in the country, of which some will be brought in by General Murray; are to be sent on board any of His Majesty’s ships, the Captains of which will consent to take charge of them, and Colonel Trant will take the receipt of the Captains for them.

‘ 3. The English vessels in the harbour of Oporto should be allowed to sail with their cargoes as soon as the Captains please, giving security, to the full amount of the value of ships and cargo, to answer such demands as His Majesty, or the Government of Portugal, may have upon them; the former on account of salvage, or prize for his navy or army; the latter on the account of any claims which the laws of nations or the law of the country may give them.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Villa Nova, 15th May, 1809.

‘We have taken about 2000 sick, wounded, and prisoners, at and near Oporto; I should, therefore, be much obliged if you would send transports to take them to England. I think they should have two tons per man, as many of them are severely wounded.

‘I do not wish to use the transports coming with the stores, &c. from Lisbon, as I shall want them to aid in the arrangement for my own movements.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Villa Nova, 15th May, 1809.

‘I have found at Oporto a considerable number of vessels, which I have directed Colonel Trant, in concert with the senior Officer of the navy off Oporto, to take an account of; and I shall be glad if you would decide what is to be done with them, and let me know as soon as you can.

‘Mr. Villiers will of course have acquainted you with our movements. We are now in pursuit of the enemy, who appear to be retiring towards Chaves.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD,

‘Villa Nova, 15th May, 1809.

‘In my secret dispatch, of the 27th ultimo, I apprised your Lordship that I had had certain communications with an Officer of the French army, in respect to the discontent which prevailed against Marshal Soult. I have since had further communications with the same Officer, with the details of which I proceed to acquaint your Lordship.

‘Captain —— met me within the posts of the British army, between Coimbra and Aveiro, on the night of the 6th instant, accompanied by Mons. ——, in the presence of

Lieut. Colonel Bathurst. He informed me that the discontent had increased, and that there were a larger number of Officers who were determined to seize their General than when he had last seen me. He said, however, that they were divided into two parties, one discontented with Buonaparte himself, and determined to carry matters to extremities against him: the other, consisting of —, —, and others whom he had before mentioned, as attached to the cause of the Emperor, were dissatisfied with Soult's conduct, particularly with an intention which he was supposed to entertain to declare himself King of Portugal; and that they were determined, if he should take that step, to seize him and to lead the army back into France, where it was understood the Emperor wished to see it.

' Captain ——— then urged me again to lose no time in pressing upon Soult, as the mode most likely to induce the more violent of the two parties to endeavour to accomplish their purpose. But he said that if my attack was likely to be delayed, it was desirable that I should endeavour to prevail upon some of the towns over which I was supposed to have influence, such as Coimbra, Aveiro, &c., to follow the example of Oporto, and petition Soult to take upon himself the government of the kingdom, as King; and that I even should write to him to urge the adoption of this measure.

' In answer to this, I told him, that I certainly should make my attack as soon as it was in my power, but that I could not fix any day, nor state to him the plan of my operations; and that in respect to his propositions, regarding the measures to be adopted by me to induce Soult to declare himself King of Portugal, they were quite out of the question; that I could not risk the loss of the confidence of the people of Portugal by doing what he desired in respect to the people of Coimbra, Aveiro, &c., nor my own character by writing the letter which he proposed I should. I told him at the same time that I considered that, notwithstanding all that had passed between him and me, I had a full right to take what steps I pleased, even if the Officers of the French army should seize their General.

' He then went away, and Mons. —, returned with me

to Coimbra, and confirmed all the statements which Captain — had made of the discontent of the Officers of the army.

‘ I heard no more of Captain — till the 13th, the day after the capture of Oporto, on which day the original orders for the arrest and secret detention of Captain —, Colonel — of the — dragoons, and Colonel — of the — regiment of infantry, were found among some papers sent to me by the police of the town; the order for the arrest of the first bearing date the 9th, and of the last two the 10th instant.

‘ In a few hours afterwards, on the same day, Captain — came into Oporto, and informed me that, on the night of the day he had returned from his last interview with me, he had been arrested, and his papers had been seized, among which had been found the three passports which I had given him. He said that he attributed his arrest to the General of Division, —, a man of weak intellect, to whom he had formerly been aide de camp, and on whom he had endeavored to prevail, as he thought successfully, to join the party. General — had, however, informed Soult of all the circumstances, requiring only his promise that — should not be injured, and should retain his commission and his military pretensions.

‘ Soult examined him in presence of General — respecting his accomplices, but he declined to name any, and he was sent back to prison in charge of a Captain of Gendarmerie. This person prevailed upon him, with promises of pardon and indemnity to all concerned, to consent to tell Soult the names of his accomplices, which he did on the following night, notwithstanding, as he says himself, similar promises in his own favor made to General — had not been performed, and that as soon as he had named Colonels — and —, immediate orders were sent for their arrest and secret detention. They marched, in confinement, with the army from Oporto on the 12th, and on the 13th, at five o'clock in the morning, Captain — made his escape, at the desire of Colonel —, from the party of Gendarmes in whose charge he was detained. He now declares that the conspiracy still exists, and that sooner or later it must burst forth and fall heavily upon the head of the usurper; and he

talked of the war in Spain as being odious to the army and to the whole nation.

‘ Captain — expressed a desire to return secretly to France, and to bring to England his wife and family, she having, as he says, some property to enable him to live in England till the arrival of better times in France.

‘ I told him that I would send him to England when an opportunity should offer to apply for permission to go to France; and I shall have the honor of addressing him to your Lordship when the opportunity shall occur of sending him.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Ruivães, 17th May, 1809.

‘ I enclose a letter and its enclosures, which I have received from Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, and if it should appear to you, as it does to me, that some of the transports, viz., eight, could be at the present moment spared from the service, it is my opinion that the employment of them, in the manner proposed by Mr. C. Johnstone, would be a public benefit; at the same time, as I have told him that I should consider him chargeable for the freight from the time the transports shall leave Lisbon till they may arrive in England, the public will be released from the expense.

‘ If you should agree in opinion with me upon this subject, I would request you to write a line to Sir John Sinclair, according to Mr. Johnstone’s request, and send me back the enclosed letters from Mr. Johnstone to me, that I may make you an official application on the subject.

‘ If you should not deem it inexpedient to allow Mr. Johnstone to have the transports, it is certainly desirable that they should be sent to Cadiz at an early period.

‘ Mr. Villiers will let you know how we are going on. If the weather had not rendered the roads so very bad, I think we should have overtaken Soult before now; as it is, he is out of his scrape.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Ruivacs, 17th May, 1809.

‘ Beresford forced in Loison’s posts to the eastward of Amarante on the 12th, while I was passing the Douro at Oporto; and on the morning of the 13th, Soult’s advanced guard was surprised to find Loison leaving Amarante, when Soult was proceeding there to pass the Tamaga. Soult then destroyed all or the greater part of his guns near Penafiel, at eleven that morning, and marched towards Guimaraens, where he arrived on the 14th. General Murray marched in pursuit of the enemy from Oporto on the 13th, and I heard, at about five that evening, of the destruction of the guns, and the alteration of the direction of the retreat. As soon as I had verified the accounts I had received, I directed Beresford upon Chaves; Murray to communicate with Beresford, if Loison still remained in the neighbourhood of the Tamaga; and with the greater part of my corps I moved to the northward, understanding that the enemy intended to direct his course towards the Minho.

‘ I arrived at Villa Nova, about three leagues from the enemy, on the 14th, and I then was certain, from the movements of his corps about Braga, that his object was Chaves or Montalegre; and I marched to Braga the 15th; General Murray to Guimaraens; Soult to Salamonde; and yesterday General Murray joined me on the road to Salamonde, where we arrived in the evening, and had a little affair with the enemy’s rear guard, in which we killed and wounded some, and took some prisoners. We should have had the whole rear guard if we had had half an hour more daylight; and, as it is, I understand that a large part of them were lost in crossing a narrow bridge over the Cabado, in the dark and in the hurry of their flight. The Guards only were engaged.

‘ Soult is gone to Montalegre, Baltiste is upon one flank, and Silveira between him and Chaves, and I shall follow him to-morrow if he does not turn towards Chaves. He has lost everything, cannon, ammunition, baggage, military chest, and his retreat is, in every respect, even in weather, a *pendant* for the retreat to Coruña. If I do not overtake him or intercept him, I shall at least have forced

him into Galicia, in a state so crippled that he can do no harm, and he may be destroyed by Romana, if he has any force at all.

‘ We have got a good many prisoners, and more are coming in every hour.

‘ Pray forward the enclosed letters. Our weather is terrible; it has rained almost incessantly since the 13th, which has rendered our pursuit very laborious and difficult. I only hope that the army will not lose their health.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Montealegre, 18th May, 1809.

‘ When I determined upon the expedition to the north of Portugal against Marshal Soult, I was in hopes that the Portuguese General, Silveira, would have been able to hold his post upon the Tamaga till he should be reinforced; by which, and by the possession of Chaves, the enemy’s retreat would have been cut off, excepting across the Minho; and I intended, if successful, to press him so hard, that the passage of that river would have been impracticable.

‘ The loss of the bridge of Amarante, however, on the 2d instant, altered our prospects. I had then no hopes that Marshal Beresford, who marched towards the upper part of the Douro on the 5th, and arrived at Lamego on the 10th, would be able to effect more than confine the enemy on that side, and oblige him to retire by Chaves into Galicia, rather than by Villa Real into Castille.

‘ General Beresford, however, having obliged the enemy’s posts at Villa Real and Mezam Frio to fall back with some loss, and having crossed the Douro, drove in General Loison’s outposts at the bridge of Amarante, and again acquired possession of the left bank of the Tamaga on the 12th, the day on which the corps under my command forced the passage of the Douro at Oporto.

‘ Loison retired from Amarante on the morning of the 13th, as soon as he had heard of the events at Oporto of the preceding day, and met the advanced guard of the French

army at a short distance from the town, which General Beresford immediately occupied.

‘ I was unable to commence the pursuit of the enemy till the morning of the 13th, when the Hanoverian legion moved to Valongo, under Major General Murray. On that evening I was informed that the enemy had, in the morning, destroyed a great proportion of his cannon in the neighbourhood of Penafiel, and had directed his march towards Braga.

‘ This appeared to be the probable result of the situation in which he found himself, in consequence of General Beresford’s operations upon the Tamaga; and as soon as I had ascertained that the fact was true, I marched on the morning of the 14th, with the army in two columns, towards the river Minho.

‘ At the same time I directed General Beresford upon Chaves, in case the enemy should turn to his right; and Major General Murray to communicate with General Beresford, if he should find, as reported, that Loison remained in the neighbourhood of Amarante.

‘ On the evening of the 14th I was certain, from the movements of the enemy’s detachments in the neighbourhood of Braga, that he intended to direct his retreat upon Chaves or Montealegre; and directed General Beresford, in case of the latter movement, to push on for Montery, so as to stop the enemy if he should pass by Villa de Rey.

‘ General Beresford had anticipated my orders to march his own corps upon Chaves, and had already sent General Silveira to occupy the passes of Ruivacs and Melgaço, near Salamonde, but he was unfortunately too late.

‘ I arrived at Braga on the 15th (General Murray being at Guinarcns, and the enemy about fifteen miles in our front), and at Salamonde on the 16th.

‘ We had there an affair with their rear guard. The Guards, under Lieut. General Sherbrooke and Brig. General Campbell, attacked their position, and having turned their left flank by the heights, they abandoned it, leaving a gun and some prisoners behind them. This attack was necessarily made at a late hour in the evening.

‘ On the 17th we moved to Ruivacs (waiting to see whether the enemy would turn upon Chaves, or continue his retreat upon Montealegre), and on the 18th to this place.

‘ I here found that he had taken a road through the mountains towards Orense, by which it would be difficult, if not impossible, for me to overtake him, and on which I had no means of stopping him.

‘ The enemy commenced this retreat, as I have informed your Lordship, by destroying a great proportion of his guns and ammunition. He afterwards destroyed the remainder of both and a great proportion of his baggage, and kept nothing excepting what the soldiers or a few mules could carry. He has left behind him his sick and wounded; and the road from Penafiel to Montealegre is strewn with the carcasses of horses and mules, and of French soldiers, who were put to death by the peasantry before our advanced guard could save them.

‘ This last circumstance is the natural effect of the species of warfare which the enemy have carried on in this country.

‘ Their soldiers have plundered and murdered the peasantry at their pleasure; and I have seen many persons hanging in the trees by the sides of the road, executed for no reason that I could learn, excepting that they have not been friendly to the French invasion and usurpation of the government of their country; and the route of their column, on their retreat, could be traced by the smoke of the villages to which they set fire.

‘ We have taken about 500 prisoners. Upon the whole the enemy has not lost less than a fourth of his army, and all his artillery and equipments, since we attacked him on the Vouga.

‘ I hope your Lordship will believe that no measure which I could take was omitted to intercept the enemy’s retreat. It is obvious, however, that if an army throws away all its cannon, equipments, and baggage, and everything which can strengthen it, and can enable it to act together as a body; and abandons all those who are entitled to its protection, but add to its weight and impede its progress; it must be able to march by roads through which it cannot be followed, with any prospect of being overtaken, by an army which has not made the same sacrifices.

‘ It is impossible to say too much of the exertions of the troops. The weather has been very bad indeed. Since the 13th the rain has been constant, and the roads in this diffi-

cult country almost impracticable. But they have persevered in the pursuit to the last, and have been generally on their march from day-light in the morning till dark.

‘The brigade of Guards were at the head of the column, and set a laudable example; and in the affair with the enemy’s rear guard, on the evening of the 16th, they conducted themselves remarkably well.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

‘MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘Ruivacs, 19th May, 1809.

‘I received this morning, from Mackenzie, an account that the French had obtained possession of the bridge of Alcantara, to which I acknowledge that I do not give much credit. However, having finished yesterday, near Monteleagre, my operations against Soult—finding that he had taken to the mountains and had gone towards Orense, and that I had no chance of impeding his progress or of overtaking him—I determined to set out immediately for the Tagus, and I shall not stop one day till I shall arrive there, if my horses can go on. The troops also will commence their march to the same quarter to-morrow, and some of them will be across the Mondego in a week. The weather is terrible: the troops have no shoes to their feet, and we have no bread.

‘I have just received your letter of the 11th. Let the light brigade and 23d dragoons land at Lisbon, if they should come there.

‘I have given directions to the engineer whose business it is, respecting the defence of Lisbon. General Blunt has nothing to do with these directions.

‘Notwithstanding the report of the Oporto merchant on board the *Nautilus*, Loison is alive and merry, and with the army.

‘The question of rank between the English and English-Portuguese Officers is one of a very delicate nature; and it arises entirely out of the practice of giving to Officers going into the Portuguese service a step of Portuguese rank beyond that which they held in the service of the King.

‘ The Officers in the two services must rank according to the dates of their respective commissions ; but English Officers taking temporary Portuguese commissions must rank, in respect to British Officers, according to the date of the commission which they hold in the service of His Majesty. In future, I recommend that they should serve in the Portuguese army with the same rank as they have in that of the King. It is my opinion, the situation of these Officers having advanced, Portuguese rank will be an anomaly, but that cannot be helped.

‘ I wish to God that Beresford would resign his English Lieutenant General’s rank. It is inconceivable the embarrassment and ill-blood which it occasions. It does him no good ; and if the army was not most successful, this very circumstance would probably bring us to a stand-still.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General Mackenzie.

‘ MY DEAR MACKENZIE,

‘ Ruivães, 19th May, 1809.

‘ I received this morning, near Montealegre, your letters of the 15th, the one announcing the approach of the French to Alcantara, and the other their being in possession of the bridge. I acknowledge that I do not give entire credit to the latter report : first, as you do not mention your authority ; secondly, because they could not be in possession of the bridge without first taking the fort ; and I think you would have heard of that misfortune, or the probability of its occurrence, before you heard of its consequence.

‘ However, my operations against Soult finished yesterday. I followed him as long as there was any corps that I thought was likely to stop or impede his march ; and I discontinued the pursuit yesterday, after he had passed the Portuguese frontier on his road to Orense, finding that there were no longer any hopes of overtaking him.

‘ We beat his rear guard on the 6th at Salamonde, and should have cut it off, if we had had one hour more daylight. Our loss in this affair was trifling.

‘ I have come here this day in consequence of your letters and I shall not stop until I reach the Tagus. The troops will to-morrow commence their march towards the same

point, and before a week shall have elapsed some of them will be to the southward of the Mondego.

‘ If you should be menaced on the side of Alentejo, break up the bridge of Abrantes, and secure the boats upon the Tagus; and if you have had only half the rain that we have had, I defy the French to cross. If you are attacked only on the side of Alcantara, you have nothing to fear; the enemy cannot penetrate by that road if vigorously opposed.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Mackenzie.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ S. Pedro, 19th May, 1809.

‘ I enclose to you the information I have received from Major General Mackenzie, in consequence of which I propose to leave this place immediately. It is very desirable that I should meet you as soon as possible. I shall be at Ruivacs this day, at Braga to-morrow, and at Oporto on the following day.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. I have just received your letter of the 17th, and I beg you will not hurry the British brigade towards Abrantes, as I do not think the enclosed information renders that at all necessary.

‘ A. W.’

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Braga, 20th May, 1809.

‘ After I had determined to discontinue the further pursuit of Marshal Soult’s army, and to return with the British troops to the south, I heard that Marshal Victor had broken up on the Guadiana, and had made an attack and had carried Alcantara on the 14th. A small garrison, consisting of the 2d batt. of the Lusitanian Legion, and the Idanha à Nova batt. of Portuguese militia, since the army marched to the northward, had occupied that place, which it was forced to evacuate, with some loss, in consequence of this attack. An attempt was made to blow up the bridge over the Tagus, which failed, and the enemy’s cavalry crossed immediately.

‘ My former dispatches will have apprised your Lordship of the measures which I had adopted, with a view to the defence of that part of Portugal, in case it should be invaded during the absence of the army to the northward; and I have now the honor to inform your Lordship that the army is in march to the southward, and the head of it will cross the Mondego before the end of this week.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Braga, 20th May, 1809.

‘ I send you a letter to Mr. Frere, in which you will see a copy of my dispatch to the Secretary of State, containing an account of our late operations.

‘ I have received your letters of the 14th and 15th. Your friend would have been very useful, if he had come a little sooner; as it is, I fear he will be of little use to us; but I shall talk to him.

‘ You shall have the seminary at Santarem for its original purpose.

‘ The Officers of the —— regiment must of course be released; but it would be proper to enable me to report that they have been tried and acquitted. What steps did Cradock take on this subject?

‘ I find that Alcantara is taken: but I shall soon be in Beira.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Braga, 20th May, 1809.

‘ Mr. Villiers will have made you acquainted with our first successes against Marshal Soult, and I now send you a copy of my dispatch to the Secretary of State, containing an account of their result. I am apprehensive, however, that these operations will not be satisfactory to our friends at Seville; at least if I may judge from General Cuesta's letter of the 3d of May to Don Antonio Cornel, which you have transmitted to me.

‘ I wish, however, to make a few observations upon that letter. In the first place my force did not, and does not at present, amount to the numbers stated by General Cuesta; and of that force there were five battalions, with three regiments of cavalry, left to the southward; and one battalion, the 40th, at Seville. The force of 20,000 men and 4,000 cavalry, which General Cuesta notices, was what I supposed I should have to march into Spain, after the expedition to the northward should be completed, and included my reinforcements expected from England and from Gibraltar, which are not yet arrived.

‘ You will see in the enclosed dispatch an account of the efforts I have made to intercept the enemy’s retreat, and of the causes by which they were frustrated; but of this I am certain, that Soult will be very little formidable to any body of troops for some time to come. I did all that I could, and more than I said I should; but no efforts of mine could have prevented him from saving the remnants of his army.

‘ I shall not remark on the General’s observations on former plans of operations, or upon our system being that of not exposing our troops, excepting to declare that I shall adhere to that system, as I did in the case of the detachments from the garrisons of Elvas and Badajoz, whenever I shall not see any clear advantage to be derived from exposing the troops.

‘ Sir Robert Wilson was withdrawn from Alcantara before I arrived in Portugal, for reasons with which I am unacquainted; but thinking the post of importance, I sent another detachment to occupy it, which I am sorry to say was beaten out of it on the 14th instant, by a French corps of 12,000 men.

‘ I am now on my return to the southward, and some of the troops will cross the Mondego by the end of the week.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. H. Frere.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General Mackenzie.

‘ MY DEAR MACKENZIE, ‘ Convent of S. Terso, 21st May, 1809.

‘ I have received your letters to the 18th, and I observe that the enemy has carried the bridge of Alcantara, with 10,000 or 12,000 men, and has advanced as far as Castello

Branco. I do not think it clear, however, that a column will enter Portugal on the side of Alentejo; but if one should enter, and you have taken up the bridge at Abrantes, and secured the boats on the Tagus, I do not see what you have to apprehend from it at this season of the year, more particularly after the late heavy fall of rain. I beg, therefore, that you will not be too ready to give credit to the report that a column is invading Alentejo. Secondly, that if one should enter Alentejo, you will not be too ready to abandon your posts in the mountains towards Castello Branco, if you have taken up your bridge at Abrantes and have secured the boats.

‘ If no column should enter by Alentejo, or if you should have no reason to apprehend that it will be able to cross the Tagus, I must say that I consider your force, constituted as it is, fully equal to keep a corps of 12,000 French from entering by those passes.

‘ You are in an error in supposing that the Portuguese troops will not fight. One battalion has behaved remarkably well with me; and I know of no troops that could have behaved better than the Lusitanian Legion did at Alcantara the other day; and I must add that if the Idanha à Nova militia had not given way, they would have held their post.

‘ If the enemy should turn the passes, and come by the Estrada Nova, you are equally able to defend the Zezere, till I shall come up to your assistance. The head of the army will cross the Mondego by the 26th, so that I shall not be long separated from you.

‘ My opinion is that Victor cannot venture to invade Portugal with his whole force. It is probable that the corps which has crossed at Alcantara is a reconnoitring party, sent in for the purpose of ascertaining what has become of Soult, what our force is, &c.; and if this be true, it will go from Castello Branco towards Guarda. If it does so, it will run the risk of never getting out of Portugal again.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Mackenzie.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. The store at Santarem ought to be sent away forthwith, excepting a supply for your own corps for four

days. It should be put in boats and kept below Salvaterra, ready to move up the river again if you should want it. From these boats you can keep up the store to four days for your corps.

‘ I have just received your second letter of the 18th, which pleases me much better than the first. Look at your instructions, my dear Mackenzie, act boldly upon them, and I will be responsible for all the arrangements.

‘ A. W.’

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Convent of S. Terso, 21st May, 1809.

‘ I have received your letter (no date), and I enclose the copy of a letter to Mackenzie, which contains my opinion upon all points.

‘ I have written to desire that the hussars may be halted at Villa Franca, where the Commissary must take care to provide them with food and forage by water.

‘ The 20th light dragoons must return to Lisbon, and take care of their horses, and all the Officers of the staff must resume their duties at the same place. It will not do to allow Officers to volunteer their services for duty in the field when they are required in garrison; and I should and shall feel the greatest inconvenience from the absence of those Officers from Lisbon, when I shall have to re-equip and refit the army.

‘ As for General Blunt’s brigade, the Portuguese Government must act as it pleases with its own troops. But surely when a plan has been well considered, it is best to adhere to it, till there shall be some reasonable ground for altering it: and I acknowledge that I have not yet seen any reason for believing that the force which has entered by Alcantara is too strong for Mackenzie, or that any force will enter by Alentejo; and yet I have received intelligence to the 18th, and when you wrote to me you had received it only to the 15th.

‘ Mackenzie has no confidence in the Portuguese troops, and therefore for what reason increase their numbers under his command? I should prefer placing them at Villa Franca as a reserve, and to secure that entrance into Lisbon

rather than at any other place, excepting their quarters at Lisbon itself.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Oporto, 22d May, 1809.

‘ I received this morning your letter of the 19th, and two from Mr. Frere, one of the 15th, the other of the 19th.

‘ I wrote to you that I wished the 23d light dragoons to land at Lisbon, if they should arrive there; but if they should arrive either here or at the mouth of the Mondego, I propose that they should land to the northward.

‘ I am much obliged to you for sending the Officer to Almeida. He will be very useful in that quarter.

‘ Mr. ——— assured me, some days ago, that he had left at Lisbon blank bills upon the Treasury, to be filled up by the Deputy Commissary General. I believe rather the truth to be, that we have been deceived by Mr. ———’s reports of the resources of money or bills to be found at Lisbon, and that, instead of large sums, they are very small and very difficult to get at. If we are to carry on war in this country, money must be sent from England. But, after all, I do not see why General Mackenzie should have required a sum of money to have enabled him to move, more than I did with the army; and, as I told you, we had not above 10,000*l*.

‘ I can give you no answer respecting the disposal of the arms at Lisbon. I expect Beresford here this day, or tomorrow, to confer with me upon our northern frontiers during my absence to the southward, and I shall prevail upon him to settle that point.

‘ I have four brigades here this day, which will be across the Mondego on the 26th. Indeed I am not certain that I shall not have the whole army to the south of that river on that day. Remember that I did not receive the account of the attack of Alcantara till the morning of the 19th, near Montealegre, about ninety miles from hence.

‘ I rather think, however, from the accounts which Frere has sent of Cuesta’s movements, that the French are not

coming into Portugal, but are retiring northwards. They were not at Castello Branco on the evening of the 19th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. I cannot be certain of the subsistence of this army, unless the Portuguese Governor will let us have 300 or 400 good mules, with saddles and drivers. It is ridiculous that in Portugal that number cannot be found.

‘ A. W.’

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Oporto, 22d May, 1809.

‘ My letter of the 20th will apprise you of all that has occurred in this quarter, since I wrote to you on the 9th instant. I have returned here with the advance of the army, having done all I could or had to do the northward, and having thought it necessary to move to the southward, in consequence of the threatened invasion of Portugal, by the attack and capture of Alcantara. The greater part of my troops will pass the Mondego on the 26th instant.

‘ I am much obliged to you for your letters of the 15th and 17th. I acknowledge that I do not consider Lord Wellesley’s appointment a subject of congratulation to himself or his friends. I suspect that the task which will devolve upon him will be a most arduous one ; and that some time will elapse before he will be sufficiently *au courant des affaires* to be able even to form a judgment of its extent. I am truly concerned, however, that your removal should not be consonant to your own wishes.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. H. Frere.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Captain General Don Gregorio Cuesta.

‘ SIR,

‘ Oporto, 22d May, 1809.

‘ I had the honor of writing to you from Villa Franca on the 29th of last month, in which letter I informed you that I was on the point of setting out with the army to attack Marshal Soult.

‘ I have now to inform you, that, having collected my troops at Coimbra early in this month, I broke up from

thence on the 9th, and marched in two columns towards the Vouga. We passed that river on the 10th, and surprised and drove in the enemy's advanced guard of cavalry. On the following day, the 11th, we beat the advanced guard of infantry, the division of General Merle and other troops, and four or five squadrons of cavalry at Grijo; and on the 12th we forced the passage of the Douro, beat off the attack of the enemy upon our advanced guard which first crossed the river, and took possession of the town of Oporto, and a great proportion of the enemy's artillery.

' The enemy retired towards Amarante, and my advanced guard followed them on the morning of the 13th.

' General Beresford, who had broken up from Coimbra on the 5th of May, with a British brigade of infantry, some battalions of Portuguese infantry, and four squadrons of cavalry, arrived at Lamego on the Douro, on the 10th and 11th; to which quarter General Silveira had retired after the defeat of his corps, on the 2d instant, at the bridge of Amarante.

' General Beresford drove in the enemy's posts from Villa Real and Mezam Frio on the 11th, and on the 12th drove in their outposts beyond the Tamaga, and thus cut off their retreat by the best road into Castille.

' The enemy, upon finding his retreat cut off, retired from Amarante on the morning of the 13th, and General Beresford took possession of that town.

' The enemy then destroyed, near Penafiel, a great part of the artillery and baggage which he had carried with him, and marched by a mountain road, by Guimaraens, towards the road from Braga to Chaves.

' My advanced guard followed him; and General Beresford moved upon Chaves, detaching General Silveira to seize the passes of Ruivães and Melgaço; and I marched with the army direct upon Braga, as soon as I had ascertained the enemy's direction. I arrived there on the 15th, and followed the enemy to Salamonde on the 16th, where we beat his rear guard in the evening, and took from him a gun and some prisoners. He had crossed at Melgaço on that day.

' I went to Ruivães on the 17th, to ascertain whether he would retire upon Chaves, and I proceeded to Montalegre

on the 18th. General Beresford, finding that the enemy went upon Montealegre instead of Chaves, marched upon Ginzo, in Galicia, but the enemy had taken a mountain road towards Orense.

‘I therefore discontinued the pursuit; and, on the 19th, having heard of the attack on Alcantara, by a corps of Marshal Victor’s army, I determined to return to the southward, and I arrived here this day with a part of the British army.

‘I did everything in my power to intercept the enemy; and although I did not succeed, I have the pleasure to inform your Excellency, that since I attacked him on the Vouga on the 10th instant, he has lost one fourth of his army, and the whole of his artillery and equipments. The road between this and Montealegre is strewn with baggage, and the carcasses of men, horses, and mules; and he is gone into Galicia, very little able to do mischief to anybody.

‘I hope to hear soon from your Excellency in what manner I can be useful to your operations. A part of the army under my command is upon the Tagus, near Abrantes, and the remainder which is here and on its march from the northward will be across the Mondego on the 26th, unless I shall hear that the corps at Alcantara is moving to the northward.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Captain General*
Don Gregorio Cuesta.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Captain Chambers, R.N.

‘SIR,

‘Oporto, 22d May, 1809.

‘If you have not yet sailed with the convoy under your orders, in consequence of my former request to that effect, I shall now be obliged to you to remain at Aveiro, as I have driven Marshal Soult beyond the frontiers of Portugal; and the army is now on its return to the southward, in consequence of information respecting the movements of Marshal Victor on the side of Alcantara; the provisions, stores, &c., are therefore likely to be wanted either at Aveiro or at Figueira.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Captain Chambers, R.N., commanding the fleet of victuallers attending the march of the army.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Marques de la Romana.

‘ MONSIEUR LE MARQUIS,

‘ Oporto, ce 23 Mai, 1809.

‘ Je viens de recevoir la lettre que vous m’avez écrite le 19 de ce mois ; et comme on me dit que le brig *Attack*, qui me l’a apportée, va se mettre en mer tout de suite, je vous envoie la copie d’une lettre que j’ai écrite hier à Monsieur le Général Cuesta, qui vous montrera de quelle manière l’armée Française, sous les ordres du Maréchal Soult, est rentrée en Galicie. J’ai fait tout ce qui était en mon pouvoir pour couper totalement sa retraite, mais cela n’a pas été possible ; et je n’ai discontinué la poursuite, que lorsque j’a vu qu’il n’y avoit plus moyen de couper l’ennemi, et qu’il ne m’étoit pas possible de l’attaquer.

‘ Je n’avois aucune nouvelle de l’état des affaires en Galicie. Depuis que votre Excellence s’est séparée de l’armée Portugaise à Chaves, au mois de Mars, nous n’avions pas eu de vos nouvelles, et nous ne savions même pas où vous étiez.

‘ J’avois promis au Général Cuesta, qui depuis un mois se tient sur la défensive auprès de Llerena, que j’irais co-opérer avec lui, aussitôt que les Français auraient quitté le nord du Portugal ; mais n’ayant nulle espérance de pouvoir détruire l’armée de Soult, en continuant la poursuite, il étoit nécessaire que je la cessasse pour retourner donner du secours au Général Cuesta.

‘ Voilà les raisons qui m’ont déterminé à cesser la poursuite le 18 de ce mois ; mais si je ne l’avois pas cessée ce jour-là, je l’aurais sûrement cessée le lendemain ; car j’ai reçu le 19, les nouvelles que les Français avoient quitté leur cantonnements sur la Guadiana le 12 et le 13 ; qu’ils avoient attaqué un corps Portugais posté à Alcantara le 14, et qu’ils étaient en possession du pont d’Alcantara. Le Portugal étoit en même tems menacé par l’attaque d’un autre corps de 10 à 12 mille hommes qui avoit suivi les premiers ; et la défense du Portugal, qui m’est spécialement confiée, m’aurait obligé de cesser la poursuite du Maréchal Soult, aussitôt que j’aurais reçu ces nouvelles.

‘ Vous me demandez de l’assistance pour la Galicie et les Asturies, les deux provinces de l’Espagne, que je reconnais être les plus intéressantes comme points militaires de la monarchie ; mais en même tems, la Junte Suprême me demande des secours pour le Général Cuesta ; et je crois

que je pourrais combiner la défense du Portugal avec les secours qu'il me serait possible de lui donner, mieux que je ne le pourrais avec ceux que vous me demandez pour la Galicie et les Asturies.

' Je vous envoie par cette occasion une lettre à votre adresse, que j'ai reçue hier au soir de Seville. Monsieur Frere m'a dit, qu'elle contenait les dernières nouvelles reçues du Général Cuesta.

' Quand les Français se sont retirés du Guadiana, ce Général s'est avancé du côté de Badajoz, et il était près de cette ville quand le courrier a passé.

' Je n'ai pas encore bien éclairé les mouvemens des Français. Ils ont attaqué Alcantara avec 10,000 à 12,000 hommes, et ils avaient, à ce que dit le Général Cuesta, un pareil nombre à Brozas. Ou ils se retireront de l'Estremadura, ou ils attaqueront le Portugal. J'aurai mon armée vers le Mondego, et s'ils se retirent, je ferai en sorte de couper toute communication entre les armées Françaises du nord, et celles qui se retirent du sud, et je ferai mon possible pour vous être utile, et pour leur faire du mal.

' J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

' *Le Marques de la Romana.*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

' MY DEAR LORD,

' Oporto, 23d May, 1809.

' The bearer of this letter is Monsieur —, respecting whom I have written to your Lordship from this country. He is now going to England, in consequence of the circumstances which I have lately communicated to you, and he has desired to be recommended to your Lordship.

' He wishes to be permitted and to have the facilities given to him to return to France as soon as possible, in order that he may sell a property he has in France, before the accounts of the transactions in which he has been concerned shall be known to the Government; and I shall be very much obliged to your Lordship if you will give directions that these facilities may be given to him.

' Your Lordship is fully acquainted with all that has passed between Captain — and me, and will judge how far he has any claim to a provision from the British Government. Possibly it might be deemed good policy not to allow a man

to starve who was engaged in a scheme which, if it had been successful, would have tended more than any other to the destruction of the power of Buonaparte.

‘ But exclusive of this general claim upon the bounty of the British Government, — is not without some which appear to me sufficiently strong. His plan was his own, and his communications with me were voluntary; but that which occasioned the discovery of the plan, and ruined him when it was discovered, was his first journey to Lisbon to meet me, and his second journey within our posts to Coimbra. He undertook the first of these journeys at the positive request of Lieut. Colonel Douglas, who had been employed by General Beresford to meet him at Ovar; and who, when he met him, found his communications so important, that he thought it desirable that — should see General Beresford, and he came the second time by my desire. I trust, therefore, that your Lordship will think that he has some claim upon the bounty of Government, and that you will give him such an allowance as may enable him to live decently in England.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Oporto, 23d May, 1809.

‘ There is nothing new this day. Beresford is on his return. I heard from him at Chaves on the 20th.

‘ Upon the capture of Oporto we found here several English, some Danish, Swedish, and one or two French vessels, and a considerable quantity of property, some of which had been loaded in these ships; and another part, principally cotton, which the French had bought in different parts of the country, and had collected here in charge of the French Consul. I wrote to the Admiral some days ago to recommend that he should order the Captain commanding off the port to send an Officer on shore to take an account of the vessels and their contents, in concert with Colonel Trant; and I received an answer yesterday from him, stating that he had desired his secretary to correspond with Colonel Trant respecting these vessels.

‘ The most valuable part of this property is 3000 tons of

wine, belonging, I believe, to the English merchants; upon which, the Admiral, on the notion that all the property at Oporto is liable to be considered and dealt with by the rules of prize, thinks us entitled to salvage. My opinion is, that if we are entitled to it at all, we are entitled to the whole of the property: but the doubt which I entertain is, whether we have a right to any part of this property; and upon this doubt I wish to have your opinion.

‘ It appears to me, that Oporto being a Portuguese port, and the British army acting in this country as allies, or even as a subsidiary army to the Government of Portugal, every thing taken in Oporto belongs to the Government of Portugal; and must be dealt with as that Government chooses, and not according to the rules which govern cases in which His Majesty’s sea and land forces take a port or town from the enemy, which afterwards becomes a part of his own dominions.

‘ I wish you to consider the question not only as one of civil law, but also in reference to the manner in which the Portuguese Government would feel, if we were to consider the property which we found here in possession of the enemy as prize; for however glad I shall be that the success of the army should turn out to their benefit, as well as to their honor, and however convenient it might be to me to share in this benefit myself, I am very unwilling to be instrumental in forwarding such a claim, if it is to have the effect of putting our friends out of temper with us.

‘ Since I began this letter I have received one from the Marques de la Romana; of which, and of my answer, I shall send you a copy. He was at Gijon on the 15th of May, having about 9,000 men in the Asturias, and 4,000 or 5,000 at Vigo. He wants my assistance to defend the Asturias.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Captain Mackinley, R.N.

‘ SIR,

‘ Oporto, 23d May, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 18th instant; and I send one for the Marques de la Romana, which I beg of you to forward.

‘ You have been informed, I believe, of the success which

attended the operations of the troops under my command to the 12th instant. We pursued the enemy on the 13th, and every measure that was practicable was adopted to cut off the enemy's retreat into Galicia: but it was impossible; and he penetrated through the mountains to Orense, on the 19th and 20th, having lost, since I attacked him on the Vouga on the 10th instant, above the fourth of his army, all his cannon, ammunition, and equipments, and all his baggage, excepting what the soldiers and a few mules could carry. The road was strewn with the carcasses of horses, mules, and French soldiers.

'I am now returning to the southward, in consequence of an attack threatened upon the eastern frontier of Portugal by a corps of 12,000 men, which has taken Alcantara.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*Captain Mackinley, R.N.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To the Right Hon. John Villiers.

'MY DEAR VILLIERS,

'Oporto, 24th May, 1809.

'This letter will be delivered to you by Mons. ———, whom I recommend to your protection and kindness. He is going to England, with an intention of returning to France as soon as possible, with a view to sell his estate before the Government shall obtain a knowledge of transactions here in which he has been engaged. I have recommended him to Lord Castlereagh, and I shall be very much obliged to you, if you will aid him in getting away from Lisbon, either in a ship of war or in the packet, as soon as possible.

'Believe me, &c.

'*The Right Hon. John Villiers.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

'MY DEAR VILLIERS,

'Oporto, 24th May, 1809.

'I enclose you a memorandum which has been put into my hands by the Quarter Master General, and I shall be very much obliged to you, if you will apply to the Government for the information which he asks in the first paragraph, and for the drawings and sketches required in the second.

'We are sadly in want of shoes; and the carts upon the road from Lisbon to Coimbra have been so ill used, that I

fear we cannot depend upon the communication ; and if we could, I believe we should receive them sooner by sea.

‘ It will require forty carts to bring up 20,000 pairs of shoes, which we want ; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will ask the Admiral to allow one of his ships of war to take them on board, and bring them as soon as possible to the mouth of the Mondego : we cannot depend upon the transports making way against the wind at this season.

‘ The Commissary at Lisbon will have orders to embark the 20,000 pairs of shoes, if you should tell him that the Admiral will send them to us ; if not, he will send them by land.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General Mackenzie.

‘ MY DEAR MACKENZIE,

‘ Oporto, 24th May, 1809.

‘ It has occurred to me, that you may be in the neighbourhood of General Cuesta, and that he may propose to you to make some movement in aid of his operations.

‘ You will recollect that your corps is destined to the defence of Portugal ; and it must not be risked in any offensive operations. General Cuesta’s corps is by no means equal in point of strength to that of the French opposed to him ; and it is not impossible that he may wish to strengthen himself by a co-operation or a junction with that under your command. All that is very well, as long as the defence of Portugal is the object ; but I cannot be responsible for the safety, or for the risk, for an inadequate object, of the King’s troops, in an operation with the Spanish troops under the command of General Cuesta.

‘ If, therefore, General Cuesta should press you to undertake any service beyond the line of your instructions, you will tell him that your corps is destined to defend a particular line of country, beyond which you cannot go without orders, so long as the French remain on the Tagus ; and that in case they should move northward, you have orders, which I now give you, to join the British army.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Mackenzie.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. The troops will be on the Mondego on the 26th and 27th.

‘ A. W.’

To Brig. General Alexander Campbell.

‘SIR,

‘Oporto, 24th May, 1809.

‘The Adjutant General has communicated to me your letter of the 23d instant, reporting the conduct of Captain the Marques —, in absenting himself from his battalion without leave on the 15th instant, and that you had put him in arrest.

‘I observe from the date that this offence was aggravated by being committed at a moment when the troops were in march in pursuit of the enemy. I am not disposed, however, to carry matters to extremities with the Marques; and I beg that you will call him and the Officers of the regiment to which he belongs before you, and point out to him the extreme impropriety of his conduct.

‘You will particularly point out to him that all the exertions of Great Britain, and that all that the valor and discipline of British soldiers can effect, will not save Portugal and secure her independence, unless the people of Portugal exert themselves in their own cause; and that it is particularly incumbent upon the nobility and persons of great fortune and station to set the example of that devotion to the service of their country, and of that strict attention to the rules of military discipline and subordination, which can alone render any exertions useful, and lead to that success to which all must look forward with anxiety.

‘You will tell the Marques that I hope that the lenity with which his fault has been treated upon this occasion will induce him to be more attentive to his duty; and that I expect from him exertions in the cause of his country, patience to bear the hardships of a military life, and submission to the rules of military discipline and subordination, in proportion as his rank, station, and fortune are superior to those of others of his countrymen in the service. You will then release the Marques from his arrest.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Brig. Gen. Alex. Campbell.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘Quinta de la Mealhada,

25th May, 1809.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘I was in hopes that I should have seen you at Oporto, and I stayed there till this morning. I shall be at Aveiro to-morrow.

‘It is absolutely necessary that I should see you. I consider the north of Portugal to be now the most exposed part of the country, and we must make a good arrangement for its security before we move to the southward.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major General Beresford.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. General Sherbrooke.

‘MY DEAR SHERBROOKE,

‘Aveiro, 27th May, 1809.

‘I hope you will have a better passage than I had. My horses are not yet arrived.

‘In respect to Mr. G——, I am aware of his merits, and I shall be happy to do something for him. But it would not answer to promote an Assistant Commissary to be a Deputy Commissary, when we have already four Deputy Commissaries with the army; more especially as he was appointed by the Treasury only in 1807. Besides, with every sense of Mr. G——’s merits, I must have a longer experience of them, and a better opportunity of comparing them with the merits of others, than I have had in the short period since the troops took the field.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. General Sherbrooke.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

‘MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘Aveiro, 27th May, 1809.

‘I received yesterday your letters of the 21st and 23d. In answer to the first, I have to inform you that I conclude General Blunt will not order the 40th regiment from Lisbon, when that corps shall arrive there, till he shall receive directions from me. As soon as I can get my papers I propose to send the 30th regiment to Gibraltar, to relieve a part of that garrison; and I propose that the 40th shall do the

duty at Lisbon, till I can get one of the younger corps down from the army to relieve the 40th.

‘I also hope that General Blunt will not order the 23d light dragoons from Lisbon, if that corps should arrive in the Tagus, without receiving directions from me.

‘I am concerned that I do not agree in opinion with you respecting the propriety of sending one regiment of dragoons to Castello de Vide; particularly not one which will have been but just landed. Neither Officers, men, nor horses are, in the first days after their disembarkation, fit for any duty, and particularly not for that description of duty to be performed by one regiment of dragoons opposed to a whole army.

‘If mules could be got in the country for any purpose, I should wish to apply them to some other purpose besides the draught of two 3 pounders, to be attached to the 23d dragoons. If such an equipment should be desirable, I shall have it in my power to supply it with horses.

‘I do not know what Beresford means by negotiation. In an intercepted letter from Victor to Marshal Jourdan, I believe, (for the copy sent to me was so faulty that I could not make out its contents, or to whom addressed,) he says that “he will not make a certain movement,” (not described, but probably a retrograde one,) “till a French negotiation should have brought to a close his negotiations with the junta, of the success of which he had some hopes.”

‘It is probable that the movement to which he referred was that lately executed upon Alcantara, so that the negotiation must have already been brought to a close. But if it were not, I should not think it advisable that we, in Portugal, should suggest any measures, in regard to negotiations, to the Junta of Seville, especially measures founded upon any thing so vague as the contents of an old intercepted letter.

‘In answer to your letter of the 23d, I have to mention that I had intended to move by Guarda, possibly Almeida, if the enemy had remained at Alcantara, and had pointed northward. But at present I intend to follow my original plan, and to assemble the army on the Tagus. From thence I shall act upon the north or south side of that river, as I may think proper.

‘I hope, however, that the troops will be left in their stations, till I shall send them orders to move.

‘The foundation of all military plans is compounded of the situations of one’s own troops, those of the allies, and those of the enemy; but if I cannot be certain even of my own, it is impossible for me to form, much less to execute, any military plan.

‘I do not in general leave the troops idle, and you may depend upon it they will have enough to do before the campaign is over. Besides you see that the reliefs from Gibraltar and England are to be executed, and the troops must not be moved without my direction.

‘I propose to send all the prisoners to England, excepting the Hanoverians, who will be allowed to enter the Legion.

‘The French broke a great number of their arms, and the Portuguese peasantry took and carried away the remainder.

‘I do not know what to do, or to recommend, in respect to the magistrates of the country. They are so very inefficient or remiss in the performance of their duty, that we are constantly stopped or thwarted, for want of the assistance which we must require from them. I have now to complain of the magistrates of this place and Ovar, for disappointing us in the boat people [necessary to attend the boats to transport the troops across the lake. For want of boats and boatmen the troops are not so forward on their march to the southward as I intended they should be.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. General Sir J. Cradock, K.B.

‘SIR,

‘Aveiro, 27th May, 1809.

‘I have the honor to enclose a letter for you from the Secretary of State, containing directions to send to Portugal, from Gibraltar, the 48th and 61st regiments, as soon as corps could be sent from Portugal to relieve them.

‘I now send from Portugal the 2d batt. 30th regiment, and I purpose to send round to Gibraltar another battalion, as soon as one can be marched down the country. In the mean time, I have requested the Admiral to send to Gibraltar a sufficiency of tonnage for the conveyance of both the

regiments; and I hope that you will have no objection to detach from Gibraltar both the regiments, in consideration of the urgency of the service in Portugal, although only one battalion is now sent from Portugal to relieve them; but you may depend upon it that the second battalion shall follow as soon as possible.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

Sir J. Cradock, K.B., Gibraltar.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Aveiro, 27th May, 1809.

‘ Before I left England, I received directions from the Secretary of State, of which I enclose a copy, to send to Gibraltar two battalions of infantry, to relieve two battalions of that garrison ordered to join the army in Portugal.

‘ I propose that the 2d batt. 30th regiment shall be one of the battalions to go to Gibraltar; and I have written to the Commanding Officer at Gibraltar to request that, as soon as that battalion shall arrive there, he will send round the two battalions destined for service in Portugal.

‘ I shall therefore be much obliged to you if you will be so kind as to give directions that tonnage for 2,000 men may be prepared, to be sent round to Gibraltar, on board of which transports the 2d batt. 30th regiment will be ordered to embark, as soon as the 1st batt. 40th regiment shall relieve them at Lisbon.

‘ I shall hereafter request of you to order tonnage for another battalion to be sent to Gibraltar, as soon as I shall have been enabled to decide which I shall send, from a comparison of their relative fitness for service in the field.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Gordon, Military Secretary to
the Commander in Chief.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Coimbra, 27th May, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a list of Officers in the British army in Portugal, who have been allowed, by the late Commander of the Forces, to serve with the Portuguese

army on the same terms with the Officers who were sent from England with General Beresford to serve in Portugal.

‘ I understand that all these Officers have complied with the conditions on which they were to be allowed to transfer their temporary services to the Portuguese troops; and I beg you will submit their names to the Commander in Chief, to be promoted one step in rank. It is very desirable that Officers should be sent to replace them in the regiments to which they belong.

‘ I also enclose a list of the names of Officers permitted by the late Commander of the Forces to serve with the Portuguese army as Brigadier Generals. Sir Robert Wilson, indeed, has been for a considerable time employed in that situation; and I beg leave to recommend that these Officers may be allowed to draw the pay and allowances of Brigadier Generals on the British establishment.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Gordon,
Military Secretary.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Brig. General Cox, Governor of Almeida.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cantanhede, 28th May, 1809. ’

‘ I have received your letter of the 22d instant. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will take measures to obtain a knowledge of the movements and strength of the different French corps in the neighbourhood of Almeida, and write to me by every opportunity.

‘ The British army, having defeated and driven Soult out of Portugal, is now on its return to the south; and, if I should find that the object of the late movements of the French towards Alcantara is to retire northward, I shall turn towards Almeida.

‘ I shall be obliged to you to let me know what quantity of provisions and military stores you have at Almeida; whether those of both descriptions, left in the place last year by the British army, are still there, and in what state of preservation.

‘ Direct to me at Coimbra, where my quarters will be to-morrow.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c

‘ *Brig. General Cox.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General Mackenzie.

‘ MY DEAR MACKENZIE,

‘ Cantanhede, 28th May, 1809.

‘ You probably do not know that the hussars are a few stray ones belonging to the 1st regiment, which landed at Lisbon, instead of Figueira with their regiment. The regiment is inefficient without them, as you may readily believe. Pray, therefore, let them be halted somewhere, till I can lay hands upon them to join them to their corps.

‘ I have received your letters of the 24th and 26th. All that you have done is perfectly correct in every part. I should like to see Alcantara occupied again; but it will not do to contest the point with the French army at Brozas. I think it probable that the people who were there on the 25th were only a patrol.

‘ The march of the army has been delayed in some measure for the want of shoes; but our head is at Coimbra, and we are all in motion to the southward.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Mackenzie.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ SIR,

‘ Coimbra, 29th May, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter, enclosing one from Major General —, expressing the desire of that Officer to be relieved from the command of the brigade placed under his orders, and to be allowed to return to England, if it is intended to employ his services in future in co-operation with the Portuguese troops.

‘ As the Commander in Chief of the British and Portuguese allied army in this country, it is impossible for me to engage to any Officer that the troops under his command shall not be employed in concert or co-operation with any particular description of troops. In that capacity, I consider myself wholly and solely responsible that His Majesty's troops shall not be employed in improper situations, and the Major Generals or other inferior Officers responsible only that they and those under them do their duty in the situation in which they may be employed.

‘ I request you, therefore, to inform Major General — that he has my leave to resign the command of his brigade, and to go to England when he thinks proper ; and that I desire he will deliver over the command to the senior Officer of the brigade present.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Coimbra, 30th May, 1809.

‘ I am very much afraid that I did not sufficiently explain myself on the subject of the rank of British Officers in the Portuguese service. I have no pretensions to decide upon the question of difference which arises upon it ; but when it is referred to me, I must give my opinion upon it, and I am concerned if it differs from yours. I have no desire that it should be decided by me : decide it yourself, or let it be referred to the Ministers in England, and I shall act cordially upon any decision that may be passed upon it.

‘ The practice has been to take a Captain from the British army to make him a British Major, and then to make him a Portuguese Lieutenant Colonel. A British Lieutenant is by the same process made a Portuguese Major ; and Lieut. Colonel Blunt and Lieut. Colonel Campbell are made Portuguese Brigadiers over the heads of all the Colonels, and all the senior Lieutenant Colonels of the British army serving in Portugal.

‘ The rank thus given to these Officers is not permanent, for they may return to the King’s service to-morrow. They have not entered permanently into the Portuguese service. If they had, I should not have a word to say ; but after having, during the service in Portugal, commanded their permanent superiors in the British service, they are to return to that service to be commanded by those superiors.

‘ I do not dispute the rank of the Portuguese commission ; on the contrary, I assert it : but I wish that an arrangement should be made which would satisfy the Officers of this army, respecting the rank they are to hold, in relation to their juniors in the British service who hold superior military rank in the Portuguese service.

‘ It may be asked, Why are they to require satisfaction? —to which I only answer, that men’s minds are so constituted, that when they conceive they are injured, they are not satisfied until the injury is removed. Dissatisfaction on one subject begets it on others, and I should have (indeed I may say I have, for the first time) the pain of commanding a dissatisfied army.

‘ If military rank and pre-eminence is an object (and it is an object on service in the field against the enemy, or it is none at all), these Officers are injured by the temporary supercession of themselves by their juniors in the British service; and all that I ask is either that British Officers entering the Portuguese service shall serve in the same rank which they hold in that of His Majesty, or, if superior rank should be given to them in the Portuguese service, it should be understood that, when they meet British Officers of superior British rank to themselves, they are to receive their orders.

‘ The effect of this last arrangement would be to give for that moment Portuguese rank to the British Officer who should thus exercise the command.

‘ I mentioned Beresford’s local rank only as an instance of the dissatisfaction unnecessarily created by such arrangements. It is of no use to Beresford; for, as Field Marshal and Commander in Chief of the Portuguese army, he must command everybody excepting the Commander in Chief of the British army, and that by virtue of a special arrangement; and I observe that the same feeling exists respecting it in England, for it has virtually been done away, respecting all Major Generals senior to him, by a late order.

‘ The dissatisfaction, however, occasioned by the grant of this rank, is undoubted. It is the cause of the resignation of one General Officer, —, who by the bye, was by no means affected by it; and Major General Murray, who will be a loss, is determined to resign, and go away, notwithstanding that, as I have above told you, the rank has now no effect with respect to him. But these two instances will be sufficient to show you in what manner dissatisfaction, once excited, works in a British army; and I must say that, from the highest to the lowest, dissatisfaction does now exist in the British army.

‘ We are not naturally a military people; the whole business of an army upon service is foreign to our habits, and is a constraint upon them, particularly in a poor country like this. This constraint naturally excites a temper ready to receive any impressions which will create dissatisfaction; and when dissatisfaction exists in an army, the task of the Commander is difficult indeed. I am, therefore, most desirous that the reasonable grounds for it, which do now exist, should be removed; and I have pointed out one of two modes in which this object can be effected.

‘ I cannot go to Lisbon, and cannot move from hence for two or three days; but I shall let you know my motions exactly.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Captain General Don Gregorio Cuesta.

‘ SIR,

‘ Coimbra, 30th May, 1809.

‘ I wrote to your Excellency, on the 22d instant, an account of the operations of the army under my command, and I informed your Excellency that the army was in march towards this place. Its progress has been in some degree delayed by the badness of the weather and the roads, and the want of shoes; but the whole are in full march for this place, and will proceed, as fast as circumstances will permit, towards the Tagus, and I expect that all the reinforcements will have arrived by the time it reaches that river.

‘ I now send to your Excellency’s head quarters two Officers in my confidence, Lieut. Colonel Bourke*, of the Quarter Master General’s department, and Lieut. Colonel the Hon. H. Cadogan†, one of my aides de camp, in order to explain to your Excellency my intentions, and to ascertain those of your Excellency, with regard to the co-operation of the two armies under our command respectively, in an attack upon Marshal Victor, with the view to the destruction of his corps, if possible; or, if not possible, its removal from its threatening position on the frontiers of Portugal and of Andalusia.

* Major General S. R. Bourke, K.C.B., Governor of New South Wales.

† Afterwards killed at Vitoria.

‘Lieut. Colonel Bourke will explain to your Excellency the points on which I wish to have information, which I request your Excellency to afford him.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Captain General*

Don Gregorio Cuesta.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUT. COLONEL BOURKE, ASSISTANT
QUARTER MASTER GENERAL.

‘30th May, 1809.

‘If the two armies under General Cuesta and Sir Arthur Wellesley are to co-operate in an attack upon Marshal Victor, the co-operation must be upon the principle of a junction; or of a co-operation with communication; or of a co-operation on separate lines previously combined and arranged.

‘If on the principle of a junction, where is it proposed that the armies should join?

‘If on the principle of a co-operation, with constant communication, by what points is the communication to be kept up?

‘If the operations of each army are to be separate and distinct, although previously combined, and it is proposed that the British army should act upon the right flank and rear of the enemy, what operations does General Cuesta propose for his army?

‘What is the position at present occupied by the enemy, and his strength in it?

‘What are his lines of retreat from it, and what are the advantages and disadvantages attending each?

‘What support has the enemy’s flank, and between him and Madrid?

‘What is the position occupied by General Cuesta? What is his strength in infantry, cavalry, and artillery?

‘What number of days would be required for General Cuesta to march from his present position to that occupied by the enemy, with a view to a combined attack upon him?

‘Is there any fortified position of which it would be necessary for General Cuesta to possess himself and occupy, before he could join in the attack with advantage?

‘Are there any natural difficulties in the road?

‘ What French corps, and of what strength, are on the left of Victor, and where situated ?

‘ How do these troops communicate with Victor ?

‘ Is their junction practicable, and if both were to withdraw, where could they join ?

‘ What is the strength of the corps under General Venegas ? and where is he situated ?

‘ How does he communicate with General Cuesta ?

‘ Would it be possible to include this corps in the system of operations to be adopted against Victor ?

‘ Are the roads practicable for an army, leading along the Tagus, both north and south of that river ?

‘ What roads lead from the Tagus to the Guadiana, and what communication between one of these roads and the other ?

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To W. Huskisson, Esq., Secretary to the Treasury.

‘ MY DEAR HUSKISSON,

‘ Coimbra, 30th May, 1809.

‘ The distress, of which I gave you a sketch in my last letter, has been aggravated by its continuance, and by an accumulation of debt for all our supplies from that period to this.

‘ I am convinced that 300,000*l.* would not now pay our debts in this country. Pay is due to the troops, and we have not a shilling, or the chance of getting any. The money sent to Cadiz to be exchanged is not returned, and none can be procured at Lisbon for bills. In short, we must have money from England, if we are to continue our operations in this country. You should now send us 300,000*l.* as soon as possible.

‘ I believe that we have all been deceived respecting the supposed facility of procuring money at Lisbon for bills upon England. Where is the trade which is likely to supply a demand for bills to the amount of two millions a year ? Is it to be believed, on the other hand, that the merchants of Portugal are sending their whole capital to England ? And if they are, must there not be some limit to the amount of the demand for bills for this purpose ? In short, Mr. — has given you an erroneous view of the state of the money

market at Lisbon, as he has to me upon many other subjects; he has availed himself of all that it could supply, and nothing now remains.

‘ I trust that 100,000*l.* will have been sent immediately after you received my last letter, and that you will send 200,000*l.* more as soon as possible. I borrowed from the merchants of Oporto all that I could get; but the sum was very small indeed, and we are in the greatest distress.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *W. Huskisson, Esq.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Coimbra, 31st May, 1809.

‘ I have long been of opinion that a British army could bear neither success nor failure, and I have had manifest proofs of the truth of this opinion in the first of its branches in the recent conduct of the soldiers of this army. They have plundered the country most terribly, which has given me the greatest concern. The Town Major of Lisbon, if he has the orders, will show you, if you wish to read them, those that I have given out upon this subject.

‘ They have plundered the people of bullocks, among other property, for what reason I am sure I do not know, except it be, as I understand is their practice, to sell them to the people again. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will mention this practice to the Ministers of the Regency, and beg them to issue a proclamation forbidding the people, in the most positive terms, to purchase anything from the soldiers of the British army.

‘ We are terribly distressed for money. I am convinced that 300,000*l.* would not pay our debts; and two months’ pay is due to the army. I suspect the Ministers in England are very indifferent to our operations in this country.

‘ I rather suspect that Sir John Cradock has detained the *Surveillante* at Cadiz, and that this is the reason why that ship has not returned with the dollars in exchange for our gold.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Coimbra, 31st May, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 29th. I am much obliged to you for the trouble you have taken, and the directions you have given respecting the oats in the ships *Bellona*, *Enterprise*, and *Anne*. I have given directions to the Commissary General to see that the arrangements which you propose respecting the cargoes of these ships should be executed forthwith, not only in respect to these, but in respect to all the victuallers, hay and oat ships, now in the port of Lisbon.

‘ The hire of store houses will be a much less heavy expense upon the public than that of victuallers, which may, of course, be sent back to England, whenever you may think proper.

‘ I have written to England to request that no more spirits or salt provisions might be sent out to Portugal.

‘ I propose to address you more fully hereafter respecting the future movements of the army : in the mean time, I have the honor to inform you, that it is now on its march towards Abrantes, on the Tagus.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

Coimbra, 31st May, 1809.

‘ I have received your letters of the 29th, to both of which I proceed to give you an answer. I proposed to you to limit the number of transports to eight; because at that time I had it in contemplation to send home only Mr. Cochrane Johnstone’s sheep, thinking, from his account, that the Government of Spain would find the means of sending home those they intended to present to His Majesty. I entirely concur with you, however, that it is desirable to increase the number to twenty five, or more, as they can be spared from the service; and that, in fact, the expense on account of the public is discontinued from the time that they shall leave the Tagus.

‘ I think that all the three months’ infantry ships, and the

horse ships of which you sent me the list the other day, may be sent home, or to Cadiz. Or, indeed, if you are desired to send home those you included in your list, you might send other horse ships to Cadiz for the sheep.

‘ I am very much obliged to you for the trouble you have taken respecting the supply of beef for the Alentejo, as likewise for sending us our shoes, and all the assistance we have received from you. I am now about to move the army to the Tagus, and I have requested Captain Chambers to come to the Mondego with his fleet, as soon as he can get out of Aveiro.

‘ My wish and intention were to send to Lisbon, by sea, the troops which are to go home when the relief shall come out; but from the accounts received this day by the *Parthian* from England, I think it not improbable that I shall be in Spain before the reinforcements, in infantry at least, can arrive. I should wish, however, Captain Chambers to remain in this quarter for a few days longer, till I shall have set everything fairly in motion to the southward, and shall have closed my concerns in this quarter.

‘ I have not answered your letter respecting the property captured at Oporto, because just at the time that I received it, a doubt occurred to me whether, under the circumstances of the case, we ought to consider the property as prize, or the captors entitled to salvage for that part which belonged to British merchants.

‘ Oporto is a town belonging to the Prince Regent, and we, the army, could be considered only in the light of auxiliaries to His Royal Highness. Your ships would be considered in a different point of view; but I imagine that your right would be founded upon ours, and would arise from our success in a conjoint expedition. So that if we have no claim, you have none.

‘ The principle upon which all claims to prize are founded is, that the property captured from an enemy belongs to His Majesty, who gives it either by Act of Parliament, or by his Proclamation, in certain shares, to his navy and his army; but in this case, the property captured could not belong to His Majesty, but to the Sovereign in whose territory we were carrying on our operations, and to whom we were auxiliaries. Under these circumstances, I should doubt whether the

King's Courts would condemn the property as prize, and whether the Act of Parliament, or the King's Proclamation, would operate upon it.

' However, I have desired Colonel Trant to proceed in every respect, notwithstanding these doubts of mine, as your Secretary has pointed out; viz., to have an account taken of everything, to have copies taken of all papers, to seal them up, and make the Captains of the vessels give receipts for them, and to send everything to England. I have also written to Villiers upon the subject.

' You will have heard, I conclude, from the Captain of the *Parthian*, from Oporto. He has sent me word by Colonel Elley*, that Admiral Young desired him to return immediately from Oporto, if I did not wish to detain him; and I have sent him word that I have no desire to keep him.

' I have letters from England of the 16th, but no news. I hope that the defeat of the Austrians has not been so decisive as the French accounts would make it.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

' MY LORD,

' Coimbra, 31st May, 1809.

' I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 15th instant, enclosing the extract of one from the late Commander of the Forces in Portugal, and the copy of one from the Master General, relative to the deficiency of supplies of ammunition.

' I believe that Sir John Cradock did not intend to represent to your Lordship that there was any deficiency of ammunition in Portugal; I certainly have not experienced any: but that the difficulties of procuring conveyance, and of the communications, were such, as that the quantities which he had been enabled to bring forward for the use of the army in the field were not what he thought sufficient.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Viscount Castlereagh.*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

* Lieut. General Sir John Elley, K.C.B.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Coimbra, 31st May, 1809.

‘ I request your Lordship will be pleased to give directions that a supply of 30,000 pairs of shoes for the use of the British troops may be sent to Lisbon at an early period. It is desirable that the Storekeeper should give directions that these shoes should be of the best quality.

‘ I shall also be much obliged to your Lordship, if you will give directions that 1,500,000 lbs. of biscuit may be sent to Lisbon for the use of the troops, and 3,000,000 lbs. of hay, and 3,000,000 lbs. of oats.

‘ I have also to inform your Lordship, that from every information I have received of the probable supply of money for bills upon England, it is my opinion, that a sum amounting to not less than 300,000*l.* ought to be sent to Lisbon at an early period.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Coimbra, 31st May, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to inform your Lordship, that since my letter of the 20th instant, the enemy has withdrawn the corps which had taken possession of Alcantara on the 14th, and his army is concentrated in the neighbourhood of Caceres, between the Tagus and the Guadiana.

‘ The Spanish army, under General Cuesta, had advanced from its position at Llerena, upon receiving accounts of the enemy’s march from the Guadiana, and the advanced guard had attacked a fortified post which the enemy still held at Merida. But, by a letter from General Cuesta of the 20th instant, I find that he had discontinued the attack, owing to the difficulty of supporting it, in consequence of the swelling of the Guadiana. His head quarters were, by the last accounts, at Fuente del Maestre.

‘ General Mackenzie is in the mountains behind Castello Branco, and he has been directed again to occupy Alcantara, in such force as to be able to secure that passage over the Tagus.

‘ The army is in march towards this place; the leading brigades have already arrived here, and I expect the whole in the course of a few days. The march has, in some degree, been delayed in consequence of the badness of the weather, and the general want of shoes by the troops, it having been impossible to bring up from Lisbon a sufficient supply. The arrangements, however, are all made for the early movement of the troops to the Tagus, and they will begin their march on the day after to-morrow.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Coimbra, 31st May, 1809.

‘ I have received your Lordship’s letter of the 13th instant, relative to the Officers of the British army allowed to serve in the army of Portugal, and I have the honor to inform your Lordship that I transmit by this opportunity, to the office of the Commander in Chief, lists of the names of Officers, belonging to regiments in Portugal, who have been allowed to serve with the Portuguese troops. I hope that their names will be submitted to His Majesty for promotion for one step of rank at an early period.

‘ I have to request your Lordship will give directions that all the Officers who have been promoted for service with the Portuguese troops, as well of the original number of twenty four as of the last number of thirty, referred to by your Lordship in your dispatch of the 13th instant, may be ordered to Portugal without loss of time.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Coimbra, 31st May, 1809.

‘ I have but little to add to the contents of my public dispatches. You will hear officially from the Admiral respecting the discharge of transports.

‘ The Agent of Transports has kept himself so much aloof from us, that I am not enabled to write to you accurately on the subject. I can only tell you in this way, that I have

begged of the Admiral to send home all the three months' infantry ships, a great proportion of the cavalry ships, and all the victuallers, as I have desired that all the provisions and stores may be landed and put in store on shore. I shall also make arrangements to send home all the ordnance store ships, as soon as I can see the Commanding Officer of artillery, who is not yet come up.

' I shall soon be in Spain, and if Victor does not move across the Tagus, he will be in as bad a scrape as Soult. I hope to receive from you, before long, some orders respecting my conduct, supposing I should drive Victor away from the frontiers of Portugal, and should be required by Cuesta or the Junta to pursue him.

' We are getting on well, and I hope the Government are satisfied with us.

' The army behave terribly ill. They are a rabble who cannot bear success any more than Sir John Moore's army could bear failure. I am endeavoring to tame them; but if I should not succeed, I must make an official complaint of them, and send one or two corps home in disgrace. They plunder in all directions.

' I have sent Colonel Bourke and Colonel Cadogan to Cuesta, to arrange a plan of co-operation in an attack upon Victor.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Viscount Castlereagh.*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

' SIR,

' Coimbra, 1st June, 1809.

' I have the honor to enclose two letters which have been transmitted to me by Colonel Trant, relative to the horse transports sent to Oporto to convey to England the French prisoners, many of whom are sick and wounded.

' I beg leave to recommend that infantry transports, to convey a thousand men, may be sent to Oporto, in addition to the horse transports already sent there, as many of the prisoners are not yet come in; and I learn from Colonel Trant that there will be no room for above 600 of those now at Oporto in the horse transports.

' As it will be necessary to make some alteration in the

horse transports to render them capable of containing the prisoners at all ; and as this alteration will occasion expense, and some expense must be incurred, and inconvenience and delay occasioned, in order to refit the ships as horse transports, you will probably think it proper to order the alteration of the horse transports to be discontinued, and to send infantry transports for the whole.

‘ I beg leave to refer you to my letter of the 15th May for a statement of the tonnage required.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Coimbra, 1st June, 1809.

‘ I enclose a dispatch which I received yesterday from England, relative to the Officers to be appointed to the Portuguese service. I wrote to Lord Castlereagh to request that all those already appointed by Sir John Cradock and me might receive their promotion immediately ; and that those appointed in England, as well of the first twenty as the last thirty, might be ordered to join in Portugal without loss of time.

‘ You have made use of Mr. M’Neal, the Commissary attached to Major General Tilson’s brigade, and have made him superintendent of your Commissariat. I cannot spare him to you : he is one of the best of his rank ; and I am now obliged to employ him on another service.

‘ Villiers will show you the dispatches from England respecting Captain —.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Coimbra, 1st June, 1809.

‘ I enclose you the answer to my first dispatch respecting Captain —, which I received yesterday from England. I think that the Ministers have taken nearly the same view of the subject which we have.

‘ I also enclose Lord Castlereagh’s private letter upon the subject, in which you will see a prospect of another success in the West Indies. Pray return these papers.

‘ I had written to the Admiral respecting the claim of the navy to share in any prize we should make at Oporto, long before I had received your letter. In fact, if the frigates had not been stationed off the port, there was nothing to prevent the French from sending away any thing they pleased; and if we had any right, the navy must have it likewise. If I had been so inclined, it would have been impossible afterwards to dispute the claim of the navy, and to assert our own; and therefore all that I have done has been to apprise the Admiral of the doubts (I ought to say the certainty) I entertain, that none of us have any claim whatever. If you are decidedly of the same opinion, I think you had better say no more upon the subject, excepting to let the Government know that there is a large property in cotton, &c. at Oporto.

‘ I have desired that the guns belonging to the French should be embarked in the frigate, and sent to Lisbon; those belonging to the Portuguese, of which there are many fine brass guns, will be left in the arsenal at Oporto. The French lost above sixty pieces of cannon in this expedition into Portugal.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Coimbra, 1st June, 1809.

‘ Since I wrote to you this morning, I have received your’s of the 30th. I shall stay here till the 5th, when I shall go by Thomar to Abrantes, and I shall be glad to see Colonel Alava. I do not mean, however, to allow any detachment of the British troops to move until the whole army is ready to support it.

‘ I am concerned that any complaint has been made by the people of Oporto. The facts are these:—It was represented to me upon my return to Oporto, after the pursuit of Soult, that the merchants and the senate were not unwilling to assist us by a loan of money, we being at that time in want of everything, particularly shoes, and not having one

farthing. I asked Mr. Murray whether he thought the exposure of our distress at Oporto was likely to have a baneful influence on the money market at Lisbon; and having been told that it would not, I made known our temporary distress, first to the Senate, who immediately said they would advance us all that was in their power. I then applied to the merchants of the Wine Company, some of whom did not appear equally willing to assist us; upon which I said to them as I left the room, that I left them to consider of the statement I had made, and of my wish that they should assist us; and that all I could say was, that if they refused to assist our distresses with the money which we wanted, after all that we had done for them, the world, when the story should be told, would not believe it. This is the amount of the *dureté* which has been put upon them. I believe I did shame them into lending us a sum of money. After all, the sum borrowed at Oporto, for it was not levied, amounted to about 10,000*l.*, and this is what the Government call "severe." I really believe that I saved for them property for which they will get a hundred times that amount; and if I had waited to attack Soult till I had had money sufficient to render this loan unnecessary (for which I may wait the next time my assistance is wanted), the expense of the support of his army would have been ten times the amount.

' I am very much obliged for the papers which you have sent to the Government respecting the conduct of their magistrates.

' I wait here till the greatest part of the army is gone by, as there are constant difficulties and distresses which must immediately be relieved; and I may as well be here as anywhere else; and my horses require rest.

' Believe me, &c.

' *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Marshal Beresford.

' MY DEAR BERESFORD,

' Coimbra, 2d June, 1809.

' I have been endeavoring to form a corps of guides—that is to say, one of Officers and non-commissioned officers, who should be interpreters between our people and those of the country, who must show them their roads. We have got

some Officers, but we want non-commissioned officers. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will allow us to have Jozé Bannas, corporal in the 2d company of grenadiers of the 13th regiment, and eight or ten other serjeants, corporals, or steady soldiers, men of good character, who can speak either English or French, to make of them serjeants or corporals of guides. They will have with us the pay and allowances of British cavalry.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To J. Murray, Esq., Commissary General.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 3d June, 1809.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know, as soon as possible, what progress you make in procuring money.

‘ You should send up here by water without loss of time all that you can get. We can do no longer without money.

‘ I also request you to desire the Commissary at Lisbon to let the Commissary at Abrantes know daily what is sent off. We much want the 10,000 pairs of shoes ordered, and the stores and baggage required in the Quarter Master General’s department, as well as the stores ordered for your own.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *J. Murray, Esq.,
Commissary General.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Coimbra, 3d June, 1809.

‘ I enclose a letter which Colonel Fletcher has given me, which affords but a bad prospect of a defence for the Tagus. I think that if Captain Chapman’s facts are true, his arguments are unanswerable; and that it is very doubtful whether any heavy ordnance ought to be placed in the batteries on the upper Tagus. However, there can be no harm in constructing the batteries, and we can arm them with some guns of a small calibre, which would be of no use to the enemy if they should fall into their hands.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Brig. General Howorth, commanding the Royal Artillery.

' SIR,

' Coimbra, 3d June, 1809.

' I have to thank you for the trouble you have taken about the captured ordnance. I did not trouble you upon this subject, because I was not aware that you would be under the necessity of remaining at Oporto.

' The barrels of gunpowder which you mention were sent by Great Britain for the service of Portugal, and must therefore be left at Oporto for the orders of General Beresford.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Brig. General Howorth.*'

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General Cotton.*

' MY DEAR GENERAL,

' Coimbra, 3d June, 1809.

' I enclose the copy of a letter transmitted to me by the Deputy Commissary General, and it is absolutely necessary that the cavalry should carry three days' corn for themselves, whenever it can be procured, as no carts can be allowed for this purpose.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Major General Cotton.*'

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Captain Chambers, R.N.

' SIR,

' Coimbra, 4th June, 1809.

' I am concerned that you are still detained at Aveiro; and I apprehend that you will not get out for some days, till there shall be an easterly wind.

' As soon as you can get out, I should wish you to go to the mouth of the Mondego for the following objects:—

' 1st. To receive into the transports a small detachment of the 3d hussars, who will have been dismounted.

' 2dly. To receive into the transports a certain quantity of stores not required for the use of the army.

' 3dly. To deliver to a Commissary, who shall be there to receive, 300,000 lbs. of bread, and 80,000 rations of oats. He will take charge of these stores, and embark them in schooners, which I have directed him to hire for this purpose.

' In case there should not be in the victuallers a sufficient

* General Viscount Combermere, G.C.B.

quantity of bread and oats to supply these deliveries, I shall be obliged to you if you will order their delivery from the empty transports and horse ships.

‘ I shall be obliged to you to send the enclosed letter to any fleet of transports that may appear off Aveiro.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Captain Chambers, R.N.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Staff Surgeon ———.

‘ SIR,

‘ Coimbra, 4th June, 1809.

‘ I have received your letter of the 3d instant and its enclosure. It is impossible for me to enter into a discussion with you on the propriety and expediency of the orders which you have received from the Deputy Inspector, and I have only to desire that you will obey them without loss of time.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ ———, Esq.,

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Surgeon to the Forces.

To Lieut. Colonel Walsh, Town Major of Lisbon.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Coimbra, 4th June, 1809.

‘ I have just heard that Colonel Roche was off Oporto on the 2d instant, in the *Swallow* sloop of war, charged with dispatches for me; that he was unable to land himself, being indisposed, and he was unwilling to send the dispatches on shore, and that he is gone with them to Lisbon.

‘ I request you will get from Colonel Roche the dispatches as soon as he shall arrive at Lisbon, and forward them to me. I shall be at Thomar on the 6th, and at Abrantes the 7th instant. I request you also to inform Colonel Roche that I shall always be happy to see him, when he is able to come to me; but that it is desirable, when he has the charge of dispatches from Government, he should adopt the most expeditious and the safest mode of conveying them to the persons to whom they are addressed, and not keep them at sea with a contrary wind for a longer period than is absolutely necessary.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Walsh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. Colonel Framingham, R.A.

‘ SIR,

‘ Pombal, 5th June, 1809.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to the Commanding Officer of the artillery at Lisbon, and the copy of another which I have written to the Deputy Commissary General at Coimbra.

‘ In case you should think it desirable to add any other articles to those enumerated in my letter to be carried in the reserve artillery, or should think any additional number of wheels desirable, I beg that you will write for them yourself.

‘ I hope that your horses on their arrival on the Tagus will not be in the unserviceable state in which you expect they will be. If they should be so, I must relinquish that important branch of our equipment, the British artillery ; and I have requested General Beresford to have some brigades of Portuguese artillery in readiness to join and do duty with the British army on its entry into Spain.

‘ In respect to the reserve ammunition which has not yet come up, my opinion is, that the best thing to do is to embark it from Oporto for Lisbon ; or if it should have marched from Oporto, to send it by boats from Coimbra to Figueira at the mouth of the Mondego, and have it in readiness to be embarked there in the store ships as soon as they shall arrive there from Aveiro.

‘ I beg of you to communicate this opinion to General Howorth.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Framingham, R.A.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Fisher, or the Officer commanding the
Artillery at Lisbon.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Pombal, 5th June, 1809.

‘ I beg that, upon the receipt of this letter, you will send by water to Santarem, in charge of an Officer, and of a sufficient number of men, fifty spare wheels for light 6 pounder carriages and cars, and twenty spare wheels for heavy 6 pounder carriages and cars ; likewise sixty rounds for each gun of the three 6 pounder brigades with the army, of round shot, with ammunition complete, and thirty rounds for each

gun of spherical case shot, with ammunition complete. You will send a proportionate quantity of shells, with ammunition complete, for the 5½ inch howitzers in those brigades. You will also send 800,000 rounds of musket ammunition, 200,000 rounds of rifle, and 200,000 of carbine, to the same place, by the same conveyance.

‘I have written these orders in the notion that the dépôt which had been formed at Santarem has been removed. If it has not, you will understand that the ammunition, &c. which I now require is in lieu of that which has hitherto been in reserve with the army to the northward, and which I apprehend cannot be brought back to the Tagus. If the dépôt should still be at Santarem, you will understand that it need not be replenished, excepting to complete the quantities above ordered.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Fisher, R.A.*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘P. S.—100 horses arrived from England some days ago for the waggon train; and there are, I believe, about 200 horses at Lisbon of those sent out for the artillery about a month ago. I beg you will have all these horses examined, and that you will give orders that as many of them as are fit for artillery service, and in condition to take the field, may be sent in charge of proper Officers, and by easy marches, to Santarem. You will give the Commissary notice of the march of the horses, that he may provide for them.

‘A. W.’

To Deputy Commissary General Dalrymple.

‘SIR,

‘Pombal, 5th June, 1809.

‘I was much concerned to learn, in conversation with Colonel Framingham this morning, that the horses of the artillery are nearly destroyed, and that they will be unable to draw the artillery farther than the Tagus, owing to the want and irregularity of the delivery of food to them.

‘As I cannot allow this important branch of the equipments of the army to be destroyed, without inquiring how it has occurred, I desire to know as soon as possible, what quantity of forage has been delivered for the use of the horses and mules attached to each of the brigades of artil-

lery, and to the reserve artillery, on each day since the 5th May last.

‘The complaint of Colonel Framingham, however, is not confined solely to the want of forage, but to the irregularity and delay, which, he says, prevails not only in the delivery of forage, but of all descriptions of provisions to the men under his command. I desire to know in what manner this has occurred. Surely where there has been no want either of provisions or forage, a very little arrangement in the Commissariat would insure their early delivery to the troops.

‘The Officers of the Commissariat will be responsible in an eminent degree if, owing to their want of capacity and management, I should lose the use of the British artillery.

‘I desire that most effectual measures may be taken to supply the horses of the artillery with forage hereafter. You will see in the General Orders some directions respecting the time of the day at which provisions and forage are to be issued to the troops.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Deputy Commissary General
Dalrymple.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. John Villiers.

‘MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘Pombal, 5th June, 1809.

‘I have received your letter of the 2d. If the question respecting the rank which the Officers of the British army are to hold among themselves is referred to me, I must decide it as I told you I would. If Government should decide upon it, I shall act cordially upon their orders. I do not see how any military Officer could determine upon the question which Trant referred to me. If our Officers are to decide these questions upon British principles, they are British, and not Portuguese Officers.

‘I have but one opinion respecting the expenses of the Portuguese army; everything ought to be managed by them (that is to say, Beresford and their Officers) in the best way for them. We ought to ascertain how much of the expense they could bear, and we ought to pay the remainder. My opinion is, that the militia, excepting those for whom there are arms, ought to be sent to their homes, the ordnanza to be dismissed, and the regulars kept in garrisons or

cantonments, till they are clothed, armed, and disciplined : to take them into the field now, only removes the period at which they may be really useful ; and we should take advantage of this period of peace for Portugal, to discipline the troops as they ought to be.

‘ I shall be at Abrantes the day after to-morrow. If the French stay where they are, I must move as soon as possible to co-operate in dislodging them, but I doubt that I shall be able to quit the Tagus till the middle of the month.

‘ I certainly recommended the Officers you mentioned to Colonel Gordon and Lord Castlereagh, by desire of Mrs. Villiers, and was informed they should be appointed, excepting Captain —, for the reason I stated. I shall write, however, to Colonel Gordon respecting them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Thomar, 7th June, 1809.

‘ I have not yet been able to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2d instant, having been constantly moving. By a note of the 24th May, from Sir John Cradock, I find that he had prevailed upon Admiral Purvis to give him 1500 tons of the transports at Cadiz to bring one of the regiments from Gibraltar to Portugal, which will be so many taken away from the sheep concern ; but I do not think that signifies much.

‘ I informed you in my official letter of this morning, of the detention of the *Port Mahon* and her convoy at Aveiro. I am seriously apprehensive that they will not be able to get out till after the next rainy season. If they should, however, I have begged Captain Chambers to go to the mouth of the Mondego with his whole fleet, my wish being to form there a depôt afloat, in schooners, of ten days’ provisions, and oats for the whole army, as the victuallers with him do not now contain that quantity. I have asked him to give from the transports as much bread and oats as the Commissary may require. As soon as he shall have delivered these provisions, and shall have received on board the transports a few stores which we did not want, and which go down by

water to Figueira from Coimbra, and some men of the 3d hussars, with their appointments, whom I wish to send by sea to Lisbon, I have requested Captain Chambers to return to Lisbon. His probable detention, however, at Aveiro deranges these projects, and I must be satisfied with my dépôt there, instead of at Figueira; and I must find some other mode of sending down to Lisbon the spare stores, and the hussars and their appointments.

‘I have arranged to have everything I want for the equipment of the army brought up the Tagus to Abrantes; and I am obliged to you for the offer of Captain Shepherd’s assistance.

‘Our Commissariat is very bad indeed; but it is new, and will improve, I hope.

‘You will have seen that Ney is in the Asturias. It is most desirable, however, to adopt every practicable mode of strengthening Vigo.

‘I doubt whether Sir William Scott’s opinion respecting the Danish ships in Lisbon would apply to the case of the Danish ships in Oporto. When we took Lisbon from the French, that city, and indeed the whole kingdom of Portugal, had in a manner been ceded to them by the Prince Regent; at all events, they had established their Government in it. We acted as principals in the expedition against Lisbon, which was considered as a port in the enemy’s possession; and His Majesty ordered that everything belonging to the French, and to the Russians, found there, should be considered as prize. But at Oporto they had had only a momentary possession; they had nothing else but that town, and the different points in the country occupied by their troops; and we acted only as auxiliaries to the Portuguese Government. The state of all the parties, you will observe, was very different, and I should doubt, whether, under these circumstances, Sir William Scott’s former opinion could be considered as applying.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘*Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Thomar, 7th June, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to enclose you the copy of a dispatch, which I received in the night from the Secretary of State. It is my opinion, that transports for 3000 horses may with safety be sent to England, as soon as you think proper to dispatch them.

‘ As Government have called for so large a proportion of cavalry ships, I conclude that you will think it proper to order some, or all of that description ordered to Oporto, to receive the prisoners of war to go to England directly, either with the prisoners on board, or without the prisoners, if they should not have been embarked. I shall write to Colonel Trant upon this subject ; and desire him to attend to any instructions he may receive from you thereupon.

‘ It is necessary to have at Oporto 4000 tons of shipping, to carry home the prisoners of war : this is the number for which I asked in my letter of the 15th May ; viz., transports for 2000 men, at two tons each man, on account of the number of sick and wounded there was among them.

‘ In answer to a paragraph of your private letter of the 2d, and to your official letters of the 5th, upon this subject, which I received yesterday, I have to inform you, that the *Port Mahon* and her convoy are shut up in Aveiro. The late gales from the westward have increased the bar of that harbour to such an extent, that there is not upon it at present, I understand, more than seven feet water ; and I apprehend that some time will elapse before the bar will be again cleared. The ships under the convoy of the *Port Mahon* cannot therefore be reckoned as applicable either to the removal of the French prisoners from Oporto, or to the dispatch to England, in consequence of the orders of the Secretary of State of the 22d of May, of which I enclose you the copies.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. Colonel Trant.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Thomar, 7th June, 1809.

‘ I think it probable that the Admiral will immediately require all the cavalry ships which he has lately sent to Oporto, to receive the prisoners of war to send to England without loss of time, in the shape of cavalry ships. You will, therefore, immediately discontinue your alteration of those ships, if you should have continued them after the receipt of Colonel Murray’s letter upon this subject.

‘ I have requested the Admiral to send you directions either to embark the prisoners in the cavalry ships, or not, as he may think proper, supposing that he should wish to send to England immediately the cavalry ships destined to convey the prisoners. You will therefore have the prisoners in readiness to embark in store ships at a moment’s notice, if the Admiral should desire it; and, at all events, the ships in readiness to sail.

‘ You will understand, however, that the prisoners must not be unreasonably crowded in these ships, and you will report to me what number will remain at Oporto, after you shall have sent those whom the Admiral may require you to send in the cavalry ships.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Trant,*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Right Hon. General Sir David Dundas, K.B.,
Commander in Chief.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Thomar, 7th June, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch of the 13th of May, relative to the appointment of Officers in His Majesty’s service, to serve with the Portuguese troops, under the command of General Beresford.

‘ It appears to be His Majesty’s intention that the number of Officers who should receive one step of British promotion, upon being permitted to serve with the Portuguese troops, should not exceed twenty four; and that thirty Officers who were to be sent from England to serve with the Portuguese troops, and all who should be appointed from the army in Portugal for the same duties, should continue to hold in the British army the commissions which they had hitherto held; and to be allowed to serve with the Portu-

guese troops, with one step of advanced Portuguese rank, and the pay of the Portuguese commission in which they should serve with the Portuguese army.

‘The King’s commands, as thus conveyed, differ, I believe, from what were understood to be the intentions of His Majesty’s Government by the late Commander of the Forces in Portugal, and from his practice, and from that which I have followed since the command has devolved upon me. He understood that the Officers who should be allowed to serve with the Portuguese troops from the regiments of the army in this country, were to stand in the same situation, and were to accept their appointments in the Portuguese service upon the same conditions with the Officers first appointed in England to serve with the Portuguese troops; and he, and I, since the command has devolved upon me, have allowed Officers, of whose names I lately transmitted you lists, to serve with the Portuguese troops on those conditions. As but few Officers have applied to serve with the Portuguese troops, even with the advantage of receiving one step of British promotion, I should have doubted whether any would be willing to serve in this manner, upon the advantage now held out to them, of receiving one step of Portuguese rank, which can be but local and temporary, together with the pay of the Portuguese rank in which they should be employed, if you had not transmitted me a list of the names of thirty Officers who are willing to be so employed, upon the terms held out to them.

‘Upon this list, however, I beg to observe that it contains the names of some Officers now in Portugal, who will refuse to serve with the Portuguese troops on the terms proposed. One of them, indeed, Captain Fordyce, of the 81st, who is Brigade Major to Major General Hill, and who has been recommended as an Officer to serve with the Portuguese troops upon the more advantageous terms, which it was imagined here that it was intended we should hold out, has desired that he may not be employed with the Portuguese troops; and that he may not be considered as having expressed a wish to be so employed, unless he should receive one step of promotion in the British army; and that this promotion should be notified to the army in this country.

‘I am convinced that no Officers in this country will offer

their services upon the terms which I now understand are to be held out to them.

‘ There is one branch of these terms to which I wish to draw your particular attention and early decision. It is that part which gives to British Officers one step of Portuguese rank above that which they hold in His Majesty’s service. The Portuguese Government claim a right which I believe cannot be refused to any independent state, of granting commissions in their army; and that the Officers holding these commissions should rank, according to seniority of dates, with the Officers holding commissions of the same denomination and rank in the service of other powers.

‘ Under the terms proposed to be held out to the Officers of the British army in Portugal, to induce them to serve with the Portuguese troops, they are to receive one step of Portuguese rank above that which they hold in the British army; and as, under their Portuguese commission, they are to rank with British Officers holding His Majesty’s commission of the same denomination and rank, according to the seniority of dates, the result of this offer will be to give to all who accept of it local and temporary rank over the heads of their seniors employed on the same foreign service.

‘ This effect would not be felt if the British and Portuguese troops were not likely to serve together; but as they do and must serve together, it will be felt daily, and will give occasion to dissatisfaction and constant complaints. I have to mention upon this part of the subject, that this dissatisfaction has already existed; and I have been called upon to decide upon a complaint made in consequence.

‘ The practice has been hitherto to give an Officer, who had already been promoted, one step of British rank, to induce him to serve with the Portuguese army, and another step of Portuguese rank when he entered that service; thus making those promoted to be British Majors, Portuguese Lieut. Colonels, and giving them temporary and local rank over all the Majors of the British army.

‘ In consequence of this dissatisfaction and complaint, I have already had some discussion with the British Ambassador and Marshal Beresford upon the subject; and I proposed either that British Officers, appointed to serve with the Portuguese army, should have Portuguese commissions only of the same rank with those which they held from

His Majesty; or that if they should hold superior Portuguese commissions, in a view to give them more extended command over the Portuguese troops, they should rank with British Officers when they should meet them on service, only by the dates of their commissions in His Majesty's service. As, however, His Majesty's commands, as conveyed in your letter of the 13th of May, recognize the principle of a British Officer holding advanced Portuguese rank, and consequently a local temporary superior commission to those held by his seniors in the British service, I think it proper to delay giving any decision upon these complaints, and to refer the following points for your consideration and that of His Majesty's servants:—

' First. Are Officers in the Portuguese service to rank with Officers in His Majesty's service, according to the dates of their several commissions?

' Secondly. If they are, is it intended that Officers of the British army, who have been or shall be appointed to serve with the Portuguese troops, shall serve with a Portuguese commission of the same rank with that which they hold in the King's service, or with a Portuguese commission of a superior rank?

' Thirdly. If with a Portuguese commission of a superior rank, in what manner is the relative rank of these Officers to be settled with the rank of Officers senior to them in the British service, although junior in reference to their Portuguese commissions?

' Fourthly. If Officers belonging to the British army in Portugal are not to serve with the Portuguese troops with advanced Portuguese commissions, what other encouragement is to be held out to them to induce them to accept of this employment?

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' General

the Right Hon. Sir David Dundas.'

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. John Villiers.

' MY DEAR VILLIERS,

' Thomar, 7th June, 1809.

' I send you a letter for Lord Castlereagh, containing one which I have received from Sir David Dundas, which will surprise you not a little, and the copy of my answer to Sir David. Pray forward this letter, and everything going up

from the army by this occasion by the first opportunity. If the French are off, which I hear they are, I shall go down to see Lord Wellesley.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. John Villiers.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. the Secretary at War.

‘ SIR,

‘ Thomas, 7th June, 1809.

‘ I had the honor of receiving your letter of the 4th May this morning, and I beg to inform you, that it has been the practice hitherto in this army to make the soldiers pay 10*d.* per diem, when in hospital, leaving to them a residue of 2*d.* per diem, and to other ranks a proportionate sum. I have ordered that from the 25th instant inclusive, the hospital stoppage shall be for all ranks 9*d.*, leaving for each rank the daily net sum stated in the enclosure No. I. of your letter. I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know whether it is your intention that the directions contained in your letter of the 4th of May should have a retrospect; and if so, from what period. The soldiers in Portugal receive a full ration from the Commissariat, and of course are liable to a daily deduction from their pay each of 6*d.*

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

the Secretary at War.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Thomas, 7th June, 1809.

‘ I did not receive your dispatch of the 22d May, relative to the transports for the conveyance of 3000 horses, till this morning, although I heard on the 4th that Lieut. Colonel Roche was off Oporto on the 2d, charged with dispatches for me, that Officer having thought it proper to take the dispatches to Lisbon.

‘ I have now the honor to inform your Lordship that I wrote this morning to Admiral Berkeley, to apprise him of my opinion, that horse transports for the conveyance of 3000 horses might be sent to England immediately, without any inconvenience, and to request that he would dispatch them as soon as possible.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Thomar, 7th June, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship’s dispatch of the 13th May, relative to the appointment of British Officers to serve with the Portuguese troops.

‘ I have likewise this day received one of the same date from the Commander in Chief, of which I enclose to your Lordship a copy, together with a copy of my answer to that dispatch; and I beg your Lordship’s early consideration of, and decision on, the several points discussed in that dispatch.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Thomar, 7th June, 1809.

‘ You will be very much surprised at reading the enclosed from Sir David Dundas, after seeing that which I before sent you from the Secretary of State; although, by the bye, upon a more attentive perusal of the letter, I think, that though inaccurately expressed, it does not differ from the former. I have sent Sir David the answer of which I enclose you the draft, and a copy of his letter and of my answer to Lord Castlereagh. I dine with Miranda to-day, and shall be at Abrantes to-morrow.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Thomar, 7th June, 1809.

‘ Since I wrote last, Marshal Victor has broken up from the neighbourhood of Caceres; has removed his head quarters to Truxillo; and has, I understand, passed a division of his army over the Tagus, by the bridge of Almaraz. It is probable that the whole are about to retreat.

‘ A part of the army of General Cuesta was, by the last accounts of the 3d instant, on the Guadiana, near Medellin, and one division near Merida. The whole are, I understand, advancing towards that river.

‘ A part of the troops under my command have arrived upon the Tagus, at Abrantes, and the remaining four brigades are following them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. Colonel Bourke, Assistant Quarter Master General.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 8th June, 1809.

‘ I write just to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 4th and 6th; that of the 6th, last night, at Thomar; that of the 4th, this morning, at the same place, as it had passed me on the road as I was coming from Coimbra.

‘ I shall forthwith take into consideration the different plans of operation proposed; and you may assure General Cuesta that I shall co-operate in one or other of the modes suggested. I shall enter further into detail to-morrow, when I shall have had further time to consider of the subject.

‘ I beg you to tell General Cuesta that I have never received the plan of operations which he proposed for my consideration through Colonel Alava.

‘ The troops have not yet arrived from the northward; and when they shall reach the Tagus, which will not be till the 11th or 12th, they will require a day or two's rest, before I can put them in motion again for a fresh operation. But this time will not be thrown away, as it may be very usefully employed in collecting supplies at Badajoz. Besides, I hope that by that time my reinforcements will have arrived from England; and it is not impossible but that I may be relieved from the restriction in my operations, which would prevent me from going to any distance in Spain.

‘ I beg also that you will inform General Cuesta, that I have heard and believe that Marshal Ney, joined by Kellermann with 8000 or 9000 men, has invaded the Asturias.

‘ I did not understand that the Marques de la Romana's troops had any action with the enemy; indeed I do not believe they were in the Asturias; but the Marques himself was at Gijon, from whence he embarked with his money, arms, ammunition, &c., and all the Spanish and English Officers and the Governor; and he was going round to

Vigo. In the mean time, if the French have obtained a footing in the Asturias, they have lost that which they had in Galicia, as I understand the Spanish troops were in possession of Lugo.

‘In proportion as the French spread themselves, they certainly do mischief in the country, which is always to be regretted, but they at the same time weaken themselves.

‘I do not consider that the operations of Marshal Ney can have any effect upon the conduct of Victor, excepting probably to induce him to delay any measures he might have in contemplation, till Ney should reinforce him. This was the plan ordered by the Gallo-Spanish Government to Victor, in an intercepted dispatch; but it is very obvious that Ney, Soult, and Kellermann will have more work upon their hands than they will be able to manage in the Asturias and Galicia: and if they should venture to detach, they will lose both those kingdoms; or if they do detach one or even two of these corps to the assistance of Victor, General Cuesta and I shall still be strong enough for them.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel Bourke.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General Cotton.

‘MY DEAR COTTON,

‘Abrantes, 8th June, 1809.

‘I enclose a letter which I have received from Mr. —, a staff surgeon with this army, who had been sent to England during Sir John Cradock’s command, I conclude, not for his good behaviour, and who was lately sent out again. I have ordered him home again with the French prisoners, and *not* to return. In consequence of this, he thinks it proper to attack the characters of all his superiors.

‘I had not an opportunity when I was at Coimbra of visiting the hospitals there, although I did visit that at Oporto, and found it in excellent order. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will visit those at Coimbra, which are placed at the San Benito, Boa Ventura, and Trinidade Convents, and let me know in what state you find them.

‘I think it not improbable that there may be a want of beds, as, notwithstanding all those were given in which the regimental surgeons had with them, and many from the

town, there were not so many from the latter as there might have been.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Cotton.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Abrantes, 8th June, 1809.

‘ It is impossible to guess what the French are doing our accounts are so very contradictory. However, I shall certainly move eastward as soon as I can. In the mean time, it is most desirable that I should see Lord Wellesley, if he shall arrive before the troops shall be ready to march. He comes in the *Donegal*, Captain Malcolm; and if you will send me off a messenger the moment that the ship appears in the offing, I will go down to Lisbon, by the *Tagus*, as soon as I shall receive your letter, and I shall be back again in a very short time.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 9th June, 1809.

‘ I have just now received your letter of the 7th; and I conclude that about this time you will have received mine of the 7th, respecting the horse transports.

‘ I see no occasion for retaining the gun boats in the river at present; and I conceive that one armed transport at Villa Nova will be sufficient to keep the country boats in that part of the river under our control.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. Colonel Bourke, Assistant Quarter Master General.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 9th June, 1809.

‘ Since I wrote to you yesterday I have fully considered the different plans suggested in your letters to the Quarter Master General of the 4th and 6th, upon which I am now about to give you my opinion.

‘ It appears to me that it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to cut off the enemy’s retreat by any movement

upon either of his flanks, made by detachments from either of the armies. In the event of the junction, as proposed, we must expect that Marshal Victor will fall back and cross the Tagus at Almaraz and Alconeta, and probably some of his infantry at Arzobispo.

‘Adverting to the difficulties of approaching the Tagus at all, and those of the passage after the Tagus should have been reached by the combined armies, I think it nearly certain that the Marshal would be able to defend the passage with a part only of his force, while with another part he would beat one or both the detachments which would have been sent round his flanks.

‘Indeed, that detachment which, according to the proposed arrangement, should have been sent from La Serena to Talavera, being between the corps of Victor and Sebastiani, could hardly escape.

‘At all events, these detachments on the two flanks appear to me to be too weak, to produce any great effect upon the movements of Victor. That which would oblige him to retire would be the collection of force in his front; and he would be under no embarrassments respecting his rear from the efforts of these detachments. This objection would appear more forcible by entering into a calculation of the marches of these detachments, compared with those of the British army from hence.

‘I conclude that General Cuesta would not wish to detach either of his divisions, till the British army should be well advanced towards the frontier; and if this should be the case, it will be found that we should be at Merida, the enemy possessing a knowledge of our position, before the division detached to the left would be at Alcantara; or that detached to the right would have made two marches through the mountains. The enemy would thus have his retreat open, annoyed only by whatever pressure we might make on his rear guard.

‘According to this reasoning, it would appear that we should effect nothing by the junction, excepting to oblige the enemy to retire across the Tagus, with a certain degree of risk to two Spanish divisions. But it will also be attended with some inconvenience to ourselves.

‘I shall now suppose that we should be able to cross the

Tagus, and that the enemy would not attempt to defend the passage of that river, having the knowledge that the great body of our force was collected on the south side of the river; the inconvenience which I apprehend in that case is the want of provisions and forage in Estremadura, between the Tagus and Guadiana. The enemy has been in that country above two months, and we understand has suffered some distress latterly; and we know that where they suffer distress, we are not likely to find any quantity of provisions and forage on our march through the country.

‘ A magazine formed at Badajoz would be little able to supply the troops on the rapid march which they would have to make across from the Guadiana to the Tagus. I have no objection to incur the risk of this inconvenience, if it is to answer any good purpose; but as the consequence of this junction will be only to oblige the enemy to retreat across the Tagus, it will be better, in my opinion, to produce this effect by another mode equally certain of producing it, with this additional advantage, that no risk will attend it; that the enemy, after having crossed the Tagus, cannot stand to defend the passage of that river, and that there is no reason to believe that any of the troops will suffer from the want of provisions.

‘ In regard to the plan proposed, that the British army should cross the Tagus at Alcantara, and co-operate from thence in an attack upon Victor, it appears to me to be equally inefficient with the other, with this addition to it, that as there is no road along the south bank of the Tagus, according to your answers to my queries, the two armies would be separated, and therefore each comparatively weak; while my appearance at Alcantara would not affect the enemy’s line of retreat, as I must go down as far as Caceres before I could turn towards the Tagus again.

‘ Of the three propositions made to me, I decidedly prefer that which takes the British army to Plasencia. By this movement, if it should be concealed from the enemy for a sufficient length of time, we must cut off his retreat by the bridge of Almaraz, and possibly by Arzobispo and Talavera.

‘ If it should not be concealed, at all events the enemy cannot pretend to defend the Tagus. It is unattended by risk, as both armies are, I conceive, sufficiently strong to

defend themselves separately against any attack which Victor might make upon them; and the probability of want is lessened for both armies, as we shall be in a country which has hitherto been untouched; and the Spanish army, having only themselves to supply in Estremadura, will incur less risk of want than if we also were to be supplied from the same resources.

‘ Another plan has occurred to me by which we should turn the enemy’s left flank, and that is, to reinforce Vanegas’s corps from the right of General Cuesta to such an extent as to enable him to beat Sebastiani, and then to bring Vanegas’s army upon the Tagus about Talavera; or if that cannot be done, for General Cuesta to move himself, with his whole army, by La Serena, and through the mountains to Talavera, leaving me to occupy, with the British army, the ground in the enemy’s front.

‘ I suggest these last plans only because an operation upon the enemy’s left appears to be preferred to an operation upon his right and rear at the Spanish head quarters; but I conceive there are the following objections to both plans: to the first, that the detachment could not be made to Vanegas, till I should be so near as to give the enemy a knowledge of my position; and to the second, there is the same objection, that General Cuesta could not move till I should be ready to occupy his ground; and that he would in fact place himself, when weak in artillery, between the two French armies.

‘ But I acknowledge that I have this further objection to all attempts upon the enemy’s left, viz., that they do not afford a chance of cutting off his retreat, as those upon the right do; as supposing they should be successful and the Spanish army in possession of Talavera, there will be nothing to prevent the retreat of the French army from the bridge of Almaraz, by Plasencia and the Puerto de Baños.

‘ I am much concerned that it is not in my power, with the instructions under which I act, to enter into any great system of co-operation with the Spanish armies. I can never admit, however, that (although, from circumstances, it is not in my power to do all I could wish,) a great and important object will not have been attained by the removal of Marshal Victor from the imposing position which he oc-

cupics, menacing the seat of government of Portugal, as well as of Spain, even though he should be able to retire with all his artillery and stores.

‘ This, however, I consider to be quite impracticable, unless he has already commenced to send a part of them to the rear, which you appear to think he has not.

‘ I request to hear from you as soon as you shall have obtained the opinion of General Cuesta upon the different points contained in this letter.

‘ The first movements will be to be made by me, whatever plan may be adopted ; and you may assure the General that I shall not lose a moment, and shall move as soon as I shall have given my troops a few days’ rest, and shall have supplied them with shoes and other articles which they require, after the marches which they have lately made.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Bourke.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. I request you to get for me all the information you can of the roads in the country north of the Tagus, and of the course of the Tietar, the passages of that river, &c.

‘ A. W.’

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 9th June, 1809.

‘ When I was enabled, by the flight of Soult from Portugal, to return to the southward, I sent Lieut. Colonel Bourke to the head quarters of General Cuesta, to converse with him on the different plans of operations which we might adopt ; and I gave him certain queries, of which you will find copies enclosed, the answers to which would give the information I required to make up my own mind on the points under consideration.

‘ I enclose to you copies of the letters which I have received from Colonel Bourke, and of my answer of this day, in which you will see the line of operations I prefer.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will apply to the Junta for orders to the magistrates about Plasencia, or indeed in all parts of Spain to which I may go, to assist me, as far as may be possible, with supplies of provisions and forage ; and with carriages and mules which I may require for the movement of the army.

‘ I understand that when Sir John Moore was in Spain last year, the Commissaries of his army received the supplies of provisions and forage which they required for the British troops from the Officers of the Hacienda; and probably some arrangement of the same kind would facilitate the supply of the British troops in this campaign.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. H. Frere.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Abrantes, 9th June, 1809.

‘ It is necessary that some arrangements should be made respecting the carriage of our letters by the post, as nothing can be more irregular than the communication is at present.

‘ My wish was to have a daily communication by post between Lisbon and the army, when it was engaged in operations to the northward, by Thomar, and one from Abrantes to Thomar, by which arrangement we should have been able to communicate with you and with General Mackenzie every day.

‘ I do not believe the post has ever gone oftener than three times a week, and no arrangement was made for the line to Abrantes.

‘ Mackenzie was thirteen days before he received a letter written by me on the 13th May; and very lately letters dispatched from Coimbra did not arrive for six days, and had been round to Lisbon.

‘ I imagine that by far the best mode of proceeding in future would be—

‘ First. To have a daily post between the army and Lisbon.

‘ Secondly. To have a daily communication from Abrantes, by Thomar and Coimbra, to Oporto.

‘ Thirdly. That we should either pay for our letters, as other people do, or that we should make up a packet at head quarters daily, which should be forwarded by either or both those lines, and pay a certain sum for the conveyance of each of those packets.

‘ In short, let us adopt any mode to insure a speedy and safe communication.

‘ Believe me, &c.

The Right Hon. J. Villiers.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Captain General Don Gregorio Cuesta.

‘SIR,

‘Abrantes, 10th June, 1809.

‘I received last night, from Colonel Alava, your letter of the 27th May; and I am happy to find, from a perusal of it, that the plan of operations for the British troops, which Colonel Bourke will have informed you that I preferred in consequence of the directions which I gave him in a letter of yesterday’s date, is that which you at that time recommended, with the exception that I shall not send a detachment of British troops to Alcantara. This post will, however, be occupied by a detachment of Portuguese troops, who will make the demonstrations upon the enemy’s flank which you are desirous should be made by a detachment placed at Alcantara.

‘I should with great pleasure comply with your desire, and place at Alcantara a British detachment, if it were not desirable, on many accounts, to keep the British army as much concentrated and collected as possible. Indeed, it is only by keeping them in a collected state that we can hope to derive from them that service which they are capable of rendering.

‘I beg leave to congratulate your Excellency upon the success of General Blake in Aragon, and upon that of the Austrian armies in Italy.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Captain General*
Don Gregorio Cuesta.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘SIR,

‘Abrantes, 10th June, 1809.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 8th instant. I agree entirely in opinion with you that it is expedient that the baggage of the army should be landed, and placed in storerooms at Lisbon; and I have given directions to the Quarter Master General to have a proper store hired for that purpose, and orders to the army to send proper persons down to Lisbon to remove the baggage from the transports, and arrange it in the storerooms.

‘I shall be obliged to you if you will direct the Agent of Transports to communicate with the Assistant Quarter

Master General at Lisbon upon this subject, and to land the baggage, when the latter shall signify to him that the Officers sent to Lisbon by the different regiments are prepared to receive it.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Peacocke, or Officer commanding at Lisbon.

‘ SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 10th June, 1809.

‘ I request you will desire the Commanding Officer of the 40th regiment to make all the arrangements for taking the field with his regiment at a short notice, as I shall move them to join the army as soon as other troops ordered to Lisbon shall approach that city.

‘ The Officers commanding companies, the Paymaster, and the Surgeon, must provide themselves with mules for the carriage of the camp kettles of their companies, of their books, and of the medicine chests respectively; and a requisition must be made upon the Commissary for one mule to carry the intrenching tools. Requisitions must likewise be made upon the Quarter Master General’s department for bill hooks, haversacks, canteens, and camp kettles, to complete the battalion; and the Officers will apply to the Quarter Master General for such number of tents as they may require, according to the orders recently given out upon that subject.

‘ I expect the 48th and 61st regiments from Gibraltar, to which corps you will give the same orders immediately upon their arrival as I have above directed you to give to the 40th regiment; and the same to the 43d, 52d, and 95th regiments, and the 23d light dragoons, expected from England.

‘ The Officers of the five last mentioned regiments of infantry will probably be in want of money to equip themselves for the field; and you will therefore inform the Officers commanding them to send to head quarters, as soon as possible after they shall land, returns for their bāt and forage, if they should not already have received that allowance this year; and you will convey to the Deputy Paymaster General at Lisbon my desire that he will advance

to the Paymasters of regiments such sums, on account of this allowance, as they may find it necessary to demand, and that I shall send the warrant for its payment without loss of time.

‘ You will take care that the corps as they arrive shall receive copies of all the General Orders which have been issued to the army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Peacocke.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right. Hon. J. Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Abrantes, 10th June, 1809.

‘ I enclose a memorandum, which I have drawn in concert with Beresford, for an arrangement of the Portuguese Commissariat. If you should approve of it, I shall write to the Treasury to prevail upon them to alter the absurd instruction which I enclose, which they have given to Mr. Murray, respecting the Portuguese Commissariat. It would appear from this, and from the instruction of the Commissary of Accounts, that they intended that the Portuguese Commissary should settle accounts before the Board of Auditors, than which no idea could be more absurd.

‘ The reason of the sixth clause is that I have received instructions to issue to the Portuguese troops no stores of any description, it being intended that all they should receive should be through you, and by way of subsidy. This cannot be easily effected; at the same time, that to omit or delay to issue the stores might be attended by the most serious inconveniences. I was, therefore, desirous to get your receipt for all stores which I should issue to the Portuguese troops, and of course your bill for the value.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Brig. General Howorth, R.A.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 11th June, 1809.

‘ I enclose a letter that I have received from Lieut. Colonel Fisher, which I beg you to return to me as soon as you shall have taken a copy of it.

‘ In respect to the wheels, I conclude that Colonel Robe

will improve the arrangement made by Lieut. Colonel Fisher by my orders, by ordering up to Santarem the carriages as well as the wheels of the two 6 pounder brigades.

‘I request you to make your own arrangements respecting the 231 horses and 26 mules, which I believe will be at Santarem to-morrow, or next day, for the service of the Royal Artillery; and make them known to the Quarter Master General, that he may direct them to be carried into execution. In order to enable you to do this more effectually, I mention to you that I have reason to believe that there will be some difficulty in getting higher up the river, by water, than Valada, which place is three leagues below Santarem, and that it may expedite the business if you should determine to draw up your gun carriages by land from Valada. The reserve stores might come as far as Santarem by water.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Howorth.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. Colonel Bourke, Assistant Quarter Master General.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 11th June, 1809.

‘ Since I wrote to you yesterday, I have received from England authority “to extend my operations in Spain, beyond the provinces immediately adjacent to the Portuguese frontier,” and I beg you to discuss with General O’Donoju the operations which it may be expedient that the combined armies should carry on after we shall have forced Victor across the Tagus.

‘ My opinion is generally that the two armies ought to keep so near each other as to afford to each other mutual support, and to be able to form a junction in case the enemy should receive reinforcements; but that in other respects we ought to keep separate, for the convenience of subsistence, &c.; that I should take the left, and endeavor to place myself between Victor and the French corps in Galicia; that neither of the armies ought to go to Madrid, but rather to direct their march upon Segovia; thus threatening the enemy upon his right, cutting off his communication with the French corps in Galicia, and hurrying him back upon the Ebro.

‘ I only throw out these general notions for consideration. I am not sufficiently acquainted with the country to be able positively to decide that this plan would be the best : of course, that must depend upon the strength and position of the Spanish corps, which may and ought to be brought to bear upon the French, as well as upon the positions they may take up, and upon the natural difficulties which may exist in the country, to impede the retreat of the enemy, of which we might take advantage.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Bourke.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Captain General Don Gregorio Cuesta.

‘ SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 11th June, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to inform you that I have just received a report from the Officer commanding at Alcantara, dated the 10th, stating that a division of the enemy’s troops, with seven pieces of cannon, had just made an attack upon his post, and that he had in consequence blown up the bridge.

‘ I am induced to believe, from a report which I have received, that the messenger who carried the letter from your Excellency to the Commanding Officer at Alcantara, in which you advised him not to destroy the bridge, fell into the hands of the enemy, and was put to death. The Officer commanding at Alcantara has not, I believe, received your letter ; and, if it be true that it fell into the hands of the enemy, it is probable that this attack has been made to bring about the destruction of the bridge.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Captain General
Don Gregorio Cuesta.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 11th June, 1809.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received this morning from England, and the copy of one which I have in consequence written to Colonel Bourke.

‘ I should now be ready to move into Spain in two or three days if I had any money : but the distress in which we are from want of that necessary article will, I fear, render

it impossible for me to move till I shall receive a supply. I have, however, reason to expect money from Cadiz in exchange for Spanish gold, which I sent there in the *Surveillante* about six weeks ago, and a supply from England.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. H. Frere.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Abrantes, 11th June, 1809.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 9th. Till I learned by Lord Burghersh’s letter of the 9th, received this morning, that Lord Wellesley had deferred his departure from England for a few days, I thought it probable that the Admiral and you would have determined not to come up, in the expectation that I should go down to you: this arrival being now, however, more than ever uncertain, I think there is a chance that I shall see you on Tuesday or Wednesday. I need not tell you how happy your arrival will make me.

‘ I regret to learn that you think of quitting us. I recollect your mentioning this intention when I was at Lisbon, which gave me great concern, which concern has increased from the experience I have had of the good you have already done, and from the expectation which I had that you would have it in your power to do still more good. I do not know under what engagement you undertook your present office, but I am very certain that Government will find nobody who can execute what is still to be done so well as yourself.

‘ My dispatches from England announce a reinforcement of seven battalions, besides Craufurd’s corps, for which I believe I may thank you; and I have besides authority to extend my operations beyond the provinces immediately adjacent to the Portuguese frontier, provided “I shall be of opinion that my doing so is material to the success of my operations, and not inconsistent with the safety of Portugal.” So that the ball is now at my foot, and I hope I shall have strength enough to give it a good kick. I should begin immediately, but I cannot venture to stir without money. The army is two months in arrears; we are over head and

ears in debt everywhere; and I cannot venture into Spain without paying what we owe, at least in this neighbourhood, and giving a little money to the troops.

‘ You might as well keep the corporal and the dragoons.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General Mackenzie.

‘ MY DEAR MACKENZIE,

‘ Abrantes, 11th June, 1809.

‘ I am very much obliged to you for all your letters, and that of this morning.

‘ I am sorry that you feel the general distress for want of money; but we shall get some in a day or two, and all that comes shall be given to your corps.

‘ I have desired that Mr. Downie* may draw upon Mr. Dalrymple for 10,000 dollars, to pay the supplies collecting at Castello Branco for the army.

‘ I beg you will let Mr. Downie know that he is a Commissary, and his business at Castello Branco is to collect supplies; and that I am much surprised and highly displeased with him for quitting his station and the business on which he was employed, to move forward to Alcantara, where a few shots were fired, *to see what service he could render there*; as if he could render any so important as that upon which he was employed by me. I thought he had seen too much service to have been so inconsiderate.

‘ As to yourself, I think you had better stay where you are. Beresford is going to Castello Branco in a day or two, to organize his Portuguese troops, and you had better remain at Sobreira.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Mackenzie.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Abrantes, 11th June, 1809.

‘ I think it proper to draw your Lordship’s attention to the want of money in this army. The troops are nearly two

* Afterwards Sir John Downie, Lieutenant General in the service of Spain. He was a very gallant soldier. He died when holding the distinguished command of Captain General of Andalusia, and Alcalde of the Alcazar, the King’s palace at Seville.

months in arrear, and the army is in debt in Portugal a sum amounting to not less than 200,000*l*.

‘ I know of no resource to answer these demands, excepting a sum amounting to less than 100,000*l*. expected from Cadiz in dollars, in exchange for Spanish gold, sent to Cadiz about six weeks ago, it not being current in Portugal.

‘ There is no reason to expect any large sum for bills of exchange on England, negotiated at Lisbon, Cadiz, or Gibraltar: and I conceive that the expenses in this country, including those of the ordnance, the advances to the Portuguese Government, the pay of the army, and the extraordinaries, will not fall short of 200,000*l*. *per mensem*. The whole of this sum ought, for some months at least, to be sent in specie from Great Britain, otherwise the operations of the army will be cramped for want of money.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Abrantes, 11th June, 1809.

‘ Marshal Beresford has represented to me, in urgent terms, the want of Officers of superior rank to command the Portuguese troops, on whom he can rely, of which I am fully aware; and he has expressed a desire that I should request your Lordship would urge the Commander in Chief to send out the Officers of whose names I enclose a list, to serve in Portugal, in the ranks set opposite to their respective names.

‘ This arrangement is not likely to supersede any Officer now serving with the British army serving in Portugal.

‘ Marshal Beresford has also desired to have the assistance of a certain number of medical Officers, which appears to me to be equally necessary with that of Officers to command the troops. He has desired that I would recommend Dr. Fergusson, who has served in St. Domingo, as the fittest person, from his experience and other qualifications, to be the medical superintendent, and that he should have the assistance of ten or twelve staff surgeons.

‘ I forward a list of arms and military equipments, principally for cavalry, which Marshal Beresford is desirous of having for the use of the Portuguese troops.

40,000 knapsacks,
5,000 saddles and bridles,
6,000 carbines,
6,000 swords,
4,000 pairs of pistols,
2,000 rifles,
5,000 saddle bags.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. Colonel Walsh, Town Major of Lisbon.

‘ SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 12th June, 1809.

‘ Three hundred horses belonging to the Irish Commissariat will have arrived from Cork in the fleet which brought out the 23d dragoons; and I desire that these horses may be landed, as well as the 23d dragoons, and given in charge to the Officers and men of those troops of the Waggon Train which are at Lisbon. Care must be taken that none of these horses, or of those of the 23d, are put into the infected stables at Lisbon.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Walsh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. Colonel Seymour, 23d Light Dragoons.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 12th June, 1809.

‘ I have every reason to hope that this letter will find you at Lisbon, and probably with a great part of your corps disembarked.

‘ I am particularly anxious that your horses should join the army in a condition for service, and in that view I recommend your attention to the following objects:—

‘ First, to their shoeing: the greater the number of sets of spare shoes and nails the better.

‘ Secondly, you should at an early period accustom the horses to eat barley, or Indian corn and straw. We find that by giving them half barley and half oats, and by degrees diminishing the proportion of oats, they soon eat the

former as well as the latter. The same with hay and straw.

‘ I shall take care that, when you get your route for marching, you shall not be made to go marches of too great length.

‘ Some of the stables at Lisbon are infected by glanders ; and, indeed, at all events, it is desirable that after the first day or two you should have your horses picketed rather than placed in stables.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Seymour,*
‘ *23d Light Dragoons.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Dom Miguel Forjaz.

‘ SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 12th June, 1809.

‘ I am very much obliged to you for the communication of the arrangement made for the command of the troops at Oporto, which I conceive to be a very good one ; and I shall be very much obliged to the Regency, if they will allow Colonel Trant to command in that town under the orders of Marechal de Campo Bacellar, as long as there may be any French prisoners, or any English sick and wounded there, or any stores belonging to the English army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Dom Miguel Forjaz.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. Colonel Trant.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 12th June, 1809.

‘ I have received your letters of the 9th instant. I have no doubt whatever of your readiness to take the field in an advanced position, if General Beresford or I should order you to do so. But I trust that without receiving those orders you will not think of stirring from Oporto.

‘ The Marechal de Campo Bacellar has been appointed by the Regency to command in the district of Oporto ; you are to continue to command in the town.

‘ The directions which you have given to the transports to cross the bar are perfectly proper. I wish that you had ordered all, whether having on board wounded, or prisoners in health.

‘ I wish to have a return of the number of guns we have

taken belonging to the enemy. You must allow the cotton to go to Lisbon according to the directions, taking an account of it, and a receipt of the person to whom you deliver it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Trant.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. Colonel Bourke, Assistant Quarter Master General.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 12th June, 1809.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 10th instant. I enclose you intelligence which I have received from the Junta of Plasencia, which would tend to prove that the enemy are retreating; and the movement upon Alcantara of the 10th, whether made with a design to destroy the bridge or not, does not look like a settled plan to attack General Cuesta immediately. I cannot, however, avoid urging you to repeat my recommendation to General Cuesta to avoid a general action with the enemy till I shall be able to co-operate with him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Bourke.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 12th June, 1809.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 9th.

‘ I am much flattered by the notion entertained by some of the persons in authority at Seville, of appointing me to the command of the Spanish armies. I have received no instructions from Government upon that subject; but I believe that it was considered an object of great importance in England, that the Commander in Chief of the British troops should have that situation, but one more likely to be attained by refraining from pressing it, and by leaving it to the Spanish Government themselves to discover the expediency of the arrangement, than by any suggestion on our parts.

‘ I concluded that you had been made acquainted with the wishes of Government upon this subject, and had seen copies of my instructions. But if you had no knowledge of the wishes of Government, I do not conceive that your insinuations upon the subject are likely to have any effect, except-

ing to forward the object of Government, even though the opinion of Ministers be well founded, viz., that that which will prevent the accomplishment of this object is the jealousy of the Spanish Government.

‘ I assure you, that after Soult had passed the bridge of Melgaço, near Ruivacs, there did not exist the smallest chance of surrounding him. Indeed, if Silveira had been in time to break that bridge, Soult might have turned to his right. When an army is reduced to the state in which his was, it is impossible to overtake it; and surrounding it is out of the question.

‘ I might have followed them another march or two into Galicia; but since the Marques de la Romana’s departure from Chaves, we had no knowledge of the state of affairs in Galicia, excepting that Vigo was in possession of the Spaniards; and I did not see any reason to believe that the Spanish peasantry could stop Soult more effectually than the Portuguese peasantry had been able to do.

‘ I shall be very glad to have with the British army a division of Spanish cavalry, and that the Duque de Alburquerque shall command it; but till we can remove Victor from his position, I think that I ought not to ask for any reinforcement which is to diminish Cuesta’s force.

‘ I shall be much obliged to you if you will not ask for Spanish rank for Colonel —— and Colonel —— . I have great difficulty in settling the question arising from the Portuguese rank granted to British Officers, which difficulties would be increased in cases in which Spanish rank should be granted. It is better that the Officers of the two armies should rank according to the dates of their commissions respectively, and that Spanish rank should not in future be granted to any British Officers, excepting by the application of the British Commander in Chief, through the Ambassador.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. H. Frere.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Abrantes, 12th June, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship’s dispatch of the 25th ult., in which your Lordship

conveys to me, by His Majesty's commands, an authority to extend my operations in Spain beyond the provinces immediately adjacent to the Portuguese frontier.

' It does not appear to be quite certain that Marshal Victor has retired, or has made any preparatory arrangements with a view to withdraw from the province of Estremadura; and the accounts which we receive of his movements are so contradictory, that I am not enabled to give your Lordship any positive opinion upon the subject, or any satisfactory statement of facts which might enable you to form your own.

' Upon my arrival at Coimbra, in the end of last month, I dispatched Lieut. Colonel Bourke and Lieut. Colonel Cadogan to General Cuesta's head quarters, with a view to arrange with him a plan of co-operation for the British and Spanish armies; with a view also to attack Victor, and to oblige him to retire from the menacing position which he had assumed in relation to the seats of Government of Portugal and Spain. I propose now to extend the objects of this co-operation, General Cuesta having expressed himself but little satisfied with the limits which I had assigned to it: but I fear that I must delay making any movements whatever till the army shall receive a supply of money.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Viscount Castlereagh.*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. Colonel Bourke, Assistant Quarter Master General.

' MY DEAR SIR,

' Abrantes, 13th June, 1809.

' I have just received your letter of the 11th instant, the contents of which have induced me to alter my plan, and to consent to carry on my operations between the Tagus and the Guadiana. Notwithstanding that, I am convinced that the most effectual mode of destroying the French army would be to adopt the line which I at first proposed; more particularly, if General Cuesta could be prevailed upon to place his army in a situation of security, till the British army should be so far advanced on its march as to render it impossible for the enemy to attack the Spanish army without being exposed to certain destruction.

' But this concession will answer no purpose, unless General Cuesta will secure his position. I cannot march

till I shall get shoes for the troops from Lisbon, and some money. Indeed, the troops are not yet all arrived from the northward; and it is obvious that, till I shall be upon the Guadiana, the Spanish army will not be in that state of security, only because General Cuesta does not choose to make it secure.

‘As to the plan of attack mentioned in the General’s letter, it is too loose for me to be able to give any opinion upon it; as far as I can understand it, it labors under the disadvantage of separating the combined armies, and placing the French army between them, without having the advantage of cutting off the enemy’s retreat, which is the plan I had proposed.

‘My opinion was, and is, that if I had once gained the bridge of Almaraz, (General Cuesta having placed his army in security,) the enemy would have been in our power: they could not have attacked him with any prospect of success, and they could not have attacked me without the certainty of having him upon their backs.

‘According to the proposed plan, they will have it in their power to attack either army separately; and their retreat is always open, excepting so far as it may be impeded by Marshal Beresford’s corps. This plan will obviously not answer.

‘If I am to go upon the Guadiana, which I certainly will do, if General Cuesta persists in thinking it the best plan, the two armies must co-operate more closely; otherwise, I fear the weaker of the two may be defeated.

‘I have no objection to taking any share of the action that may be allotted to me; but I am convinced, that, if the Spanish army separates itself from us, as proposed, at the distance of ten or fifteen leagues, with rivers and mountains between us, they will be defeated, and we shall see nothing of the enemy. I shall be obliged to you if you will make a suggestion to General Cuesta in this view of the case.

‘I shall also be much obliged to you if you will obtain for me, as soon as possible, an account of the roads leading from Badajoz and Montijo to Caceres, how far they pass from the enemy’s position at Montanches, Torremocha, and Alcuescar; an account of the roads from Merida to Caceres, from Merida to Truxillo, from Medellin to Truxillo; whe-

ther there are any roads or communication between the roads from Merida and Medellin to Truxillo and Caceres, respectively, and the roads from Badajoz and Montijo to Caceres. I beg you also to let me know what is the nature of the country about Caceres, Montanches, Torremocha, and Alcuescar, and also about Truxillo.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Bourke.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Captain General Don Gregorio Cuesta.

‘ SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 13th June, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to inform your Excellency, that I have received accounts from General Viana at Monção on the Minho, stating that the enemy had made an attack on the 7th instant, with 2000 men and five pieces of cannon, on the Spanish troops under the Conde de Neroña, and that they had been repulsed with loss.

‘ I beg to congratulate your Excellency upon this fresh instance of the steadiness and bravery of the Spanish army.

‘ I acquaint your Excellency, in another letter, of my intention to co-operate with you in an attack upon the enemy between the Guadiana and the Tagus; and I have only to recommend to your Excellency to keep your troops in their strong positions till I shall be in a state to give them assistance.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Captain General*

Don Gregorio Cuesta.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Captain General Don Gregorio Cuesta.

‘ SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 13th June, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letter of the 11th instant; and, as I find that your Excellency prefers that I should co-operate with you in an attack upon the enemy between the Tagus and the Guadiana to an endeavor, by the army under my command, to intercept the enemy’s retreat across the Tagus, by the march of this army to Plasencia, and thence to Almaraz, I shall comply with your Excellency’s desire, and shall direct my march upon Badajoz as soon as I am able to move my troops.

‘ I request your Excellency will, in the mean time, give

directions that preparations may be made to supply this army with provisions at Badajoz.

‘Notwithstanding that the great body of the British troops will co-operate with your Excellency between the Tagus and the Guadiana, a body of British and Portuguese troops, under the command of Marshal Beresford, will move by Plasencia on the line which I had before proposed to take with the British army.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Captain General*

Don Gregorio Cuesta.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Abrantes, 13th June, 1809.

‘I send you copies of the letters I have received from the Spanish head quarters, and of those which I have written to General Cuesta and Colonel Bourke this day.

‘Colonel Bourke’s letter explains so fully the situation of Cuesta’s army, and my letter to him is so explicit upon the dangers of his position; the small chance there is that I shall be able to serve him, unless he should take up a strong position till I can come to his assistance; and upon the advantages of the operation which I had proposed; that I do not think it necessary to trouble you further upon the subject.

‘I can only say, that the obstinacy of this old gentleman is throwing out of our hands the finest game that any armies ever had; and that we shall repent that we did not cut off Victor when we shall have to beat the French upon the Ebro. With such a letter, however, as Colonel Bourke’s before me, I could not but yield the point to General Cuesta, which I hope will convince the Spanish Government of my sincere desire to be of service to them.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Right Hon. J. H. Frere.*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

‘SIR,

‘Abrantes, 13th June, 1809.

‘I have the honor to enclose to you a letter which I have received from Brig. General Langworth, in which he

encloses the proceedings of a Court of Inquiry, on the circumstances attending the absence of a corporal and two private soldiers from an escort of Commissariat carts, on their march from Aveiro to Coimbra. It is obvious that one of the private soldiers has been wounded; it is probable that all three have been put to death by the peasantry of Martede.

‘ I am sorry to say, that, from the conduct of the soldiers of the army in general, I apprehend that the peasants may have had some provocation for their animosity against the soldiers; but it must be obvious to you and to the Government, that these effects of their animosity must be discouraged, and even punished; otherwise it may lead to consequences, fatal to the peasantry of the country in general, as well as to the army.

‘ The Government may depend upon my exertions to keep the troops in order, and that I shall exert all the power which the law has placed in my hands to punish those who may be guilty of any outrages. The discovery and proof against the soldiers guilty of them is, however, a matter of considerable difficulty, as the law now stands; and it is rendered more difficult by the unwillingness of the inhabitants of the country to come forward to give their evidence on oath before a court martial. Probably this evil might be remedied, or removed, either by the circulation of a proclamation or a circular letter to the country magistrates, by the Government, calling upon the people to come forward with their complaints against the soldiers, and to prosecute them to conviction before a court martial. What I have now to request is, that strict inquiry may be made respecting the circumstances of the probable death of the three soldiers of the 53d regiment at Martede, that those who put them to death may be discovered and brought to trial.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. Colonel Bourke, Assistant Quarter Master General.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 14th June, 1809.

‘ I have received your letter of the 12th, and one from General Cuesta.

‘ The enclosed, to Mr. Frere, contains a copy of his and my answer, and of the enclosure in the letter.

‘ I acknowledge that I entertain no apprehensions that the French will attack General Cuesta: I am much more afraid that they are going away, and strengthening themselves upon the Tagus. Indeed I understand that they have fortified the Puerto de Mirabete. If this be true, their design is obvious; and the only way to defeat it is to adopt the plan I originally proposed.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Bourke.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. I wish you would hint to General O'Donoju, that if the French should attack General Cuesta, and he should be beaten, he will be highly responsible for omitting to place his army in a good position.

‘ A. W.’

To Captain General Don Gregorio Cuesta.

‘ SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 14th June, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 12th instant. My letter of yesterday's date will have apprised your Excellency that, in compliance with your desire, I intended to march towards Badajoz, in order to co-operate with your Excellency in the attack of the enemy in the manner which you preferred. Your Excellency may depend upon it that I shall not delay the march of the troops for one moment after I shall have it in my power to move them; and I beg leave to refer your Excellency to Colonel Alava for a detailed account of the circumstances which must prevent my march at the present moment.

‘ From the enclosed paper, I should judge that the enemy had not concentrated his force, and that he had no intention of attacking the army under the command of your Excellency. But if your Excellency has reason to believe that the enemy has adopted the measures to which you refer, and has concentrated his force, your Excellency will, doubtless, have deemed it expedient to concentrate the Spanish army, to receive his attack in a position which, from its strength, will give your troops every advantage.

‘ We have nothing now to apprehend, excepting that a misfortune may happen to one army before the other can

join it, or shall be in a position to co-operate with or give it assistance; and I feel confident that when your Excellency shall have considered the situation in which I stand at this moment, the absolute necessity which exists that I should delay my march till all my troops shall have joined, and till I shall have received all that I require, you will deem it most for the general benefit to place your army in a secure position till I can move to your assistance, which you may depend upon my doing as soon as it shall be in my power.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Captain General*
Don Gregorio Cuesta.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.

MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 14th June, 1809.

‘ I enclose the letters received this day from the Spanish head quarters, and copies of my answers.

‘ One of the great difficulties which I have in moving is the want of money; however, I have reason to expect that will be removed at an early period, either by the arrival of the *Surveillante*, from Cadiz, with 100,000*l.*, or by that of a vessel from England, with a similar sum. The arrival of either would enable me to march forthwith, as I have reason to expect the shoes and other necessaries every moment.

‘ It has occurred, however, to Mr. Villiers, who is here, and to me, that the Spanish Government, which is so much interested in my early advance, might be able to lend me 100,000*l.* in specie, to be repaid out of the first money that may arrive from England for the army. If they will do so, and will send the money to Badajoz, I shall move forthwith.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. H. Frere.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Abrantes, 14th June, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship’s dispatch of the 26th May, in which you have notified that His Majesty had ordered seven battalions of infantry therein named to proceed to Portugal, to reinforce the army under

my command. I request that those battalions may be ordered to Lisbon.

‘ I propose to send to England the two battalions composed of detachments, as soon as the other troops shall arrive in Portugal, and a detachment of the 3d German hussars immediately. I have drafted from these last the few horses they had, and given them to the 14th light dragoons, which regiment your Lordship will have observed was incomplete in horses at the commencement of the campaign, and sustained some loss in the actions of the 10th, 11th, and 12th May.

‘ I have arranged with the Admiral to send to Cork forthwith horse transports to convey one regiment of cavalry, 800; one troop of horse artillery, 200; and artillery horses, 300; in the whole 1300 horses.

‘ I request your Lordship will order such of the above-mentioned troops and horses as may be destined for Portugal to proceed to Lisbon. The 23d light dragoons having arrived, the 20th will proceed to Sicily as soon as there shall be transports ready for them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 15th June, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to inform you that I have received the orders of His Majesty’s Secretary of State to send to Gibraltar the 2d batt. 9th regiment, to relieve one of the regiments, for which transports have been ordered to that garrison; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will give directions that transports may be prepared to convey the 2d batt. 9th regiment to Gibraltar as soon as that corps shall arrive at Lisbon.

‘ I have also received the directions of the Secretary of State to send to Cork horse transports, containing stalls for 1300 horses, to convey to Portugal one regiment of dragoons consisting of 800 horses, 300 horses for the service of the artillery, and one troop of horse artillery, 200.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To J. Murray, Esq., Commissary General.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 16th June, 1809.

‘ I am happy to hear of the arrival of the *Surveillante*.

‘ You will do quite right to refer to the Lords of the Treasury the charge of Mr. Duff of a per centage upon the exchange of the gold for dollars.

‘ I have settled with Mr. Villiers that he is not to have any of the money which has arrived in the *Surveillante*, or that is disposable at the present moment.

‘ The Paymaster at Lisbon and the Paymaster of Artillery must have those sums *which are absolutely necessary, and no more*, as they will be in a place where some money can always be procured; and the bills drawn upon Lisbon must be paid. I do not think any demands can be more pressing than those of the service of the army; and I conceive that no demands ought to be paid, or no money left for the Paymaster General, or others, which will reduce the sum to be brought here to a smaller amount than 110,000*l.*; you will, therefore, take measures to have that sum sent up to the army without loss of time. This will be 50,000*l.* in addition to the 60,000*l.* which you tell me in your letter of the 15th was coming up.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *J. Murray, Esq.,
Commissary General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Donkin.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Abrantes, 16th June, 1809.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 11th, upon which I shall take an opportunity of writing to you fully in a day or two.

‘ I trouble you now upon a subject which has given me the greatest pain: I mean the accounts which I receive from all quarters of the disorders committed by, and the general irregularity of, the — and — regiments. I have ordered a provost to Castello Branco to put himself under your orders, and I hope you will not fail to make use of him.

‘ I beg that, on the receipt of this letter, you will call on

* Lieut. General Sir Rufane Donkin, K.C.B.

the Commanding Officers of the — and — regiments, and apprise them of the concern with which I have heard these reports of their regiments; and of my determination, if I should hear any more of them, to send their regiments into garrison, and to report them to His Majesty as unfit for service in the field, on account of irregularity of conduct and disorder.

‘ I desire that, upon the receipt of this letter, the — and — regiments may be hutted outside of the town of Castello Branco, if there should be wood in the neighbourhood, not fruit trees, and the rolls to be called every hour, from sunrise till eight in the evening, all Officers, as well as soldiers, to attend.

‘ The number of men absent from these regiments in consequence of their late marches is scandalous; and I desire that an Officer from each of them may go back immediately the whole road by which the brigade has moved since the 5th May, in search of the missing men. Those missing on the late march and ground between Guarda and Castello Branco must be sent on immediately to Castello Branco; and those missing on the former march must be collected at Guarda, and afterwards brought up by the Officers to the regiment when they shall return through that town.

‘ I beg to have reports from you of the state of the arms, ammunition, &c. of these regiments, and to hear whether the roll calls above ordered are regular, and are attended by all the Officers. Non-commissioned officers and soldiers absent must be punished. I beg to know whether the brigade has received all the orders.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Donkin.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Abrantes, 16th June, 1809.

‘ I beg you to see a letter which I have written to the Commander in Chief, enclosing one from General — to Marshal Beresford, in which that Officer objects to being employed on service with the Portuguese troops, and my letter to Marshal Beresford on that subject, allowing that Officer to go to England.

‘ I only hope that General —— will not be placed on the staff of the army anywhere else.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To their Excellencies the Junta of Badajoz.

‘ GENTLEMEN,

‘ Abrantes, 17th June, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your two letters of the 16th instant, and I am very sensible of the attention which you have paid to the wants of the army under my command.

‘ It is my intention to march by the route of Castello Branco and Coria, towards Plasencia and the banks of the Tictar, and I request you to give directions that provisions may be prepared in that quarter for 30,000 men and 6000 horses, including those of the cavalry, artillery, and military equipages.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Their Excellencies
the Junta of Badajoz.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Gordon, Military Secretary to the Commander
in Chief.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Abrantes, 17th June, 1809.

‘ I enclose a memorial which has been given into my hands by Major Davy, which I beg you to lay before the Commander in Chief.

‘ I believe that His Royal Highness the late Commander in Chief had intended to promote all the Majors commanding battalions in the late service in Portugal; and certainly, if the services of any battalion could give to their Commanding Officer a claim to promotion, the conduct and services of the 5th batt. 60th foot entitled their Commanding Officer to this advantage. I have had every reason to be satisfied with their conduct again upon this occasion, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will recommend Major Davy to the favorable consideration of the Commander in Chief.

‘ I likewise enclose a memorial from Mr. Thompson, Inspector of Hospitals to this army; who prays, what appears to be a matter of justice, that his appointment of Inspector may be notified in the Gazette.

‘ Believe me, &c.

Lieut. Colonel Gordon.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General Mackenzie.

‘ MY DEAR MACKENZIE,

‘ Abrantes, 17th June, 1809.

‘ I have received your two letters of the 16th. I do not think it necessary to make any movement in consequence of the intelligence of the passage of the Tagus by the enemy. There is no doubt, I believe, now, that Victor is retiring ; and I conclude that the troops mentioned in the enclosures of your letters are some strong parties which have crossed the Tagus in the places referred to.

‘ I propose that the whole of the army should move forward in a few days, when the money shall have arrived to pay them ; but I do not like to move any part of the force till the whole shall be prepared to follow.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Mackenzie.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Abrantes, 17th June, 1809.

‘ I have received your letter of the 31st May.

‘ My correspondence with General Cuesta has been a very curious one, and proves him to be as obstinate as any gentleman at the head of any army need be. He would not alter his position even to ensure the safety of his army, because he supposed that this measure might be injurious to himself, notwithstanding that this alteration would have been part of an operation which must have ended in the annihilation of Victor’s army if he stood our attack, or, in his retreat through the mountains to Arzobispo, with the loss of all his cannon and baggage if he went away.

‘ I hope I acted right in giving way, more particularly as the operation was to be carried on in Spain, and the argument urged to me was, that the safety of Cuesta’s army depended upon my compliance. The best of the whole story is, that Cuesta, in a letter of the 27th May, which I did not receive till after I had written to him to propose my plan of operations, proposed to me the same plan with very little alteration.

‘ I hope that notwithstanding Colonel Roche’s delay, and the partiality which the Admiral has for the employment of the horse transports in all services, that the horse transports will have arrived in time. It is desirable that all the trans-

ports for horses, as well as those for infantry, should have a thorough cleaning; for I have reason to believe that some of the former in particular are infected.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Abrantes, 17th June, 1809.

‘ I have received information that the French withdrew the post which they had at Merida, and their outposts in front of Medellin, and there is every reason to believe that their whole army is retiring across the Tagus and towards Madrid.

‘ The Spanish troops under General Cuesta took possession of Merida, and crossed the Guadiana at Medellin.

‘ I have had a discussion with General Cuesta, respecting the plan of operations to be carried on by the British and Spanish armies in the attack of Marshal Victor. We had every reason to believe that the French army consisted of about 27,000 men, and that the defeat and retreat of Soult had deprived Victor of all support; and that the Spanish army consisted of 30,000 men, of which 7000 were cavalry; and the combined British and Portuguese force, which I was in hopes I should have been enabled to march upon this expedition, would have amounted to about 24,000 men, of which nearly 4000 would have been cavalry.

‘ The only practicable retreat for the French army was by the bridge of Almaraz, and my proposition to General Cuesta was, that he should remain with the Spanish army, in a position in which, if attacked, he could have the advantage, such as that by which he had so long kept in check the French armies, until I should move by Castello Branco and Plasencia to Almaraz, and cut off the only practicable retreat which the French had to Madrid.

‘ It appears by the correspondence of Lieut. Colonel Bourke, that General Cuesta had by no means a good position on the Guadiana; and the Colonel expresses in strong terms his apprehensions and those of General O'Donaju, that if the Spanish army should be attacked in that position, it would be defeated. At the same time

General Cuesta could not be prevailed upon to draw further back towards the Sierra Morena, although it was obvious that the consequence of any movement which should place the Spanish army in security, while I should move round the enemy, would be, most probably, to cut off their retreat; and he pressed me in the most earnest terms to join the British army to that under his command upon the Guadiana.

‘ Finding it impossible to induce General Cuesta to improve his position, and that serious apprehensions were entertained for his safety, I consented to forego the execution of the plan which I preferred, and I promised to march to Badajoz as soon as I should be enabled to move, by the arrival of money from Cadiz or from England, and as the army had had a few days’ rest, and had received a supply of shoes.

‘ In the mean time the French army having retired, probably upon hearing of the arrival of this corps upon the Tagus, I proposed to continue on the right bank of that river, and to move towards Plasencia.

‘ The money expected from Cadiz arrived at Lisbon on the day before yesterday, and I propose to commence my march as soon as it shall reach the army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. Since writing the above, I have received letters from General Cuesta and Lieut. Colonel Bourke, of the 16th. The General was to move his head quarters to Merida on this day; his advanced guard is at Alcuescar and Albala. General Cuesta now wishes me to march by Plasencia.

‘ A. W.’

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Abrantes, 17th June, 1809.

‘ I cannot, with propriety, omit to draw your attention again to the state of discipline of the army, which is a subject of serious concern to me, and well deserves the consideration of His Majesty’s Ministers.

‘ It is impossible to describe to you the irregularities and outrages committed by the troops. They are never out of the sight of their Officers, I may almost say never out of

the sight of the Commanding Officers of their regiments, and the General Officers of the army, that outrages are not committed; and notwithstanding the pains which I take, of which there will be ample evidence in my orderly books, not a post or a courier comes in, not an Officer arrives from the rear of the army, that does not bring me accounts of outrages committed by the soldiers who have been left behind on the march, having been sick, or having straggled from their regiments, or who have been left in hospitals.

‘ We have a provost marshal, and no less than four assistants. I never allow a man to march with the baggage. I never leave an hospital without a number of Officers and non-commanding Officers proportionable to the number of soldiers; and never allow a detachment to march, unless under the command of an Officer; and yet there is not an outrage of any description, which has not been committed on a people who have uniformly received us as friends, by soldiers who never yet, for one moment, suffered the slightest want, or the smallest privation.

‘ In the first place, I am convinced that the law is not strong enough to maintain discipline in an army upon service. It is most difficult to convict any prisoner before a regimental court martial, for I am sorry to say that soldiers have little regard to the oath administered to them; and the Officers who are sworn “ well and truly to try and determine, *according to the evidence*, the matter before them,” have too much regard to the strict letter of that administered to them. This oath, to the members of a regimental court martial, has altered the principle of the proceedings of that tribunal. It is no longer a court of honor, at the hands of which a soldier was certain of receiving punishment if he deserved it; but it is a court of law, whose decisions are to be formed according to the evidence, principally of those on whose actions it is constituted as a restraint.

‘ But, admitting the regimental or detachment court martial, as now constituted, to be a control upon the soldiers equally efficient with that which existed under the old constitution of a court martial, which my experience tells me it is not, I should wish to know whether any British army

(this army in particular, which is composed of second battalions, and therefore but ill provided with Officers) can afford to leave with every hospital, or with every detachment, two Captains and four Subalterns, in order to be enabled to hold a detachment court martial.

‘ The law in this respect ought to be amended ; and when the army is on service in a foreign country, any one, two, or three Officers, ought to have the power of trying criminals, and punishing them *instantly* ; taking down all proceedings in writing, and reporting them for the information of the Commander in Chief on their joining the army.

‘ Besides this improvement of the law, there ought to be in the British army a regular provost establishment, of which a proportion should be attached to every army sent abroad. All the foreign armies have such an establishment : the French *gendarmerie nationale*, to the amount of thirty or forty with each of their corps ; the Spaniards their *policia militar*, to a still larger amount ; while we who require such an aid more, I am sorry to say, than any of the other nations of Europe, have nothing of the kind, excepting a few serjeants, who are taken from the line for the occasion, and who are probably not very fit for the duties which they are to perform.

‘ The authority and duties of the provost ought, in some manner, to be recognized by the law. By the custom of British armies, the provost has been in the habit of punishing on the spot (even with death, under the orders of the Commander in Chief) soldiers found in the act of disobedience of orders, of plunder, or of outrage.

‘ There is no authority for this practice excepting custom, which I conceive would hardly warrant it ; and yet I declare that I do not know in what manner the army is to be commanded at all, unless the practice is not only continued, but an additional number of provosts appointed.

‘ There is another branch of this subject which deserves serious consideration. We all know that the discipline and regularity of all armies must depend upon the diligence of the regimental Officers, particularly the Subalterns. I may order what I please ; but if they do not execute what I order, or if they execute with negligence, I cannot expect that British soldiers will be orderly or regular.

‘ There are two incitements to men of this description to do their duty as they ought—the fear of punishment, and the hope of reward.

‘ As for the first, it cannot be given individually ; for I believe I should find it very difficult to convict any Officer of doing this description of duty with negligence, more particularly as he is to be tried by others probably guilty of the same offence. But these evils of which I complain are committed by whole corps ; and the only way in which they can be punished is by disgracing them, by sending them into garrison and reporting them to His Majesty. I may and shall do this by one or two battalions, but I cannot venture to do it by more ; and then there is an end to the fear of this punishment, even if those who received it were considered in England as disgraced persons rather than martyrs.

‘ As for the other incitement to Officers to do their duty zealously, there is no such thing. We who command the armies of the country, and who are expected to make exertions greater than those made by the French armies,—to march, to fight, and to keep our troops in health and in discipline,—have not the power of rewarding, or promising a reward for a single Officer of the army ; and we deceive ourselves, and those who are placed under us, if we imagine we have that power, or if we hold out to them that they shall derive any advantage from the exertion of it in their favor.

‘ You will say, probably, in answer to all this, that British armies have been in the field before, and that these complaints, at least to the same extent, have not existed ; to which I answer—first, that the armies are now larger, their operations more extended, and the exertions required greater than they were in former periods ; and that the mode of carrying on war is different from what it was. Secondly, that our law, instead of being strong in proportion to the temptation and means for indiscipline and irregularity, has been weakened ; and that we have not adopted the additional means of restraint and punishment practised by other nations, and our enemies, although we have imitated them in those particulars which have increased and aggravated our irregularities. And, finally, that it is only within late years that the Commanders in Chief abroad have been deprived

of all patronage, and of course of all power of incitement to the Officers under their command.

‘It may be supposed that I wish for this patronage to gratify my own favorites; but I declare most solemnly that, if I had it to-morrow, there is not a soul in the army whom I should wish to promote, excepting for services performed.

‘I have thought it proper to draw your attention to these subjects, which I assure you deserve the serious consideration of the King’s Ministers. We are an excellent army on parade, an excellent one to fight; but we are worse than an enemy in a country; and take my word for it, that either defeat or success would dissolve us.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General Mackenzie.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘Abrantes, 18th June, 1809.

‘The enemy are retiring across the Tagus; and it is not by any means probable that they will make any offensive attempt upon our post at Alcantara, though not at all unlikely that they might push a patrol that way to ascertain the strength of the corps by which we hold that point.

‘It is very desirable, however, that the greatest part of Colonel Mayne’s corps should be placed at Zarza la Mayor, with a view to look to the valley of Plasencia, and that Alcantara should be held by a small force only; but let it be under the command of an Officer who will not take fright when the enemy look at him from the other side of the river.

‘The late movements of the enemy have induced an alteration of our plans. I propose to move the whole British army into the vale of Plasencia, as soon as I can get from Lisbon what I want, which is principally money; and the Portuguese troops, with the exception of the legion which remains with me, are to go to the northward with Marshal Beresford.

‘I do not understand from your letter that the two Portuguese battalions have moved to Zibreira. If they should not have gone there, they must not be moved; and indeed I conceive the position at Zarza la Mayor to be but little ex-

posed, and not to require much immediate support. If they have been moved, it does not much signify; they can march to the north from thence.

'The 87th and 88th regiments are at Castello Branco. The hussars were halted at Thomar, when it was imagined that we should be obliged to go into Spain, between the Tagus and the Guadiana; but they will now be ordered to move on to Castello Branco. But until the British troops are paid, I wish none of them to be moved forward.

'Believe me, &c.

'Major General Mackenzie.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. Colonel Bourke, Assistant Quarter Master General.

'MY DEAR SIR,

'Abrantes, 18th June, 1809.

'I have received your letters of the 14th and 16th, and one from General Cuesta of the 16th. I send copies of all these papers, and of my answer of this day, to General Cuesta, in the enclosed to Mr. Frere, which I beg you to forward.

'The money from Cadiz is arrived at Lisbon, and I expect it here every moment. I also expect the shoes and other necessaries for the army, which have been an unaccountably long time upon the river. I shall wait for none of the reinforcements, although I expect to hear at every moment of the arrival of 5000 excellent infantry, and a troop of horse artillery; but I shall march as soon as the money and the shoes arrive, which cannot be in less than two or three days.

'In respect to yourself, I wish you to join the army; but it is very desirable that I should have an Officer at General Cuesta's head quarters, who can talk to him and General O'Donoju confidentially; and I propose to send Colonel Roche there, who is lately come from England. I should wish you to stay till Colonel Roche shall arrive, unless you are very anxious to return; in which case you will desire Cadogan to stay till he shall be relieved by Colonel Roche.

'I cannot omit taking this opportunity of expressing to you how much I am satisfied with all the communications

I have received from you, and with the manner you have performed the service on which I sent you.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Bourke.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Dom Miguel Forjaz.

‘ MONSIEUR,

‘ Abrantes, ce 18 Juin, 1809.

‘ Comme les nouvelles arrivées disent que les Français devaient entrer à Orense le 14 de ce mois, et comme les Gouverneurs du Royaume voudraient savoir les dispositions qui ont été faites pour la défense du Portugal, j’ai l’honneur de vous faire savoir que toutes les troupes Portugaises sont en marche pour arriver sur le Douro, et que le Maréchal Beresford, qui va à Lisbonne, ira au nord du Royaume pour se charger du commandement.

‘ Quoique les Français s’avancent sur Orense, je ne crois pas qu’ils aient l’intention d’envahir le Portugal par la Galicie. Ils n’ont pas une force suffisante pour cet objet sans abandonner la Galicie et les Asturies entièrement ; et s’ils abandonnent la Galicie, la force qu’ils auraient envoyée dans le Portugal serait surement perdue.

‘ Le Maréchal Victor s’étant retiré pour passer le Tage à Almaraz, je compte marcher sur Coria à Plasencia, mais je serai toujours en communication avec le Portugal et je tournerai à gauche, si je trouve que l’ennemi envahit encore ce pays-ci.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *Dom Miguel Forjaz.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Captain General Don Gregorio Cuesta.

‘ SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 18th June, 1809.

‘ I had the honor to receive last night your Excellency’s letter of the 16th. I agree entirely with your Excellency, that the best line for the march of the British army is by Plasencia, towards the banks of the Tietar, and I propose to put the troops in movement to that quarter as soon as it shall be in my power.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Captain General
Don Gregorio Cuesta.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘Abrantes, 19th June, 1809.

‘I enclose a letter for Lord Castlereagh, in respect to the ordnance and military stores you require. It appears to me that you have omitted to require carriages for the carronades; and you might as well alter your letter and ask for them. I also think you had better have another copy made of the list of intrenching tools required, and leave out the remarks at the end. You can get the plank and timber in Portugal. I also think that you might get—

Artificers’ tools,

Steel,

Iron wedges,

Tarpaulins,

Coils of rope,

Chests of tools,

Junk,

Sand bags,

Iron,

Ballast baskets,

in Portugal, and you had better omit them in your list altogether; as it only swells it, and will delay the transmission of other articles more necessary to you.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal Beresford.*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘P. S. When you shall have made these alterations, forward the letter to Lord Castlereagh.

‘A. W.’

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD,

‘Abrantes, 19th June, 1809.

‘I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have received from Marshal Beresford, detailing the articles of ordnance and military stores which it is necessary should be supplied as soon as possible to this country. I am convinced that these articles are necessary, in order to get this country in a proper state of defence, and I request your Lordship to have them sent at an early period.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Brig. General Cox, Governor of Almeida.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Abrantes, 20th June, 1809.

‘I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 17th, which I received this morning.

‘I shall give directions that provisions, bread, flour, and

corn, principally, and some military stores, for the use of the British army, may be sent to Almeida, and I shall be obliged to you to have them taken care of when they may arrive there.

‘ They shall go in a regular manner, and not as the barrels of pork, in charge of the serjeant of the 5th King’s German Legion. These appear to me to have wandered to Almeida, not knowing where they were to go.

‘ I shall be obliged to you for any intelligence you may have it in your power to send me.

‘ Marshal Victor has retired from the Guadiana, I conclude upon hearing of our arrival upon the Tagus, as part of his army has crossed the Tagus, at Almaraz. General Cuesta has crossed the Guadiana, and his head quarters were on the 18th at Miajadas. The British army will move in a day or two towards Plasencia, by Castello Branco and Coria.

‘ I shall be much obliged to you, if you will forward the enclosed letter to the Junta of Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Cox.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To their Excellencies the Junta of Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ GENTLEMEN,

‘ Abrantes, 20th June, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving from your Excellencies an account of the sums due at Ciudad Rodrigo, and in the neighbourhood of that city, for articles received by the British army, when under the command of Sir John Moore.

‘ It is my wish to pay these sums immediately; but as it will be difficult to transport the money to Ciudad Rodrigo, I should be glad, if equally convenient to your Excellencies, to pay it to any agent you might appoint to receive it at Lisbon. If, however, this mode of payment should be inconvenient to your Excellencies, I shall send a gentleman to Ciudad Rodrigo to pay the demand.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Their Excellencies*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ *the Junta of Ciudad Rodrigo.*

To Captain General Don Gregorio Cuesta.

‘SIR,

‘Abrantes, 20th June, 1809.

‘As Lieut. Colonel Bourke has concluded the business on which I sent him to wait upon your Excellency, and as he fills a station in this army of which it is desirable that he should resume the duties, I have written to him to request that he will return; and I send Colonel Roche with this letter, with whom I understand you are acquainted, and who has received marks of your favor.

‘As it may be convenient to your Excellency that a British Officer should attend at your head quarters, in order to communicate to me your wishes, and to explain to your Excellency such circumstances as I may have to communicate, I wish Colonel Roche to remain with you to accomplish these objects.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Captain General*
Don Gregorio Cuesta.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘SIR,

‘Abrantes, 21st June, 1809.

‘Having received the orders of the Secretary of State to send the 20th light dragoons with their horses to Sicily, I shall be much obliged to you if you will give directions, that transports may be prepared for them, and that a convoy may be allotted to take them to Sicily, as soon as they shall be embarked. The Assistant Quarter Master General at Lisbon will acquaint the Agent of Transports with the number of men and horses to be embarked.

‘I have also received the directions of the Secretary of State to send to England by the first opportunity a detachment of the 3d light dragoons, German Legion, without their horses; and I shall be obliged to you if you will give directions that this detachment, of the strength of which the Assistant Quarter Master General will acquaint the Agent of Transports, may be embarked in any of the empty transports returning to England.

‘I have sent orders to Lisbon that the 48th and 61st regiments may join the army as soon as they are prepared to march, by being provided with the mules, &c. which they

require. I have directed that they may proceed by water as far as Valada; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will give directions that such assistance in the way of boats as the Navy can afford may be given to them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 21st June, 1809.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 19th. I fancy the 27th regiment was obliged to march, because the Commissary could not procure boats for their conveyance, and that they could not procure boats because they have, till lately, had no money to pay the boatmen.

‘ I shall be very happy to receive any suggestions from you through Major Berkeley, on this or any other subject.

‘ I have written to you about the 20th dragoons, the husars, 48th and 61st regiments.

‘ Lord Castlereagh, in a letter to me, expresses some anxiety respecting the employment of the horse ships in the transport of the sheep.

‘ I am very sensible of the pains you have taken to establish for us a good water communication with Lisbon, which is indeed a most desirable object.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. I enclose a report from the Assistant Quarter Master General at Lisbon respecting the mode of disembarking horses in the Tagus. The Officers of the cavalry have before mentioned the same subject, which deserves attention and requires reform. Probably the best thing to do would be to put the horses into our own flats, or the large country boats, from the transports.

‘ A. W.’

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Abrantes, 21st June, 1809.

‘ I have considered of the means of supplying you immediately with intrenching tools, and I find that I can give you

what is stated in the enclosed paper, marked No. 2 in pencil, if Villiers will give a receipt for them; and as to the first you received for this place, I enclose the receipt of the Officer of Engineers here for them, which Villiers ought to keep.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. I signed an order similar to the enclosed, No. 3, for the tools given to Captain Patton.

‘ A. W.’

To Lieut. Colonel Bourke, Assistant Quarter Master General.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 21st June, 1809.

‘ I received in the night your letter of the 19th instant. Colonel Cadogan has informed me of your objects respecting yourself; and although I shall be sorry to lose your assistance at this critical moment, when you have shown that you are so capable of assisting me materially, I can do no more than express my regret at your departure. It is impossible for any man to pretend to give an opinion upon the feelings which induce you to take the step which I so much regret.

‘ Before you leave General Cuesta’s head quarters, however, I wish you to get information for me upon some points, by which my operations, and indeed those of all the Spanish corps which will co-operate with us, must in a great measure be guided.

‘ I enclose a paper containing queries, on which I wish you to obtain as much information as you can from General O’Donoju.

‘ If the two corps under Victor and Sebastiani should join, my opinion is, that they will give battle on this side of Madrid; more particularly if there should be any position in the country which would afford them any advantage. I should rather suspect this to be their intention, as I observe that the French corps in Galicia have not yet made any movement, which would induce me to believe that they intend to evacuate that country; and yet, if Victor and Sebastiani withdraw beyond Madrid, the French corps in Galicia must leave that kingdom, otherwise Victor and Sebastiani will not be able to hold their ground.

‘ The first queries are directed to the possibility of an action on this side of Madrid. If they do not fight on this

side of Madrid, where will they find a position north of that city

‘ The next queries are directed to that point.

‘ Lastly, they will certainly defend the Ebro as long as they can ; and the last queries are directed to this point.

‘ My object, in these inquiries, is to be able to make up my own mind, and to recommend to the Spanish Officers such a disposition of our forces, at an early period, and to combine our march in such a manner, as that, whenever we may have to attack the enemy, we shall not have to halt, and alter our disposition immediately in his front, and thus give him a knowledge of our intentions.

‘ It is true that I have had no great encouragement to recommend anything to the Spanish Officers, but still I shall not fail to communicate to them my opinion upon the plan for our operations.

‘ My determination upon the line of march which I shall take from Plasencia must depend much upon the answers to these queries. For many reasons I should think it best to take the line which would lead me nearest to the Portuguese frontier, particularly if the enemy are likely to retire to the Ebro.

‘ If General Cuesta had not determined to pass with his corps on the other side of Madrid, my opinion is, that his corps, as well as Venegas, ought to leave that city on their right ; that the pressure of the whole army ought to be on the enemy’s right ; and our object to be, in hurrying them from Madrid, to cut off their communication with the corps in Galicia. However, if General Cuesta and Venegas leave Madrid upon their left, I must march by the Escorial, or insulate myself entirely from them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Bourke.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM OF QUERIES.

‘ Abrantes, 21st June, 1809.

‘ 1. When the French corps under Victor and Sebastiani shall join near Toledo, and be reinforced probably by the French garrisons in Toledo and Madrid, is there any defensive position they could take up ? Is such a position afforded

by the Guadarama or the Manzanares, throwing their left upon the Tagus ?

‘ 2. What is the nature of the country between the Guadarama and Manzanares ? What the nature of the banks of those rivers, particularly the upper part of the former ? What the nature of the banks of the Tagus between them ? Any fords or other passages.

‘ 3. Are there any roads leading from Plasencia or Talavera, and of what description, to the upper part of the Guadarama ?

‘ 4. Supposing the enemy to retire beyond Madrid, upon being threatened with an attack by the three combined corps, under Generals Cuesta and Venegas and myself, could the mountains of Castille afford him any defensive position ?

‘ 5. What position would be most probably taken up by the French army in those mountains ?

‘ 6. What are the commonly used passages through them from the southward, in the whole extent of their range ?

‘ 7. What the nature of the country on this side ? and of the different passages through them ?

‘ 8. What the nature of the country after passing them ?

‘ 9. Supposing the enemy to retire at once to the Ebro and take up his position upon that river, his object would be most probably to secure his communication with Franco. With that view what position would he take up ?

‘ 10. Is the Ebro fordable in the whole length of its course ?

‘ 11. Where the principal passages ?

‘ 12. The nature of the banks generally ?

‘ 13. The nature of the country on both sides ?

‘ 14. What Spanish corps are there in Valencia, Murcia, Aragon, and Catalonia, which might be brought to co-operate in a general movement upon the enemy ?

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Brig. General Campbell, President of a General Court Martial.

‘ SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 21st June, 1809.

‘ I have received and perused the proceedings of the General Court Martial, of which you are President, on the trial of O—— J——, private soldier of the 29th regiment of foot, “ for mutiny, and for attempting to shoot Ensign J——,

of the 88th regiment," and I am concerned that I cannot agree in opinion with the Court, that the prisoner ought to be acquitted.

' Differing as I do in opinion with the Court Martial, it is my duty to state the grounds of that difference of opinion, and to request that the Court will revise their sentence.

' It appears that the detachment of troops to which Ensign J——, of the 88th regiment, and Private O—— J——, belonged, were on their march towards Leyria; and that on the 4th May, between Carvalhos and Leyria, Ensign J——, in consequence of orders from his superior Officer, Lieut. F——, of the 36th regiment, endeavored to keep order in the detachment, and pushed, and even struck O—— J——, who, among other soldiers, was pressing forward to the front, out of his place in the ranks. That the offence having been repeated, he repeated the chastisement; and that then the soldier went to the rear, muttering something which Ensign J—— could not understand, loaded his firelock, and came again to the front, threw his firelock from his right hand into the left, and was in the act of firing at Ensign J——, when he was stopped by Private L——, of the 88th regiment.

' It appears by the evidence of Serjeant T——, of the 88th regiment, that O—— J—— repeatedly refused to form in his place in the ranks, which was the cause of Ensign J—— striking him.

' It appears by the evidence of Private P——, of the 50th regiment, that the prisoner loaded his piece on the road; and the prisoner declares himself, that he loaded it (though for a different purpose) on "that day" on the march, and it appears by the evidence of other witnesses who saw the charge drawn that it was loaded with ball cartridge; and by that of Serjeant T——, that the piece was primed; and that he, the serjeant, as "acting serjeant major of the detachment, had never heard of any order given to load, nor did it ever come under his observation that any pieces were loaded."

' It appears by the evidence of Ensign J——, that Private O—— J—— having loaded his piece, had it on the recover, when he turned round and saw him. Serjeant T—— saw him "coming up nearly as fast as he could walk,

with his firelock nearly in the position of the port. Some person, when he came near to Ensign J——, called out to him (Ensign J——) to take care, as that man's piece (meaning the prisoner's) was loaded. The witness then saw the prisoner bring his firelock nearly to the level, when it was seized."

'It appears by the evidence of Private L——, of the 88th regiment, that he saw the prisoner "coming from the rear, with his firelock nearly at the position of the charge, with his thumb upon the cock; that the prisoner was going at the time faster than the other men;" and it appears that this same L——, of the 88th regiment, was the person who, having been called to by the other men, seized his firelock, and prevented the prisoner from executing his purpose.

'From this statement of the evidence, I conceive the crime of mutiny, refusing to obey the Officer's orders, and that of attempting to shoot Ensign J——, to be clearly made out; and there is no contradiction whatever of the evidence, no justification and no pretence stated on the part of the prisoner, excepting that he heard that day on the march that the French were in the neighbourhood.

'But there is one circumstance stated in evidence which tends to confirm the proof of the crime; and that is, the fact that the soldiers of the detachment, at the time, believed that it was the intention of O—— J—— to shoot Ensign J——. From the length of time which has elapsed, and the variety of occurrences which have taken place since the 4th May, they might have forgotten some of the circumstances that occurred, which, by being now related, might have thrown light upon the transaction; but the Ensign, the serjeant, and the private, L——, agree in that fact, that the soldiers of the detachment, who saw O—— J—— come up, imagined that he was about to endeavor to kill Ensign J——, and they put the Ensign on his guard. This fact tends to confirm all the other evidence.

'In respect to the fact stated to me by your Surgeon, that O—— J—— is insane, I have to observe that there is no proof whatever of its existence. It might not be necessary to prove it, the prisoner being acquitted; but if the Court should agree in opinion with me, upon the revision of their sentence, that the prisoner ought to be convicted of one or

both of the crimes charged against him, it will be necessary that means should be taken to ascertain whether he is insane.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Campbell.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. John Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Abrantes, 21st June, 1809.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 20th. I am much concerned to hear of the distress of the Portuguese troops ; more particularly as it is out of my power to relieve it at present, excepting by the repayment of those sums of money which our troops received from their Paymaster General ; and of any sums (I know of none) that we are said to have received from the provincial treasuries.

‘ If I give any of the money I now command, not only will the British army be unable to move, but it must starve where it now is, as *I cannot get either supplies, or boats, or carts, to move supplies from Lisbon, without money.*

‘ The British Government appear to me to have undertaken more in this country than they can manage ; and I am concerned that I have it not in my power to make up for the deficiency of supplies which they have furnished for the service.

‘ I have asked for 200,000*l.* every month, in which sum I have included the estimate of a sum of 40,000*l.* a month required by you for the Portuguese troops. If you should require more, the supply must be increased in proportion ; this in addition to the money which can be got at Lisbon, Cadiz, and Gibraltar, for bills. Besides this a sum of money must be sent from England to pay the arrear due to the Portuguese Government.

‘ I expect from England 100,000*l.* , of which sum you may take 50,000*l.* for the Portuguese Government, when it shall arrive ; but I cannot allow any more to be allotted for this service, or any of the money which may be got for bills at Lisbon or elsewhere, without exposing to want, or even imminent risk, the King’s troops under my command.

‘ Mr. — is arrived, but is so unwell that I cannot speak to him. He has always had a gentleman at Lisbon charged

with the business of negotiating his bills; another at Gibraltar, and another at Cadiz.

‘The misfortune is that this gentleman, like many others attached to this army, does not appear to me to be very equal to the performance of the duty which he has undertaken.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To W. Huskisson, Esq., Secretary of the Treasury.

‘SIR,

‘Abrantes, 22d June, 1809.

‘Upon referring to the instructions of the Treasury to the Commissary General with this army, it appears to me to have been understood by their Lordships that it was intended that the Commissariat attached to the Portuguese army was to be conducted under the orders of the Commander in Chief of the British army, and its expense to be defrayed by the British Government; and upon this ground I imagine that their Lordships thought proper to order the Commissary General to furnish the Commissary General of the Portuguese army with instructions; and that the accounts of the latter should be examined by the Commissary of Accounts attached to the British army.

‘I request you, however, to apprise their Lordships, that the Portuguese army have long had a Commissariat adapted to the nature of the country, and managed by persons who have long been employed in its management, probably at less expense to the Government than it would be managed under rules established by their Lordships’ authority. All that is required is the assistance of some persons belonging to the British Commissariat, to conduct the business under the Portuguese Government according to the rules established for that branch of their service; and to make rules to prevent the clashing of the Officers of the Commissariat of two armies acting in the same country, and for the mutual payment for supplies furnished by the one to the troops of the other nation.

‘I have the honor to enclose an arrangement, which I propose should be adopted on this subject, if it should meet their Lordships’ approbation. I have submitted it to the Ambassador and to Marshal Beresford, who entirely concur

in it; and I have ordered Mr. Deputy Commissary Rawlings to place himself under the directions of Marshal Beresford, in order that he may superintend the Portuguese Commissariat under this arrangement.

‘There are two points which require an explanation in the arrangement; the one, the difference of the price of the ration; the other, the mode of payment for magazines delivered by the British Commissariat for the use of the Portuguese army.

‘The cause of the difference of price is that the Portuguese ration is smaller than that delivered to the British soldiers; and I have arranged this mode of paying for magazines, because I have understood it to be the wish of His Majesty’s Government, that all stores delivered to the Portuguese Government should be in the way of subsidy, and should reach them with the knowledge and through the means of the Ambassador. If their Lordships should approve of this arrangement, it will be necessary that they should cancel the 30th Article of the Instructions to the Commissary General, and the 35th of the Instructions to the Commissary of the Accounts.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*W. Huskisson, Esq.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM OF AN ARRANGEMENT FOR THE PORTUGUESE
COMMISSARIAT.

‘Abrantes, 10th June, 1809.

‘1. The Portuguese Commissariat, whether superintended by a British Deputy Commissary, or by a Portuguese Commissary, must be solely and exclusively under the direction of the Portuguese Government and the Commander in Chief of the Portuguese army.

‘2. When the British and Portuguese armies shall be joined, or when the troops of the one nation shall pass through the cantonments occupied by the other, the Commissary General of the Portuguese army will communicate with the Commissary General of the British army, respecting the proportion of the supplies of the country to be allotted for the Portuguese Commissariat, and the quarters from whence to be drawn. The arrangements upon these occa-

sions must necessarily be made by the Commissary General of the British army.

‘ 3. The requisitions upon the country for mules, horses, carriages, and boats, are to be regulated in the same manner.

‘ 4. When the detachment of the troops of the one nation shall act with the army of the other, the Commissaries are to pay for the rations they will receive at the following rates :—

‘ That is to say, the Portuguese Commissary General, for every ration issued to the Portuguese troops, 9*d.*; and the British Commissary General, for every ration issued to the British troops, 1*s.* Rations to horses and mules to be paid for each at the rate of 2*s.*

‘ 5. When the British Commissary General shall receive magazines or supplies of any description from the Portuguese Commissariat, he is to pay the Portuguese Commissary for them, at the rate at which the same description of supplies can be purchased in the country at the same time.

‘ 6. All magazines and supplies of every description, given by the British Commissary General to the Portuguese Commissariat, are to be delivered under the orders of the British Commander in Chief; and the receipt of the Ambassador must be taken for them, and his bill upon the Lords of the Treasury for the amount of the value.

‘ The value to be settled according to the price of the same articles in the country at the time.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Abrantes, 22d June, 1809.

‘ I judge from your letter to me, from one which I have received from the Admiral, and from a letter from Cooke to your brother, that Government are not pleased with our having allowed the transports to go to Cadiz to take to England the Merino sheep; and as I was, I believe, the first mover in this business, in Portugal at least, I wish to let you know what I did, and from what motive.

‘ Mr. Johnstone wrote to me a letter which I received at Ruivães, about a month ago, to tell me that he had got the sheep in question, but that he was afraid that he should lose them, unless we could lend him some of our transports to carry them home early in the summer. At this time I saw

clearly that we should not want the transports in order to evacuate Portugal; and I sent Mr. Johnstone's letter to the Admiral at Lisbon, and told him that I thought all the three months' transports might be sent home; and that as it was certainly a national object to get home the Spanish sheep, I saw no objection to allow *eight* of the three months' infantry transports to go to Cadiz to convey them home, on condition that *Mr. Cochrane Johnstone should pay for their hire from the time they should sail from the port of Lisbon for this purpose.*

'Mr. Frere afterwards made a requisition for transports to carry home 2000 sheep for His Majesty; and the Admiral having represented this circumstance to me, and having stated that eight transports could carry only a small number of sheep, I consented to his sending twenty five of the three months' ships. I fear that the Admiral sent horse ships instead of infantry ships on this service, which arrangement might be inconvenient. But if he sent infantry ships, I acknowledge that having received instructions to send home three months' ships as soon as I thought they could be spared, without risk to the King's troops, in order to save the expense of their hire to the public, I thought I could not better answer that purpose than to get rid of the expense at Lisbon instead of in England, by consenting to an arrangement which would accommodate an individual, and was likely to be advantageous to the public.

'I must add, at the same time, that I am not even acquainted with Mr. Johnstone.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Viscount Castlereagh.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Gordon, Military Secretary to the
Commander in Chief.*

'SIR,

'Abrantes, 22d June, 1809.

'I have the honor to enclose a letter (No. 1) which I have received lately from Mr. Staff Surgeon —; in consequence of which, not having had an opportunity of visiting the hospitals at Coimbra, when I passed through that town, I directed Major General Cotton, who was still there, to visit them, and make a report on the state in which he found them. I have the honor to enclose his report (No. 2). "

‘ I trouble you with these papers, not because I am apprehensive that the Commander in Chief, or the head of the Medical Department in England, should listen to the reports of any inferior Officer to the prejudice of his superior. If we are fit to be trusted with the charge with which we are invested, our characters are not to be injured by defamatory reports of this description. But I am aware that there are not wanting in England channels for circulating defamation of this kind; and I am desirous of laying before the Commander in Chief, in the most authentic form, the original complaint, and the real state of the case as it was found to be upon inquiry.

‘ I understand that Mr. Staff Surgeon — was sent home some time ago, by the late Commander of the Forces in Portugal, in consequence of a complaint from the head of the Medical Department here, and because he is a person of that description of temper with which no other person could agree. Notwithstanding that he was sent home by Sir J. Cradock, he was sent back by the Medical Department in England to this country; and, considering that it was still desirable that Mr. — should not serve with the army in Portugal, I lately ordered that he should return to England, with the sick and wounded prisoners of the French army. This drew from him a remonstrance, to which I paid no attention, excepting to desire him to obey the order he had received, and then it appears that he commenced his inquiries into the conduct of his superior Officer, Mr. Deputy Inspector Fergusson.

‘ In respect to this gentleman, I must say that I never saw him till I met him on my arrival in this country, and that I have had every reason to be satisfied with his conduct.

‘ In respect to Mr. —, I shall be obliged to the Commander in Chief if he will prevent his being sent back to Portugal.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Gordon.*

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.

‘ *MY DEAR SIR,*

‘ *Abrantes, 22d June, 1809.*

‘ I enclose my late letters from Colonel Bourke, and my answers, and the copy of a letter from General Cuesta.

‘ I am sorry that Colonel Bourke is coming from the Spanish head quarters; and I fear that I shall lose his assistance altogether, as he wishes to go to England, and even to retire from the service.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. H. Freres.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Abrantes, 22d June, 1809.

‘ I enclose you a letter from Fletcher. You will probably be able to discover the cause of the discontinuance of the works at Lisbon. If you have no workmen, however, you cannot want our Officers; and I should wish to have them again.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. John Villiers.

‘ SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 22d June, 1809.

‘ I am concerned to forward to you an account of another British soldier put to death by the inhabitants of the country in the neighbourhood of Santarem, upon which I beg to refer you to my letter of the 13th instant.

‘ I am concerned to add that two soldiers of the 7th regiment were wounded in this neighbourhood a few days ago, by two inhabitants of the country; and that I have reason to fear that others, now missing from the camp near this place, have been killed by them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Abrantes, 22d June, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to inform your Lordship that I have ordered the detachment of the 20th light dragoons, which has been in Portugal, to embark for Sicily, with all their horses; and that I have ordered to England, by the first opportunity, the detachment of the 3d hussars, which was left in Portugal when the regiment marched into Spain last year. I have drafted the horses from the 3d hussars to the 14th light dragoons.

‘ The 1st batt. 48th regiment, and 1st batt. 61st regiment, are arrived at Lisbon; and the 2d batt. 30th regiment are gone to Gibraltar. The 2d batt. 9th regiment is ordered to Gibraltar to replace the 61st.

‘ I propose to send to England the two battalions of detachments, as soon as I shall be joined by General Robert Craufurd’s brigade.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY,

To J. Murray, Esq., Commissary General.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 22d June, 1809.

‘ I conceive that it is consistent with your instructions, and at all events it is desirable, that you should procure as much money at Gibraltar as you can for bills upon England, at the rate of exchange of Lisbon, or at any other reasonable rate.

‘ I conceive that you ought to endeavour to make the merchants pay the freight, but not to insist upon this as a *sine quâ non*, as it is most important to get money in any way.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *J. Murray, Esq.,
Commissary General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Abrantes, 22d June, 1809.

‘ When I wrote you last I was in hopes that I should have marched before this time, but the money is not yet arrived. Things are in their progress as they were when I wrote on the 17th. The French are continuing their retreat; Sebastiani has also fallen back towards Toledo; and Venegas has advanced, and Cuesta had his head quarters at Truxillo on the 19th.

‘ I am apprehensive that you will think I have delayed my march unnecessarily since my arrival upon the Tagus. But it was and is quite impossible to move without money. Not only were the Officers and soldiers in the greatest distress, and the want of money the cause of many of the disorders of which I have had reason to complain; but we can no longer obtain the supplies of the country, or com-

mand its resources for the transport of our own supplies, either by land or by water. Besides this, the army required rest after their expedition to the frontiers of Galicia, and shoes, and to be furbished up in different ways; and I was well aware that if necessity had not obliged me to halt at the present moment, I should have been compelled to have made a longer halt some time hence. To all this add, that, for some time after I came here, I believed the French were retiring (as appears by my letters to your Lordship), and that I should have had no opportunity of striking a blow against them, even if I could have marched.

‘I hope that you will attend to my requisitions for money; not only am I in want, but also the Portuguese Government, to whom, Mr. Villiers says, we owe 125,000*l*. I repeat that we must have 200,000*l*. per month from England, till I write to you that I can do without it; in which sum I include 40,000*l*. per month for the Portuguese Government to pay for 20,000 men.

‘If the Portuguese Government are to receive a larger sum from Great Britain, the sum to be sent to Portugal must be proportionably increased. Besides this, money must be sent to pay the Portuguese debts and our debts in Portugal. There are, besides, debts of Sir John Moore’s army still due in Spain, which I am called upon to pay. In short, we must have 125,000*l*.; and 200,000*l*. per month, reckoning from the beginning of May.

‘It is very extraordinary that I have not received a line from Huskisson upon this subject, notwithstanding that I wrote to him upon it early in May.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘P. S. I hope you will send the remount horses soon. I have given to the 14th and 16th ninety five horses from the Irish Commissariat, and I believe I shall give some to the other regiments. This arrangement, and the draft from the 3d hussars, will keep up the regiments for a short time. But it is inconceivable how fast both the horses of the cavalry and artillery fall off. When horses, as well as men, are new in war, I believe the former are generally the sacrifice of their mutual inexperience. I hope we shall profit by the

experience acquired in the expedition to the northward, and that we shall be able to keep up the regiments rather better in future.

‘ A. W.’

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Abrantes, 23d June, 1809.

‘ I have received your letter of the 21st. The question respecting Silveira’s advance is a very delicate one : in the first place, it involves the Portuguese troops necessarily in the desultory operations of Romana in Galicia ; secondly, there is no ground for calculating relative force or numbers, on which any solid plan of operation could be founded. In the same letter in which Romana asks for these reinforcements, he tells you that he wants everything, arms, ammunition, and provisions ; and yet he wants you to unite yourself to this deficiency of means, to carry on an operation in Galicia.

‘ You can only lose by entering into it. At the same time, I think that Spain has some claim upon Portugal, on the ground of Cuesta’s operations, when Portugal was threatened by the French corps at Alcantara. It may be said that we shall remunerate these claims by our advance into Spain at present ; but I think we ought to do more than is expected from us.

‘ I am decidedly adverse to our engaging in the loose, desultory operations in which Romana appears to delight. They can answer no purpose excepting to disorganize your troops ; they will not answer to us even the ends to which he appears to aspire : for when we come to engage in them, it will very soon be found that we are doing nothing.

‘ My opinion is, that you should call upon Romana to state what his object is, and what his means of accomplishing it, and what the force of the enemy opposed to him. You might tell him that our intention was to remain on the defensive in the north of Portugal, and to employ the time in the discipline and organization of the troops which should elapse while the British army would be engaged in co-operation with General Cuesta, in forcing the enemy to evacuate the south of Spain.

‘ That these objects, from which we shall not depart, may be combined with his, and we may consistently be able to

give him assistance; provided his objects and means are clearly explained and defined. If you get from him a clear explanation upon these points, and that all he intends is to hold a little of Galicia, I see no objection to your giving him the assistance of two or three battalions and some squadrons under Silveira, which would as effectually cover Portugal in Galicia as in Portugal itself.

‘ But it will be rank madness to enter upon an offensive plan in Galicia at present; and indeed I conceive that we must make up our minds to lose for future operations the corps which Silveira will, under this arrangement, have under his command. We certainly derive some advantage from Romana and his operations, but I conceive none that would compensate for the loss of the discipline and organization of our troops. I cannot but observe that it is curious that Romana should now call for assistance, when he stated to me that he found the Portuguese army so undisciplined, and in such a state of disorganization, that he incurred the risk of a quarrel between the two nations by staying with them; and therefore he quitted them without further notice, as he appears to intend to do now.

‘ Do as you please about my aide de camp. The best thing for him would be to consider his promotion to the rank of Lieut. Colonel of Militia as one step, viz., that of Captain; and now to give him the rank of Major in the Line. However, do as you like, and adhere to your own rules.

‘ Colonel Peacocke is gone to command at Lisbon: I shall send you a copy of the instructions given to him. Our money, which left Lisbon on the 15th, is not yet arrived!

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To J. Murray, Esq., Commissary General.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 23d June, 1809.

‘ I have just received your letter of this day’s date, respecting the supplies of money to be procured at Gibraltar.

‘ There is no doubt but that the most advantageous mode for the public will be to negotiate bills at Gibraltar, as it is probable that those who prefer to buy bills at Lisbon will

send their money there, so that you will have the advantage of both modes. It is true, however, that if the merchants at Gibraltar send their money to Lisbon, the exchange at Gibraltar will very soon rise to the Lisbon rates.

‘ I recommend to you to send to Gibraltar your bills, to be negotiated by your assistants there. I do not believe you have authority to give your assistant the power of drawing on the Treasury; and if you had, I do not see what would be gained by negotiating his bills instead of yours.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *J. Murray, Esq.,*
Commissary General.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Peacocke, commanding at Lisbon.

‘ SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 23d June, 1809. .

‘ As there is at Lisbon a Portuguese Lieutenant General in command of the troops, it is necessary that you should lay before him all orders that you will receive from me relating to the British troops and establishments at that place, and report to him all measures that you may take in consequence.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Peacocke.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Donkin.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Abrantes, 23d June, 1809.

‘ I have received your letter of the 21st. I am delighted with your account of the 5th batt. 60th regiment. Indeed, everything that I have seen and known of that excellent corps has borne the same stamp.

‘ I am astonished that it did not occur to the Commanding Officer of the 2d batt. — regiment, that their armorer would be useful to the corps on service, and that he could be of no use anywhere without his tools. I am really ashamed, of such ignorance in a British Officer of what it is necessary to attend to, to enable his men to be of any use whatever. Let the armorer be ordered to join the regiment forthwith.

‘ I am afraid I have no arms to give this corps. Let me have an official report upon their accoutrements, that I may send it to England. You must let me know the exact quantity of ammunition which the 2d batt. — regiment

requires, and it shall be supplied. But it is really necessary to impress upon the minds of the Officers the necessity of looking after the arms, accoutrements, and ammunition of their companies and regiments daily, otherwise they will do nothing against the enemy.

‘ I shall try to borrow armorers, but I doubt whether the artillery have any. We have no arms or accoutrements. I approve of your discontinuing the hourly roll calls; and you may discontinue them entirely when you think proper.

‘ I have sent provisions to Castello Branco. The regiments have made requisitions for shoes, I presume, in the quantities they want. Those for which they have made a requisition will be delivered to the Officers, who, I conclude, will be here this day, under the General Order of the 20th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Donkin.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. If I had known that the 2d batt. — regiment had been in so bad a state, I should have sent them to Gibraltar instead of the 9th; and if they do not soon improve, I shall still send them there: an unserviceable regiment is of no use here.

‘ I see that the hussars are arrived at Castello Branco. If you find that you cannot forage them in a body in that town, separate them into half squadrons, and put half a squadron in each village in the neighbourhood, either forward or backward, or on your flanks. They must eat green forage if they cannot get dry, according to my orders of the 17th June.

‘ Keep the forge carts, and let all the shoeing work go on at Castello Branco.

‘ 2d P.S. Since writing the above I have received your letter of the 19th. Measures shall be taken to send to your brigade the bill hooks, intrenching tools, and the camp stores wanting to complete, according to their requisitions on the Quarter Master General, made under the General Orders of the 5th June.

‘ Let Lieut. Colonel Talbot’s squadron of the 14th be put into the place where it is most likely to get forage and corn, reporting to me where it is.

‘ All the men belonging to your brigade which are here shall march to-morrow morning.

‘ A. W.’

To Major General Cotton.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ Abrantes, 23d June, 1809.

‘ I wish that you and Hill should be made Lieut. Generals in Portugal, but as this promotion will remove you from your brigade of cavalry, I do not like to recommend it without your own consent. I shall be much obliged to you, therefore, if you will let me know what you feel upon the subject. With your objects in the cavalry I should recommend you not to move.

‘ Payne has just been here about your forage. We could move one regiment to Torres Novas, and get the other upon the river; but this would not get you grain: and if you went to Golegão, you would be in an unhealthy situation. Besides, it would a move which I conceive it desirable, for your shocing, &c., to avoid just at this moment.

‘ They have blundered the business of our grain in such a manner that I do not know whether we shall get it; but I shall make arrangements this day to send you the first which comes. I refer you to the orders of the 17th instant respecting green forage. There is no want of it about Thomar: in its present state it is nearly as good as hay and oats together, and you must cut whatever you want. In the mean time I shall send you grain as soon as any can be procured.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Cotton.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. John Villiers.

‘ SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 23d June, 1809.

‘ I am sorry to have to inform you that Lieut. B——, of the 66th, was shot in a duel some days ago, as is supposed, by Lieut. D——, of the same regiment. I enclose you the report of persons who viewed the body of Lieut. B—— after he was dead, and the proceedings of a court of inquiry into the circumstances which occasioned the duel. Captain M——, Lieut. D——, &c., are now in arrest; and if the Government of the country think proper to order that they should be tried by the tribunal of the country, they shall be given up: if not, I shall give directions that they may be tried by a General Court Martial.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. I beg you will return the enclosed original papers.

‘ A. W.’

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Abrantes, 23d June, 1809.

‘I omitted to inform your Lordship yesterday, that, having received a letter from General —, in which he has, in my opinion, sufficiently retracted his erroneous military notion, as stated in his letter of the 10th May to General Beresford, I have consented to allow him to continue with the army, and have re-appointed him to command a brigade.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICER COMMANDING THE ARTILLERY.

‘Abrantes, 24th June, 1809.

‘It is desirable, with a view to the future operations of the army, to form a depôt at Almeida, consisting of 1,200,000 rounds of musket ammunition, 200,000 rounds of rifle, 800,000 rounds of carbine, and 200,000 of pistol ammunition, and 100 rounds for each gun of the four brigades of 6 pounders, and the brigade of 3 pounders, which will move with the army; besides such stores as the Officer commanding the artillery may deem necessary in a forward station of this description.

‘The mode in which this depôt must be formed is, that the stores must be embarked in a schooner or schooners at Lisbon, with the necessary number of conductors of stores and artillerymen to take charge of the stores and proceed to Oporto.

‘From Oporto they must go in boats by the Douro to Lamego, and from Lamego in carts to Almeida, by a route which the Quarter Master General will furnish.

‘Directions will be sent to Colonel Trant to give every assistance to forward the stores by boats to Lamego, and to have carts procured at Lamego to move the stores from thence to Almeida, and to furnish a guard of Portuguese troops to accompany them.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Marshal Beresford.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘Abrantes, 24th June, 1809.

‘I have written to you fully about Silveira’s operations; and I have now to answer your letter of the 22d instant in respect to the soldiers of the Buffs.

‘ I certainly ordered all soldiers absent from the Buffs to join, upon a representation from Colonel Muter. The form and words of the order I know nothing about; but people are not unwilling to detain men when they have them; and I dare say the order was peremptory. I gave the order because the men have now been absent from their regiment three months, because that time was full long enough to drill anything on which they could have been employed; and because men of that description are now wanted by the Buffs to drill their own recruits lately come out.

‘ I particularly struck out of the list of men to be called in Colonel Blunt’s *servant*; but when the Commanding Officer represented to me that he had more servants than were allowed by the orders of this army, or by the standing orders of his regiment, I could not avoid ordering the overplus to join their corps.

‘ I propose to give the best drilled of the seven battalions coming to Portugal, in order to assist in your drills, and to call off all the other privates and serjeants you have got.

‘ Colonel Campbell of the — came to me the other day, and wanted to join his regiment, saying he had accepted his command in the Portuguese service only at the moment Portugal was threatened by invasion, and that he wished now to resign it. I refused to allow him to do so: but if the question of rank should be settled, as I expect it will, it may probably be proper to allow him to resign the command of his brigade.

Nothing detains me now but the non-arrival of the money. It will hardly be believed, and I am ashamed to tell it, that the money which left Lisbon on the 15th of this month is not yet arrived!!

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General Mackenzie.

‘ MY DEAR MACKENZIE,

‘ Abrantes, 25th June, 1809.

‘ I have received your letter of the 23d. I beg that you will let Mr. Downie know that I am perfectly satisfied with the activity with which he has done his duty, and sensible of the advantage, in a military point of view, which I have derived from his late reconnoissance into the vale of Plasencia.

‘ My objection to his conduct was founded upon his own report, written in pencil on the letter from Colonel Grant, upon the military principle, that the only proper place for any military Officer was that to which he was ordered. However, I am not irreconcilable upon this or any other subject; and I am quite convinced that Mr. Downie did what he thought best for the service, and that a gentleman who feels a censure so sorely will take care not to incur the risk of receiving another.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Mackenzie.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Abrantes, 25th June, 1809.

‘ When I wrote to you yesterday I had not referred to Stewart. I find now that, notwithstanding I had observed the irregularity of Colonel Blunt having three servants from the ranks, I specially directed that none of them should, and not one of them has been ordered to join.

‘ Your ammunition that is here will be of use to us, and I propose to take it. I shall give you in return 200,000 rounds of musket ammunition, and if you choose to have it at Aveiro, I can give you an order upon a transport in that harbour for that quantity.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Brig. General Cox, Governor of Almeida.

‘ SIR,

‘ Abrantes, 26th June, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 23d instant. I have directed the Commissary General to have prepared and laid in store at Almeida a quantity of biscuit for the British army, and the Commanding Officer of the artillery to send there a quantity of ammunition and military stores.

‘ I request you to receive into the fort of Almeida what may be lodged there for our use.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Cox.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. I have likewise received your letter of the 21st.

‘ A. W.’

To Lieut. Colonel Bourke, Assistant Quarter Master General.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Abrantes, 26th June, 1809.

‘I have received your letters of the 21st and 23d; and I have the pleasure to inform you the army will march to-morrow morning, the money having arrived yesterday; the advanced guard will be at Zarza la Mayor on the 2d July, and the infantry of the army on the 4th and 5th. There will be some difficulty in moving the cavalry on account of the want of forage; and one regiment has not yet arrived from Lisbon. But the whole will move forward to Plasencia as soon as possible: indeed I do not propose to make any halt till I shall arrive at that place.

‘I strongly recommend to General Cuesta to risk nothing till I shall be at hand to give him assistance.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Bourke.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Abrantes, 26th June, 1809.

‘I enclose the last two letters I have received from Colonel Bourke, and my answer of this day.

‘I shall not go into Spain as strong as I could wish, or as I expected, as 3000 men are not yet arrived. But I think it better to move with the troops I have, having received the money, than to delay my march for one moment after I am enabled to commence it.

‘I conclude that Colonel Bourke has given me the character which he has heard of Señor —; but I beg you will believe that if I should find it correct, I shall be convinced you had no knowledge of this character when he was sent; and, at all events, I shall have no prejudice against Señor —.

‘I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send me any topographical or geographical information respecting Spain which can be procured at Seville. I particularly wish to have two copies of Lopez’ Maps, which I request you to send me by any messenger who may come.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Right Hon. J. H. Frere.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Abrantes, 26th June, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter from Brig. General the Hon. C. Stewart, in which he desires that Major Waters* should be attached to the department of the Adjutant General of the British army.

‘ I am equally aware with Brig. General Stewart of the advantages which the public would derive from the employment of the services of Major Waters with the department of the Adjutant General; but as Major Waters has been promoted to the rank of Major, in order that he may serve with the Portuguese troops, I have considered myself precluded, by the principle on which British Officers were allowed to serve in the Portuguese army, from selecting any Officer so allowed and promoted for that purpose for any staff situation in this army.

‘ Upon looking over the list of the Officers appointed to the Portuguese service, particularly the first appointed, your Lordship will observe the names of some whom it would be most desirable to employ upon the staff of the British army.

‘ Adverting to your Lordship’s recent directions to me to employ Major Roche, of the Portuguese service, with the Spanish armies; and, observing that Major Carroll is still employed with the Marques de la Romana, I should wish to know whether I am to understand that I am at liberty to employ Major Waters, or other Officers appointed and promoted to serve in Portugal, in any other manner excepting with Portuguese troops?

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Abrantes, 26th June, 1809.

‘ As Lord W. Bentinck is employed, I imagine, in Germany, and General Spencer’s health is in such a state as to prevent him from joining, and General Paget must necessarily be absent for some time, it is desirable, that I should have some Officers appointed to be Lieutenant Generals in Portugal, to take the command of divisions.

‘ Generals Cotton and Hill, two Major Generals of this

* Major General Sir John Waters, K.C.B.

army, are senior to General Beresford; and it would be desirable that they should be made Lieut. Generals in the Peninsula, if only to place them in their proper situations in the British army relatively with that Officer; and indeed I am obliged already to employ General Hill in the command of a division of infantry. If Major General Murray had not quitted the army, because he did not choose to serve with it, General Beresford, having been made a Lieut. General in Portugal, although junior to him, I should likewise have requested your Lordship to have him appointed as Lieutenant General.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Abrantes, 27th June, 1809.

‘ The money having arrived, the army marches this day. I have received from you three letters of the 24th, and one of the 25th.

‘ I shall speak to Colonel Fletcher respecting the employment of Captain Chapman with the army; but I rather believe that his business having been interrupted in consequence of the terror occasioned by Victor’s movement to Alcantara, he has not finished what I sent him upon. If, however, we should not want him at Lisbon, I shall call him to the army, as you do not require his services, and you shall keep at Lisbon the Lieutenant of the Germans.

‘ I should wish you to delay, if possible, all arrangements respecting the rank of the English Officers till I shall receive the answer to my letter of the 7th instant. I think it probable that none of the Officers whose names are mentioned in the letter from the Commander in Chief, of the 1st June, will come out before that answer shall arrive. But if they should, at least, if they are all of the same stamp with Colonel —, you would be much better without them, as he is the person who was obliged by Sir John Moore to retire from the —th regiment, for incapacity in the last campaign.

‘ If Mr. Rawlings has not been already directed to place himself under your orders, he shall be so in the General

Orders of this day. I shall speak to the Commissary General respecting the three clerks to be appointed assistants, and you shall have them, if he can spare their services. Mr. Belson shall be ordered this day to place himself under your orders.

‘ I do not recollect whether I sent home the return for your saddles. If I did, the letter went to yourself, I believe. I think you had better send to Cooke, in a private letter, the amended return which was sent home by me. Tell Cooke also to take care that your saddles are made with narrow trees. I shall order Captain —, of the 9th, to place himself under your orders.

‘ —’s conduct appears, by your account of it, to be very bad. These people are so much accustomed to trick, that they cannot refrain from it; and they have recourse to it now to acquire popularity, in the same manner as they did formerly to acquire Court favor. There is only one line to be adopted in opposition to all trick; that is, the steady straight line of duty, tempered by forbearance, lenity, and good nature.

‘ The Government having published —’s letter, you can have nothing to say to him upon that ground. But you ought to call upon the Government to furnish you with the original, or with official copies of the reports from — which they have published. You ought then to call — to account; first, for having made any report to the Government instead of to you, his superior Officer; secondly, for the difference between his report to Government and his reports to you; and thirdly, for his deviations from the truth in his reports to Government, in respect to his operations, at which you were present.

‘ Having received his answers upon these subjects, you ought to publish an order to forbid any Officer to make a report to any superior authority, excepting through the medium of his immediate Commanding Officer; and you ought to point out the variations, the inconsistencies, and the falsehoods in the report made by —, as the cause of the order at that moment.

‘ I think that by these means you will give a check to the propensity of these gentlemen to endeavor to acquire popularity at your expense, by trick and falsehood. I would

insert in this order, or in the correspondence, no severity or asperity, only a plain and short abstract of the facts.

‘ I have not got (but I will get) a return of our medical gentlemen at Lisbon ; you shall have all the assistance of this kind that I can give you. I think that the French are drawing out of Galicia, and it is not impossible but that they may take a look at Braganza as they pass by. I conclude that that place is dismantled, as all the other Portuguese places are.

‘ You are acquainted with my opinion respecting the position for your corps, in case the enemy should move to his left ; that is, that you move to your right upon an inner and of course a smaller circle, being convinced that they are moving from Galicia into Castille. You have done quite right, therefore, to halt your corps upon the Douro, at Coimbra and Guarda. In respect to the place for assembling them, you must recollect that your object is twofold ; first, to organize and discipline your troops ; next, to observe the motions of the enemy, and to cover and secure, by your appearance, your numbers, and your reputation, the entrance into Portugal, which may at the moment be threatened by the enemy.

‘ In choosing your position, you should take care not to put yourself too forward towards the enemy, otherwise you may be interrupted in your measures for obtaining your first object ; and indeed you may put to risk the security which you might give to the country if you were at a greater distance from them.

‘ In respect to me, I conceive that, at present, whether you march a day or two farther one way or another, it can make but little difference to my operations. You must depend very much upon the movements of the French. If they should hang about the Guadarama in strength, I must move that way ; if not, I shall certainly go upon Segovia, and, in doing so, I shall try to keep as near the Portuguese frontier as possible.

‘ I have already told you that you shall have the best of the new battalions coming out. Would you like the second battalion of your own regiment ? I shall likewise try to send you some riflemen.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Abrantes, 27th June, 1809.

‘ The money for which I have been waiting arrived here on Sunday, and the army has marched forward. Our advanced guard will enter Spain at Zarza la Mayor, on the 2d of July.

‘ The French retired from Almaraz on the road towards Madrid on the 24th. And General Cuesta was at the bridge of Almaraz on the same day. and was making arrangements to cross the Tagus.

‘ Sebastiani was retiring towards Toledo. He was on the 22d at Madridejos, and Venegas at Villarta.

‘ It is unfortunate that I could not march ten or twelve days ago; but just to show you the uncertainty of all communications in this country, and probably the deficiencies of our Commissariat, I shall mention that the money which arrived on the 15th at Lisbon, and was sent off immediately, did not arrive here till late on the 25th. It is the same with everything else. On the day I determined to move into Spain from Abrantes I ordered everything that could be required for the army, and I have not had occasion to add to or to alter the original order; yet the articles ordered are not yet arrived, notwithstanding that there is a water communication from Lisbon, and Officers and others come up in five days.

‘ I believe much of this delay and failure is to be attributed to the want of experience of our Commissariat; much to the want of money, and to our discredit in Portugal, on account of our large and long owed debts; and something to the uncertainty and natural difficulties of all the communications in Portugal.

‘ We shall not go into Spain quite so strong as I could wish; but when Craufurd’s brigade arrives I think we shall have nearly 20,000 rank and file of infantry, and about 3000 cavalry. I shall desire that a weekly state may be sent to your Lordship, that you may see how we really stand; for I observe it is frequently imagined in England that armies are much stronger than they really are, and expectations are formed which cannot be realized. It is a most difficult task to keep up numbers, particularly of cavalry, in this country and climate. The brigade of heavy

cavalry, which has not yet done a day's duty, is obliged to leave here nearly 100 horses; and the brigade which has been to the northward is so much reduced, that they are happy to take 110 horses of the Irish Commissariat. I hope, therefore, you will send us the remount as soon as you can.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General Mackenzie.

‘ MY DEAR MACKENZIE,

‘ Cortiçada, 28th June, 1809.

‘ The Commanding Officer of the 24th regiment has, I am sure, contrary to your orders, and certainly contrary to mine, left the sick of his regiment here, without money, without non-commissioned officers, and without giving them over to the Officer of the 31st regiment, left here in charge of the sick of the 31st. The 24th regiment have money, I know, in advance, for the subsistence of the regiment to the 24th July; and I desire, as soon as possible after the receipt of this, that Officers may be sent over here with subsistence for the sick of their companies to the 24th July, at 9*d.* per diem, according to the General Orders; and that these Officers should deliver their men regularly over to the charge of the Officer of the 31st, left with the sick of the brigade; likewise the proportion of non-commissioned officers ordered to be left with all sick, according to the General Order.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know any cause that may have come to your knowledge for the desertion by its inhabitants, and plunder, even to gutting, of Cardigos.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Mackenzie.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Peacocks.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cortiçada, 28th June, 1809.

‘ I have desired that Colonel R. Craufurd's brigade, consisting of the 43d, 52d, and 95th, may move to join the army as soon as they may be equipped and in readiness to march, as also a troop of horse artillery, expected at Lisbon from England. In moving these troops, you will, of course, use

the water communication as far as Valada, if Colonel Craufurd should approve of it.

‘ It occurs to me that it might be a convenience to the horses of the horse artillery, particularly just after they are landed, if the artillery, and carriages, and stores belonging to the troop were sent up by water, even as far as Abrantes. But, in doing this, great care must be taken to provide for the payment of the boatmen the whole way up to Abrantes ; and that proper measures are adopted at Valada to transship the artillery carriages, &c., from the large boats, used in the lower parts of the Tagus, to the smaller ones used in the upper parts.

‘ If you will speak to the Admiral on this subject, I am convinced that he will give you every assistance ; and you will allow Colonel Craufurd to decide whether they shall move by land or by water, if the artillery should come out and are to march with him ; or the Commanding Officer of the troop, if they should come out and are to march alone.

‘ Besides the troops above mentioned, I expect from Ireland and the islands seven battalions of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, one troop of horse artillery, and 300 artillery horses.

‘ You will direct the battalions of infantry to equip themselves immediately for the field, according to the orders of the army. You will send me up the returns for bāt and forage, if they should not already have received that allowance this year ; and you will direct the Paymaster General at Lisbon to make such advances upon it as the Officers of the regiments may require to put themselves in a state of equipment fit to take the field.

‘ I desire that these regiments may be encamped on the high ground immediately above and behind Belem, where they are to remain in readiness to move till I shall send them further orders. You will inspect each of them on their arrival, and make a particular report on their state as soon as possible, in order that I may determine whether I shall call them to the army or not.

‘ The cavalry and horse artillery expected are likewise to send up their bāt and forage returns, but I do not at present intend to call these corps immediately into the field.

‘ I beg that the stables at Belem, Alcantara, &c., may be washed, painted, and whitewashed, for the reception of those horses and of the 300 horses of the artillery. All these are to remain at Lisbon till further orders.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Peacocks.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To W. Huskisson, Esq., Secretary of the Treasury.

‘ MY DEAR HUSKISSON,

‘ Cortiçada, 28th June, 1809.

‘ The money which had been sent to Cadiz to be changed arrived at Lisbon on the 15th, and with the army on the 25th; and we marched yesterday, having been obliged to halt nearly three weeks for want of money.

‘ Our distress for everything has been very great indeed, and has been produced by the want of money.

‘ After all, the sum which we have received, and that which we have lately got for bills upon England, will not do more than pay the army their arrears to the 24th of this month, and to keep in hand a sum of about 30,000*l.* to begin with in Spain, leaving all our debts in Portugal unpaid.

‘ I trust that you will have attended to my first requisition for 100,000*l.*, and that that sum will arrive soon, and that you will have made arrangements to send to Portugal 200,000*l.* every month.

‘ It will be better for Government, in every view of the subject, to relinquish their operations in Portugal and Spain, if the country cannot afford to carry them on. The gentlemen of the Commissariat are very new in their business, and I am not without grounds of complaint of their want of intelligence; but I believe they do their best, and I shall not complain of them. I dismissed one assistant, Mr. —, two days ago; but I have cancelled the order for his dismissal, upon his promise of greater exertion in future, and upon the request of the General Officer who had complained of him.

‘ We shall want some more assistants with the reinforcements coming out: there are several sick at Lisbon, and as our operations extend, we are obliged to detach the Commissaries to a greater distance.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *W. Huskisson, Esq.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General Mackenzie.

‘ MY DEAR MACKENZIE,

‘ Sarzedas, 29th June, 1809.

‘ I am sorry to tell you that I have passed a broken cart, laden with intrenching tools and other baggage, belonging to the 31st regiment, in charge of a serjeant’s guard, in the pass on this side of Sobreira Formosa.

‘ A mule is allowed for the intrenching tools of each regiment, which ought to be employed in no other manner. If he is sick, it might be excused putting the intrenching tools on a cart; but the cart ought not to have been loaded with three times more baggage than it could carry; and, above all, no guard ought to have been left with any baggage. The serjeant of the guard is taken sick, and is at the river at the bottom of the pass.

‘ Whenever an order is disobeyed, an Officer must be sent to set matters right again. I therefore request you to send an Officer of the 31st, with a cart, to bring up the intrenching tools and the sick serjeant, and nothing else, and then to return to-morrow with the party to Castello Branco.

‘ I shall be obliged to you to tell the Commissary, that, having put on the carts three casks of flour instead of two, a great number of the carts have broken down between Sobreira Formosa and this place.

‘ I request, that immediately on the receipt of this note he will send off twenty empty carts, with an Officer of the Commissariat. He will meet at the river at the foot of the pass the Officer of the 31st, in charge of the convoy, who will let him know where the different carts have broken down, and where the casks of flour are; and I beg that only two casks may be placed on each cart.

‘ As you have so many men absent who are not likely to join you till late to-morrow, I have no objection to your halting to-morrow at Castello Branco, if the Commissary should think that he can give you another day’s provisions, without interfering with the supply of three days for the other divisions, as they shall come up. If, however, that supply should be likely to run short, you must march according to your route.

‘ Colonel Donkin’s brigade might as well halt if you do, if

it can be done without inconvenience, as I observe they have many things behind.

‘ I shall be at Castello Branco to-morrow.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Mackenzie.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To J. Murray, Esq., Commissary General.

‘ SIR,

‘ Castello Branco, 30th June, 1809.

‘ I have received information that the *Rosamond* has brought from England about 300,000 dollars (65,000*l.*); and the *Niobe* 60,000*l.* in Spanish doubloons, 50,000*l.* in Portuguese gold coin, and 50,000*l.* in dollars, making a total of 225,000*l.*

‘ I beg that the disposal of this money may be made as follows:—the 60,000*l.* in Spanish doubloons are to come up to the army in charge of Brigadier General R. Craufurd’s brigade. I desire that an efficient arrangement may be made to supply carts or mules to move this money. The loads must not be made too large, not more than 200 lbs. for a mule; and the drivers must receive rations in the same manner as soldiers, deducting 6*d.* for each ration from their pay.

‘ If they should require rations of forage for their cattle they must have it; but a proportionate reduction must be made in the rate of their hire.

‘ Mr. Villiers must have for the use of the Portuguese Government such sums as he may require, not exceeding 80,000*l.*, which may be paid him in the Portuguese gold coin, or in dollars, in their proportion, in the military chest: and I beg that you will give directions that 50,000*l.* of the sum which will remain in the chest be employed in the discharge of the debts due on the road from Oporto to Coimbra, Leyria, Thomar, and Abrantes.

‘ The remainder, or 35,000*l.*, must remain in the military chest at Lisbon till I shall give further directions for its disposal.

‘ I beg that you will continue to make every exertion in your power to procure money for bills upon England, at Lisbon, Cadiz, and Gibraltar; and that you will give me a

return every Monday of the sums received for those bills, at any of the three places.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *J. Murray, Esq.,*
Commissary General.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. I enclose a letter from the Junta of Castille, from which it appears that they have deputed Don Antonio Palacios and Don Narciso Ybana, to receive the sum of money due to the town of Ciudad Rodrigo by Sir John Moore’s army. I beg that you will give directions that this sum be paid to those gentlemen at Lisbon, when they shall ask for it.

‘ A. W.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Castello Branco, 30th June, 1809.

‘ His Majesty’s principal Secretary of State having intimated to me the wish of His Majesty’s Servants, that I should send home the transports now in the Tagus, if I should not require their services, I have the honor to inform you that it is my opinion that all the transports now in the Tagus may be sent home without inconvenience, with the exception of 5000 tons of transports for infantry, of the coppered ships.

‘ I some time ago gave directions to the Commanding Officer of the artillery, and to the Commissary General, to have disembarked from the ordnance store ships, victuallers, &c., and to put in store at Lisbon, all the ordnance and military stores, provisions, forage, &c. &c., which were in those ships, and destined for their departments respectively; and I have called upon these gentlemen this day to let me know what progress has been made in the execution of those orders. It is my opinion that all those store ships and victuallers, as soon as their contents shall be disembarked, may be sent home, as well as the transports to which I have above referred.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. John Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS, ‘ Castello Branco, 30th June, 1809.

‘ I arrived here this day, and shall go on the day after to-morrow. I find that 225,000*l.* have arrived in the *Rosamond* and the *Niobe*. I have desired that 80,000*l.* of this sum be paid to you in the proportions of gold and dollars as they are in the military chest at present. I have allotted 50,000*l.* to pay part of our debts in the north; 60,000*l.* to be sent to us into Spain, in Spanish doubloons; and 35,000*l.* to remain in the chest in Lisbon.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD, ‘ Castello Branco, 30th June, 1809.

‘ I received your letter of the 11th yesterday. I am much obliged to you for the reinforcements you have sent, and you may depend upon it that I shall make the best use of them in my power; but none are yet arrived, excepting the 23d light dragoons.

‘ It is impossible to say how we shall stand in point of numbers when these troops arrive, till I shall see a return of their numbers. But nothing is more fallacious than a return such as you have sent me. It contains an enumeration of no less than eleven battalions not arrived, of two gone to Gibraltar, and of two (the detachments) ordered home, and of the 20th light dragoons, ordered and gone by this time to Sicily; and it omits, on the other hand, two battalions, the 48th and 61st, arrived from Gibraltar.

‘ The mischief of these returns is that they never convey an accurate notion of the strength of the army. According to your account I have 35,000 men; according to my own, I have only 18,000; and the public will not be satisfied either with you or me, if I do not effect all that 35,000 men are expected to do. Including Officers, who ought to be counted, I make no doubt that I shall have before long more than 35,000 men; but from all these returns a deduction of 10 in the 100 ought always to be made for sick, and then you may come nearly to the mark.

‘ I enclose an abstract of the last return I have received

of Victor's army, which shows the comparative numbers of effectives and total. I hope that our effectives will never be so much reduced in comparison with our total as that is. But surely it must be admitted that if our army is now only 18,000, and hereafter to be called 35,000 rank and file, the French army ought to be calculated in the same manner; and yet neither you nor I shall be forgiven by those who will see your return, if I do not now perform deeds which might with justice be required from 35,000 men.

' If I am to have the 57th from Gibraltar, you should send an order to the Governor to send that corps to Portugal in exchange for one which I shall send to Gibraltar to relieve it.

' I enclose you an abstract of the last return of the Portuguese forces which I have received. Of this number we pay for 20,000 men 480,000*l.*, or, I believe, 500,000*l.* per annum. My belief is, that the Portuguese Government cannot go on unless Great Britain will assist them with a million.

' The Portuguese army is not yet in a state of discipline, or organized as it ought to be for service. I have settled with Beresford, that he shall collect all that part of it not required for garrisons in a camp on the most exposed frontier, for the double purpose of watching the enemy's movements, and disciplining his Officers and troops. If he can get them together for two or three months they will be a fine army, and probably very useful. But in order to effect this object they must be kept clear of the desultory operations of Romano, and other Spanish chiefs in Galicia.

' Besides these troops, called regulars, there is an army of militia, amounting, I believe, to 30,000 men. They are divided into battalions of 1000 each. We propose to discipline the whole of these by 600 at a time, in reliefs of 200 each; and when the whole are disciplined, to call out the whole in camps of 8000 or 10,000 men, at a season of the year in which the country can spare the labors of the men, and perfect them, and then send them to their homes till they may be wanted.

' I conceive that, exclusive of the militia, the Portuguese army will be 50,000 men when complete. The question is in what way this force ought to be employed.

' There is no doubt but that that part of the Portuguese force which is not required for internal purposes ought to be

employed against the common enemy in Spain, if that addition of force is likely to be of any avail. But if circumstances should bring the contest in Spain to that state that, notwithstanding all our efforts, the enemy should still be superior to us in the field, I should then have doubts of the expediency of marching the Portuguese troops beyond their own frontier.

‘ These doubts turn upon a view of the military operations which it would be expedient to adopt in that case throughout the Peninsula, which I think should be founded upon strong reserves in parts of Spain as well as of Portugal, and by means of which the contest would be infinitely prolonged, even if it should ever be in the enemy’s power to make the conquest. They are also founded upon my apprehension that great length of time must elapse before we can make the Portuguese sufficiently good troops to retire before a superior enemy; and my opinion is that they, as well as we, should be lost before we could enter the frontiers of Portugal.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to the Admiral, by which you will observe that you will have home the ships in the Tagus of all descriptions, excepting 5000 tons of infantry coppered transports; and I propose to keep horse transports for 300 horses, when they shall return from Ireland, in case I should have occasion to move horses by sea.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Brig. General R. Craufurd.

MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Castello Branco, 1st July, 1809.

‘ I am glad to find, by a letter which you have addressed to the Adjutant General on the 28th, that you arrived on the 28th June. You do not mention the troop of horse artillery, and I therefore conclude it is not come with you. You will find orders at Lisbon upon all points on which you can require them.

‘ I beg that if the troop of horse artillery should not be ready to march when your brigade will be ready, you will not wait for them.

‘ We have here two battalions composed of detachments from all the regiments which composed the army under the

command of the late Sir John Moore, and among others, of the 43d, 52d, and 95th; of which three I enclose a return. I believe that these men belong, generally, to the 2d battalions of those regiments. I propose to send these battalions of detachments down to Lisbon immediately, in order that they may embark for England, if I should find that the enemy do not make a stand on this side of Madrid, in a position which I understand they can occupy near Talavera de la Reyna. I beg that you will inquire from the Commanding Officers of the 43d, 52d, and 95th, whether they wish that the Officers and men belonging to these regiments respectively should be detained in Portugal, and of course, with the army to join the regiments; or whether I shall send them down to Lisbon to go home with the other detachments.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General R. Craufurd.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. Colonel Roche.

‘ SIR,

‘ Castello Branco, 1st July, 1809.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 29th. The British army are in full march towards the frontier, and no time shall be lost in collecting them at Plasencia.

‘ In the present situation of affairs, my opinion is, that General Cuesta should establish his bridge at some point on the Tagus below the junction with the Tietar, to which there would be a road on each side of the Tagus, in order to enable me to move to his assistance if it should be necessary, or he to mine. He will be the best judge of the exact situation for the bridge.

‘ If General Venegas’ corps can be put in a secure position in or about its present situation, it ought for the present to be kept where it is, because it threatens Toledo and Madrid, and the enemy’s rear, in case he should advance against General Cuesta and me. If General Venegas’ corps cannot be put in security where it is, it ought either to fall back into the mountains, if it is apprehended that the enemy entertain designs to march towards Cordova and Seville by the road of La Carolina; or, if those apprehensions are not well founded, it ought eventually to be brought in communication with the corps of General Cuesta.

' Upon the whole, I prefer for General Venegas' corps, at present, a strong position near the situation in which it is, as being most likely to keep the enemy in check till I shall be up; but if such a position cannot be found, it ought to be put in security, by being obliged to fall back to its old position in the mountains.

' You will communicate these my sentiments to Major General O'Donoju.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Lieut. Colonel Roche.*'

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General J. Erskine.

' MY DEAR GENERAL,

' Castello Branco, 1st July, 1809.

' I am much concerned to hear of your continued indisposition, and I am seriously of opinion that you ought to lose no time in going to the coast, and even to England, if you should not recover. No man likes to withdraw from an army in the situation in which we stand at present; but you ought to consider that your health is in such a state as to render it impossible for you to do a day's duty, and you must be a burthen to yourself and to everybody else.

' I have sent a carriage to bring you in to Castello Branco; but I strongly recommend to you to set off on your return to Lisbon as soon as you are able.

' I cannot conclude without expressing my concern to lose your assistance; but I am convinced that, if you were to stay, you would be unable to afford me any, and that you will become worse instead of better.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Major General J. Erskine.*'

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Military Secretary of the Commander in Chief.

' SIR,

' Castello Branco, 1st July, 1809.

' I have the honor to enclose extracts of the orders which I have issued, containing appointments of Officers to the Staff, till the pleasure of His Majesty should be known, and other arrangements which require the confirmation of authority. I shall explain such appointments and arrangements as appear to me to require explanation.

' 1. When I arrived in Portugal, Captain Cooke was

Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General; and before I left England, I had recommended that he should be Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, to which appointment I understood the Commander in Chief had consented. I found, however, that his name was omitted in the list of the Officers of the department which I received from your office: this omission I concluded was a mistake, and I appointed Captain Cooke to act as Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, which department he preferred to that of the Quarter Master General. I have since found, by a letter received from the Commander in Chief, that Captain Cooke is appointed Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General; but I propose to keep him in the department of the Adjutant General, which he prefers, and for which he is most fit, till I shall receive your answer to this letter.

‘ 2. I likewise found Captain Vernon Graham in the department of the Adjutant General, and I continued to employ him in it as a Deputy Assistant; and I appointed Captain Mellish to be Deputy Assistant Adjutant General.

‘ 3. At that time Lieut. Colonel Elley, Captain Cockburn, and Captain Ompteda, of those Officers whose names are in the list received from your office, were not in Portugal. Lieut. Colonel Elley has since arrived; but Lieut. Colonel Darroch and Major Tidy have gone home.

‘ 4. I appointed Captain Reynett, of the 52d, to be Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, because I had recommended him to the Commander in Chief, by desire of the Quarter Master General, and understood that his appointment had been approved of, and he had left England before the letter was written which ordered him to join his regiment.

‘ 5. The letter from the Commander in Chief, of the 5th June, also directs the appointment of Captain Maw to be Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, which appointment I had made on the 6th May, 1809, having found Captain Maw doing duty with the department on my joining the army, and that his services were then necessary. Captain Maw has since returned to England.

‘ 6. The following Officers, whose names appear in the list of the department as furnished from your office, are not in Portugal, Major Blaquiere and Major Northey; and the

following are employed with the Portuguese service : Captain Hardinge *, Captain Le Mesurier, and Captain Waller. Captain Gomm was ordered to join his regiment. I have therefore thought it necessary to appoint Captain Mercer, Captain Doyle, and Captain Humphries, to be Deputy Assistant Quarter Master Generals. I found Lieut. Mergenthal doing duty with the Quarter Master General's department when I took the command of the army, and as he was useful in it, I continued him in his situation.

‘ 7. The appointment of Assistant Provost Marshals, I am am sorry to say, is but too necessary; and I trust that the allowance granted to them by the order of the late Commander of the Forces in Portugal, viz., Ensign's pay and allowances, by his orders of the 14th April, and the allowance to purchase a mule, given by me, will be approved of by the Commander of the Forces.

‘ 8. When the army went upon the expedition to the northward, it was deemed expedient to attach a battalion of Portuguese infantry to each of four British brigades, and an interpreter was attached to each of the Commanding Officers of these brigades. This expense has been discontinued since the Portuguese battalions have been detached from these brigades.

‘ 9. The order of the 7th May, attaching Mr. Cussan and Mr. Andrade to the office of the Quarter Master General, was issued with a view to the formation of the corps of guides, respecting which the order was finally issued on the 23d May, 1809.

‘ This corps is essentially necessary in all operations in Portugal. It is most difficult to obtain any information respecting roads, or any of the local circumstances which must be considered in the decisions to be formed respecting the march of troops; and this difficulty obliged me last year, and all those who have since conducted operations in this country, to form a corps of this description.

‘ The object is not only to have a corps whose particular duty it will be to make inquiries, and have a knowledge of roads, but to have a class of persons in the army who shall

* Major General Sir Henry Hardinge, K.C.B.

march with the heads of columns, and interpret between the Officers commanding them and the people of the country guiding them, or others from whom they may wish to make inquiries.

‘ 10. The order of 10*l*. bat money to Surgeons and Paymasters of regiments of the 10th and 23d June was issued to enable them to keep up a mule to carry the Surgeon’s medicine chest and Paymaster’s books, respectively.

‘ 11. I appointed Colonel Peacocke to be a Colonel on the Staff, as he was the senior Colonel of the army, with the exception of Colonel Anson, who declined the appointment; and there was a brigade of infantry which had no Commanding Officer. Since the appointment of General Anson to be a Brigadier General, by His Majesty, Colonel Peacocke is gone to command the British troops at Lisbon, where it was necessary to station an Officer of rank.

‘ 12. I appointed Colonel Low to be a Brigadier General, as he was the senior Colonel of the legion present; and Brigadier General Dieberg was gone to England for the recovery of his health, and Colonel Low was senior as a Colonel to many Officers who are Brigadiers in this army.

‘ 13. I appointed Mr. Leslie Melville and Mr. Head to be Assistant Commissaries, and to be attached to the Portuguese troops, upon the recommendation of the Ambassador, and because the appointment was necessary.

‘ 14. Lieut. Carlos de Tamm, appointed a Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, is an Officer of Portuguese Engineers, who had been very useful to the Quarter Master General, and whose services were still necessary to him.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Military Secretary to the
Commander in Chief.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. the Commander in Chief.

‘ SIR,

‘ Castello Branco, 1st July, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have received this day from Colonel Doukin, who commands the brigade of infantry in which the 5th batt. 60th regiment is serving, to which Lieut. —, to whom these papers relate, belongs.

‘ In addition to the complaints contained in these papers

of the conduct of Lieut. —, I have to mention, that that Officer waited on me last night with a letter from the Adjutant General, authorising him to serve with the Portuguese troops; and he desired that I would permit him to join them. I declined doing so, as I wished to wait for an answer to the letter which I had addressed to you on the 7th June, before I should allow any other Officer to join and do duty with the Portuguese troops; and Lieut — then told me that he was very sorry that he could not do duty with his regiment, as he was unwell.

‘ I beg to recommend that Officers, particularly belonging to regiments doing duty in Portugal, should not be permitted to serve with the Portuguese troops, unless they should be recommended by the Officers commanding the regiments to which they belong.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

the Commander in Chief.’

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Castello Branco, 1st July, 1809.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Bourke has returned to the army, and I shall hereafter communicate to you the detailed information which he has brought to me, in answer to the queries which I had sent him. In the mean time, I enclose the copy of a letter just received from Lieut. Colonel Roche, and my answer.

‘ I should not be surprised if we were to have a battle on this side of Madrid.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Right Hon. J. H. Frere.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Castello Branco, 1st July, 1809.

‘ The enemy’s corps, commanded by Marshal Victor, have continued their retreat from the Guadiana across the Tagus at Almaraz, and along that river towards Talavera; while the corps commanded by Sebastiani have likewise retired towards the Tagus. The retreat of both these corps has been gradual, and they have sustained no loss; although the

former has been followed by the army of General Cuesta, and the latter by that of General Venegas.

‘ General Cuesta’s advanced guard crossed the Tagus at Almaraz, on the 26th June, and the main body were to follow as soon as the bridge of boats should be completed. General Venegas’ corps were on the 22d, the last day on which I heard of them, at Villarta.

• The British army broke up on the 27th June from the camp and cantonments on the Tagus, and are on their march into Spain by Zarza la Mayor towards Plasencia. The advanced guard will be at Zarza la Mayor on the 3d.

• I have the honor to inform your Lordship that I have heard that General Robert Craufurd arrived at Lisbon with his brigade on the 28th June.

• I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Castello Branco, 1st July, 1809.

• I have just received intelligence from Oporto, stating that the *Resistance* had passed by, having been at Coruña, which place and Ferrol were in the possession of the Spaniards. I have a letter from the Marques de la Romana, from Orense, of the 25th, in which he states that he had heard reports that the enemy had evacuated Coruña.

• Believe me, &c.

‘ *Right Hon. J. H. Frere.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Castello Branco, 1st July, 1809.

• Since I closed my dispatch to your Lordship of this day’s date I have heard from Colonel Roche, who has relieved Colonel Bourke at General Cuesta’s head quarters. It appears that Joseph Buonaparte had arrived at Toledo on the 22d, with a corps consisting of about 5000 men, and he had crossed the Tagus, and had proceeded as far as Mora to join Sebastiani, apparently with a view to fall upon the corps of Venegas. He had, however, returned to Toledo, as I understand Colonel Roche, with Sebastiani’s corps and the troops he had brought with him, and he was on his march

towards Talavera, where the French were in considerable strength.

'The whole of the army of General Cuesta had crossed the Tagus at Almaraz, on the 29th, excepting three divisions, amounting to 10,000 men, which were higher up the river, at and in the neighbourhood of Arzobispo, on the left bank; and his advanced posts were at Naval moral, on the right bank, and he occupied some villages still nearer to Talavera. The General had determined, however, upon hearing of the collection of the French troops at Talavera, to recross the Tagus; and Colonel Roche expected that that operation would be completed by that night.

'I have recommended to General Cuesta to throw his bridge over the Tagus at a place below the junction of the Tietar with that river, in order that I may join him, or he may join me, if the enemy should move against either of the corps, and that Venegas' corps should be kept in a place of security near Villarta, in which position he threatens Toledo and Madrid, and the enemy's rear, in the event of his moving to this quarter.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Viscount Castlereagh.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Brig. General Cox.

'MY DEAR SIR,

'Zibreira, 2d July, 1809.

'I enclose a letter which I request you to forward to the Duque del Parque. The advanced guard of the British army will enter Spain to-morrow morning at Zarza la Mayor.

'It is understood that the French armies are collecting at Talavera, and that King Joseph has joined them with 5000 men. General Cuesta therefore repassed the Tagus, I understand, at Almaraz, on the 29th June.

'Believe me, &c.

'Brig. General Cox.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To His Excellency the Duque del Parque.

'SIR,

'Zibreira, 2d July, 1809.

'I have had the honor of receiving the letter which your Excellency addressed to me, in which you have informed me of your intention to depute two gentlemen whom you have

named to receive the sum of money due on account of the British army to the town of Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ I shall be obliged to your Excellency if you will direct those gentlemen to proceed to Lisbon, the British Commissary at that city having received instructions to pay the money.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*

the Duque del Parque.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Marques de la Romana.

‘ MONSIEUR,

‘ A Zibreira, 2 Juillet, 1809.

‘ J’ai reçu hier la lettre que votre Excellence m’a écrite d’Orense le 25 du mois passé, et je vous félicite sur l’évacuation prochaine de la Galicie par l’armée ennemie. J’ai reçu hier les nouvelles qu’ils avaient évacué la Corogne et Ferrol, dont les Espagnols étaient en possession; mais je ne crois pas qu’il y ait des troupes Anglaises de ce côté là. Je crois plutôt que l’ennemi a été obligé d’évacuer la Galicie par la nécessité de ses affaires en général.

‘ Le Général Cuesta avait passé le Tage à Almaraz à la poursuite de l’armée de Victor, qui s’était réplée du côté de Talavera de la Reyna. Mais, ayant reçu des nouvelles le 29 du mois passé qui lui donnaient lieu de croire que l’ennemi rassemblait toutes ses forces à Talavera, et que le Roi Joseph avait joint l’armée Française avec 5000 hommes; le Général Cuesta avait l’intention de repasser le Tage ce jour-là. Je n’ai pas eu de ses nouvelles depuis le 29 du mois passé. Le Général Sebastiani avec son corps est, je crois, à Talavera, avec le corps de Victor et les 5000 hommes ci-dessus nommés.

‘ Le Général Venegas est à Villarta avec son corps.

‘ L’armée Anglaise est en marche pour entrer en Espagne par Zarza la Mayor, Coria, et Plasencia; l’avant-garde sera à Zarza demain matin.

‘ Je ne crois pas que Ney et Soult envahissent le Portugal encore; mais s’ils y entrent, ils y trouveront le Maréchal Beresford avec l’armée Portugaise.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *Le Marquis de la Romana.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Don Martin de Garay.

SIR,

Zarza la Mayor, 3d July, 1809.

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 29th June. When I was about to march the British army into the north of Portugal, I wrote to General Cuesta and to your Excellency on the 29th of April, recommending a defensive system for the Spanish armies on the frontiers of Andalusia. I gave this recommendation, not because the continuance of the Spanish armies on the defensive was likely to prevent the enemy from interrupting the operations of the British army; for it was obvious to me, as it must be to your Excellency, that the best mode of preventing the enemy from undertaking such an operation would have been for the Spanish armies to act upon the offensive; but I recommended that General Cuesta and General Venegas should continue on the defensive till I should be able to return to their assistance, from a conviction, that although the army under the command of each was more numerous than that opposed to it, yet the armies of the enemy were more inured to war; and I promised to return and give that assistance which would render the contest more advantageous, at least as soon as I should have settled affairs to the northward.

According to my promise, I did return, as soon as Marshal Soult was driven out of Portugal; and my march into Spain has been delayed till this moment only on account of the want of some necessaries, without which the army could not move; and it did move, without waiting for its reinforcements, on the day after its wants were supplied.

I have the pleasure to inform your Excellency, that the advanced guard passed the frontier this day; the army will follow to-morrow and the following days; and no time shall be lost in placing ourselves in communication with General Cuesta.

I shall be much concerned if, in the intermediate time, the enemy should fall with his whole concentrated force on General Cuesta or General Venegas. But as both these Generals are aware of the superiority of the enemy's strength, and the former, in particular, is aware of my near

approach to him, I conclude that each of them will have placed themselves in such a situation as that the misfortune which your Excellency apprehends cannot occur.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*

Don Martin de Garay.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To J. Murray, Esq., Commissary General.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Zarza la Mayor, 3d July, 1809.

‘ I have received your letter of the 1st. It is necessary that your measures adopted both at Gibraltar and Cadiz, to procure money for bills upon England, should be much more extensive than you have stated them to be. Your agents at those places and at Lisbon should have unlimited power of drawing upon the Lords of the Treasury ; otherwise some money may be directed into other channels ; and I know that we have no chance of receiving supplies of money in future, excepting for our bills upon England.

‘ Claims for deliveries of provisions must not be paid, of course, unless the receipts for the deliveries should be produced. It may be proper to allow those claims, upon a consideration of the particular circumstances in which the deliveries were made by the Commander of the Forces. But the safe rule for your Commissariat is, to reject, in the first instance, all claims not duly vouched by receipts.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *J. Murray, Esq.*

Commissary General.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Zarza la Mayor, 3d July, 1809.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Don Martin de Garay, and my answer, which I beg of you either to send to that gentleman, or to communicate to him its purport.

‘ I do not think that Don Martin has made a correct or a fair reference to my letter of the 29th of April to General Cuesta and himself ; nor does he act very fairly in attri-

buting to me the misfortune which may possibly befall General Cuesta or General Venegas. I have repeatedly warned General Cuesta of the danger to which he was exposed till I should join him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. H. Frere.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. Colonel Roche.

‘ SIR,

‘ Zarza la Mayor, 4th July, 1809.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 3d. I shall be obliged to you to send me to Coria, where I shall be on the 6th, the particulars of the intelligence acquired by the intercepted letters from Victor to King Joseph.

‘ I am glad that General Venegas has put himself in safety.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will endeavor to obtain for me an accurate account of the course of the Alberche, the nature of its banks, the depth of water, &c., particularly low down towards Talavera; whether there are many bridges over that river besides that which has been broken up, or fords, or ferries, the nature of the roads leading to such passages on both sides the river, through what towns they pass.

‘ I shall also be obliged to you if you will mention to General O'Donoju, that I think it would be very desirable, if possible, to get some intelligent person to examine the lower part of the Alberche and the enemy's position upon that river. Till the post of cavalry, mentioned by you, and the infantry which they must have at Talavera, are driven in, it will be impossible to employ an Officer in this reconnaissance, unless in disguise.

‘ I also request you to mention to General O'Donoju, that I conceive it will be desirable to occupy the Puerto de Baños with the Spanish infantry, which I understand are at Plasencia, as soon as I shall arrive at that city with the British army: they will strengthen our whole position, while we are engaged in our operations against Victor.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Roche.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

well as those respecting which I wrote to you on the 30th June, reserving, of those last arrived, tonnage for infantry to carry 2000 men, of the two battalions of detachments which I propose to send back from the army, and to England, as soon as I shall have ascertained exactly the movements and intentions of the enemy. This tonnage is in addition to the 5000 tons mentioned in my letter of the 30th June. I am also of opinion that the transports which brought out the horse artillery ought to be sent home as soon as possible.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY. ’

To the Right Hon. John Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Coria, 6th July, 1809.

‘ Since I wrote to you last I find that Cuesta has passed, and is on the left bank of the Tagus. The French have crossed the Alberche, near Talavera, where they have a good position. They have detached across the Tagus; and I believe King Joseph himself is gone in pursuit of Venegas, who has retired towards the passes of the Sierra Morena, so that all is safe till we shall arrive.

‘ I shall be at Plasencia on the 8th. The whole army will be there on the 12th, Craufurd excepted.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. I believe that the northern French were at Zamora in the beginning of the month. I have reason to think they are moving from thence to Valladolid. Franceschi has been taken with his two aides de camp, riding post between Toro and Tordesillas, on his road to Valladolid; and I understand that a division of troops was in march at no great distance from the place where he was taken, in the same direction.

‘ A. W.’

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Coria, 6th July, 1809.

‘ I received your letter of the 2d last night. I have done everything you have recommended respecting our new

troops ; that is, I have ordered them to encamp near Lisbon for some time.

‘ I am ordered positively to give you nothing ; particularly neither ordnance nor military stores, as everything of that kind was to be given in the way of subsidy. I am willing, however, to assist you, if Mr. Villiers will give me a receipt, or will authorize any one else to give me a receipt for the articles delivered.

‘ If Mr. Villiers should decline to do this, to which, by the bye, he has consented both in conversation and by letter to me, I cannot allow you to have anything, even though I do not want what is essentially necessary to you. If the service should fail in consequence, the fault is not mine.

‘ I have written to the Commandants of Abrantes and Castello Branco, to beg them to assist our convoys with escorts of militia. Our battalions are so lamentably weak, that this is necessary.

‘ I observe, from a letter from Colonel Cox, that the Duque del Parque is disposed to annex conditions to the permissions you have asked to encamp within the Spanish frontiers, a compliance with which will defeat the great object of collecting your army.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Junta of Plasencia.

‘ GENTLEMEN,

‘ Coria, 6th July, 1809.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving the letter of the Junta of Plasencia, dated the 4th instant ; and I am very sensible of the attention and kindness of the Junta in their expressions in their letter to me, as well as in their proclamation to the people under their government.

‘ I shall, on my part, do everything in my power to maintain the discipline of the army ; and I have no doubt but that the people of Plasencia will have no reason to complain of the troops ; and, in order that they may put the inhabitants of the towns, through which they pass, to as little inconvenience as possible, they construct huts for themselves, and lodgings will be required only for the General Officers and Officers of the Staff.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Junta of Plasencia.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Coria, 6th July, 1809.

‘ I have received your letter of the 2d. I believe there is no doubt that all the French have withdrawn from Galicia, and Kellermann’s corps from the Asturias. They were in some strength at Zamora in the beginning of July, and I have some reason to believe were to move towards Valladolid. This looks like a general retreat.

‘ I am much obliged to you for the trouble you have taken about our boating.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

To Deputy Paymaster General Boys.

‘ SIR,

‘ Plasencia, 8th July, 1809.

‘ The Quarter Master General has communicated to me your letter of the 5th, which has astonished and disappointed me not a little. I cannot understand why you did not move at an earlier day, after I had quitted Abrantes; nor for what reason you did not make known to me, at an earlier period, the difficulties in procuring conveyance for the military chest, if these difficulties prevented its removal. I beg that, upon your arrival within the Spanish frontier, you will take measures for moving at least two stages in a day, in order to join head quarters; from whence you are not in future to separate yourself without my orders.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Deputy Paymaster General Boys.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Commissary General.

‘ SIR,

‘ Plasencia, 8th July, 1809.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Mr. Boys, which has surprised and disappointed me not a little. You must have been aware—indeed Mr. Dalrymple was repeatedly informed—that I waited only for money to commence my advance into Spain, as I was determined that the army should not be reduced in that country to the difficulties under which it had labored in Portugal for want of

money. Yet I am sorry to observe that Mr. Boys, who, I expected, would have left Abrantes a day or two after me, does not come away till the 5th, nine days after I had set out; and then, instead of bringing with him all the money in his possession, he brings only about 23,000*l.*, out of which sum I know that he would have to pay 5000*l.* or 6000*l.* to the Paymasters of the regiments which had been stationed at Castello Branco, and who had omitted to send in their estimates before I quitted Abrantes.

‘ Thus, then, the object for which I stayed so long at Abrantes has been defeated, and the promise which I have made to the Spanish authorities upon the frontier, viz., “that ready money should be paid for the supplies furnished to the British troops,” will be violated; and the Commissaries will experience all the difficulties in procuring supplies, and the troops will suffer the distress, for the want of them, which we suffered in Portugal.

‘ All these evils would have been avoided if Mr. Boys had been supplied with thirty carts, which is the largest number that would have been required to draw 60,000*l.* in silver, which I believe is the utmost of the sum he had in the military chest at Abrantes.

‘ It is impossible that any man can pretend that Portugal, or even the neighbourhood of Abrantes, could not supply thirty carts for this service. I cannot and nobody can believe, that, if proper measures had been adopted, a sufficient number of carts could not have been procured to remove the treasure at an early period; and I now beg that, immediately upon the receipt of this letter, you will wait upon the Commissary at Abrantes, and tell him that I desire he will employ parties of the militia at that place to bring in carts in sufficient numbers to remove, not only the money, but the provisions and stores which you have received directions to remove.

‘ You will then adopt efficient measures to have the drivers of the carts fed and paid during their march; and you will send off everything without loss of time.

‘ It is necessary that positive orders should be given not to put more than 600 lbs. on any cart, and that a certain number of spare carts should accompany the convoy.

‘ I hope that efficient measures have been adopted to

secure the arrival of the 60,000*l.* in Spanish gold with General R. Craufurd, and that I shall not be disappointed there also.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Commissary General.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Officer commanding the Artillery at Castello Branco.

‘ SIR,

‘ Plasencia, 8th July, 1809.

‘ I learn from the Deputy Paymaster General that he has been unable to move the military chest from Abrantes for want of carts, and I beg that, upon the receipt of this letter, you will call upon the magistrate at Castello Branco to supply as many carts as he can get, and you will employ the artillerymen under your command to press them. You will then send them under escort of the artillerymen under your command to Abrantes by the road of Villa Velha.

‘ After taking the carts to Abrantes the artillerymen may return, as there are escorts at Abrantes for the money as well as for the ordnance stores, &c.

‘ The number of carts wanted for the money is thirty; but I doubt not but others are required to move the ordnance stores.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Officer commanding
the Royal Artillery.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Officer commanding the Artillery.

‘ SIR,

‘ Plasencia, 8th July, 1809.

‘ It is desirable that all the horses belonging to the artillery in different parts of Portugal should be ordered to be collected at Lisbon, with the exception of those attached to Captain Baynes’ brigade at Castello Branco.

‘ It is desirable that a 9 pounder and a 6 pounder brigade should be equipped for the field with these horses, and should be encamped upon the high ground behind Belem with the seven battalions of infantry now there; and I beg that you will give directions accordingly.

‘ In case this letter should not find you upon the road, I send a duplicate of it to the Officer commanding the artillery

at Lisbon, through the Commissariat at that station, in order that he may take measures to carry these orders into effect.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Officer commanding
the Royal Artillery.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Peacocke.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Plasencia, 8th July, 1809.

‘ I enclose a letter for the Officer commanding the artillery, which I beg of you to peruse and deliver to the Officer commanding the artillery at Lisbon.

‘ Although I have thus given directions that the strength of the body of troops in the camp at Belem should be augmented, I beg that you will understand that they are to move; but not till I shall send orders for their movement, after I shall have received from you and from the General Officers commanding them a report of their state, such as I directed should be made in my letter to you of the 28th June.

‘ I beg that you will communicate this letter to Major General Lightburne and to Brig. General Catlin Craufurd, who, I conclude, command these troops.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Peacocke.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Plasencia, 8th July, 1809.

‘ I have arrived here with the advanced guard of the British troops. The army which was with me on the Tagus will be here on the 9th and 10th, having marched some of them from the neighborhood of Santarem since the 27th of last month. The distance is not far from 200 miles. The cavalry and part of the infantry lately arrived will be up in two or three days afterwards.

‘ I am going over to see General Cuesta the day after to-morrow, and I shall return here on the 12th. I shall write to you from his quarters.

‘ You will have heard that General Franceschi is taken, with dispatches from Soult to King Joseph, and other interesting papers. I have seen the purport of these papers; but I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send me

copies of the originals, which have been sent to Seville, as well as General Franceschi and his aides de camp.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. H. Frere.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. Colonel Roche.

‘ SIR,

‘ Plasencia, 8th July, 1809.

‘ I have received your letter of the 6th. I have this day received from Almeida the purport of the letters taken from General Franceschi's possession, of which I have given to Lieut. Colonel O'Lalor a copy to forward to General Cuesta, who may not have received them.

‘ From these it appears that Soult has evacuated Galicia, and come to Zamora, solely with a view to give repose and to refit his army, and that he intends to plunder Braganza and to threaten Portugal; and he has detached a small corps under Colonel Guipé, the precise object of whose operations is not stated. Ney remains, and must remain, in Galicia.

‘ I beg that you will tell General O'Donoju that I have no apprehensions for Portugal. Braganza must be plundered and that we cannot help; but I have taken measures to prevent any serious impression being made upon Portugal. I think, however, that the corps under Colonel Guipé may be destined to pass through the Puerto de Perales or the Puerto de Baños, to endeavor to ascertain what is going on in this quarter. The latter will be occupied on the 11th instant, but it is very desirable that some measures should be taken to occupy the Puerto de Perales, from whence the enemy could equally and most effectually annoy my communications with Portugal.

‘ I propose going over to see General Cuesta on the 10th. to stay with him the 11th, and to return on the 12th.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Roche.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. John Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Plasencia, 8th July, 1809.

‘ Beresford will have communicated to you the accounts which he has received from General Cox of the capture of

General Franceschi and his aides de camp, and of the letters taken on his person. From these letters it appears to me that Soult has been obliged to come out from Galicia to Zamora solely for the purpose of giving repose to and refitting his army; that he intends to plunder Braganza, which I conceive we cannot well prevent, and by his position, as well as by his movements, to threaten Portugal; that Ney remains in Galicia, in which kingdom he is to fortify certain points, and to occupy them with his troops.

‘ You are aware that Beresford is about to collect his army upon the frontier, somewhere south of the Douro; and I defy Soult to do him or Portugal any injury as long as his army is in its present situation, or by any amelioration of its situation which can be produced in a short period of time. He may be able to plunder Braganza, or any other village; but I trust that the Portuguese Government will have firmness sufficient to look at the great objects of the war, and not to disturb our plans or operations by calling for detachments to protect trifling objects upon the frontier; which detachments, after all, will not be able to effect any of the objects which the Government would have in view in calling for them.

‘ Beresford’s army on the frontier of Portugal will protect that country, and will add much to the strength of my left flank. Hereafter it will be able to accomplish more important objects; and, in the meantime, I do not think it much signifies whether a village more or less is plundered.

‘ I arrived here this day. It is said that King Joseph has crossed the Tagus with some of Victor’s cavalry and infantry, and the reinforcement he brought with himself, and is gone to join Sebastiani’s corps, which will thus amount to 30,000 men; and that his intention is to beat Venegas, who has 20,000 men, and then to penetrate to Seville by Cordova. Victor remains near Talavera with the remainder of his army, it is said, in great distress for provisions.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Mr. Boys, and the copy of one which I have in consequence written to the Commissary General. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will mention to the Government the great inconvenience which the army has felt, ever since its arrival in Portugal, for the want of the assistance of the

Civil Government to procure the supplies it has required, particularly of carriages and mules. For the latter I have written to you, I believe, not less than ten letters; but they have not yet assisted the British army with one, and the magistrates of the country have rather prevented than aided us in procuring carts.

‘I hope that now that we have left the country more attention will be paid to our demands, and that I shall not want that which alone I shall require from Portugal—the means of moving the money and ordnance stores which I shall want from Lisbon. I shall be obliged to you if you will send to Beresford the observations contained in the first part of this letter.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘Plasencia, 9th July, 1809.

‘I have received your letters of the 4th and 5th. I have not forgotten either the Puerto de Baños or the Puerto de Perales, and have called upon Cuesta to occupy both. The former is already, and the latter will be so in a day or two.

‘I have no apprehension that Soult will be able to do anything for some time with his whole corps, but I think that that column ought to be watched. Your position in this view of the enemy’s operations will materially aid our left. I believe that the enemy do not know now where we are.

‘In respect to your Officers, I have no objection to your appointing them to regiments, if you think you can do so without inconvenience hereafter. All that I say is that the decision of the Commander in Chief and of Government upon my letter of the 7th June must be final, and must be carried into execution.

‘I have not yet been able to obtain a return of our camp stores. As soon as I can get a return, I will spare you what can be given without inconvenience to the British troops; but I must have Mr. Villiers’ receipt for everything.

‘I should have thought that the arrangements which I had made for paying Mr. Villiers 80,000*l.* of the money

lately arrived would have enabled you to have taken the field. I am going to Cuesta's camp, and I shall write to you again when I return.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. John Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Plasencia, 9th July, 1809.

‘ I have received your letter of the 5th, and I am perfectly satisfied with any notice taken by the Government of the present acts of enmity committed by the people of Portugal on the troops, which I fear that the latter deserve but too well.

‘ We must have some general rule of proceeding in cases of criminal outrages by British Officers and soldiers, by which the individuals guilty of them may be brought to early punishment. As matters are now conducted, the Government and I stand complimenting each other, while no notice is taken of the murderer; and the example of his early trial and punishment is lost to the troops.

‘ The artilleryman who has committed the murder at Cascacs must be tried according to the laws of the country, or for a military offence under the Articles of War. My opinion is that he, and all guilty of similar offences, ought to be tried (I mean tried in earnest, and not as the Officers of the —th were tried) according to the laws of the country; but if the Government prefer that we should take cognizance of these offences, as being of a military nature, we will do so at once in every case; but they must assist us in obliging the witnesses to come forward and give their testimony on oath, to which I find they have great objections.

‘ I have been working ever since I have been in Portugal to effect the object proposed by Government in respect to the carts; but the army commenced ill before I arrived, and I have never been able to get it right since.

‘ I shall most readily come into any measure proposed by Government to remedy the horrible abuses and hardships now existing, and occasioned entirely by the mode in which carts are taken for the service of the British army.

‘ Let me see the plan of the Government before they promulgate it. I have directed that the money borrowed from Quintella at Oporto be repaid to him at Lisbon.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General O'Donaju.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Plasencia, 13th July, 1809.

‘ We arrived here last night, and Colonel O'Lalor has this day communicated to me your letter of the 12th, with the information from your Officers sent on a reconnaissance towards the Alberche, for which I am much obliged to you.

‘ I desired Sir R. Wilson to write to you respecting the two battalions of infantry ; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will tell General Cuesta that I have ordered Sir Robert to march on the 15th, and that it is desirable that the battalions should go to-morrow to El Toril, or at all events next day to Miajadas, to communicate from thence with Sir Robert, whom I will desire to leave orders for them at El Toril.

‘ I have desired Sir Robert to move thus early, in order that he may cover and assist the Commissaries whom I am about to send into the Vera de Plasencia, to endeavor to draw some subsistence from thence.

‘ Sir Robert tells me that the road by Miajadas, Talayucla, and the Venta de San Julian, is a good one for artillery. I have sent an Officer to examine it as far as Oropesa, and I expect his report to-morrow. If it should turn out to be good, it would probably be most convenient that I should march by that road ; and I shall be obliged to you if in the mean time, till I shall receive the Officer's report, which I shall communicate to you, that you will ask General Cuesta whether he thinks that any inconvenience will result from my being so far from him when he shall cross the Tagus. If he does, I shall go by the road originally fixed. We shall have some difficulty in getting all the bread we shall require at this place, but I still hope that we shall do.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General O'Donaju.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Plasencia, 13th July, 1809.

‘ I have received your letter of the 7th.

‘ Dr. Fergusson writes to Mr. Thompson, to desire that you may have a certain proportion of medicines, for which Mr. Villiers must give his receipt.

‘ I am sorry that I cannot allow any Officers to take soldiers as servants from the British regiments in this army. You will observe that the late Commander of the Forces gave orders that Officers belonging to regiments in this army should have Portuguese bätmen and servants, for the hire of which he gave them an allowance; and it would be rather an extraordinary circumstance if I were to allow soldiers as servants to Officers not belonging to regiments in Portugal, particularly when the Commander in Chief in England, by their own account, consented to their bringing servants with them from their regiments. I therefore return their application.

‘ In respect to the commissions for your Officers the question is exactly whether the commission by the local government will give their authority equally with that given to others by the Prince. If it will not, they ought to have the Prince’s commission.

‘ I do not think I should do you much good in giving you any part of our Commissariat. Nothing can be worse than it is; and I should recommend to you to take the Portuguese Commissariat, and do the best you can with it.

‘ I wish you would desire your Commissaries and others employed not to take carts from the neighborhood of the Tagus for the service of the Portuguese army, and to give up to the British Commissary at Abrantes above 200 carts, which are collected at Thomar for the use of the Portuguese army.

‘ You will recollect that to take carts in our neighbourhood is inconsistent with our arrangements for the two Commissariats. In consequence of this seizure of the carts for the Portuguese army, we cannot move our ammunition or our money from Abrantes.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Plasencia, 12th July, 1899.

‘ I received your letter of the 8th, at General Cuesta's head quarters, to which I went on the 10th, in order to settle the plan of our future operations.

‘ I stated to the General my opinion that the principal attack upon the enemy's posts on the Alberche ought to be made by the united force of the British army and the Spanish army under his command; that it would be desirable to detach a corps consisting of 10,000 men, on our left, towards Avila, to turn the enemy's right; and that Venegas, after having driven Sebastiani's corps across the Tagus, by which alone he is understood now to be opposed, should turn to his right, across the Tagus, either at Aranjuez or at Fuentidueña, and threaten Madrid by the enemy's left.

‘ The General proposed that I should make the projected detachment to Avila from the British army, which I declined, on the ground that the British troops, to act with advantage, must act in a body, and that I thought that the detachment might with more propriety and advantage be made from the Spanish army, which already appeared to me to be more numerous than was necessary for the operations on the Alberche, or than would be found convenient in reference to its state of discipline.

‘ I then proposed that this Spanish detachment should march by the Puerto de Baños, that by Arenas and the Puerto del Pico being deemed impracticable for artillery. General Cuesta, however, declined making any large detachment from his army; but offered to send two battalions of infantry and a few cavalry, to join Sir Robert Wilson's Portuguese brigade, and march upon Arenas, and thence upon Escalona on the Alberche, in communication with the left of the British army. He adopted, however, the remainder of the plan proposed, which we shall begin to carry into execution on the 18th instant.

‘ General Cuesta having declined to send any large detachment to the quarter proposed by me, I of course have no opportunity of requesting that the Duque de Alburquerque

should have the command, to which I certainly should have been disposed, as well on account of your recommendation as from his own character.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. H. Frere.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Plasencia, 13th July, 1809.

‘ I have received your letters of the 8th; and you will see in the accompanying letters an account of my endeavors to prevail upon General Cuesta to make a detachment upon Avila, and eventually upon Segovia.

‘ I agree with you in thinking that such a detachment would be a great advantage in a military point of view, and it might be attended by the political advantages to which you refer.

‘ In order to enable you to endeavor to attain the political advantages, I write the accompanying letter; but I must at the same time inform you that I do not consider the movement to be *necessary* as a military measure; nay, that to order it at present, when we have settled our operations, might be very inconvenient, and would certainly create delay; and I conceive it would excite a jealousy of me in the mind of Cuesta which does not appear now to exist. The General received me well, and was very attentive to me; but I had no conversation with him, as he declined to speak French, and I cannot talk Spanish.

‘ I settled the plan of operations with General O’Donoju, who appears to me to be a very able Officer, and well calculated to fill his station. It is impossible for me so say what plans General Cuesta entertains.

‘ The general sentiment of the army, as far as I can learn it from the British Officers, appears to be contempt of the Junta and of the present form of the Government; great confidence in Cuesta, and a belief that he is too powerful for the Junta, and that he will overturn that Government. This sentiment appears to be so general, that I conceive that the Duque de Alburquerque must entertain it equally with others; but I have not seen the Duque, as he was at Puente del Arzobispo.

‘ I acknowledge that I conceive that the Junta would gain

but little by the change of the person in whose hands the command should be placed; that person, in the existing state of the Government, must be formidable to them, particularly if he should be successful; and if this be true, I do not know whether there are not some advantages to be derived from the employment of Cuesta.

‘ By dividing the troops into different armies they may certainly diminish the danger; but this security can only be temporary, for in proportion as the French concentrate their troops, the Spanish armies must do so likewise; and they must, when together, be under one head, and this head will be an object of fear and danger to the Junta.

‘ I do not know what your opinion is of O’Donoju: he is certainly an able man, and I think that if it is your opinion that he can be trusted, I could talk confidentially to him; and if I did not guide their measures, and prevent all mischief, either by Cuesta or others, I should at least obtain a knowledge of their real designs.

‘ I have no reason to complain; on the contrary, I have reason to be satisfied with Señor ———. He only appears to me to be too anxious to obtain a knowledge of our plans; but I do not know whether I ought to attribute this appearance of anxiety in him to my prejudices against him or to his desire to make his own employment of more importance, to his curiosity, or to his wish to make himself useful. A man in his situation must have a foreknowledge of all our intended operations, and if he is not honest, he has it in his power to do us much mischief. ——— has certainly the mind and manners of an *intrigant*, and he comes from a part of Spain of which the people are most likely not to be inimical to the French.

‘ Besides the anxiety of ——— to obtain a knowledge of our plans from me, I have heard him making inquiries respecting the strength of corps from others, with the result of which inquiries he certainly had no concern.

‘ Upon the whole I am not quite sure that it would not have been better to send me eight or ten Spanish Assistant Commissaries to act with mine, and that the Junta should have given general orders throughout the country that my requisitions should be attended to.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. H. Freres.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. John Villiers.

‘MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘Plasencia, 13th July, 1809.

‘I have received your letters of the 6th and 7th. I did not understand, when I desired Mr. Murray to pay you 80,000*l.*, that you had already received 35,000*l.*, otherwise I should certainly have confined the supply to you to 45,000*l.*; but as I ordered that you might have 80,000*l.* out of the sum of money arrived from England, which sum I then thought and still think can be spared from the demands of the army, I desire Mr. Murray to give you the sum of 80,000*l.* besides 35,000*l.* which you have received, making a total of 115,000*l.*

‘When I reflect that the largest sum you have ever stated to be necessary for you is 125,000*l.*, I hope that I may say that the wants of the Portuguese army, in money, have been well supplied by us; and I wish I could say, with equal truth, that our wants in mules, carriages, provisions, &c., for which we are ready to pay, had been equally well supplied by them; or that they had been supplied at all. Seven or eight regiments of infantry are at this moment waiting at Lisbon for want of twelve mules for each regiment, to be purchased by the Officers, to carry camp kettles, medicine chests, &c., &c.!

‘In respect to further supplies of money for the Portuguese troops, I must regulate them from time to time, by the knowledge I shall have of the state of the treasury at Lisbon, Cadiz, and Gibraltar; and of the wants of the British army; that being, in every possible case, the object to be attended to in the first instance. As far as I can arrange it you shall feel no inconvenience from delay in the issue of money to your orders, which money can be given from the British military chest. But I must consider the British army in the first instance; and you must attribute any inconvenience which may result from the delay, not to me, but to those who have evidently undertaken to accomplish objects which they are not able to reach, from the want of pecuniary means. I send you a dispatch from Mr. Frere, which I beg you to put up in a cover and forward to Mr. Canning.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘P.S. I shall answer your letter of the 7th to-morrow morning.
‘A. W.’

To the Right Hon. the Judge Advocate General.

‘ SIR,

‘ Plasencia, 14th July, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the proceedings of a General Court Martial on the trial of O—— J——, of the —— regiment, for mutiny and for attempting to shoot Ensign ——, of the —— regiment, of which crime the Court at first acquitted him; but upon a revisal of its sentence, under my direction, the Court found him guilty, and sentenced him to be shot.

‘ The Court at the same time represented to me that O—— J—— was insane, and they entered into an inquiry upon this subject, of which I likewise enclose the proceedings, as well as the report of Deputy Inspector of Hospitals, Fergusson, on O—— J——’s health, and a memorial from O—— J—— to myself.

‘ I am desirous of receiving His Majesty’s commands respecting the execution of the sentence of the General Court Martial on O—— J——.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

the Judge Advocate General.’

To Brigadier General Cox.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Plasencia, 14th July, 1809.

‘ I have received your letter of the 9th. I request you to have each man that you may find belonging to the British army clothed and fed. Send me from time to time a list of their names, and of the regiments to which they belong, and I shall send you directions how they are to be disposed of; and an account of the disbursements made for each man, and I shall have the money reimbursed to you. I am obliged to you for the orders you have given to the Assistant Surgeon and party of the 87th regiment.

‘ I do not think that Soult is able to attack Ciudad Rodrigo, although it is not impossible that he may annoy the frontier. He has no artillery, and is not well provided with arms.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Cox.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

ships from which the stores shall be disembarked, should be sent home as soon as may be possible.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. John Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Plasencia, 14th July, 1809.

‘ I have perused Dom Miguel Forjaz’s paper respecting carts, &c., upon which I will send him some observations as soon as I shall have conversed upon the subject of it with the Quarter Master General and the Commissary General. In the meantime I beg you will inform Dom Miguel Forjaz that the greater part of what he has recommended has already been carried into execution.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. General Sherbrooke.

‘ MY DEAR SHERBROOKE,

‘ Plasencia, 15th July, 1809.

‘ I enclose a letter which has been forwarded to me by Deputy Commissary General Dalrymple from Mr. Commissary —, containing an account of transactions at Castello Branco, which does not differ materially from that which you gave me of the same transactions.

‘ I am not astonished that you and the General Officers should feel indignant at the neglect and incapacity of some of the Officers of the Commissariat, by which we have suffered and are still suffering so much; but what I have to observe, and wish to impress upon you, is, that they are gentlemen appointed to their office by the King’s authority, although not holding his commission; and that it would be infinitely better, and more proper, if all neglects and faults of theirs were reported to me, by whom they can be dismissed, rather than that they should be abused by the General Officers of the army. Indeed, it cannot be expected that they will bear the kind of abuse they have received, however well deserved we may deem it to be; and they will either resign their situations, and put the army to still greater inconvenience, or complain to higher authorities, and

thereby draw those who abuse them into discussions, which will take up, hereafter, much of their time and attention.

‘ I do not enter into the grounds you had for being displeased with Mr. —, which I dare say were very sufficient, but I only desire that, in all these cases, punishment may be left to me, who alone can have the power of inflicting it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Sherbrooke.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Plasencia, 15th July, 1809.

‘ After I had written to your Lordship, on the 1st instant, King Joseph Buonaparte crossed the Tagus again, and joined Sebastiani with the troops he had brought from Madrid, and with a detachment from Marshal Victor's corps, making the corps of Sebastiani about 28,000 men, with an intention of attacking Venegas' corps. Venegas, however, retired into the mountains of the Sierra Morena, and Colonel Lacy, with his advanced guard, attacked a French corps in the night, and destroyed many of them.

‘ The French troops then again returned to the Tagus, which river King Joseph had crossed with the reinforcement which he had taken to Sebastiani's corps; and this last corps, amounting to 10,000 men only, was on the left bank of the Tagus, about Madridejos, in front of Venegas, who was again advancing. The last accounts from this quarter were of the 8th.

‘ The French army under Victor, joined by the detachments brought by King Joseph from Sebastiani's corps, and amounting in the whole to about 35,000 men, are concentrated in the neighbourhood of Talavera and on the Alberche.

‘ General Cuesta's army has been in the same position which I informed your Lordship that it had taken up when I addressed you on the 1st instant.

‘ The advanced guard of the British army arrived here on the 8th, and the troops which were with me on the Tagus arrived by the 10th. The 23d light dragoons arrived yesterday, and the 48th and 61st regiments will arrive to-morrow.

‘ I went to General Cuesta's quarters at Almaraz on the 10th, and stayed there till the 12th, and I have arranged with that General a plan of operations upon the French

army, which we are to begin to carry into execution on the 18th, if the French should remain so long in their position.

‘The Spanish army under General Cuesta consists of about 33,000 men (exclusive of Venegas’ corps), of which 7000 are cavalry. About 14,000 men are detached to the bridge of Arzobispo, and the remainder are in the camp under the Puerto de Mirabete.

‘The troops were ill clothed but well armed, and the Officers appeared to take pains with their discipline. Some of the corps of infantry were certainly good, and the horses of the cavalry were in good condition.

‘I have the pleasure to inform your Lordship that the seven battalions of infantry from Ireland and the islands, and the troops of horse artillery from Great Britain, arrived at Lisbon in the beginning of the month.

‘General R. Craufurd’s brigade are on the march to join the army, but will not arrive here till the 24th or 25th.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Plasencia, 15th July, 1809.

‘I have nothing to add to my public letter of this date. I enclose to you the last state of the army, with such remarks upon it as may be useful to you.

‘I have but a bad account of the corps arrived from Ireland and the islands; and I have been obliged to leave them still at Lisbon, till they can get mules and other means to enable them to move; and I have desired the Officers to take advantage of that time to put them in a state fit for service.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major General Mackenzie, President of a General Court Martial.

‘SIR,

‘Plasencia, 16th July, 1809.

‘I have perused the proceedings and sentence of the General Court Martial, on the trial of —, private in the — regiment, for striking Ensign —, of the — regiment, and I am concerned that I cannot agree in opinion

with the General Court Martial in respect to their sentence, and that I must request them to revise it.

‘ There appears to be no doubt of the guilt of the prisoner — ; and the question remains for consideration whether any circumstances have appeared upon the trial which ought to prevent the Court from passing upon — the sentence of death.

‘ The only justification that can be alleged is that Ensign — “collared the prisoner —” to take him to a place of confinement, for it does not appear in any part of the evidence that — was struck by Ensign —.

‘ But supposing he was struck by the Officer, as it appears he was by the serjeant, it is no justification for the crime of the greatest magnitude that a soldier can commit, and committed, I observe, in this instance, after previous repeated threats. A soldier has modes of redress for violence committed upon him by his Officer, without threats and blows ; and the General Court Martial cannot intend, by their sentence, to give currency and sanction to an opinion that a soldier can be justified, by any circumstances, in threatening and striking his Officer.

‘ I am the more anxious that the General Court Martial should revise their sentence upon this occasion, because I am concerned to state that several instances have occurred lately of soldiers having struck Officers and non-commissioned officers in the execution of their duty.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Mackenzie.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General O'Donoghue.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Plasencia, 16th July, 1809.

‘ The Officer who was sent out to examine the road by Miajadas and Talayuela has reported that it will answer for artillery ; so that, in consequence of your letter, we shall march by it. My head quarters will be, on the 18th, at Miajadas, on the 19th, Centinello, and on the 20th at Oropesa. I am sorry to say that we shall march but ill provided with many articles which we require, owing to the deficiency in the means of transport in our possession ; and this country is either unable or unwilling to supply them. I have sent a Commissary to Gata and Ciudad Rodrigo, but

he has not been able to procure one mule; and I fear that he will not be more successful at Bejar, as there appears a general disinclination to give that assistance to the army which every army requires, more particularly in a country unprovided with magazines or strong places.

‘ Nothing shall prevent me from carrying into execution the arrangements which I settled with General Cuesta when I had the pleasure of seeing him, although to do so will be attended with the greatest inconvenience, on account of the deficiency of the means of transport, which I then hoped that this country and Ciudad Rodrigo would have afforded; but I think it but justice to the army under my command, and to His Majesty, to determine that I shall undertake no new operations till I shall have been supplied with the means of transport which the army requires; and but fair and candid towards General Cuesta to announce to him this determination at the earliest moment.

‘ The British army does not require much assistance of this description; none for the baggage of individuals; and what is wanted is to be applied solely to the transport of provisions, ammunition, money, and medical stores.

‘ All countries in which an army is acting are obliged to supply these means; and if the people of Spain are unable or unwilling to supply what the army requires, I am afraid that they must do without its services.

‘ I shall be obliged to you if you will lay this letter before General Cuesta for his information, and tell him that I shall send a copy of it to Mr. Frere for the information of the Government. I beg you at the same time to inform General Cuesta that I am convinced Señor Lozano de Torres and Colonel O’Lalor have done everything in their power to procure for the army the means of transport which we have required.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major General O’Donoju.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Plasencia, 16th July, 1809.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to Major General O’Donoju, which I beg of you to communicate to the Government.

‘ It is impossible for me to express to you the inconvenience and risk which we incur from the want of means of conveyance, which I cannot believe the country could not furnish if there existed any inclination to furnish them.

‘ I cannot but observe, however, that although to me, personally, there has been much civility from all classes of the inhabitants since I came into Spain, this has not been the case with the army in general. The Officers complain, and I believe not without reason, that the country gives unwillingly the supplies of provisions we have required, and I have been obliged to promise that they shall be replaced from our stores in Portugal; and we have not procured a cart or a mule for the service of the army. This does not look promising; and I shall certainly not persevere if our prospect of good treatment does not improve.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. H. Frere.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. We really should not be worse off in an enemy’s country; or indeed so ill, as we should there take by force what we should require.

‘ A. W.’

To C. Flint, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Plasencia, 17th July, 1809.

‘ The Spaniards took General Franceschi and his two aides de camp, Captains Antoine and Bernard, on their way from Zamora towards Tordesillas and Madrid; and I saw these gentlemen at Zarza la Mayor, on their journey to Seville, about a fortnight ago. General Franceschi was very anxious that his wife and family should be informed that he was alive, as well as his aides de camp, and not likely to be hurt, although a prisoner. I shall be much obliged to you, therefore, if you will convey to Madame Franceschi de Somme this intelligence through Holland, according to the address, “*Madame Franceschi de Somme, Rue Ville l’Evêque à Paris.*”

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Flint, Esq.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. John Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS, ‘ Plasencia, 17th July, 1809.

‘ I sent you my last dispatch to Lord Castlereagh, which will have apprised you of our intended operations.

‘ The infantry moved this morning, and the whole army will be across the Tietar to-morrow, in order to carry into execution the plan of operations concerted with Cuesta.

‘ Mr. Murray is not come up; but as soon as I shall see him, and shall get from him an exact account of the states of our supplies of money, I propose to desire him to give directions that one-sixth of all the money which may arrive from England, and which may be procured for bills at Lisbon, Cadiz, and Gibraltar, may be paid to you for the use of the Portuguese Government, your demand being about one-sixth of the estimated expenses.

‘ We do not yet know what the French are doing. The intelligence from General Cuesta looks like a retreat; that from other quarters, as if they intended to fight us on the Alberche.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘ Plasencia, 17th July, 1809.

‘ The infantry of the army moved this day, and the whole will cross the Tietar to-morrow, to co-operate with Cuesta in an attack upon the French upon the Alberche. It is not quite certain yet whether they intend to retire, or to wait for us, but I am inclined to think they will do the former.

‘ I have ordered General Lightburne, and the 2d batt. 5th regiment, and 2d batt. 58th regiment, to be prepared to obey any orders they may receive from you. Having been in camp for a fortnight, at Alcantara (Lisbon), I conclude that they are now prepared to move.

‘ I have ordered the other troops to join me by Abrantes, and I shall be obliged to you if you will arrange that this brigade, which is to join you, should proceed by any other road. You must take care of their subsistence on the road; and I beg you to recollect that they are young troops, unaccustomed to war, and I shall be obliged to you if you will

not march them more than three or four leagues in a day. They will be subsisted to the 24th of August, before they leave Lisbon.

‘ I asked Cuesta to secure for me the passes of Baños and Perales, and he has occupied the former, but has left the latter to be occupied by the Duque del Parque. I wish that you would send somebody to see how the pass is occupied, and that, at all events, you should have an eye to that pass. It will make me quite secure, and will render me the greatest service that in their present situation the Portuguese troops could render. I do not think that the French would like to venture through that pass in the existing situation of their affairs. The bridges of Alcantara and Almaraz being irreparable, they would be in a *cul de sac*, and would have no *exit*, excepting through a desert on the frontier of Portugal.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. If you do not like to have —, you may leave him at Lisbon.

‘ A. W.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Plasencia, 17th July, 1809.

‘ I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 10th instant.

‘ I do not understand to what use Dom Miguel Forjaz could apply the articles which he has demanded from the naval stores. I rather believe, however, that he would require two good cables to be passed across the river, one ahead, the other astern of the boats, to which the boats are fastened head and stern by other ropes. This is the more approved mode of fixing a bridge, particularly in a river liable as the Tagus is to sudden rises and falls.

‘ I have not yet sent off the two battalions of detachments, and shall not send them till I shall be more certain of the movements of the enemy. It is probable that it will be too late in the season before they could arrive at Abrantes, that they would experience much delay and inconvenience in embarking in boats before they could reach Valada.

‘ I am glad to find the accounts confirmed which we had

received of the evacuation of Ferrol and Coruña by the French troops.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General O'Donaju.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Miajadas, 18th July, 1809.

‘ The British army crossed the Tietar this morning, and I have my head quarters at this place. I hear that an Officer passed at Bazagona last night, with a letter for me from General Cuesta, and through the army this morning, but he missed me, and I have not yet seen him. I imagine from the dust I saw near Almaraz, that the Spanish army crossed the Tagus this day.

‘ I shall probably meet you at Oropesa, but, if I should not, I mention now, that I think it would be desirable that we should revise our plan for the attack of the enemy, so far as goes to the separation of the two armies. When at Escalona, I shall be nine leagues from you, and the enemy will have been perfectly acquainted with my movements, which will have been made along his front. It appears to me, that we ought to concentrate our attack, and both armies to cross the Alberche at or near the same place. As long as we are together, no accident can happen to either; when separate, we are both liable to be attacked by the enemy's whole force, and it does not appear to me that any object will be gained by our separation.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General O'Donaju.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Junta of Plasencia.

‘ GENTLEMEN,

‘ Miajadas, 18th July, 1809.

‘ I was much concerned that I was not at home when you did me the honor of calling upon me last night; and I have now the honor of acknowledging the receipt of the letter which you wrote to me.

‘ I am much gratified to learn that I have given you satisfaction during my residence at Plasencia, and that you have no cause for complaint of the conduct of the British troops. A certain degree of inconvenience must be felt by the in-

habitants of every town near which an army is stationed, and I did everything in my power to alleviate that which you would feel from the neighbourhood of the British army.

‘ Upon my entrance into Spain, I certainly expected to derive that assistance in provisions and other means which an army invariably receives from the country in which it is stationed; more particularly when it has been sent to the aid of the people of that country. I have not been disappointed in the expectations I had formed of receiving supplies of provisions, and I am much obliged to the Junta for the pains they have taken upon that subject, and I am convinced that they did everything in their power to procure for us the other means we required, although I am sorry to say we did not receive them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Junta of Plasencia.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General O'Donoghue.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Centinello, 19th July, 1809.

‘ I have received your paper from Colonel O'Lalor, for which I am much obliged to you. We shall be at Oropesa to-morrow.

‘ I agree with nearly all that you suggest; I wish you and General Cuesta, however, to consider of the suggestions contained in my note of yesterday.

‘ When the enemy shall retire over the bridge of the Alberche, near Talavera, it is probable that he will destroy it. The question will then arise, whether the river can be crossed there with artillery; if it cannot, in my opinion, the greatest part, if not the whole, of both armies, ought to attack by San Roman, where I understand the river is fordable for artillery; otherwise, while a part of our united army, or the British troops for instance, may be engaged with the whole of the enemy's force on the left bank of the Alberche, the Spanish army may be *hors de combat* on the right bank, by being unable to ford the river, or to repair the bridge. This would be the case, supposing the lower part of the river not to be fordable for artillery; but supposing it is so, I still think that the two armies ought to co-operate with each other, as near as possible, in order to

throw our whole concentrated force upon the enemy, and insure a victory to your new troops.

‘ When we shall cross the Alberche the engagement will have begun, the enemy will have assembled his force, and the distance of three leagues between the Spanish and British armies will be too much, and will expose both to some risk.

‘ I wish you to consider these points, and I will meet you to-morrow at Oropesa, or at Montalvan, if that place shall be more convenient to you, if you will name the hour.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General O'Donoghue.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. John Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Centinello, 19th July, 1809.

‘ I have only now received your letter of the 13th, and I am glad that I have had it in my power to gratify you with the 80,000*l.* As soon as I shall see the Commissary General, I shall desire him to arrange that you shall have one-sixth of all the money we procure for bills, &c., from England, and I can do no more.

‘ It is not my fault if the British Government have undertaken in Spain and Portugal a larger concern than they can find means to provide for.

‘ I must take measures to prevent the British troops from suffering want; and I think I provide very handsomely for the Portuguese subsidy, which amounts to one-sixth of our estimated expense, by allotting to it one-sixth of our supply, whatever it may be. I cannot do more, and cannot give you an unlimited power of taking money from the Commissary at Lisbon.

‘ Colonel — is mad; neither he nor we have anything to do with the expenses of the Vice Consul; and he knows that the Commissary General must pay the expenses of transporting the troops.

‘ I have nothing new from hence. The Spanish army has crossed the Tagus, and I believe that the French are still in the same situation. King Joseph is certainly gone to Madrid.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Captain General Don Gregorio Cuesta.

‘ SIR,

‘ Talavera de la Reyna, 23d July, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to inform your Excellency that two divisions of British infantry, and one brigade of British cavalry, will cross the Alberche to-morrow morning at four o'clock, and will proceed to the attack of the right of the enemy's position on the heights near Cazalegas. Two divisions of British infantry, and two brigades of British cavalry, will remain in reserve on the plain on the right of the Alberche, with their left on the wood near the Duque de Alva's palace, to act in support of the other British divisions, or otherwise, as circumstances may require.

‘ I understand it to be settled by your Excellency, that a Spanish division of infantry and cavalry is to cross the Alberche in a central point, between the bridge and the wood in which the Duque de Alva's palace is situated, nearly at the time the British divisions will commence their attack upon the enemy's right; and that nearly at the same time another Spanish division of infantry and cavalry, and strongly supported by artillery, is to attack the bridge over the Alberche.

‘ I also understand that your Excellency intends that a large division of infantry, and the great body of the Spanish cavalry, should be in reserve in the plain behind the Alberche.

‘ Having been this evening on the left bank of the Tagus to examine the enemy's position on that side, I am of opinion that great facility will be given, and eventual success will attend, the attack of the bridge over the Alberche, if a battalion with four 6 pounders were this night sent over the Tagus, with directions to the Commanding Officer to place himself, and use his artillery, first on the flank of the enemy's defences of the bridge, and secondly, as the Spanish troops will advance, on the left flank of his position on the heights.

‘ I am of opinion that if the guns are unlimbered, and taken over by hand, there will be no difficulty in getting them across the bridge over the Tagus, and that they can be at their station in the evening. If your Excellency

wishes it, I will send an English Officer with them to show where they ought to be stationed.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Captain General*
‘ *Don Gregorio Cuesta.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. General Sherbrooke.

‘ Talavera de la Reyna,
24th July, 1809.

‘ MY DEAR SHERBROOKE,

‘ I find that General Stewart is gone forward with two squadrons of hussars, and he followed the enemy to S^{ta} Olalla, where the rear guard was in force, and he is returning to El Bravo, which is about two leagues forward from Cazalegas, where I understand that he has some thoughts of leaving the two squadrons. You will be the best judge whether they ought to remain there, and will give your own directions upon that subject. I also find that General Cuesta is advancing with his army upon S^{ta} Olalla, and I think it more than probable that he will be in a scrape, and will send to you to move to his assistance. I beg that you will not move till you shall hear from me.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Sherbrooke.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. The Commissary sends you 5000 rations of bread, which I shall be obliged to you if you will divide among the troops of yours and Mackenzie’s divisions and Anson’s brigade.

‘ A. W.’

To Lieut. General Sherbrooke.

‘ Talavera de la Reyna,
24th July, 1809.

‘ MY DEAR SHERBROOKE,

‘ I have just received your letter of 4 P.M., and I have learnt from General Stewart that he has left the two squadrons at S^{ta} Olalla. As the Spanish armies are there, they can be of no use, and I am sure will be much better with their regiment. You will therefore do well to draw them in in the morning.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Sherbrooke.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Talavera de la Reyna, 24th July, 1809.

‘ I conclude that General Cuesta apprised the Government of the success of the first operations of the combined armies. We intended to attack the enemy this morning at daylight in his position on the Alberche, and all the arrangements were made and the columns formed for that purpose; but the enemy retired to S^{ta} Olalla in the course of last night.

‘ General Cuesta has since marched to Cevolla; and I do not know whether he intends to halt there, or what are to be his future operations.

‘ I have been obliged to intimate to him, since my arrival here, that I should consider that I had performed the engagement which I had made with him as soon as I should have removed the enemy from the Alberche, and should thereby have given him possession of the course of the Tagus, and should have laid open to him the communication with La Mancha and with General Venegas’ corps, and that I could attempt no further operation till I should be made certain of my supplies, by being furnished with proper means of transport and the requisite provisions from the country.

‘ This intimation has become still more necessary within the last two days, in which I am concerned to say that, although my troops have been on forced marches, engaged in operations with the enemy, the success of which I must say depended upon them, they have had nothing to eat, while the Spanish army have had plenty; notwithstanding that I have returns of engagements made by the alcaldes of villages in the Vera de Plasencia to furnish this army before the 24th of this month with 250,000 rations.

‘ I certainly lament the necessity which obliges me to halt at present, and will oblige me to withdraw from Spain, if it should continue. There is no man that does not acknowledge, even General Cuesta himself acknowledges, the justice and propriety of my conduct in halting now, or in eventually withdrawing; and I can only say, that I have never seen an army so ill-treated in any country, or, consi-

dering that all depends upon its operations, one which deserved good treatment so much.

‘It is ridiculous to pretend that the country cannot supply our wants. The French army is well fed, and the soldiers who are taken in good health, and well supplied with bread, of which indeed they left a small magazine behind them.

‘This is a rich country in corn, in comparison with Portugal, and yet, during the whole of my operations in that country, we never wanted bread but on one day on the frontiers of Galicia. In the Vera de Plasencia there are means to supply this army for four months, as I am informed, and yet the alcaldes have not performed their engagements with me. The Spanish army has plenty of everything, and we alone, upon whom everything depends, are actually starving.

‘I am aware of the important consequences which must attend the step which I shall take in withdrawing from Spain. It is certain that the people of England will never hear of another army entering Spain after they shall have received the accounts of the treatment we have met with; and it is equally certain that without the assistance, the example, and the countenance of a British army, the Spanish armies, however brave, will never effect their object.

‘But no man can see his army perish by want without feeling for them, and most particularly must he feel for them when he knows that they have been brought into the country in which this want is felt by his own act, and on his own responsibility, and not by orders from any superior authority.

‘I shall be obliged to you if you will make known to the Government my sentiments upon this subject.

‘I have reason to believe that the enemy are in full march towards Madrid. They had their rear guard in S^{ta} Olalla this day; and I have just heard that General Cuesta was marching to that place instead of to Cevolla. I am only afraid that he will get himself into a scrape: any movement by me to his assistance is quite out of the question.

‘I advised him to secure his communications with Venegas and the course of the Tagus, while measures should be taking to supply the British army with means of transport. If the

enemy should discover that we are not with him, he will be beaten, or must retire. In either case he may lose all the advantages which might have been derived from our joint operations and much valuable time, by his eager desire to enter Madrid on an early day. The enemy will make this discovery to-day, if Cuesta should risk any attempt upon their rear guard at S^{ta} Olalla.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. H. Frere.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Talavera de la Reyna, 24th July, 1809.

‘ I find General Cuesta more and more impracticable every day. It is impossible to do business with him, and very uncertain that any operation will succeed in which he has any concern. O’Donoju expresses himself to be heartily tired of him, and has declared that he will quit him at the first moment he is unsuccessful. He has quarrelled with some of his principal Officers; and I understand that all are dissatisfied with him, for the manner in which he has conducted his operations near this place.

‘ He contrived to lose the whole of yesterday, in which, although his troops were under arms, and mine in march, we did nothing, owing to the whimsical perverseness of his disposition; but that omission I consider fortunate, as we have dislodged the enemy without a battle, in which the chances were not much in our favor. His want of communication with his Officers of the plan settled with me for the 22d, and his absence from the field, were the cause that we did the French but little mischief on that day; and of these circumstances his Officers are aware.

‘ Upon the whole, I understand that there is a material change in the sentiments of the army respecting him; and I am told (although I cannot say that I know it to be true) that if the Government were now to deprive him of the command, the army would allow that their order should be carried into execution.

‘ However, I think that the Government, before they take this step, ought to have some cause for removing him, the justice of which would be obvious to everybody, or they

ought to be more certain that their order would not be resisted by the army than I have it in my power to make them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. H. Frere.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Talavera de la Reyna, 24th July, 1809.

‘ According to the arrangement which I had settled with General Cuesta, the army broke up from Plasencia on the 17th and 18th instant, and reached Oropesa on the 20th, where it formed a junction with the Spanish army under his command.

‘ Sir Robert Wilson had marched from the Venta de Bazagona on the Tietar, with the Lusitanian Legion, a battalion of Portuguese caçadores, and two Spanish battalions, on the 15th. He arrived at Arenas on the 19th, and at Escalona on the Alberche on the 23d.

‘ General Venegas had also been directed to break up from Madridejos on the 18th and 19th, and to march by Tembleque and Ocaña to Fuentidueña on the Tagus, where that river is crossed by a ford, and thence to Arganda, where he was to arrive on the 22d and 23d.

‘ The combined armies moved on the 22d from Oropesa, and the advanced guards attacked the enemy’s outposts at Talavera. Their left was turned by the 1st hussars and the 23d light dragoons, under General Anson, and directed by Lieut. General Payne, and by the division of infantry under the command of Major General Mackenzie, and they were driven in by the Spanish advanced guard under the command of General Zayas and the Duque de Albuquerque. We lost 11 horses by the cannonade from the enemy’s position on the Alberche, and the Spaniards had some men wounded.

‘ The columns were formed for the attack of this position yesterday, but the attack was postponed till this morning by desire of General Cuesta, when the different corps destined for the attack were put in motion. But the enemy had retired at about one in the morning to S^{ta} Olalla, and thence towards Torrijos, I conclude, to form a junction with the corps under General Sebastiani.

‘ I have not been able to follow the enemy as I could wish, an account of the great deficiency in the means of transport with this army, owing to my having found it impossible to procure even one mule or a cart in Spain.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I thought it proper to address upon this subject to Major General O’Donoju, the Adjutant General of the Spanish army, as soon as I found that this country could furnish no means of this description ; and I have since informed General Cuesta, that I should consider the removal of the enemy from his position on the Alberche as a complete performance on my part of the engagement into which I had entered with him in his camp on the 11th instant, as that operation, if advantage was duly taken of it, would give him possession of the course of the Tagus, and would open his communication with La Mancha and with Venegas.

‘ Within these two days I have had still more reason for adhering to my determination to enter into no new operation, but rather to halt, and even to return to Portugal, if I should not be supplied as I ought, as, notwithstanding His Majesty’s troops have been engaged in very active operations, the success of which depended no less upon their bravery and exertions than upon the example they should hold out and the countenance they should give to the Spanish troops, they have been in actual want of provisions for these last two days ; and even if I should have been willing, under such circumstances, to continue my co-operation with General Cuesta, I am unable to do so with any justice to the troops.

‘ General Cuesta is, I believe, fully sensible of the propriety of my determination, and I understand that he has urged the Central Junta to adopt vigorous measures to have our wants supplied. It is certain that at the present moment the people of this part of Spain are either unable or unwilling to supply them ; and in either case, and till I am supplied, I do not think it proper, and indeed I cannot, continue my operations in Spain.

‘ I ought probably to have stipulated that I should be supplied with the necessary means of transport before the army entered Spain. I did require and adopted the measures necessary to procure these means, which I conceived would have answered, considering the large supplies of the

same kind which the army under the command of the late Sir John Moore had procured ; and as I could not engage to enter upon any operations in Spain which should not be consistent with the defence of Portugal, I did not think it proper to make any stipulation for the advantage of the troops, which stipulation after all did not appear necessary, in order to enable me to procure what I wanted.

‘ I have great hopes, however, that before long I shall be supplied from Andalusia and La Mancha with the means which I require, and I shall then resume the active operations which I have been compelled to relinquish.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General O'Donju.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Talavera de la Reyna, 25th July, 1809.

‘ It is difficult to guess what are the enemy's ultimate objects. That which he has immediately in view is evidently to join with Sebastiani, who would have been in a bad scrape if we had beaten Victor yesterday. I think also that they must have some troops at Madrid, probably Suchet's corps, to oppose Venegas. He, I conclude, is by this time pretty well advanced towards, if not at, Arganda.

‘ I am doing everything in my power to procure for the army means of transport and provisions. I hope I have got some of the former, which may reach me in three or four days, and in the meantime I may get something to eat.

‘ We are still in great distress for provisions, which I do not see any very early prospect of relieving.

‘ I should recommend to General Cuesta to be very cautious in his movements, particularly of the main body of his army, and to direct his march rather to the right towards Toledo than to the left towards Madrid.

‘ I have two divisions of infantry and two regiments of cavalry at Cazalegas and Brujel, and Sir R. Wilson at Escalona; the rest of the army here. I should not be surprised if the enemy, when joined, were to offer us battle again, particularly if they have anything at Madrid to oppose Venegas.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General O'Donju.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General O'Donaju.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Cazalegas, 25th July, 1809.

‘I have just returned from Cevolla, where I heard that General Cuesta was about to retire across the Alberche. I have ordered General Sherbrooke to remain here with his corps till to-morrow morning, at all events, unless he should be hard pressed by the enemy.

‘I think that, supposing the Spanish army should cross the Alberche, it would be desirable to occupy and fortify the sand hills on the left bank of that river, near the bridge. But it would probably be best not to cross the river this evening, but to let the troops halt on this side, holding the heights with your advanced guard; and give us time till to-morrow morning to consider of the position in which it would be most expedient to place the combined armies to receive the attack which it is to be hoped the enemy will make upon us.

‘No position can be worse than that which we occupied before the French retired; but I propose to make a further reconnoissance this afternoon, and I think I shall be able to propose one to the General which will answer our purpose.

‘Pray do not give up the sand hills on the left side of the bridge.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major General O'Donaju.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. General Sherbrooke.

‘Talavera de la Reyna,
25th July, 1809.

‘MY DEAR SHERBROOKE,

‘I have reason to think that the enemy are drawing together their forces between Torrijos and Puebla de Montalban, by which position they threaten the right of our position by Cevolla. I do not know that there are any Spanish troops at that place, the whole Spanish army being, as I believe, at S^{ta} Olalla. I wish therefore that you would this night send two squadrons of hussars to Cevolla, and desire them to report all extraordinaries to you as well as to me. I think also that you should order Mackenzie to join you at daylight in the morning; for if I should find that Cevolla is not occupied by the Spanish army to-morrow

morning or this night, I shall send either one or both of your divisions to that place. Cevolla is about one league and a half from you to the south east towards the Tagus.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Sherbrooke.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General O'Donoju.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Talavera de la Reyna, 26th July, 1809.

‘ I have just received your letter of last night. I have not heard of the biscuit you mention; but if I should get that, I am ready to join you immediately. I rather believe, however, that you are mistaken respecting this business. I am now going out to look for some position near Cevolla, in case the enemy should advance, as I think that upon the Alberche is very bad.

‘ I am of opinion that the best thing which can happen would be that the enemy should attack us. I shall support General Cuesta, as far as is in my power, whether he moves to Cevolla or retreats here.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General O'Donoju.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. General Sherbrooke.

‘ Talavera de la Reyna,
26th July, 1809.

‘ MY DEAR SHERBROOKE,

‘ In a note which you wrote me yesterday, at half past 4, you mention some biscuit taken from the enemy at Maqueda. I know nothing of the circumstances attending this capture, which I conclude are referred to in the letter from Sir R. Wilson, which ought to have been, but was not, in the packet. Pray send it to me as soon as possible, or, if you have mislaid it, let me know its purport.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Sherbrooke.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. General Sherbrooke.

‘ Talavera de la Reyna, 27th July, 1809,
past 9 A.M.

‘ MY DEAR SHERBROOKE,

‘ As soon as you shall receive this, you may withdraw across the river. Leave Mackenzie's division and the cavalry

at their old position in the wood, and come yourself with the Germans to the town. If you have no enemy near you, it does not much signify where you cross the river ; if you have an enemy near you, I recommend you to cross at a ford nearer the bridge, and at a greater distance from the heights than the ford is at which you first crossed.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Sherbrooke.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. I desired Murray to look this morning for such a ford as I have above described, and to have it shown you.

‘ A. W.’

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Talavera de la Reyna, 29th July, 1809.

‘ General Cuesta followed the enemy’s march with his army from the Alberche, on the morning of the 24th, as far as S^{ta} Olalla, and pushed forward his advanced guard as far as Torrijos. For the reasons stated to your Lordship in my dispatch of the 24th, I moved only two divisions of infantry and a brigade of cavalry across the Alberche to Cazalegas, under the command of Lieut. General Sherbrooke, with a view to keep up the communication between General Cuesta and me, and with Sir Robert Wilson’s corps at Escalona.

‘ It appears that General Venegas had not carried into execution that part of the plan of operations which related to his corps, and that he was still at Daymiel, in La Mancha ; and the enemy, in the course of the 24th, 25th, and 26th, collected all his forces in this part of Spain, between Torrijos and Toledo, leaving but a small corps of 2000 men in that place.

‘ This united army thus consisted of the corps of Marshal Victor, of that of General Sebastiani, and of 7000 or 8000 men, the guards of Joseph Buonaparte, and the garrison of Madrid ; and it was commanded by Joseph Buonaparte, aided by Marshals Jourdan and Victor, and by General Sebastiani.

‘ On the 26th, General Cuesta’s advanced guard was attacked near Torrijos and obliged to fall back ; and the General retired with his army on that day to the left bank of

the Alberche, General Sherbrooke continuing at Cazalegas, and the enemy at S^{ta} Olalla.

‘ It was then obvious that the enemy intended to try the result of a general action, for which the best position appeared to be in the neighborhood of Talavera ; and General Cuesta having consented to take up this position on the morning of the 27th, I ordered General Sherbrooke to retire with his corps to its station in the line, leaving General Mackenzie with a division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry as an advanced post in the wood, on the right of the Alberche, which covered our left flank.

‘ The position taken up by the troops at Talavera extended rather more than two miles : the ground was open upon the left, where the British army was stationed, and it was commanded by a height, on which was placed *en echelon*, as the second line, a division of infantry under the orders of Major General Hill.

‘ There was a valley between the height and a range of mountains still farther upon the left, which valley was not at first occupied, as it was commanded by the height before mentioned ; and the range of mountains appeared too distant to have any influence on the expected action.

‘ The right, consisting of Spanish troops, extended immediately in front of the town of Talavera, down to the Tagus. This part of the ground was covered by olive trees, and much intersected by banks and ditches. The high road leading from the bridge over the Alberche was defended by a heavy battery in front of a church, which was occupied by Spanish infantry.

‘ All the avenues of the town were defended in a similar manner. The town was occupied, and the remainder of the Spanish infantry was formed in two lines behind the banks on the road which led from the town and the right to the left of our position.

‘ In the centre, between the two armies, there was a commanding spot of ground, on which we had commenced to construct a redoubt, with some open ground in its rear. Brig. General Alexander Campbell was posted at this spot with a division of infantry, supported in his rear by General Cotton’s brigade of dragoons and some Spanish cavalry.

‘ At about 2 o’clock on the 27th, the enemy appeared in

strength on the left bank of the Alberche, and manifested an intention to attack General Mackenzie's division. The attack was made before they could be withdrawn; but the troops, consisting of General Mackenzie's and Colonel Donkin's brigades, and General Anson's brigade of cavalry, and supported by General Payne with the other four regiments of cavalry in the plain between Talavera and the wood, withdrew in good order, but with some loss, particularly by the 2d batt. 87th regiment, and the 2d batt. 31st regiment, in the wood.

' Upon this occasion, the steadiness and discipline of the 45th regiment, and the 5th batt. 60th regiment, were conspicuous, and I had particular reason for being satisfied with the manner in which Major General Mackenzie withdrew this advanced guard.

' As the day advanced, the enemy appeared in larger numbers on the right of the Alberche, and it was obvious that he was advancing to a general attack upon the combined armies. General Mackenzie continued to fall back gradually upon the left of the position of the combined armies, where he was placed in the second line in the rear of the Guards, Colonel Donkin being placed in the same situation farther upon the left, in the rear of the King's German Legion.

' The enemy immediately commenced his attack, in the dusk of the evening, by a cannonade upon the left of our position, and by an attempt with his cavalry to overthrow the Spanish infantry, posted, as I have before stated, on the right. This attempt entirely failed.

' Early in the night, he pushed a division along the valley on the left of the height occupied by General Hill, of which he gained a momentary possession; but Major General Hill attacked it instantly with the bayonet, and regained it. This attack was repeated in the night, but failed; and again, at daylight on the morning of the 28th, by two divisions of infantry, and was repulsed by Major General Hill.

' Major General Hill has reported to me, in a particular manner, the conduct of the 29th regiment, and of the 1st batt. 48th regiment, in these different affairs, as well as that of Major General Tilson and Brig. General R. Stewart.

' We lost many brave Officers and soldiers in the defence of this important point in our position; among others, I

cannot avoid mentioning Brigade Major Fordyce and Brigade Major Gardner; and Major General Hill was himself wounded, but I am happy to say but slightly.

‘ The defeat of this attempt was followed about noon by a general attack with the enemy’s whole force upon the whole of that part of the position occupied by the British army.

‘ In consequence of the repeated attempts upon the height upon our left, by the valley, I had placed two brigades of British cavalry in that valley, supported in the rear by the Duque de Albuquerque’s division of Spanish cavalry.

‘ The enemy then placed light infantry in the range of mountains on the left of the valley, which were opposed by a division of Spanish infantry, under Lieut. General Bassecourt.

‘ The general attack began by the march of several columns of infantry into the valley, with a view to attack the height occupied by Major General Hill. These columns were immediately charged by the 1st German hussars and 23d light dragoons, under Brig. General Anson, directed by Lieut. General Payne, and supported by Brig. General Fane’s brigade of heavy cavalry; and although the 23d dragoons suffered considerable loss, the charge had the effect of preventing the execution of that part of the enemy’s plan.

‘ At the same time, he directed an attack upon Brig. General Alexander Campbell’s position in the centre of the combined armies, and on the right of the British. This attack was most successfully repulsed by Brig. General Campbell, supported by the King’s regiment of Spanish cavalry and two battalions of Spanish infantry, and Brig. General Campbell took the enemy’s cannon.

‘ The Brig. General mentions particularly the conduct of the 97th, the 2d batt. 7th, and of the 2d batt. of the 53d regiment; and I was highly satisfied with the manner in which this part of the position was defended.

‘ An attack was also made at the same time upon Lieut. General Sherbrooke’s division, which was in the left and centre of the first line of the British army. This attack was most gallantly repulsed by a charge with bayonets by the whole division; but the brigade of Guards, which were on the right, having advanced too far, they were exposed on their left flank to the fire of the enemy’s batteries, and of their retiring columns, and the division was obliged to retire

towards the original position, under cover of the second line of General Cotton's brigade of cavalry, which I moved from the centre, and of the 1st batt. 48th regiment. I had moved this last regiment from its position on the height as soon as I observed the advance of the Guards, and it was formed in the plain, and advanced upon the enemy, and covered the formation of Lieut. General Sherbrooke's division.

' Shortly after the repulse of this general attack, in which apparently all the enemy's troops were employed, he commenced his retreat across the Alberche, which was conducted in the most regular order, and was effected during the night, leaving in our hands twenty pieces of cannon, ammunition, tumbrils, and some prisoners.

' Your Lordship will observe, by the enclosed return, the great loss which we have sustained of valuable Officers and soldiers in this long and hard fought action with more than double our numbers. That of the enemy has been much greater. I have been informed that entire brigades of infantry have been destroyed; and indeed the battalions which retreated were much reduced in numbers.

' I have particularly to lament the loss of Major General Mackenzie, who had distinguished himself on the 27th, and of Brig. General Langwerth, of the King's German Legion, and of Brigade Major Beckett, of the Guards.

' Your Lordship will observe that the attacks of the enemy were principally, if not entirely, directed against the British troops. The Spanish Commander in Chief, his Officers and troops, manifested every disposition to render us assistance, and those of them who were engaged did their duty; but the ground which they occupied was so important, and its front at the same time so difficult, that I did not think it proper to urge them to make any movement on the left of the enemy while he was engaged with us.

' I have reason to be satisfied with the conduct of all the Officers and troops. I am much indebted to Lieut. General Sherbrooke for the assistance I received from him, and for the manner in which he led on his division to the charge with bayonets; to Lieut. General Payne and the cavalry, particularly Brig. General Anson's brigade, to Major Generals Hill and Tilson, Brig. Generals Alexander Campbell, Richard Stewart, and Cameron, and to the divisions and

brigades of infantry under their command respectively; particularly to the 29th regiment, commanded by Colonel White; to the 1st batt. 48th, commanded by Colonel Donellan; afterwards when that Officer was wounded, by Major Middlemore; to the 2d batt. 7th, commanded by Lieut. Colonel Sir W. Myers; to the 2d batt. 53d, commanded by Lieut. Colonel Bingham; to the 97th, commanded by Colonel Lyon; to the 1st batt. of detachments, commanded by Lieut. Colonel Bunbury; to the 2d batt. 30th, commanded by Major Watson; the 45th, commanded by Lieut. Colonel Guard; and to the 5th batt. 60th, commanded by Major Davy.

‘ The advance of the brigade of Guards was most gallantly conducted by Brig. General H. Campbell; and, when necessary, that brigade retired and formed again in the best order.

‘ The artillery, under Brig. General Howorth, was also throughout these days of the greatest service; and I had every reason to be satisfied with the assistance I received from the Chief Engineer, Lieut. Colonel Fletcher; the Adjutant General, Brig. General the Hon. C. Stewart; the Quarter Master General, Colonel Murray; and the Officers of those departments respectively; and from Lieut. Colonel Bathurst, and the Officers of my personal Staff.

‘ I also received much assistance from Colonel O’Lalor, of the Spanish service, and from Brig. General Whittingham, who was wounded in bringing up the two Spanish battalions to the assistance of Brig. General Alexander Campbell.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Return of Ordnance captured from the enemy at the battle of Talavera de la Reyna.

15 pieces of cannon, of various calibre.

2 howitzers.

2 tumbrils, with ammunition complete.

Return of the numbers of killed, wounded, and missing of the army under the command of Lieut. General the Hon. Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B., in action with the French army commanded by King Joseph Buonaparte in person, at Talavera de la Reyna, on the 27th and 28th July, 1809.*

| | Officers. | Serjeants. | Rank and File. | Horses. | Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File. |
|-----------------|-----------|------------|----------------|---------|---|
| Killed | 40 | 28 | 789 | 211 | 857 |
| Wounded | 195 | 165 | 3553 | 71 | 3913 |
| Missing | 9 | 15 | 629 | 159 | 653 |

* GENERAL ORDER.

‘ Horse Guards, 18th August, 1809.

‘ The Commander in Chief has received the King’s commands to notify to the army the splendid victory obtained by his troops in Spain, under the command of Lieut. General the Right Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, on the 27th and 28th of the last month, at the battle of Talavera de la Reyna.

‘ His Majesty is confident that his army will learn, with becoming exultation, that the enemy, after escaping by a precipitate retreat from the well concerted attack with which Sir Arthur Wellesley, in conjunction with the Spanish army, had threatened him on the 24th of July, concentrated his force, by calling to his aid the corps under the French General, Sebastiani, and the garrison of Madrid, and thus reinforced, again approaching the allied army, on the 27th of July; and on this occasion, owing to the local circumstances of its position, and to the deliberate purpose of the enemy to direct his whole efforts against the troops of His Majesty, the British army sustained nearly the whole weight of this great contest, and has acquired the glory of having vanquished a French army double its numbers, not in a short and partial struggle, but in a battle obstinately contested on two successive days (not wholly discontinued even throughout the intervening night), and fought under circumstances which brought both armies into close and repeated combat.

‘ The King, in contemplating so glorious a display of the valor and prowess of his troops, has been graciously pleased to command that his royal approbation of the conduct of the army serving under the command of Lieut. General Sir Arthur Wellesley shall be thus publicly declared in General Orders.

‘ The Commander in Chief has received the King’s commands to signify, in the most marked and special manner, the sense His Majesty entertains of Lieut. General Sir Arthur Wellesley’s personal services on this memorable occasion, not less displayed in the result of the battle itself than in the consummate ability, valor, and military resource, with which the many difficulties of this arduous and protracted contest were met and provided for by his experience and judgment.

‘ The conduct of Lieut. General Sherbrooke, second in command, has entitled

MEMORANDUM UPON THE BATTLE OF TALAVERA.

‘The position was well calculated for the troops which were to occupy it. The ground in front of the British army was open, that in front of the Spanish army covered with olive trees, intersected by roads, ditches, &c. The Spanish infantry was posted behind the bank of the road leading from Talavera to the left of the position.

‘The German Legion were on the left of the position in the first line. I had intended this part for the Guards; but I was unfortunately out, employed in bringing in General Mackenzie’s advanced guard when the troops took up their ground. The 5th and 7th battalions of the legion did not stand their ground on the evening, and in the beginning of the night of the 27th, which was the cause of the momentary loss of the height in the second line.

‘General Sherbrooke moved his division, which was the

him to the King’s marked approbation: His Majesty has observed, with satisfaction, the manner in which he led on the troops to the charge with the bayonet—a species of combat which on all occasions so well accords with the dauntless character of British soldiers.

‘His Majesty has noticed with the same gracious approbation the conduct of the several General and other Officers. All have done their duty; most of them have had occasions of eminently distinguishing themselves, the instances of which have not escaped His Majesty’s attention.

‘It is His Majesty’s command, that his royal approbation and thanks shall be given, in the most distinct and most particular manner, to the non-commissioned officers and private men. In no instance have they displayed, with greater lustre, their native valor and characteristic energy; nor have they on any former occasion more decidedly proved their superiority over the inveterate enemy of their country.

‘Brilliant, however, as is the victory obtained at Talavera, it is not solely on that occasion that Lieut. General Sir Arthur Wellesley and the troops under his command are entitled to His Majesty’s applause. The important service effected in an early part of the campaign by the same army, under the command of the same distinguished General, by the rapid march on the Douro, the passage of that river, the total discomfiture of the enemy, and his expulsion from the territory of one of His Majesty’s ancient and most faithful allies, are circumstances which have made a lasting impression on His Majesty’s mind, and have induced His Majesty to direct that the operations of this arduous and eventful campaign shall be thus recorded, as furnishing splendid examples of military skill, fortitude, perseverance, and of a spirit of enterprise, calculated to produce emulation in every part of his army, and largely to add to the renown and to the military character of the British nation.

‘By order of the Right Hon. the Commander in Chief,

‘HENRY CALVERT,

‘Adjutant General.’

left of the first line, to support General Hill's attack, in order to regain the height ; and it was difficult to resume in the night the exact position which had been first marked out ; and in fact, on account of these circumstances, we had not that precise position till after the enemy's attack upon the height at daylight in the morning had been repulsed.

‘ The advance of the Guards to the extent to which it was carried was nearly fatal to us, and the battle was certainly saved by the advance, position, and steady conduct of the 48th regiment, upon which General Sherbrooke's division formed again.

‘ The ground in front of the Spanish troops would not have been unfavorable to an attack upon the enemy's flank, while they were engaged with us, as there were broad roads leading from Talavera and different points of their position, in a direct line to the front, as well as diagonally to the left. But the Spanish troops are not in a state of discipline to attempt a manœuvre in olive grounds, &c., and if they had got into confusion all would have been lost.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Right Hon. John Villiers.

‘ Talavera de la Reyna,
29th July, 1809.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ The enemy having collected all the troops he had in this part of Spain, attacked us here on the 27th. The battle lasted till yesterday evening, when we beat him in all parts of our line ; and he retreated in the evening and night, leaving in our hands twenty pieces of cannon, ammunition, waggons, prisoners, &c. The battle was a most desperate one. Our loss has been very great, that of the enemy larger. The attack was made principally upon the British, who were on the left ; and we had about two to one against us ; fearful odds ! but we maintained all our positions, and gave the enemy a terrible beating.

‘ The Spanish troops that were engaged behaved well ; but there were very few of them engaged, as the attack was made upon us.

‘ I have received your letters of the 19th and 22d July. I shall send the Commissariat an extract of your letter

respecting the want of bills; it is strange that there should be any want of this kind.

‘ I rather believe that a Commissary, Mr. Belson, has been sent to Ciudad Rodrigo, to settle our accounts and pay our debts there, notwithstanding that two gentlemen have been sent to Lisbon for the same purpose. I shall write also to the Commissary General upon this subject.

‘ The demands of the Portuguese upon our funds are so very large, as well on account of debts as of subsidy, that I do not know how to answer them; but I will see what can be done in respect to this debt on bills.

‘ I wish that you would give Government a hint privately that they have embarked on too wide a scale, and that the funds which they have provided cannot supply us and the Portuguese subsidy, and Sir John Moore’s old debts in Portugal and Spain.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. I shall send you my dispatch, and one to the Regency to-morrow.

‘ A. W.’

To Lieut. Colonel Gordon, Military Secretary.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Talavera de la Reyna, 29th July, 1809.

‘ I beg that you will do me the favor of recommending Major Middlemore to the particular protection of the Commander in Chief. He commanded the 1st batt. 48th regiment, after Colonel Donellan was wounded, during the greater part of the advance of that corps, which tended so much to the final success of the action yesterday, by covering and enabling General Sherbrooke’s division to form again. He is, besides, an excellent Officer, and if his conduct then did not, I would almost say, demand promotion, his uniform good conduct and attention to his duty would do so.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Gordon,
Military Secretary.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Talavera de la Reyna, 29th July, 1809.

‘ I have to inform you, that the enemy having collected all their forces in this part of Spain, made an attack upon the

combined armies on the day before yesterday, which lasted till a late hour yesterday. Their principal efforts were directed against the British troops, which were upon the left of our position; but they were repulsed in all their attacks with considerable loss, and they retreated during the night, leaving in our hands twenty pieces of cannon, some ammunition, tumbrils, prisoners, &c.

‘ Our loss has been very large indeed, as may well be imagined, considering that, during two days and a night, we were attacked by a body of French troops of more than double our strength.

‘ But a reinforcement of 3000 men has joined the army this morning, which will, I hope, make up in some degree for our loss of men: that of Officers is, I am afraid, irreparable.

‘ I am well satisfied with the conduct of the Spanish Officers and troops who had an opportunity of assisting us. Bassecourt’s division was of great use to us in covering our left flank on a mountain. The regiment of cavalry, I think called the King’s, made an excellent and well-timed charge upon our right, and the Duque de Alburquerque, who was in the rear of our left, showed throughout the day the utmost readiness to do what I wished. Two pieces of cannon, 8 pounders, which I borrowed from General Cuesta, were likewise very useful to us.

‘ I beg that you will apprise Government of these circumstances. I shall send you a copy of my dispatch to the Secretary of State as soon as I shall have time to write it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. H. Frere.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ Talavera de la Reyna,
29th July, 1809.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ I have received your letters of the 19th, 23d, and 26th July, the last by Sewell, who will give you an account of the manner in which we have been engaged for the last two days.

‘ I have given directions that the debts of the British army at Ciudad Rodrigo may be paid, which, I trust, will re-establish confidence in that quarter. A Commissary is gone there, which measure was, I believe, necessary; at the same time that I believe two Spaniards are gone to Lisbon to

settle the account. The debt will, however, be positively paid, if I can get any obedience to my orders.

‘ I shall communicate with General Tilson, respecting the demand upon him at Guarda.

‘ I shall endeavor to let you have some blankets, and will let you know how many.

‘ I send you the decision of the Commander in Chief, received this day, on my letter of reference of the 7th June. You will now appoint your Officers as you may think proper.

‘ Your position now becomes more important to me than ever it was. The result of the battles of the 27th and 28th must show the enemy that they have nothing to hope from a general action, and they must and will endeavor now to act upon my communications with Portugal, by the troops which they are re-organizing to the northward.

‘ What I should wish to see would be a good communication between you and Romana, upon the Eastern frontier of Portugal, for your mutual security, that of my left, and the safety of Portugal, Ciudad Rodrigo, &c.

‘ If this was once settled, and I shall work with the Junta upon it, while you may do the same by Romana, you might place yourself where you pleased, the enemy would not like to venture through the passes into Estremadura, having me on one side of him, and you and Romana on the other, or into the *cul de sac*, Portugal. You and Romana would be thus most useful to the general cause; and in proportion as your armies should become disciplined, you would aid in driving them north, if they should not be disposed to go that way after what they received yesterday. Their loss was immense, but ours was so likewise.

‘ My intention now is to get Cuesta to follow them, particularly if they should have detached a corps this morning to oppose Venegas, who, I believe, entered Toledo yesterday; and I shall follow as soon as my troops are a little rested and refreshed, after two days of the hardest fighting I have ever been a party to. We shall certainly move towards Madrid, if not interrupted by some accident on our flank.

‘ If you cannot arrange a good communication and understanding with Romana, with a view to these specified objects, you must look to your own security and that of Portugal, rather than to mine, and to the benefit of the common cause;

and if, while I am operating in the common cause, I cannot, from any circumstances, be secured as I ought to be, I must give up the common cause, and seek for security by turning round and attacking the army which may attempt my flank, leaving Cuesta to manage his affairs as he can.

‘ These are my general opinions upon this subject; you must decide yourself upon the details. A position which would prevent the enemy from attacking the Puerto de Baños with a large force (for there is a small Spanish corps now taking care of it) would be most useful to me. If you and Romana communicated and understood each other well, you might take each a position which, at the same time, would cover Portugal and Ciudad Rodrigo. But if you do not understand each other, you are not, I believe, sufficiently strong to be of much use to me.

‘ I shall try and prevail upon the Junta to give you some Spanish cavalry.

‘ I shall send you a copy of my dispatch to the Secretary of State. Apprise the Duque del Parque and the Marques de la Romana of our success of yesterday and the day before.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Talavera de la Reyna, 30th July, 1809.

‘ We have received this morning accounts that the enemy are threatening the pass of the Puerto de Baños, which leads to Plasencia, in which object, if they should succeed, they would cut off my communication with Portugal, and may otherwise do us infinite mischief.

‘ I have long had in view this operation of the enemy, and, upon my arrival at Plasencia, I prevailed upon General Cuesta to place in the Puerto de Baños a small corps, under the command of the Marques de la Reyna. I had also desired General Beresford long ago to collect the Portuguese army on the frontier of Portugal; by which measure not only would he have protected that country and Ciudad Rodrigo, but he would have saved my left flank by the security which he would have given to the passes through the mountains into Estremadura.

‘ I am afraid, however, that General Beresford is, unfortunately, not strong enough for the enemy in that quarter. He will not be able to collect more than 10,000 to 15,000 men, of which only 600 are cavalry, and the troops none of them of the best description; whereas the enemy have, on the Duero and in the neighborhood, not less than 20,000 men, being the remains of the corps of Soult, Ney, and Kellermann.

‘ From your knowledge of my instructions, it must be obvious to you, that my first duty is to attend to the safety of Portugal, and I must do nothing which can be deemed inconsistent with that object. At all events, if my flank and communication with Portugal are not secured for me while I am operating in the general cause, I must move to take care of myself, and then the general cause must suffer.

‘ It appears to me, however, that by a better and more combined arrangement of our forces, we shall be able to effect all our objects.

‘ First, I would recommend that the Marques de la Romana, who has, as I understand, 25,000 men in arms somewhere near Formoselle, at the junction of the Tormes and the Duero, and the Duque del Parque should be ordered by the Central Junta, without loss of time, to communicate and come to an understanding with Marshal Beresford, to whom I have already given directions on this subject, and that they should direct their efforts to the following specific objects:— To secure the frontiers of Portugal; to secure the city of Ciudad Rodrigo; to secure the passages into Estremadura through the mountains, and, consequently, my left flank.

‘ Secondly, I should recommend that the Government should adopt measures to reinforce these combined armies with cavalry. The Duque del Parque has one regiment, that of La Reyna, but there ought to be 3000 or 4000.

‘ If these measures were adopted, the enemy would not venture to move into Estremadura, as he would expect to be opposed in front, and attacked in his rear, by our combined Spanish and Portuguese force, whose original position might, in the first instance, be calculated only to give security to the frontiers of Portugal and to Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ By degrees, as we should be enabled to get on in this quarter, and as the Spanish and Portuguese troops under

the Marques de la Romana and Beresford would be disciplined, we might look further, and make them act on the offensive in the general cause.

‘ I shall be obliged to you if you will take these suggestions into consideration, and convey them to the Government, if you should approve of them ; but I hope they will lose no time in sending their orders, as the object is of importance.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. H. Frere.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General O'Donaju.

‘ SIR,

‘ Talavera de la Reyna, 31st July, 1809.

‘ Adverting to the intelligence which has been received of the movements of a French corps towards the Puerto de Baños, I cannot avoid requesting that you would press his Excellency General Cuesta to detach towards that quarter, on this night, a division of his infantry with its guns, and a Commanding Officer upon whose exertions and abilities he can rely.

‘ I certainly never should have advanced so far, if I had not had reason to believe that that point was secure ; and I still think that the movements of General Beresford with the Portuguese army on the frontier, or that of the Duque del Parque from Ciudad Rodrigo, combined with the natural difficulties of the country, and the defence by the Marques de la Reyna, may delay the enemy's advance till the arrival of this division.

‘ At all events this division will not be missed here, and it will be in a situation to observe the enemy, if he should have crossed the mountains before the arrival of the division. But if the division should arrive in time, it will perform a most important service to the common cause, as it will preclude the necessity of my adopting more effectual measures to re-establish and secure my communication with Portugal, which measures must tend to delay the execution of all our plans against the great body of the enemy.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General O'Donaju.*

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. I have to observe that his Excellency is equally

interested with me in preventing this irruption into Plasencia, as the enemy's first step will certainly be to interrupt his Excellency's communication with Seville by the bridge of Almaraz.

'A. W.'

To Major General O'Donaju.

'MY DEAR SIR,

'Talavera de la Reyna, 31st July, 1809.

'I have just received intelligence from a man of the 60th regiment, who was taken prisoner on the 28th, that the enemy are in the villages on the other side of the Alberche; and I think it would be desirable to adopt, at an early period, some mode of ascertaining this point, by the observation of Officers or peasants or others, from this side of the Alberche, and from the other side the Tagus.

'In addition to the official letter which I have written to you this morning, respecting the advance of the enemy through the Puerto de Baños, I cannot but observe to you that the situation of both armies will become very critical in such an event.

'There is but one way to avoid it, besides stopping the enemy's advance through the Puerto de Baños, and that is, to urge on the advance of General Venegas towards Madrid, by a line, as distant and as distinct from that adopted by the combined armies as may be possible. The enemy must then detach from his main body to oppose him, and the main body will in that case be so much weakened as to enable us to attack it without disadvantage, or, if that measure should be preferable, to enable the combined armies to detach a sufficient corps to beat the army which is supposed to be advancing through the mountains of Plasencia.

'I shall be obliged to you if you will explain these my sentiments to General Cuesta.

'Believe me, &c.

'Major General O'Donaju.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.

'SIR,

'Talavera de la Reyna, 31st July, 1809.

'I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Don Martin de Garay, upon which I request of you to convey to him the following observations.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to him if he will understand that I have no authority, nay, that I have been directed not to correspond with any of the Spanish ministers; and I request that he will in future convey to me through you the commands which he may have for me. I am convinced that I shall then avoid the injurious and uncandid misrepresentations of what passes, which Don Martin de Garay has more than once sent to me, apparently with a view of placing on the records of his Government statements of my actions and conduct which are entirely inconsistent with the truth, and to which statements I have no regular means of replying.

‘ As soon as my line of march into Spain was determined upon, which you and Don Martin de Garay are aware was not till a very late period, I sent to procure means of transport and other supplies at the places in which I considered it most likely I should get them, namely, Plasencia, Ciudad Rodrigo, Gata, Bejar, &c. ; and as soon as I found that I had failed, I wrote to General O'Donoju, on the 16th July, a letter, of which you have, and of which I know the Government have, a copy, in which I told him that, as I had not received the assistance I required, I could undertake for no more than the first operation, which I had settled with General Cuesta in my interview with him on the 11th. It is therefore an unfounded assertion that the first account that the Government received of my intentions not to undertake any new operations was when they heard that I had left General Cuesta alone to pursue the enemy.

‘ The statement is not true, for, although I disapproved of General Cuesta's advance of the 24th and 25th, which I knew would end as it did, I did support it with two divisions of infantry and a brigade of cavalry, which covered his retreat to the Alberche on the 26th, and his passage of that river on the 27th: and supposing the assertion to have been true, and that General Cuesta was exposed to be attacked by the enemy when alone, it was his fault and not mine; and I had given him fair notice, not only by my letter of the 16th July, but frequently afterwards, that I could do no more.

‘ It is not a difficult matter for a gentleman in the situation of Don Martin de Garay to sit down in his cabinet and write his ideas of the glory which would result from driving the

French through the Pyrenees; and I believe there is no man in Spain who has risked so much, or who has sacrificed so much, to effect that object as I have.

‘ But I wish that Don Martin de Garay, or the gentlemen of the Junta, before they blame me for not doing more, or impute to me beforehand the probable consequences of the blunders, or the indiscretion of others, would either come or send here somebody to satisfy the wants of our half starved army, which, although they have been engaged for two days, and have defeated twice their numbers, in the service of Spain, have not bread to eat. It is positively a fact that, during the last seven days, the British army have not received] one third of their provisions; that at this moment there are nearly 4000 wounded soldiers dying in the hospital in this town from want of common assistance and necessaries, which any other country in the world would have given even to its enemies; and that I can get no assistance of any description from the country. I cannot prevail upon them even to bury the dead carcasses in the neighborhood, the stench of which will destroy themselves as well as us.

‘ I cannot avoid feeling these circumstances; and the Junta must see that, unless they and the country make a great exertion to support and supply the armies, to which the invariable attention and the exertion of every man and the labor of every beast in the country ought to be directed, the bravery of the soldiers, their losses and their success, will only make matters worse and increase our embarrassment and distress.

‘ I positively will not move, nay, more, I will disperse my army, till I am supplied with provisions and means of transport as I ought to be.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. H. Frere.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. Colonel Gordon, Military Secretary.

‘ SIR,

‘ Talavera de la Reyna, 31st July, 1809.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a memorial to the Commander in Chief from Captain Mellish, who is an Assistant Adjutant General with this army.

‘ I beg leave to recommend Captain Mellish in the most

particular manner to the attention of the Commander in Chief, as an Officer whose activity, ability, and attention to his duty upon all occasions deserve, and have obtained, the approbation of all those with whom he has served.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Gordon,*
Military Secretary.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To W. Huskisson, Esq., Secretary to the Treasury.

‘ Talavera de la Reyna,
1st August, 1809.

‘ MY DEAR HUSKISSON,

‘ I have received your letters of the 8th June and 19th July.

‘ The supplies of money have come very opportunely, and I hope that you will contrive to supply us with all you can afford. You are certainly mistaken in England respecting the sums of money to be procured at Lisbon, Gibraltar, or Cadiz, for bills. They are not near so large as you imagine ; and, indeed, till the money arrived from England, and that which had been sent to be changed arrived from Cadiz, the sum we procured for bills was trifling indeed.

‘ If circumstances should prevent Government from supplying us with money, it ought to become a question with them whether they should keep us here, for we can do nothing without money ; and indeed our existence in this country, unless supplied with sufficient quantities, would become very precarious.

‘ I do not know what we can do more than we have done to draw to our net all the money which is to be got for bills at Gibraltar, Cadiz, and Lisbon, unless indeed we were to insist that none of the British authorities, excepting the Commissary General, should draw bills at the two former places, as we have done at Lisbon, and thus leave the market to him alone ; and of course to him the charge of providing supplies for the expenses at Gibraltar and those at Cadiz. We might not get more money by this mode of proceeding, as I believe we now get all that there is, but we might get it at rather a cheaper rate.

‘ On the other hand, it must be observed, that as the Commissary General of this army would under this arrangement be obliged to furnish supplies of money for the ex-

penses of Gibraltar and Cadiz, he would be obliged to keep the treasuries at those places full to the extent of the regular demands upon him, and thus we might not get the resource from those places which we may expect under the existing arrangement. We feel very much in this manner the inconvenience of the heavy demands on the Commissary General at Lisbon, for services not altogether of a military description. But we could not get on at all there, if anybody but the Commissary General were permitted to draw a bill.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *W. Huskisson, Esq.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General O'Donaju.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Talavera de la Reyna, 1st August, 1809.

‘ We have got thirteen pieces of French artillery, which I wish to give over to the Spanish army; the other seven you have already got. I shall be obliged to you if you will urge General Cuesta to desire the Commanding Officer of the Spanish artillery to receive charge of them from the Commanding Officer of the English artillery.

‘ We want ninety artillery horses to complete the number required to draw the guns we have in the field. Could you give us any assistance in this way, either in draught horses or mules?

‘ During the action of the 28th many of the horses of our dragoons and of the artillery strayed, and were taken possession of by the stragglers from the Spanish army who were in the rear of the town. I see English horses, with short tails, in possession of many of the Spanish troops; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will urge General Cuesta to give an order that all persons having in their possession English horses, or horse appointments, such as saddles, bridles, &c., should take them to the English cavalry lines forthwith.

‘ I also understand, that on the morning of the 29th, when our Officers and soldiers were engaged in collecting the wounded and in burying the dead, the arms and accoutrements of both were collected and carried away by the Spanish troops. The consequence is, that, as our soldiers recover in the hospital, we shall have no arms or accoutre-

ments for them. I shall be very much obliged to General Cuesta if he will give orders that all English arms and accoutrements of infantry may be lodged at the convent of San Geronimo.

‘We are much in want of medical assistance for the attendance of the wounded in the hospital; and I have been obliged to send there all those who ought properly to do duty with the regiments in the field. This cripples our operations much; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will urge General Cuesta to apply to the Government for the assistance of at least forty or fifty Surgeons as soon as possible, who shall be paid at the same rate as the Hospital Mates in the British service.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major General O’Donaju.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD,

‘Talavera de la Reyna, 1st August, 1809.

‘Since I last had the honor of addressing you on the 29th July, the enemy have continued to keep a rear guard of about 10,000 men on the heights on the left of the Alberche, and I imagine that the whole army is still in the neighborhood. It is difficult, however, to ascertain the fact, owing to the great deficiency of intelligence in the Spanish army.

‘On the 30th we received intelligence that provisions had been ordered for a French corps of 10,000 or 12,000 men, on the road from Alba de Tormes towards Bejar, in the Puerto de Baños, which affords the best road through the range of mountains which separates Plasencia and Estremadura from Castille.

‘I had hoped that this pass had been effectually secured by the Spanish troops, otherwise I certainly should not have moved from Plasencia; and I had taken the further precaution to secure that point, as well as the frontier of Portugal, by directing Marshal Beresford to assemble the Portuguese army in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo, within the Spanish frontier.

‘I am apprehensive, however, that the Marshal, although he was at Ciudad Rodrigo, had not been able to collect his troops in time; and as I cannot prevail upon General Cuesta to detach a sufficient force to secure that important point, I

am apprehensive that this French corps will pass through the mountains into Estremadura in our rear.

‘ These circumstances, combined with the extreme fatigue of the troops, the want of provisions, and the number of wounded to be taken care of, have prevented me from moving from my position.

‘ Brig. General Robert Craufurd arrived with his brigade on the 29th, in the morning, having marched twelve Spanish leagues in a little more than twenty four hours.

‘ General Venegas’ corps arrived upon the Tagus on the 28th and 29th; and he attacked Toledo with a detachment under Brig. General Lacy, and moved himself to the bridge of Aranjuez.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Talavera de la Reyna, 1st August, 1809.

‘ When I addressed you this morning I had not received the report from the outposts. It appears that the enemy withdrew the rear guard which was posted on the heights on the left of the Alberche last night at 11 o’clock, and the whole army marched towards S^{ta} Olalla, I conclude, with an intention of taking up a position in the neighborhood of the Guadarama, with a view to be able to throw their whole force upon Venegas, or upon this army, if either should move towards Madrid.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Castlereagh.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Talavera de la Reyna, 1st August, 1809.

‘ My public letters will give you some idea of our situation. It is one of some embarrassment, but of which I think I shall get the better, I hope, without fighting another desperate battle, which would really cripple us so much as to render all our efforts useless. I certainly should get the better of everything, if I could manage General Cuesta; but his temper and disposition are so bad, that that is impossible.

‘ Venegas’ movement will probably relieve our front. I

think it probable also that the French will not like to press through the Puerto de Baños, having Beresford's army on their rear, and a victorious army in their front; and indeed that point would be quite secure, if I could prevail upon General Cuesta to reinforce his troops at Bejar, so as to secure that point as I had understood it was.

' We are miserably supplied with provisions, and I do not know how to remedy this evil. The Spanish armies are now so numerous that they eat up the whole country. They have no magazines, nor have we, nor can we collect any; and there is a scramble for everything.

' I think the battle of the 28th is likely to be of great use to the Spaniards; but I do not think them yet in a state of discipline to contend with the French; and I prefer infinitely to endeavor to remove the enemy from this part of Spain by manœuvre to the trial of another pitched battle.

' The French, in the last, threw their whole force upon us, and although it did not succeed, and will not succeed in future, we shall lose great numbers of men, which we can but ill afford. I dare not attempt to relieve ourselves from the weight of the attack by bringing forward the Spanish troops, owing to their miserable state of discipline, and their want of Officers properly qualified. These troops are entirely incapable of performing any manœuvre, however simple. They would get into irretrievable confusion, and the result would probably be the loss of everything.

' I have received your Lordship's letter of the 11th July, for which I am much obliged to you. I hope that your expedition will succeed. I guessed the point to which it was directed.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Viscount Castlereagh.*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right. Hon. J. H. Frere.

' MY DEAR SIR,

' Talavera de la Reyna, 2d August, 1809.

' The state in which our men in hospital are from want of sheets and shirts induces me to request of you to prevail upon the Government to have 5000 or 6000 of each sent here from Seville without loss of time: 200 mules would carry the whole, and I will pay for them.

' I have seen a letter from the Government to General

Cuesta, stating that they had determined to send us a large quantity of salt beef. If, instead of salt beef, they would form in this neighborhood a magazine of 300,000 or 400,000 lbs. of biscuit, they would enable us to get on and to take advantage of our successes.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. H. Frere.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General O'Donaju.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Oropesa, 3d August, 1809.

‘ I arrived here a little after 12, but have received no intelligence of the enemy. There is no dust forwards; and I understand that we have a Commissary at Naval moral, who would probably have moved if he had heard of the enemy on this side of the Tietar. I have written to General Bassecourt to recommend to him to halt to-morrow at Centinello, and to patrol the roads in the Vera de Plasencia, as well as in his front.

‘ The movements of the enemy which Sir Robert Wilson announced in his letter of last night, which I gave you this morning, induce me to think that he will not endeavor again to force his way through the valley of Talavera; but that he intends to be in readiness to aid Soult by Escalona, between the Alberche and the Tietar.

‘ If I should be correct in this notion, General Cuesta may be induced to give up his position at Talavera, and then my hospital there will be placed in a state of risk. This gives me much uneasiness. At all events, in the present state of our operations, it appears to me that the hospital is too far advanced at Talavera, and I am very desirous of removing it farther back.

‘ I wish that you would mention this subject to General Cuesta, and request him, from me, to make a requisition in the country south of the Tagus, for carts to remove the hospital. It is impossible to hope to be able to remove it at once. Indeed, to attempt it might destroy the men whom we wish to save; but by first fixing upon an intermediate station, at no great distance from Talavera, we might soon remove the whole from thence, and afterwards by degrees to the place to be ultimately fixed upon for the hospital.

‘ I cannot avoid again taking this opportunity of recom-

mending that General Venegas should be ordered to keep the enemy in a state of alarm for the safety of Madrid, by the road of Fuentidueña and Arganda, as the only one by which he can oblige the enemy to keep his forces divided. This is really necessary, till we shall have our rear clear and secure again.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General O'Donaju.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General O'Donaju.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Oropesa, 3d August, 1809.

‘ I have just received your letter of this day and its enclosures. I acknowledge that I do not conceive the enemy are likely to attack you or to harass me, as they say they will, for some time, and I wish that General Cuesta had remained a little longer. Sir Robert Wilson must give you notice if they break through at Escalona; and you are in time if you march when you find the enemy making that movement, or breaking up for a forward movement from Sta Olalla. You see that Joseph, with Sebastiani's corps, is, or rather was, at Bargas. At all events I conceive that it will be desirable that you should delay your march till morning, and send off your wounded Commissariat, baggage, &c., before you, and that you should halt in the wood where the venta is, till the wounded shall have arrived at Arzobispo, and your baggage be here.

‘ Depend upon it you are mistaken in Soult's strength; and that Victor, without Sebastiani and the King, who cannot move, while Venegas is where he is, can do us no harm.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General O'Donaju.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. I conclude that you will take care to establish a strong post at Arzobispo, and destroy the bridge at Talavera.

‘ A. W.’

To General Bassecourt.

‘ MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

‘ Oropesa, le 3 Août, 1809.

‘ Je suis arrivé ici avec l'armée Anglaise, ayant l'intention d'arrêter les progrès du corps Français que l'on dit être entré à Plasencia par le Puerto de Baños. Je vous serai

bien obligé de me faire savoir si vous avez quelques nouvelles de ce corps. Comme ce corps là est plus fort que celui que vous avez sous vos ordres, il me paraît que vous êtes trop en avant de moi. Je vous conseille donc de faire halte demain à Centinello ; j'irai à Navalmoral si je le puis, et vous serez à deux ou trois lieues de distance. Si l'ennemi connaît nos mouvemens, il tâchera de passer par la Vera de Plasencia à l'autre côté du Tietar. Il ne peut pas y mener son canon, mais je vous prie d'avoir l'œil sur cette route.

‘ J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

‘ *Le Général Bassecourt.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General O'Donaju.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Oropesa, 3d August, 1809.

‘ I have just heard that the enemy was coming into Navalmoral this afternoon, and I also understand that your Officer at Almaraz was prepared to break the bridge upon the first appearance of the enemy. This being the case, what does General Cuesta propose to do ? I think it probable that he would be able to drive off Soult if he is alone, or even with Ney ; but you know much time must elapse before your bridge would be repaired, if it could be repaired at all ; and it would not be pleasant to fight a general action with the whole French army, with the river at our back, and no means of passing it.

‘ We cannot fight here without holding Calera, which appears to me to be impracticable, and, therefore, what I would recommend is, that the whole army should assemble at this side the bridge of Arzobispo. I have written to General Bassecourt to recommend that, as soon as he shall receive my letter, he should march either to this place or to La Calzada.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General O'Donaju.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To General Bassecourt.

‘ MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

‘ Oropesa, le 3 Août, 1809.

‘ Je viens de recevoir la nouvelle que l'ennemi est entré cet après-midi à Navalmoral.

‘ Je crois que le Général Cuesta a marché cet après-dîner à trois heures, et il m'informe que l'ennemi est en force des

deux côtés. Je vous conseille donc de marcher aussitôt que vous aurez reçu cette lettre à la Calzada ou à cette place.

‘ Si vous allez à la Calzada, envoyez un Officier pour prévenir nos patrouilles.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *Le Général Bassecourt.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Oropesa, 3d August, 1809.

‘ The movement of Soult through the Puerto de Baños has deranged all our plans, and I am obliged to return to drive him out. I think you might be able to assist us materially in effecting this object, or probably even to cut off his retreat entirely.

‘ We understand that he arrived at Plasencia on the 1st, and I have not yet heard that he has moved from thence; but I shall desire the Officer who will take you this to procure for you all the intelligence he can up to the latest moment. I intend to go to Naval Moral to-morrow, and if I should find that Soult is still at Plasencia, I hope to be at that place by the 6th or 7th.

‘ We are miserably off, however, for provisions, and it is possible that I may be obliged to halt a day, to endeavor to procure a day’s bread for the men. If we should find Soult at Plasencia, he will endeavor to retreat by the Puerto de Baños, or by that of Perales, or he may make a run for Portugal. I think that you may stop him for me either in Perales or Baños. You cannot do much if he goes for Portugal, where we must make other and more extensive arrangements. I wish you, therefore, if you can, to occupy Baños and Perales as soon as possible after you shall have received this letter. I rather think that there is a point not far from Plasencia, intermediate between the two passes, which effectually commands the road to either from Plasencia. If this should be the case, which you will find out at Ciudad Rodrigo, I recommend you to occupy that point.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal Beresford.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘Oropesa, 3d August, 1809.

‘Since I wrote you the letter which goes with this I have received a letter from General Cuesta, which gives me reason to believe that it is possible that Ney may be with Soult; and he so far thinks that Victor will be of the party, that he breaks up from Talavera, leaving there my hospital, and follows me.

‘Under these circumstances, it is difficult for me to say what I shall do.

‘The Spaniards will certainly retire across the bridge of Almaraz, and in that case, with Ney and Soult before me, and Victor, and probably the King, behind me, I cannot go to Plasencia.

‘However, if I find my front weak, that is the line I shall take; and I wish you to be prepared to stand behind Soult if he should be alone. If Ney should be with him, you will do best to go with your army, as soon as you can, to Castello Branco, and defend the passes.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal Beresford.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Oropesa, 3d August, 1809.

‘Notwithstanding the anxiety which I felt, the pains which I took, and the assurances which were given to me respecting the security of the Puerto de Baños, General Cuesta received intelligence yesterday morning, that the French corps which had threatened that point had passed through unopposed, and had entered Plasencia on the 1st, at about 2 o’clock.

‘I had at last prevailed upon the General to detach a sufficient corps to defend the Puerto, which marched yesterday morning; but after the evil was done, he became equally sensible with myself of the important advantage which had been gained by the enemy, and he came to me to propose that half of the army should march immediately to set the matter right again. I told him that if by half of the army he meant half of the Spanish and English corps, I could not consent to the proposal, and that I would either stay or go

with my whole corps. He then desired that I would choose, and I offered to go.

‘ My reason for this preference is, that I think that I shall effect the operation, probably without contest, in a shorter time than he could, and with much more certainty; and that I can bring to bear upon this point, not only all the Spanish troops in the neighborhood, but the Portuguese army, which are collected not far from Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ It is possible that the enemy, who by last night’s accounts appeared to be occupied by Sir Robert Wilson’s appearance again, near Escalona, may not hear of my departure before I shall be upon my return; or, what I think more probable, from his movements towards Escalona, and his having Victor’s head quarters at Maqueda, that he intends to re-enter Estremadura that way, despairing of success by the way of Talavera: thus at the same time to turn that position, and give a hand to Soult, who, I conclude, will endeavor to advance by the Tietar.

‘ If, however, I should be mistaken in this conjecture, and the enemy should discover that I am gone, and should move upon General Cuesta in full force, he must only retire until he shall again join me.

‘ In the meantime, with all these movements, we are horribly distressed for provisions. The soldiers seldom get enough to eat, and what they do get is delivered to them half mouldy, and at hours at which they ought to be at rest.

‘ I enclose to you the copy of an intercepted letter which Sir Robert Wilson sent to me this morning. I am induced to suspect that it was put in his way purposely. The senator who was at Vitoria on the 21st, with such important intelligence, would have been at Madrid long ago, and we should have heard of his arrival. There are rumours, however, among the deserters, of the preliminaries of peace having been signed.

‘ Believe me, &c.

The Right Hon. J. H. Frere,

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General O’Donofu.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Puente del Arzobispo, 4th August, 1809.

‘ I have received the letter containing General Cuesta’s congratulations upon the honor conferred upon me by the

Government, and I beg that you will do me the favor to congratulate his Excellency upon the honor conferred upon him.

‘I beg you, at the same time, to inform him, that not having found any good position on the right of the Tagus, and having heard that he had ordered his army to pass the river, I have ordered that under my command to pass the river likewise. If he should be attacked before we should make our ulterior dispositions, it would not make half an hour’s difference: I wish, however, that the General would carry into execution the plan agreed upon this morning, and fall back on the Tagus.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major General O’Donoju.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Puente del Arzobispo, 4th August, 1809.

‘I wrote to you yesterday a letter, which I now send to you, since which time the appearance of our affairs has changed for the worse.

‘After I had written to you, I learned that the enemy had arrived at Naval moral, by which movement he acquired possession of Almaraz, and that the bridge at that place was destroyed by the Marques de la Reyna, who had retired thither from Baños.

‘Shortly afterwards I received a letter from General O’Donoju, in which he informed me that the French corps which had entered by Baños consisted of 30,000 men, being composed of all the troops which had been in the north of Spain; and that General Cuesta, being apprehensive that I was not strong enough for them, and moreover, having reason, from the contents of intercepted letters and the reports of Sir Robert Wilson from the neighborhood of Escalona, to apprehend that the enemy intended to press upon my rear, while I should be engaged in front, and that he should be cut off from me, had determined to march from Talavera yesterday evening.

‘Thus my security was gone, and nearly 1,500 of my wounded soldiers were left behind. It then became a subject of serious consideration what I should recommend to the General to do. We could not regain the ground of the bridge of Almaraz without a battle, and, in all probability,

we should have had to fight another with 50,000 men before the bridge could be re-established, supposing we had succeeded in the first. We could not stand at Oropesa, where we were, the position being but an indifferent one, and liable to be cut off, by Calera, from this place, its only point of retreat.

‘ I preferred and recommended the latter : First, from a consideration of the losses which we, the English, must have sustained in these successive contests, without the chance of being able to take care of our wounded.

‘ Secondly, from the consideration that if it were true that 30,000 men had been added to the French forces in this part of Spain, it was quite impossible for us to act upon the offensive. A diversion must be made in favor of the armies in this quarter, by the movement of some other body towards Madrid, which will draw off a part of their forces to oppose it, and then we may resume the offensive.

‘ Thirdly, in order that these operations and battles should be successful, it was necessary that the marches to be made should be long, and made with great celerity. I am sorry to say that, from the want of food, the troops are now unequal to either the one or the other ; and it is more than probable that Victor would have been upon our backs before the first action between Soult and me could have been concluded.

‘ Upon the whole, therefore, I am convinced that the measure which I have advised is the wisest, and likely to lead to the best, if not to the most brilliant, result.

‘ As usual, General Cuesta wanted to fight general actions. Now that all the troops are removed from Castille, Romana and the Duque Del Parque ought to be directed to make some demonstrations towards Madrid, which would now relieve this front. I understand that, besides the 50,000 men, there will be a corps of 12,000 employed to observe Venegas.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. J. H. Frere.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Marshal Beresford.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Mesa de Ibor, 6th August, 1809.

‘ After I had written to you on the 3d, and I had fully considered our situation, I thought it best to retire across the Tagus, by the bridge of Arzobispo, to take up the line of that river, and to move the British army as soon as pos-

sible, to secure the passage of Almaraz. Soult arrived that day, at Navalmoral, and had therefore possession of the road to the bridge, which was either taken up, or, if not taken up, the enemy might have destroyed it. I was not certain that Ney was not with Soult; and I was certain that, if not with him, he was at no great distance from him: we should, therefore, have had a battle to fight to gain the road to Almaraz, for Plasencia was then out of the question; and if Victor had followed Cuesta, as he ought, most probably another battle before the bridge would have been re-established with the whole French army, and, if unsuccessful, I should have been obliged to retire over one bridge, supposing that I had been able to re-establish the bridge at Almaraz at all.

'Then it was to be considered that Cuesta, having left Talavera, the bridge of Arzobispo was open to the enemy's enterprise; and if he had destroyed it, and we had failed in forcing Soult at Navalmoral, we were gone.

'To all these considerations, add that it was evident to me that we must take up the defensive, if Soult and Ney were come through the Puerto de Baños; and although you will believe I gave up with reluctance the fruits of our victory, and of all our toils and losses, I did not hesitate, and do not repent that I crossed the Tagus at Arzobispo; and your letter has confirmed my opinion of the propriety of that proceeding.

'I should have written to you sooner, only that I considered my second letter of the 3d to be likely to keep you in safety, which was all I wished for; and I did not like to trust a second letter to the chance of falling into the enemy's hands.

'I propose now to take up the position of Almaraz, to give my troops some rest and some food, both of which they want, and to see what the enemy will do. My opinion is, that they will invade Portugal, in order to draw us away, and you will do well to put yourself in a situation to defend the passes.

'I am concerned to hear of the desertion of your troops. Is there no remedy for it? I was sure that the Commander in Chief's decision upon my letter would induce all the Officers to quit the Portuguese service.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Marshal Beresford.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major General O'Donaju.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Deleytosa, 7th August, 1869.

‘I arrived here this morning. The whole army has passed over the worst part of the road. One division is still at Mesa de Ibor; but all the artillery is by this time at Campillos. The advanced guard is upon the Tagus, opposite Almaraz. I have sent an Engineer to look at the river, to examine and settle what defences it will require, which I shall have constructed forthwith; and I will replace the bridge. I shall want some Spanish artillery, of heavy calibre, however, to arm these batteries; and for this, as for other reasons, I would recommend to General Cuesta, to take early measures for sending the greatest part, if not the whole, of his heavy artillery through the mountains, as soon as he can, as well as his Valencian and Catalonian carts, which travel through these mountains with great difficulty, and can be of no use to him where he is.

‘I shall this day, if I can get it copied, or to-morrow, send you a report on the Tagus, from the bridge of Talavera to that of Almaraz, from which you will see an account of the banks, mill dams, and fords.

‘It would appear from this report, that the enemy would not find it difficult to throw over the river some light infantry, between you and us, which we might find inconvenient in the interruption of our communication, if in nothing else; I therefore recommend to you to have a division of infantry at Mesa de Ibor, if only with the object of keeping up the communication between the two armies; but I have also observed that this is a very strong post indeed, and in case of any accidents upon your right, it would effectually secure your retreat.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major General O'Donaju.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To His Grace the Duke of Richmond.*—[vol. iv. p. 355.]

‘MY DEAR DUKE,

‘Oporto, 22d May, 1809.

‘I have just returned from the most active and severe service. I have been on the pursuit, or rather chace, of Soult out of Portugal. We should have taken him if Silveira had been one or two hours earlier at the bridge of Melgaço, or if the Captain of militia of the province had allowed the peasants, as they wished, to destroy it. We should have taken his rear guard on the 16th, if we had had a quarter of an hour's more daylight; but, in the dark, our light infantry pursued by the road to Ruivães instead of by that of Melgaço. But as it is, I think the chace out of Portugal is a *pendant* for the retreat to Coruña. It answers completely in weather: it has rained in torrents since the 12th.

‘I am now moving the army as fast as possible to the Eastern frontier, by which a corps of Victor's army has entered. I hope soon to be able to force them out also. Remember me most kindly to the Duchess.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*His Grace*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

the Duke of Richmond.’

To His Grace the Duke of Richmond.—[vol. iv. p. 436.]

‘MY DEAR DUKE,

‘Abrantes, 17th June, 1809.

‘I have been waiting here ever since I wrote to you last, for money, and to give the troops some rest after the marches they had had to the northward. The money is arrived at Lisbon, but has not yet reached the army; and I shall be ready to march in a day or two.

‘In the meantime Victor has retreated, I conclude, upon hearing that we have arrived upon the Tagus.

‘The Spanish army crosses the Guadiana this day, and when I move I shall march upon Plasencia. I rather believe that Joseph must evacuate Madrid.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*His Grace*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

the Duke of Richmond.’

* This and the following letters were inadvertently omitted according to their respective dates in this edition, although they had been forwarded to the Compiler, by His Grace the present Duke of Richmond, in time to have been so inserted. They are therefore placed at the end of vol. iv., as relating chiefly to the events detailed therein.

To His Grace the Duke of Richmond.—[vol. iv. p. 531.]

‘ MY DEAR DUKE, ‘ Talavera de la Reyna, 25th July, 1809.

‘ We formed a junction with the Spanish army under General Cuesta, on the 20th, at Oropesa; and on the 22d our advanced guards drove in the enemy’s outposts at this place. We were to have attacked him in his position on the Alberche yesterday morning; but Victor retired in the night, and is gone towards Toledo, I believe, to join himself with Sebastiani. Whether they will offer us battle again when joined, or will retire to the northward, I cannot tell. We have certainly closed upon Madrid on both sides, with Venegas’ corps of 20,000 men at Arganda, and Sir Robert Wilson’s Portuguese and Spanish corps of 4000 at Escalona; and I think the question whether they will offer us battle or not depends upon their means of defending Madrid without the assistance of their main army. I think, however, that, with or without a battle, we shall be at Madrid soon: and I think it best for the Spaniards that they should never fight any general action.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Grace*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

the Duke of Richmond.

To His Grace the Duke of Richmond.—[vol. iv. p. 544.]

‘ MY DEAR DUKE, ‘ Talavera de la Reyna, 29th July, 1809.

‘ You will see the account of the great battle we fought yesterday. Our loss is terribly great. Your nephew is safe. His horse was shot under him on the 27th. Almost all my Staff are either hit or have lost their horses; and how I have escaped unhurt I cannot tell. I was hit in the shoulder at the end of the action, but not hurt, and my coat shot through.

‘ Tom Burgh’s son was hit by a cannon shot in the arm, but, what is extraordinary, not much hurt.

‘ I will enclose a plan if I can get one; but I send you a memorandum which will throw some light upon my dispatch.

‘ Tell Lady Edward that I received her letters, &c. last night, and gave them to Lord Edward, who is very well. Remember me kindly to the Duchess and all the little girls.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Grace*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

the Duke of Richmond.

To His Grace the Duke of Richmond.—[vol. v. p. 3.]

‘MY DEAR DUKE,

‘Deleytosa, 8th August, 1809.

‘Since I wrote to you last the enemy have introduced a large corps, supposed to be 30,000 men, into our rear by Baños and Plasencia; in consequence of which, and of a train of mismanagement by the Spaniards, we have been obliged to withdraw, and to take up the defensive line of the Tagus. I have desired Lord Castlereagh to send you a copy of my dispatch and its enclosures, if he should not publish it, which will make you acquainted with every thing. We were in a bad scrape, from which I think I have extricated both armies; and I really believe that, if I had not determined to retire at the moment I did, all retreat would have been cut off for both.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*His Grace*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

the Duke of Richmond.’

To His Grace the Duke of Richmond.—[vol. v. p. 66.]

‘MY DEAR DUKE,

‘Truxillo, 21st August, 1809.

‘Starvation has produced such dire effects upon the army, we have suffered so much, and have received so little assistance from the Spaniards, that I am at last compelled to move back into Portugal to look for subsistence. There is no enemy in our front of any consequence: Ney is gone back into Castille; Soult is at Plasencia; Mortier at Oropesa, Arzobispo, and Navalморal; Victor’s corps is divided, being half of it at Talavera, and half in La Mancha with Sebastiani. They cannot say we were compelled to go therefore by the enemy, but by a necessity created by the neglect of the Spaniards of our wants.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*His Grace*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

the Duke of Richmond.’

To His Grace the Duke of Richmond.—[vol. v. p. 147.]

‘MY DEAR DUKE,

‘Badajoz, 13th September, 1809.

‘I have received, and thank you for, your letter of the 18th of August. I am glad that you were satisfied with our battle, and I hope that you will have been so with our subsequent operations. I find that my dispatch of the 8th August did not get home, in which I gave an account of the

causes and circumstances of our retreat across the Tagus, a copy of which, with its enclosures, I desired might be sent to you; but I have sent a duplicate of it this day, and a copy of it will go to you. Pray observe in Jourdan's letter to Soult the accurate knowledge the French had of all our movements. I have since heard that they had messages going between them and their spies in the Spanish army throughout the days of the 27th and 28th; but this I can scarcely credit. Soult says that we are covered with glory; but that if we had remained two days longer we must all have been prisoners; and I am afraid we must, or have been destroyed.

'The army are recovering, and we shall be in high order again. The French have done nothing for the last month, and I believe meditate nothing, excepting possibly the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, the success of which I shall prevent if the Spaniards will hold out for a few days.

'Lord Edward has been unwell for some time: he has been living with me, and is now much better. He has had the common dysentery, aggravated by a slight fit of the gout. The latter has gone, and the former is getting better every day.

'The last accounts I had of Lord Chatham were of the 20th August. He had then I think gone the full length of his success. It was impossible to make any head on the continent against one army collecting in his front, and another in his rear in Holland.

'Pray remember me kindly to the Duchess and Lady Edward, and all the children.

'Believe me, &c.

'*His Grace*

the Duke of Richmond.

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

'P. S. I send by this occasion a plan of the battle of Talavera, which is not very correct; but it will serve to give you a notion of it.

'A. W.'